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5 May.
H. H. u. St. A.
England, f. 1.
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The Ambassadors in England to Margaret Of Savoy.
After I, Marnix, reached London May 2nd, we consulted on
my charge. We were not able to see Wolsey until today. We
told him what you were able to do to assist the English army
which is to land at Calais, that is to say that you could send to
join them two thousand horse and four thousand foot with twelve
pieces of heavy artillery, by May 15th. Wolsey refused brusquely,
saying that we offered too little, and that the English, who were
only making war to please the emperor, would have fifteen
thousand men in the field and a train of siege artillery. He said
that to reach an agreement we must furnish at least three thousand
horse and eight thousand foot and half the artillery, munitions
and wagons ; the English would then furnish fifteen thousand
infantry and agree to take the field by June first. We replied
as best we could, pointing out the great expenses which the
emperor was bearing, and those which the Low Countries had
already borne because of the great extent of the frontiers we had
to defend, and because of the war with Gelderland. Wolsey said
that Henry was making war only to please the emperor ; he had
been very comfortable before the war, and his expenses last year
had been very heavy. This year, he said, there were costly
preparations against the Scots and it was rumoured that the king
of Denmark, who has a powerful fleet in Zeeland, intends to
cross to Scotland, marry his daughter to the king of Scots, and
assist him against England. Nevertheless, if we would furnish
three thousand horse and five thousand foot and half the artillery,
etc., without fail, Henry would furnish fifteen thousand troops
and the rest of the artillery. Also, it should be agreed to spend
at least fifteen days besieging Boulogne. He wished us to come
to terms with him in this fashion at once.
We replied that we were not authorized to increase the number
stated and asked him to be content with it. He then advised
us to write you at once, saying that Henry would not be satisfied
with less than three thousand horse and five thousand foot as he had
said. Therefore, Madame, as the emperor has this affair much at
heart, as he has written to me, de Praet, we thought best to send
this courier at once.
It seems to me, de Praet, that, since, as the emperor has written
me, he is sending M. Môqueron with letters for a hundred thousand
crowns to raise more troops, our offer might be increased to three
thousand horse and five thousand foot, in order to meet the
wishes of the English, We should consider that, unless some
notable exploit is performed by this army, the expense for it
would be useless.
It has been proposed to me, de Praet, that if the English grant
our present wishes, the "Great Enterprise" shall be postponed
until 1525. I do not know whether the emperor will consent, or
whether the English will insist if you agree to their present
request. I can say nothing on this point without orders from my
master, to wait for which would consume a good deal of time.
Nevertheless, we shall do our best to achieve the emperor's
wishes. A prompt reply from you will be most helpful.
London, 5 May, year '23.
P.S.—We have an appointment to see the king tomorrow, but
Wolsey says we must not hope for a different reply from him
from that we have already received. We shall not therefore
delay this courier.
Signed : Loys de Praet and Jehan de Marnix. To Madame.
Copy. French. pp. 3. |
8 May.
H. H. u. St. A.
England, f. 1.
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Louis De Praet to Charles V.
As I wrote on March 18th, I have no doubt that the bishop of
Badajoz has fully informed your majesty of the state of affairs
here up to the date of his departure, so that I shall not repeat his
news.
On March 26th Bernardino de Bertolotti arrived here with
briefs from the pope and the college of cardinals to the king and
Wolsey, exhorting them to accept a peace or truce, and commanding
them, on the obedience which all Christians owe the see
of Rome, to send an ambassador to the papal court empowered
to conclude a truce for at least three years, during which time a
lasting peace might be arranged, and Rhodes and the other
recently captured places be recovered from the Turk. Wolsey
is sending copies of these briefs to the English ambassadors at
your court for your information. I had several conversations
with Bernardino ; he told me that the pope had addressed similar
briefs to your majesty, and hoped that you would not make
difficulties. Bernardino had also presented similar briefs on his
way through France and found King Francis inclined to be quite
reasonable. In fact, Bernardino said, the pope had reason to be
very pleased with Francis on account of the good reception he
had accorded papal messengers, and his prompt obedience.
Francis, he said, had sent the necessary powers to Rome two
months ago, and shown greater conformity to His Holiness'
wishes than any other Christian prince. By talking in this
fashion to Wolsey, Bertolotti has drawn such suspicion on himself
that the cardinal will not trust him to take the English answer
to Rome, but is sending it instead by Dr. Clerk.
Two couriers from Spain reached here on March 31st with your
letters from Valladolid of Jan. 11th, Feb. 7th, and March 8th.
I am somewhat puzzled by their contents. In your letter of
February 7th your majesty seems quite inclined to a truce, and
sends me powers to be shown the king of England and then
forwarded to the duke of Sessa at Rome, provided Henry agreed
to send similar powers to his ambassador. In the same letter
there is a power to reach agreements with Henry either about a
joint invasion from the side of Spain by May first, or for separate
invasions by each of you as you find convenient. In your most
recent letters, those of March 8th, your majesty seems entirely
bent on war, and orders me to try to persuade Henry to put the
greatest army possible in the field against the French. There is
no word in this letter about powers for the duke of Sessa, and I
have been in grave doubts whether I should speak of them to
Wolsey or not.
To describe matters in the accustomed order, I notified Wolsey
immediately on the arrival of the couriers, but, since it was
Holy Week, I was unable to have audience with him until Easter
Sunday after dinner. I then gave him your letters and he seemed
very pleased, particularly by your majesty's wish that your cordial
regards be given to the princess, your future empress. At these
words he was marvellously rejoiced. When he had read all the
letters Wolsey began to complain that someone must have been
slandering him to your majesty, since in spite of all the efforts
he had made to preserve this alliance and friendship, the English
ambassadors with you were no longer received as of old, and
people in Spain seemed very cold to him and to his king. I said
that he must not lightly credit such reports, and that when he
had heard my charge he would see that the contrary was true.
I then told him that your majesty had sent payment of the
pensions, with excuses for their delay. Wolsey took this in good
part, especially since the money was ready, and asked me to
have de Berghes send it to London so that he might receive it.
Wolsey then began to speak to me of my charge, saying he
understood that your majesty was now quite bent on war,
particularly since the taking of Fuenterrabia, with other remarks
which showed me that he had been informed by the English
ambassadors of the greater part of what I had to say. Therefore,
although I had first decided to conduct myself according to your
most recent letters without mentioning the earlier ones, fearing
that I might otherwise thwart your majesty's real desires, particularly
since Wolsey already seemed inclined favourably to the
pope's proposal, I now decided to conceal nothing of my various
charges since in your last letters you had not expressly commanded
me to suppress anything and since Wolsey, informed by his own
ambassadors, might otherwise conceive some suspicion. Therefore
I told him the whole contents of all of your letters, but in
such a way as to make it clear that your chief desire was to
continue the war this summer.
Wolsey replied that what I said agreed exactly with what his
ambassadors in Spain wrote him. He thought it strange, however,
that he had not been told sooner of your plans for war. It was
very late now, he said, for Henry to get together a large army to
attack the French, since he had so far expected to do nothing of
the sort, but to bend his main efforts against Scotland in order
to be ready for the "Great Enterprise" next year. Wolsey also
said that he himself believed firmly that, in view of the fall of
Rhodes and the great danger to Naples and Sicily from the Turks,
your majesty would change your mind and be willing to agree to
the pope's proposal. I answered as well as I could, trying to
persuade him to the main effect of your majesty's letters, so that
he promised to think over the whole matter and to undertake
that Henry would conduct the war according to your wishes as
far as was possible. He appointed the following Tuesday for me
to have audience with the king.
On this day, after I had delivered my charge at length, Henry
himself replied. He said my charge was so long, and contained
so many different articles, that he could not reply to everything
at this time, but he was willing to speak to some of the principal
questions.
In the first place, he said, the Bourbon conspiracy had been
too long drawn out, and the secret badly kept. English spies
advised him that Bourbon had come to terms with King Francis
and was to marry Madame Renée, so that there was no more hope
of him. Even if Bourbon persevered in his desire to serve your
majesty, the king said, he, for his part, would not promise him
any money, for after he had received payment from your majesty
and the king, he might go back to the French, so that your money
would only help Francis to make war on you.
To what your majesty wrote about the war this summer, Henry
replied substantially as Wolsey had done. He added that he was
surprised that you had changed your mind so suddenly, for
according to what Badajoz and I had been telling him all winter,
he had understood that your affairs in Spain would not permit
any important operations against the French this year. Moreover,
his ambassadors had written on February 6th that your
majesty had expressly told them that you would not be able to
put into the field this summer more than the ordinary Spanish
gensdarmerie, that is to say 1,700 men-at-arms equipped in the
Spanish fashion, with one horse to each lance, nine hundred light
cavalry, and about three thousand foot. In proof of this Henry
insisted on sending for his ambassadors' letters and showing me
that they had written as he said. Henry said your majesty
had taken him off guard, and that it was no small matter to set
on foot an army capable of a serious invasion of France. He had
a good many complaints on this subject, caused, I think, by his
feeling ashamed that your majesty had taken him unprepared,
after all he had told us last winter of his great plans, both on the
side of Scotland and on that of France, by land and by sea.
Henry also took it very ill that the fleet, which your majesty has
fitted out in Biscaya to sweep the sea in those parts, has not come
to join the English in the Channel, as, he said, it ought to do
according to the treaty, and he repeated his complaints that the
whole burden of the war rested on him, reminding me how little
Lescano had done on account of his lack of provisions and payment,
and of the slight assistance which the English had received
in Flanders.
To all these complaints I replied as best I could. I pointed
out how much might be hoped from Bourbon, and how unwise it
would be to lose so great advantage for lack of a little care. I said
that if he sent his powers to the ambassadors in Spain, it was
not necessary to assume that any of the unfortunate consequences
he predicted would follow, since the ambassadors could use their
discretion and act, or not, as prudence dictated. I tried to persuade
him that he ought not to take your majesty's requests
about the war this summer in bad part, and said it seemed to
me that you could not have acted more sincerely than in telling
him openly the whole state of your affairs. You had always
pointed out the advantage in pressing the war vigorously this
summer, and the disadvantage of giving the enemy a breathing
spell. You had not thought to take him unaware, since no doubt
you relied on the report of Jehan de le Sauch, and on our letters
of January 20th, in which Badajoz and I had described the great
English preparations by land and sea. In view of these, you
must have hoped that Henry would be willing to seize the present
opportunity (since the conquest of France was a greater affair
than that of Scotland), and would be glad to employ all his
power against the common enemy, postponing the Scottish war.
At least, I suggested, Suffolk and his army might cross the sea
without any danger, either joining with the troops in the Low
Countries, or invading France without them if that seemed better.
I advanced all the arguments in your majesty's letters, and Henry
finally promised to think things over and give me his opinion
through Wolsey both on this point, and on the rest of my charge.
By Wolsey's advice, I also spoke to the king about the indemnity,
asking him in your behalf to raise the money at your expense
for a year. Henry replied that he really could not say anything
about this, and that Wolsey would discuss it with me. I replied
as gently as I could to the king's grievance that your navy in
Biscay had not joined his in the Channel, since I did not wish to
irritate him and impede more important affairs. I said that
considering everything, especially the great expenses which your
majesty had sustained for so long a time in this war, you did not
appear to have failed in anything agreed on by treaty except the
indemnity and that on this point you wished to offer present
satisfaction, This was the substance of our negotiations that day.
The next day I went promptly to see the cardinal, to hear
what the king had decided, for I had been informed that after
he saw me he had at once held a meeting of the council to discuss
my charge, and his answer to the pope. I found the cardinal in
quite a different frame of mind from that of the past weeks, and
strongly decided to follow your majesty's wishes in the matter
of the war. He told me that the king, having considered what
I said and the reports of his ambassadors, found it impossible to
comply entirely with your request, since there were only twenty-two
days left until the beginning of May, which was too short
a time to form so large an army. Moreover, not expecting such
a request, Henry had made all his preparations to invade Scotland,
and was still determined to finish with the Scots this season, for
there was not a man in his council who would advise him to cross
the sea in person as long as Scotland remained unconquered,
Also, even if Henry were ready to invade France at once, there
was no assurance so far what help could be expected from
Flanders, your majesty's envoy with the hundred thousand
ducats to pay the troops not having arrived. Nevertheless, to
show his love for you and his desire to please you in everthing,
Henry had decided to make ready a strong army with artillery,
to invade France by the beginning of June, provided that Madame
would equip in Flanders as large a force as possible of horse and
foot, the joint army to besiege Boulogne or Thérouanne, or to
go farther into France if that seemed desirable. He asked me,
therefore, to write Madame at once to find out what power she
could furnish, so that an agreement could be reached promptly
on the number of troops and artillery which Henry should supply
for the common army. Wolsey did not neglect to remind me
that your majesty was very much indebted to Henry for this
good will, and that he, himself, had done his utmost to persuade
the king, his master, to an invasion this year. He added that,
although he (Wolsey) had sometimes spoken to me frankly and
sharply about our common affairs, I should not believe he did
not have them at heart. He assured me that all his life he
would remain your majesty's servant, and would maintain the
work he had done, which was the alliance and friendship between
you and the king of England, with many other fine words for
which I thanked him, saying that he would not find your majesty
ungrateful. The time appointed for the mobilization of the
common army seemed to me a little late, since a part of the good
weather would already be over, nevertheless, because I was
afraid the negotiations in Flanders would take a long time, since
I had no news of what Madame would be willing to do, and
since, even if the two armies were ready at once, the cavalry
could hardly keep the field until the end of May for lack of forage,
I raised no objections but sent a courier at once to Madame.
About the proposals brought by Bertolotti, Wolsey said the
king had decided that, to meet the pope's wishes and let him
know that neither of you was an enemy to peace, Dr. Clerk
should go to Rome, within two days, with ample instructions,
and powers to treat, jointly with the duke of Sessa, for a truce
or peace. Wolsey showed me Clerk's powers, which were quite
similar to yours, except that the preamble was based on the
capture of Rhodes and the consequent danger to Christendom,
as you may see by the enclosed copy. In view of Clerk's imminent
departure, and because this matter was a subject for joint
negotiation only, Wolsey then asked me to give Clerk your
majesty's powers, addressed to the duke of Sessa and carefully
sealed. He promised that Clerk would guard them safely, and
deliver them to Sessa as soon as he reached Rome. I did as he
asked, since there seemed no harm in complying, and refusal
might have aroused his suspicions. In my opinion, the sending
of these powers to Rome may turn out to be very helpful to
your enterprise this summer. Dr. Clerk will not be at Rome
before the beginning of July ; he is not the man to travel fast,
and he is charged to stop in Flanders on his way, and also to
have audience with the duke of Milan, with whom he will remain
for some days, communicating with Pace, and with the princes
of Italy. During this time your armies by land and sea, in Spain
and Italy, and the army of the king of England, in conjunction
with your troops in Flanders, can assail the enemy stoutly and
continue their attack without giving the pope the least cause to
complain, since the powers he asked for are being sent to his
court. Also your majesty may write your pleasure to the duke
of Sessa, and instruct him as you please, for, in view of your
apparent wish to press the war this summer, I did not state the
terms contained in your letter of February 7th very clearly, in
order not to dampen Henry's and Wolsey's enthusiasm for the
war. Indeed, I feel that Wolsey is much inclined to follow the
pope's lead, especially since, to win him over, His Holiness has
continued Wolsey's legation in this kingdom for another five
years, and sent him the bulls for Durham almost without charge.
These things are very much to Wolsey's personal honour and
profit and the real way to his heart. I did my best to find out
what terms Henry wants to make about peace or truce, but the
cardinal put me off, promising to tell me before Clerk left, and
to give me a copy of his instructions to send you. Clerk left this
town on April 13th, taking with him your power addressed to
the duke of Sessa.
It has been impossible to reach a definite agreement about the
army for Flanders this summer without further information from
Madame, whom my dispatches did not reach until the third of
this month. Meanwhile, I tried my best to keep Henry and
Wolsey and the other lords of the council in a good humour,
especially since for a good many reasons I have felt that this
king and his council were not much inclined towards your plans,
having decided to push the war with the Scots to a conclusion,
while your majesty kept the French too busy for them to be able
to give any help to Scotland. It seemed to me that we might
be sorry for any further delay in the pensions, so, as Lalemand
suggested, I approached certain merchants in this town who, for
a small charge, were willing to find the money for the bills of
exchange for 8,500 crowns. I used this money to pay the pensions,
and I am sending you receipts from the lords to whom
they were paid.
While I was still waiting for Madame's decision and instructions,
on April 28th, during a conversation with Wolsey, he
showed me a papal brief dated April 7th, a copy of which he is
sending to his ambassadors to show you. The tenor of this
brief was the same as the former ones on the subject of a truce,
but in addition the pope informed the legate that your majesty
had sent the duke of Sessa a power to treat about peace or truce,
forbidding him, however, to use it until the king of England had
sent a similar power to his ambassador, so that the two of them
might treat jointly. His Holiness also wrote that, in his opinion,
King Francis had been brought very low, and despite the high
tone he had taken so far, refusing to agree to any truce unless
Milan were restored, he would now agree to a truce on condition
that each side should retain what it now held, castles and strong
places in dispute to be placed, during the truce, in the hands of
the pope. The language of the pope's letter indicated that he
is beginning to be aware of French intrigues, and that he will
willingly declare against them in case they refuse reasonable
terms. Wolsey seemed very satisfied with what the pope wrote,
except that he gave me to understand by indirection that he
was somewhat taken aback that you had sent powers to Rome
without his or his master's knowledge, and thought it strange
you should send one power here to show the king, saying that
it would be used or not as he advised, and send another to Rome
without Henry's knowledge. I hastened to make what excuses
I could for fear this incident should be used to justify their
coolness toward the war. I said I hoped they did not believe
your majesty had intended to negotiate anything without their
knowledge, since according to the pope's own letter, the power
you sent was useless unless the English ambassador had a similar
power, and, even if the pope's information was entirely accurate,
the fact that your majesty had sent your power on this express
condition, showed that you did not wish to contravene the
treaties in any way. Henry and Wolsey conceded that your
majesty had not in any way violated the treaty, but they said
that, in view of the sincerity and frankness of conduct they
had always found in you, they found the information in the
pope's letter strange.
On April 30th the Sieur de Montfort, Jehan de le Sauch, and
Richard the courier arrived in London with your letters of March
22nd, replying to the messages Henry and Wolsey sent you by
Beaurain, and to what Badajoz and I had told him when he last
passed through this kingdom. Montfort and I agreed, on consultation,
that it would be better for him not to seek an audience
with Henry, but to go on at once to Flanders, leaving me to
make his excuses.
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On May 2nd I called on Wolsey, presented your letters, declared
my charge, and made Montfort's excuses. Wolsey replied
little to the purpose during that interview, saying that he would
have to talk to the king first. He interrogated me sharply about
Spanish affairs, asking whether the nobles and commons of those
countries were really obedient to you and whether your preparations
by land and sea were really so great as I had told him.
He gave me to understand that Henry and he had information
to the contrary. After this conversation he took me to Henry,
who said he had read your letters and considered my charge.
Since it seems of great importance, I shall set down his further
reply, word for word, as nearly as I can :
"Ambassador, I have considered the messages you gave me
from the emperor about the war this summer, about the indemnity,
and about the Bourbon affair. As to the first, as I have
already told you, the emperor's request has come too late, nevertheless
I shall comply with it as far as possible without more
delay than may be necessary to find out what co-operation
Madame can offer. When I know that, I shall be ready to put
in the field 15,000 English infantry, a good number of cannon
with the necessary munitions, under the following conditions :
First, the emperor shall maintain in Spain, Roussillon, the
Mediterranean, and the Bay of Biscay the forces he has described.
Second, since to please the emperor I am putting off
my invasion of Scotland for this year, he shall, in return, consent
to delay the 'Great Enterprise' until May, 1525. I may tell
you frankly that if I send an army into France this year, I shall
not be ready for the 'Great Enterprise' next year. Although
I am now treating with the estates of this kingdom, and expect
them to grant me the largest sums of money ever granted in
this kingdom, it will be impossible to have all this money in hand
for almost two years. Third, since last year Hesdin was besieged
at Madame's request, this year the joint armies shall
besiege Boulogne for at least fifteen or twenty days, during which
time I hope it may be captured. If it is not, the allied captains
may then consider what use to make of the rest of the season.
Fourth, this year there shall be no such safeguards as there were
last, and the troops shall burn all the enemy's country, even
places belonging to the emperor's subjects, if they are not strong
enough to be defended, so that it may not happen again as happened
last year, that as soon as our army breaks up, the French
are able to capture castles and strong places, and do great damage
to our territory.
To be frank with you, I am informed that affairs are not
going as well in Spain as the emperor writes and that he will
probably not be able to carry out the plans he has outlined.
If this happens I shall have been betrayed ; the chief cost of the
war will fall on me alone, and this without hope of any considerable
victory ; my prestige among my own subjects will be seriously
impaired, and my treasury exhausted, for there is no prince
in the world who makes war at such great cost as I. I am also
concerned because the gentleman whom the emperor was to send
with a hundred thousand ducats to pay the troops in Flanders
has not yet arrived. I am therefore sending at once a special
ambassador to explain my plans to the emperor, and to say that
if he persists in his present intention, there will be no failure on
my side, but that I do not think we shall be able to do anything
much this year.
Please write the emperor what I have told you, and ask him
to be more open with my ambassadors henceforward, without
changing what he tells them from day to day. It seems to me
that he should choose one road or the other and keep to it.
I feel sure that he is now so strongly inclined to war, only in
the hope of taking Fuenterrabia. I understand, also, that the
emperor has been told I am trying to take advantage of our
common affairs for my own profit, which is false.
Since the emperor has the Bourbon affair so much at heart,
I am sending my ambassadors in Spain the instructions he asks.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, nothing will come of these negotiations,
for Bourbon has already been reconciled with the French
government by marriage with Madame Renée, and there is no
misunderstanding between him and the king except, perhaps,
on account of his refusal to marry Louise of Savoy, who is very
much in love with him.
"As for the indemnity, as I have already told you and the
bishop of Badajoz, I am astonished that the emperor has not
been more careful to keep his agreements, since I undertook
this war for love of him, and have borne its expenses out of my
own treasury. My people know that the emperor owes me this
indemnity and believe that it will be paid ; they may not help
me in the war unless it is. Moreover, the French may legitimately
complain that I broke my alliance with them because
they defaulted payment, but continue that against them although
the emperor does the same. If I were the councillor of any prince,
I should advise him to keep his promises."
Hereupon Wolsey began to speak, saying not less than the
king had said, and adding that this question of the indemnity
touched no one more closely than him. Default would make
him lose all his credit with his master and with the lords and
people of this kingdom, who had agreed to abandon the French
alliance only on his assurance that the indemnity would continue
to be paid. Henry said, bitterly enough, that this was true.
I replied as gently as I could, reminding them that matters
often moved so fast in war time that elaborate precautions were
hardly feasible if they expected to make a good war this summer,
and if they insisted on refusing to put their army in the field
without first having news of your envoy, and knowing about
your preparations in Spain, and receiving your consent to putting
off the "Great Enterprise" to 1525, summer would be
almost over, and your majesty would be left all this season
unable to make either war or peace, which was the thing most
likely to work your ruin. I begged them, therefore, not to delay
the invasion of France, assuring them that their envoy would
find your majesty's preparations satisfactorily advanced, but I
could not persuade them to change their minds. I thanked Henry
for what he said about Bourbon, and asked him to agree to pay
half the expenses, but he would give me no final assurance, and
would only say that he would tell me more in a few days. I advanced
the best arguments I could about the indemnity, reminding
them of the expenses your majesty had to bear, and of your offer
to pay the interest if they wished to borrow the sum in England,
but this they refused. I then begged them to have patience for
a short time while I wrote your majesty for further instructions,
but Henry was very impatient and said this was a matter which
should be settled at once. I did not wish to say anything further
on the subject to Wolsey in Henry's presence, but afterwards
I reminded him of his conversation with you at Bruges, when
you made the first treaty. He said he had no recollection of it,
and I am sure it is something he does not wish to remember.
I could not make final arrangements about this summer's
campaign without hearing from Madame, and she kept writing
me that the answer would come on the arrival of her treasurer,
Marnix, who would inform me of her intentions. Marnix finally
reached here May 3rd, charged to explain to Henry and Wolsey,
jointly with me, the assistance that the Low Countries could
offer in troops and artillery. Although I might have felt somewhat
in disgrace on account of Marnix' mission, since it seemed
to indicate that Madame had little confidence in me, I did not
wish to make any difficulties, and felt that Madame had meant
well, taking my insufficiency into account and also, as for several
reasons seemed probable, wanting to find out what really was
being negotiated about a peace or truce, since she seems to have
learned from the English ambassador on his way to Rome of the
sending of your majesties' powers there. Since Marnix' arrival,
therefore, I have always communicated with Henry and Wolsey
in his company, and I shall write no more here of our negotiations
about the campaign, leaving these matters to the joint letters
which we shall soon write you.
I trust your majesty has been able to gather from this letter
the state of your affairs here, and the assistance you may expect
from the English, which, in my opinion, will be as much as is
laid down in the treaties and no more. Henry's and Wolsey's
present language, their excuses, and the difficulties they are
making, all seem to mean that they are trying to avoid putting
the army you ask for into the field so that they may make an
end to the Scots this season, since they are on such terms with
Scotland that Henry could not otherwise cross the sea to invade
France according to the treaty. The payment of the indemnity,
and the repayment of the loan will be a heavy burden for your
majesty, but there is no doubt the English will insist on it before
Henry makes a personal invasion of France. I greatly doubt
whether Henry will give much help in money in the Bourbon
matter, and I think his pleasant offers proceed from his certainty
that the whole business will come to nothing. I have been unable
to persuade them to alter their former decision about the negotiations
with the Swiss, which was that, as soon as Pace had
finished in Venice, he would be sent to assist the papal and
imperial ambassadors in Switzerland by his advice, without
promising any money. Henry and Wolsey approve the idea
that the archduke Ferdinand should stay in Wurtemberg this
summer to prevent the Swiss and Germans from serving the
French king, and that he should raise an army there, but they
will make no contribution to assist him.
On the whole, I find your majesty's affairs here very perplexing,
and I can see no means whereby your majesty can
persuade the king and the cardinal to make either a good war
or an honourable peace. The obstacles they have raised will
delay their invasion of France until after July first, even if your
majesty agrees to the postponement of the "Great Enterprise,"
and meets all their other objections. If they then begin by
besieging Boulogne, it is to be feared that the whole summer
will go by with little or no profit, in which case your majesty may
be sure that they will throw all the blame on your army in the
Low Countries and on Madame as they did last year, and perhaps
on your majesty also, thus excusing to their own people
the expenses of the war, and endangering your reputation in
this kingdom.
As to a truce, as far as I can understand from the cardinal's
words, Henry will drag matters out as long as he can, at least
until he knows the result of his efforts against Scotland. It is
consistent with this view that Henry has instructed Clerk that,
although His Holiness wishes to arrange peace among all Christian
powers, the Scots should not be included, since they are
his rebels and disobedient subjects. Clerk has been given certain
ancient documents to show His Holiness, documents which seem
to prove the truth and legality of the English contention. Even
if Scotland is conquered, I doubt very much whether Henry will
really assist the negotiations for a truce ; he will rather let
himself be besought by you on the one hand, and by the French
on the other, in order to increase his own reputation, and to be
able to say that he would never have agreed to make peace
except at the earnest solicitation of your majesty and the pope.
This he can do easily enough, since the war between King Francis
and yourself cannot last many years without the total destruction
of one of you, and the great enfeeblement of the other, while the
English, if they can avoid the "Great Enterprise," will be put
to little danger or expense, since their territory on the continent
is so small. You and Francis, on the other hand, have such long
and open frontiers that defensive warfare is as costly as offensive,—
but your majesty knows all these things better than I. Although
I wrote you that I was sending the receipts of the lords to whom
pensions were paid, I am keeping them with me at present, for
I have not been able to get receipts from the marquis, or the
admiral, or Compton, who are on the Scottish border, as Badajoz
will have told you. The copies of the papal briefs and other
documents Wolsey is sending by the English envoy of whom I
spoke, one Jerningham, a groom of the bed chamber, an
honourable gentleman, formerly English ambassador in France.
The king, the queen and the cardinal have been in London
since April 13th and there is no news yet of their intention to
depart. They are treating daily with parliament for supplies
and hope to bring the matter to a good end. Some days ago the
king sent to the Tower a bishop of this kingdom and some of his
adherents because, as the story runs, they have been in correspondence
with Richard de la Pole, called "White Rose." It is
said that a hundred thousand crowns in gold for the furtherance
of this intrigue were found in the bishop's coffers. I cannot tell
you what truth there is in the rumour, since neither Henry nor
Wolsey has said anything about it and it did not seem becoming
to ask.
London, 7 May, 1523.
Signed, Loys de Praet. French. pp. 31. |
8 May.
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Eng., f. 1.
|
The Ambassadors in England to Margaret Of Savoy.
Yesterday I, Marnix, received your letters of May third and
communicated them to de Praet. This morning we went together
to Wolsey to tell him that the citadel of Milan had been taken,
and, on this account, the Low Countries were threatened by the
French, and to ask him that, while the English army was being
made ready, a sufficient number of troops be sent at once to help
guard the frontiers, since he had said himself that the English
would not be ready before the end of June, during which time
many things could happen. We also told him of the arrival of
the king and queen of Denmark and their children, and of what
the king of Denmark had said to you, and of the perplexed state
in which you found yourself, and asked his advice on this point.
Wolsey replied that there was no use talking about further
assistance in guarding the frontiers ; there were two thousand
English troops at Guines in fulfilment of the treaty, and no more
would be sent until their army crossed. He again asked us to
increase our force, as we have written. Even if we meet the
English terms, it seems to us that things can hardly turn out
well, because they insist on three further points not in our power
to concede : first and most important, that the "Great Enterprise"
be postponed for a year ; second, before their army
crosses, they intend to send an envoy to the emperor to see
whether his preparations are as far advanced as he has said, a
point on which they insist, we suppose, because of something
written by Master Boleyn ; third, they wish first to take Boulogne,
and after that Thérouanne or whatever the captains may decide.
Moreover, they say the army will not be ready until the end of
June. So it seems very difficult to manage matters as you and
the emperor wish. We shall do what we can, however ; a
prompt reply from you will be of great assistance. When such
a reply arrives I, Marnix, should like to withdraw, for I am of no
use here.
Wolsey said he supposed the king of Denmark must have come
for one of three reasons. He may have been driven to do so in
order to ask aid against his subjects, and in this case it is unlikely
that he would be up to mischief, although the safe-conduct he
was asking for partly discredited this supposition. Or he might
have come with malicious intent to complain that his wife's
dowry had not been paid, and to make unreasonable demands,
the refusal of which he would avenge by a descent on the Low
Countries with his fleet. In this case he should be treated
gently, and delayed with the excuse that you were sending to
the emperor. During this time he would consume his supplies,
and not be so capable of doing harm. Or he might have come
to leave his wife and children on account of some quarrel, and
to go with his ships to France or Scotland to make war on the
emperor and the king of England. In this case the emperor and
the king of England would have to unite their fleets and attack
the Danes. He asked us to write you at once, and added that
it was unnecessary to speak to Henry about the king of Denmark
since he had already been informed by the English ambassadors.
He also said in connection with the king of Denmark that if the
straits of Dover were unsafe, not an English soldier should cross,
by which you may see how slight is the confidence we may have
in these people.
We said nothing about the safe-conducts because they were
not mentioned, but we shall be ready to discuss them if the
subject arises.
We have twice discussed the question of Hungary with the
cardinal. He has promised to take the matter up with Henry,
but it would be better to approach him through others than
through us, for reasons which I, Marnix, will tell you when I
return.
London, 8 May, 1522 [sic].
Copy. French. pp. 3. |
9 May.
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Eng., f. 1.
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Margaret Of Savoy to the Ambassadors in England.
We have received yours of May 5th and do not find what
Wolsey told you very hopeful. He fails to consider the great
expenses being borne by the emperor and by us, and that we can
furnish no more than we are granted by these countries. As I
told you, Marnix, before your departure, the war here must be
conducted according to the grants of the estates, and the number
of the gens d'armes d'ordonnance. We have offered to get
together as many men as possible in order to assist the English,
leaving our frontiers very lightly protected. Should you agree
to increase the number, we could not possibly furnish the troops.
It is better not to rely too much on Môqueron's mission, since
we do not know when he will get here, or how much money he
will bring, though we understand that it will be less than at first
stated, since a part will be used to raise the lanzknechts which
Montfort will take back with him to Spain. We understand that
Môqueron is to spend this money according to instructions the
nature of which we have not learned, so that should we promise
anything, relying on him, we might fail in it, to our great shame
and confusion. We hope, however, that he will stop in England,
so that you may learn the details of his mission and tell Wolsey.
You may say to Wolsey that he knows that were it in our power
to furnish greater assistance we should do so gladly. If he
wishes to follow the route set forth in your instructions, or to
attack Thérouanne, a part of the frontier garrison could be sent
to join him, and our cousins, de Buren and de Gavres will order
the people of the country, to the number of ten or twelve thousand
infantry, to be ready to assist the army if necessary. According
to this plan, the supply of provisions would also be much easier
than it would be around Boulogne, as you know, since that town
is too far from our frontiers. There is hardly any likelihood that
Boulogne will be taken according to the opinion the English
themselves, the officials of Calais and other servants of Henry,
expressed to de Buren last year. Such a siege would certainly
be unprofitable from our point of view, and would play into the
enemy's hands.
Therefore you, Marnix, will follow the course laid down in my
earlier letters ; you will stand on your earlier instructions and if
there is no hope of agreement on those terms, you will advise the
emperor to that effect, and seek to have some additional English
troops to help guard our frontiers this season. As for artillery,
we can furnish that described in your instructions, with the
necessary munitions, pioneers and wagons, and for the rest
things should be managed as they were last year, some wagons
provided, and the rest hired, but expenses should not be in
common, since the English costs are always higher than ours.
Only the emperor can decide about the postponement of the
"Great Enterprise" until 1525. The king of Denmark does not
appear to have any intention of going to Scotland. He will be
here tomorrow, and we will let you know what he says. We have
already written you what we know about his coming, and told
the English ambassador the same thing. We have heard nothing
further.
So far, the estates of Brabant have not been willing to grant
anything, but we hope that they will end by consenting, and we
are going today to Bois-Le-Duc with our cousin de Buren to get
the consent of that town. It seems to us they are only haggling
to gain time in England. You should press for some kind of
agreement, for the season is already well advanced, and it will
be impossible to be in the field before half the summer is past,
so that the whole campaign will be no longer than three months,
and little will be done, just as it was last year.
Malines, 9 May, 1523.
Signed, Margaret ; countersigned, des Barres. Copy. French.
pp. 3. |
