Spain: September 1524

Pages 384-394

Calendar of State Papers, Spain: Further Supplement To Volumes 1 and 2, Documents From Archives in Vienna. Originally published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1947.

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September 1524

Sept. 11.
H. H. u. St. A. England, f. 1.
Louis De Praet to Margaret Of Savoy.
I have received your letters of September 4th and those which M. de la Roche wrote me from Rome, and communicated both to Wolsey. He burst out with unbelievable fury to the pope's ambassador and to me, and plainly declared that he wished no other but his master and himself to have the honour of negotiating peace. He would not listen to a truce, and swore a great oath that he would never consent to one, and would rather have his tongue cut out than advise one. This seems to me very bad news, since I can see no remedy for the present state of affairs in Italy except a truce, as I have written to M. de la Roche.
As to the English invasion of France, Wolsey told me he had instructed Jerningham to inform you that the king did not intend to order his army to cross the Channel unless Bourbon marched on Lyons. This is very bad news. God grant that things may be going better than I fear. Since Gregory Casale came here, there has been no further news of Bourbon's army, which is very disturbing.
London, 11 September, 1524.
Signed, Loys de Praet. French.
Sept. 11.
H. H. u. St. A. Belgien DD Abt. B. f. 8.
Louis De Praet to Seigneur De La Roche.
Your letter of August 22nd arrived very opportunely while the papal envoy and I were at Windsor. We went at once to Wolsey and told him as much of it as seemed likely to serve our purpose. He grew very heated, and began to utter his customary reproaches of the pope, the emperor, the grand chancellor, and the viceroy of Naples. These latter, he said, were the cause of this overture for a truce, and he added flatly that the king and he would not agree to any truce, long or short, even if Bourbon's army were defeated and all Italy in danger. He said, how truthfully I do not know, that he was informed that in making this truce the emperor intended to charge the duchy of Milan with two hundred thousand ducats a year, one hundred and fifty thousand to repay the king of England, and fifty thousand for Bourbon, who would thus be enabled to go to Spain and marry the emperor's sister. These and other charges equally unlikely he made in the presence of the papal and Milanese ambassadors, who will no doubt report them. He also said that since matters were handled thus, Henry would rely entirely on the execution of the "Great Enterprise" next May, according to the treaty of Windsor, and if the emperor did not do his part therein, he would be breaking his oath to the treaty, and Henry would take measures accordingly, and if he was obliged to make war alone, he hoped that he was strong enough to do so. In spite of everything we could say, Wolsey continued to pour out similar threats. Finally, however, he grew calm enough to say that if the pope could begin negotiations for a good peace and induce King Francis to offer terms satisfactory to the emperor and to his king, so that the general peace conference could be held, he would willingly go there to represent Henry. Meanwhile an armistice could be granted.
In my opinion, however, all this talk is meant only to colour his refusal of the truce, and I am more and more of the opinion which I last wrote you, i.e. that Wolsey wishes the honour of conducting all the negotiations himself, and is bending all his efforts in that direction. If he persists in this, it seems to me that Bourbon's army, and all Italy, will be in grave peril, for there is little likelihood of successful peace negotiations without a preliminary truce. Yet I hesitate to advise the emperor to negotiate separately with the French, anticipating English action. Whatever the French offer him, he can hardly trust them, and he may fall into still graver dangers. Jehan Jockin is still here, and in daily touch with Queen Louise, and we cannot find out anything about what is being negotiated, for Wolsey says no more about it than if Jockin were not here. I fear he will lend Jockin a more favourable ear now than formerly. Also I have learned that not a single English soldier will cross the sea until Henry is sure Bourbon will march through Auvergne on Lyons. I do not know whether that will be possible, and even if it is, it will be the end of this month before Henry can be notified of Bourbon's decision, and the end of next month before the English army can be in France, and by that time the weather will be too unfavourable for campaigning. On the whole, I do not think there will be any English invasion of France this year, whatever they say. What is worse, they have sent Bourbon only 150,000 crowns, which must be nearly all spent now, and the cardinal shows no disposition to send any more money. He will excuse himself, I suppose, by the viceroy's failure to send the promised reinforcements, which Wolsey now maintains should be entirely at the emperor's expense. In fact, it looks as if the emperor would have to support the entire expense of Bourbon's army, which he can hardly do without ruin, particularly if Henry insists upon the execution of the "Great Enterprise" next year. But I am not wise enough to offer my advice in these matters.
London, 11 Sept., 1524.
P. S.—I should not omit to say that Wolsey exhorted the papal envoy to urge the pope to contribute, at least secretly, to the defence of Italy, and to summon the Italian princes to contribute, according to their former agreements, 300,000 crowns to the defensive league. In doing so, Wolsey certainly did good service, but he spoiled everything at the end by breaking out into his accustomed threats, and saying that if the pope did not do as he advised, King Francis would invade Italy and make the pope of as little account as a poor chaplain. He added that it was in Henry's power to reinstate Francis in Italy whenever he liked. I have no doubt the papal envoy here will report this strange language.
The English ambassador in Rome, the bishop of Bath, is not helping matters. He writes the strangest little fancies in the world, and often makes things seem a great deal worse than they are. For instance, he recently wrote to Wolsey that the pope almost compelled him to agree to a two years' truce, saying that he would answer for the king of England's consent, and also when the French ambassador did not wish to speak first, the pope had tried to get him to do so. He also wrote that Pace had sent him word not to consent to any truce for Bourbon's campaign was going very well, and the truce was a French practice.
The papal envoy here thinks that, notwithstanding all Wolsey's protests, he will send the bishop of Bath powers to conclude the truce. Certainly that would be a reasonable course, for should the emperor lose Italy, I cannot see what the English could expect to gain, unless they abandon him and ally themselves with his enemies, which is hardly credible. I do not think, however, that Wolsey has sent any powers yet ; he has his own plans about the negotiations too much at heart.
Signed, Loys de Praet. French. pp. 6.
Sept. 20.
H. H. u. St. A. England. f. 2.
Charles V to Louis De Praet.
We have received your letters by Richard, considered them carefully, and are grateful for your prudent advice. Continue in your present line of conduct and send us frequent news.
Although the English ambassador here has had no general instructions from the king, his master, he has come to us, acting on a private letter, and told us news of Scotland, substantially the same as you wrote, and spoken in general terms of the unofficial negotiations with France, assuring us that the king and the cardinal will observe the treaties scrupulously.
We replied graciously, without showing we had information from you, that we were glad Henry's affairs, which we regarded as our own, were going well in Scotland, and had no doubt that Henry and Wolsey would observe the treaties as we always intended to do. We said the king and the cardinal knew we had always refused to enter into separate negotiations with the French, and had always sent them copies of all communications with the enemy, and we thought they ought to do the same, as no doubt they would. We felt confident they would have no secret practices with the French, particularly now the whole affair had been placed in the hands of the pope, to whose arbitration they should submit all their differences.
In speaking to Wolsey, you will conform to the tone of our reply to the English ambassador. Point out to him amicably that the light-hearted fashion in which he has continued to keep Jehan Jockin in England has considerably damaged our affairs and reputation, particularly since he has gone so far as to arrange for the coming of Robertet or Villeroy. The news has reached Rome, and run through all Italy. We could have retaliated by similar actions had we wished, for the French have made us many separate offers, but if Queen Louise had sent to us, as Wolsey told you she was going to do, we should never have granted the envoy a safe conduct, without first informing Henry and Wolsey.
We have known for a long time of Wolsey's desire to get the negotiations into his own hands, but everything has now been committed to the pope. You must dissimulate your suspicions, and say, as of your own motion, that it would prejudice the common cause to display any distrust of His Holiness at this time, but Wolsey may be assured that we shall show the love and confidence we bear him at the appropriate time. So far there is no news of the coming of the archbishop of Capua, except that the pope will send him as soon as His Holiness has heard de la Roche, who ought to reach Rome by the middle of August.
Contradict flatly Jockin's tale about the intercepted letters from the archduke Ferdinand. We have received duplicates, as well as originals, of all the archduke's letters, and there is no mention in any of them of any such matter. It is true that the French are spreading this rumour in Italy to arouse the duke of Milan's suspicions, but he has complete confidence in us, and we shall treat him in a way with which he will be entirely satisfied.
We have no doubt that you have frequent news of our army in Provence, and know that Francis is moving south to hearten the garrison at Marseilles. Point out the importance of the present crisis to Wolsey, and show him how necessary it is that Bourbon's army be maintained in order to bring the French to reasonable terms. Solicit the English contribution to the army as urgently as you can, according to our last letters.
Do not mention the "Great Enterprise" unless Wolsey speaks of it, and then reply, as if without instructions. It is not in our power to execute the "Great Enterprise" next year, but you must not say so, and you must seek to refer all negotiations here. Try to persuade Wolsey not to press for the payment of the indemnity and the loan at the present time, and assure him that England will lose nothing by the delay. We shall try to pay the pensions to Wolsey and the others as soon as possible, and your back salary will not be forgotten.
We should have been glad to prefer the brother of Dr. Jerome to the bishopric of Malta, but he claims it in virtue of provision by the pope and we have the right of patronage in that bishopric as king of Sicily and have bestowed it elsewhere. We shall be glad to prefer the person to some future vacancy. Tell Queen Catherine that the son of her physician shall have the first suitable vacancy, and beg her to excuse our failure to reply in our own hand to her letter. For some days we have been ill of a quartain fever ; we are now somewhat better, and, even when the fever is most intense, it does not trouble us too much, while on other days we are able to attend to ordinary business, and we hope soon to be entirely well. Be sure to give this news to Henry and Wolsey, lest our enemies attempt to make capital out of misrepresenting the seriousness of our illness.
Our Germans have now reached the frontier of Languedoc, where the enemy have gathered in considerable force to oppose them. We are eager to send them to reinforce the army in Provence, although that army seems strong enough, and the only danger now is lack of money. We have had very good news of the army's progress, but your news should be later than ours.
As to the marriage of our sister, the queen of Portugal, to King Francis, you may say that we have never even heard it spoken of, except as a rumour current in France, and give our solemn assurance that we shall never do anything contrary to the treaties. Valladolid, 20 September, 1524.
P. S.—Since writing the above we have received a courier from the pope, who came by land through France, and one by sea, from the duke of Sessa. The papal courier brings news from France, a copy of which is enclosed. Both couriers bring the announcement of the death of M. de la Roche. We have provided that our other ambassadors in Rome shall have the power to act just as if he were present. The conference of ambassadors at Rome has already agreed for the passage of couriers by land, a copy of the agreement is herewith enclosed to be communicated to Henry and Wolsey. If they accept it, they and we will have fresher news of Italy, and be able to keep in closer touch with the pope. Given as above.
Draft. French. pp. 6.
Sept. 28.
H. H. u. St. A. England. f. 1.
Louis De Praet to Charles V.
I wrote last on August 31st. On September 8th, with a view to learning Henry's final decision, I went to Windsor, where the king and the cardinal were that day receiving the Rose sent the king by the pope, with very solemn ceremonies. After these ceremonies, the king, at Wolsey's instigation, I believe, began to make great complaints to me about your majesty. He said from the beginning to the end you had not kept one of your promises to him, and in acting so you would lose your reputation among princes. He said you had done so to a great extent already, and the German princes were talking of making the duke of Saxony king of the Romans, and would not stop there. He fell to abusing your majesty's ministers, and said you were so badly advised that no one would trust you, and it would have been better had you never undertaken such heavy commitments and such adventures, but been satisfied with what your ancestors had left you, at least until your realms were in some good order. He required me to write this to you, and said he would also instruct Dr. Sampson to speak to you at length on the subject, as a father should advise his son.
I replied as gently as I knew how, and indeed in the course of the conversation I could not see that Henry bore your majesty anything except good-will, as far as he, personally, is concerned. But it would be a mistake to rely too much on this, for this king is always changeable, always agreeing with the cardinal, and, in fact, always whatever the cardinal wishes him to be. As for Wolsey, he does not seem so fond of your majesty as he used to be.
After these preliminaries the king and the cardinal began to speak of the invasion of France, saying definitely that their army would not cross this season unless Bourbon passed the Rhone and marched on Lyons, and Jerningham would recruit no German infantry until Henry was assured of Bourbon's plans. They said they had spent too much for the benefit of other persons, and they would be careful not to do so in future. All my arguments could obtain no other answer, and the king dismissed me, saying Wolsey would tell me his further pleasure. This the cardinal would not do at once, but gave me an appointment for three or four days later.
The following morning, just as the papal envoy and I were leaving Windsor, I received a letter from M. de la Roche, dated August 27th, recounting his negotiations at Rome about a truce, and asking me to get the cardinal to send a power to the English ambassador there to conclude a two years' truce. Copy of the letter enclosed. Although I was sure this news would be unwelcome to the cardinal, I decided to go to him at once, accompanied by the pope's envoy, who had received, by the same courier, letters from the archbishop of Capua, substantially the same as mine. Capua added that he found the French ambassador, the count of Carpi, so favourably disposed that he did not doubt, if the English ambassador would join the others, truce could be concluded in three days. Capua ordered the envoy here to urge this strongly upon Wolsey, particularly since the pope was informed by Pescara and other persons in Bourbon's camp, that the duke and his army were in danger of being completely destroyed, thus endangering all Italy. Capua also wrote that he was leaving for France within a week, and would go from there to Spain and thence here, to arrange the peace conference. He said Francis had written very graciously to the pope to inform him that he would soon be in Italy with a great power, and to tell him to fear nothing, for he would be honourably treated, and the Adorni would be left in Genoa if he wished, and he would send one of the French princes, his sons, to Rome as security for his good conduct, with many other soothing words to which the pope would give no ear, being determined to continue to work for peace among all Christian princes.
The papal envoy and I each gave Wolsey our news in a separate interview, and he then replied to us jointly, in the presence of the Milanese ambassador. At the beginning he grew very warm against the pope and your majesty, and against the chancellor and the viceroy of Naples, as the persons who were responsible for this talk of a truce. He said that your majesty and the others were so fearful for Italy that you took no account of the interests of the king, his master, and were willing to make a truce very disadvantageous to England which had conquered nothing in this war, and lost what it had peaceably possessed. As for your majesty, he said, you had reason enough to desire a truce, for you had conquered all Italy, Tournai, and Fuenterrabia, all of which you expected to retain, so a truce was as good or better than a peace as far as you were concerned. Wolsey persisted in this bitter tone until the end of the interview, as your majesty may see by the enclosed copy of my letter to de la Roche. I fear Wolsey's obstinacy and vainglory will be the ruin of Bourbon's army, after which the enemy will certainly not make peace, and your majesty and the king of England will both be the losers. At the end of our interview Wolsey drew me apart and said, as if it were a great secret, that he was informed that the pope's efforts for a truce were inspired by the French, and the pope was of their party and preferred their rule in Italy to that of the Spaniards ; this is quite contrary to what he had said a little before, and seems to be intended merely to create suspicion between your majesty and the pope.
On Saturday, September 17th, I called on Wolsey by appointment. It happened that the courier had just brought Madame's reply to Jerningham, a copy of which is being sent you, and I spoke first of this matter to Wolsey. He said in a quarrelsome tone that it was now easy to see that Madame had no desire to please the king in anything, since she was only willing to furnish the troops in question according to the terms of the treaty, that is to say, for only two months, when it was notorious that the English army could hardly be in France before the end of October. If disaster overtook Bourbon's army, Wolsey said, a part of the blame would rest on your majesty, because Lannoy had not sent the expected money and reinforcements, and the rest of the blame on Madame, who had refused to assist Henry when he wished to come to Bourbon's aid. I hardly knew what to reply ; it was clear that Wolsey was trying to shift the blame for any possible failure onto your majesty, so as to excuse himself to his king, but if I replied as he deserved, I should certainly anger him, and this your majesty has forbidden. I offered what excuses I could, and pointed out that Madame did not refuse to continue her assistance to the English army after the end of December, but merely asked what Henry's intentions were about the continuation of the campaign, so that she could reply accordingly.
After a long conversation on this point, Wolsey gave me a formal reply to Madame as follows : First, Henry expects Madame to assist his army with three thousand horse and one thousand foot, paid for at least five months, counting from the day the army lands, and longer if on the expiration of this term the army seems likely to win further successes, providing,-of course, that when the time comes for the "Great Enterprise" she shall be quit of this obligation. Second, as for Madame's request that Henry furnish ten thousand English infantry and a thousand horse, and four thousand German infantry and two thousand German horse, in addition to her reinforcements, Henry refuses to state the numbers which he will bring into the field, except that he will have no German men-at-arms, but will have an army capable of offering and accepting battle. Third, Jerningham, who has returned from Malines, reports that neither Madame nor the Count de Buren will agree to the army's marching through Normandy, or by whatever route the king's lieutenant pleases, nor will they agree that Buren is to be subordinated to the English command. Jerningham says Buren expressly told him that he wished to be at liberty to do whatever he and the king's lieutenant decided was best under the circumstances, while the army was in the field. To this Henry replies that, since he is bearing the principal expense of the army, he intends that the Count de Buren or whoever may command Madame's contingent, shall be bound to obey the English commander, and all towns and castles shall be surrendered to the king of England, and all acts and proclamations shall be in his name. Fourth, Henry will not inform Madame of the date when his army will be landed in France until he knows that Bourbon has passed the Rhone and is marching on Lyons. Unless Bourbon does so, not an Englishman will cross this season.
In view of all the difficulties that Wolsey is raising, I see little hope that the English will cross this year, and am obliged to believe that, whatever Wolsey says, he does not intend them to do so, but wishes merely to throw the blame of their failure on Madame, and to use the projected expedition as an excuse for sending no more money to Bourbon. I tried to persuade him that, since it was possible that Bourbon might be unable to act as the English wished, or might see a much more favourable opportunity in another direction, he ought to send a further supply of money to Bourbon's army, to keep up the English contributions, according to the recent treaty. He said angrily that he would certainly not do so, and that no more English money would be spent to aid Bourbon in Provence, and that, unless his army entered a part of France to which Henry laid claim, he would not send him another penny. He added that Henry would base his actions hereafter entirely on the execution of the "Great Enterprise," according to the treaty of Windsor, without admitting any diminution of the armies or any further delay. He garnished this declaration with threats such as he had uttered a few days before in the presence of the papal and Milanese ambassadors. I then spoke to him about Jehan Jockin. He said at once that he had nothing new to tell me, and when I pressed him, took refuge in vague and general terms. I said I was surprised that Jockin was permitted to stay here, and Wolsey promised to send him home unless he made new proposals shortly. I suspect, however, that things are going quite otherwise than Wolsey says, for I am credibly informed that Jockin had a long conversation with Wolsey that very day, and sent off another courier in haste to France.
While I was with Wolsey, I heard the sad news of the death of M. de la Roche. It was reported in Madame's letters and also in news Wolsey had from Rome. The English ambassador at Rome wrote that the pope and the duke of Sessa had immediately informed your majesty by special courier of la Roche's death. The marquis of Pescara, the same letter said, had written asking the pope to conclude some sort of truce at once, since Bourbon's army was in grave danger. I took this opportunity of urging Wolsey to avoid the loss of so many brave men, by sending a power to his ambassador at Rome to treat for a truce, but he absolutely refused, and said that he and his master would not consent to a truce even if Bourbon's army were to be wiped out, and all Italy lost. He said the king insisted on the execution of the "Great Enterprise."
Wolsey then drew me apart and, after rehearsing his customary complaints, became more and more angry and excited, saying that he could see that your majesty had no love for him or for the king, his master, and treated them like dependants, but they would show you the contrary, for it was within their power to ruin you, not only in Italy but in all your other realms. He swore with a great oath that he wished he had broken his arms and legs when he stepped on shore to go to Bruges, and he added that, if you reduced him to desperation, he would embroil you in troubles worse than any within the memory of man. All the discredit of this affair, he said, had fallen on his shoulders, because he had tried to do your majesty service, by which weakness he had involved his master in war and great expense and loss of reputation. As he spoke there were tears in his eyes, and his face was distorted with grief. In the end he calmed himself somewhat, and begged me to tell your majesty everything he had said, saying that he would write the like to Dr. Sampson. I think you should weigh his words carefully, and if it is at all possible to extricate yourself from this war to the satisfaction of these lords, you should do so. If you cannot, you should refrain in future from promising them more than you can fulfil, and do your best to pay what is owing them. These seem to me the only ways to retain their friendship, and avoid unpleasantness in future. I can see that this is almost impossible, since there is little hope of concluding a peace without the preliminary armistice to which these lords are unalterably opposed, and it will be beyond your means to constrain the French by force, and pay all the pensions at the same time. As you can see by the recent treaties, the English want to throw the whole burden of the war on your shoulders, and at the same time oblige you to the execution of the "Great Enterprise" without any moderation of terms. I think they really take this line in order to compel you to give first place to their demands, and I do not think they would be nearly so eager for the "Great Enterprise" if they saw that your majesty was in a position to carry it out. But these matters are too high for my understanding.
When I last wrote you Wolsey reported that all was going well in Scotland. Since then I have learned from him that there have been many tumults there, stirred up by Albany's adherents, and it is impossible to know what the outcome will be. The Sieur de Bredain, who is on his way to your majesty's court, has stopped here, charged by your brother, the archduke, with some mission to this king, the nature of which he has not told me.
London, 20 September, 1524.
One of Pace's couriers has just arrived ; he left Bourbon's camp August 31st and brought me a letter from de Roeulx, which was so short and vague that I really do not know how affairs stand there. It is impossible for me to negotiate here successfully unless I have full information, but at present I am obliged to rely on what Wolsey tells me. He said yesterday that Pace wrote that Bourbon and Pescara had laid siege to Marseilles and bombarded it for some time until the shortage of powder obliged them to give over. Since then they have mined the walls in several places. Wolsey says Jockin heard that, on the 11th of this month, Bourbon had given up the siege and was in retreat. He also said that Bourbon and the other captains complained greatly of your majesty, and even more of your agents in Italy, saying they could not have managed affairs more to the advantage of King Francis had they been his servants. He said the three hundred Neapolitan men-at-arms had not arrived when Pace wrote, and only 34,000 crowns had come of the money you had promised, while the Germans had arrived late and very badly paid. Wolsey also said that, if Russell had not reached Bourbon when he did, the infantry would have mutinied. Bourbon and Pescara, he said, sent a gentleman to tell you this, and to ask you to make a diversion around Perpignan. Wolsey said, in conclusion, that, by these failures Bourbon had not only lost the opportunity to conquer a great part of France, but had been reduced to such extremity that Pace wrote the army now had to fight, not for the interests and reputation of princes, but to save their own lives. I hardly knew how to reply to Wolsey's reproaches except to say I had no information or instructions, and to suggest that, if what he said was true, the truce ought to be accepted. He said he would never consent, but added that if Bourbon was really in danger and unable to pass the Rhone, it might be well to make a truce until the end of April, and disband his army except for garrisons in the towns that he had taken. These garrisons, he said, could be paid at common expense, and by May a good army could be organized to permit Bourbon to continue his advance. Meanwhile your two majesties could carry out the "Great Enterprise" according to the treaty of Windsor.
We had considerable conversation on this point, and I think Wolsey would have been glad to have me admit that your majesty would be unequal to such an effort. I did not do so, though I did say it would be a heavy burden. Finally he said to me that, if you could not do so much, you should tell Henry frankly and in good time ; he would then advise his master that Bourbon's army next summer should be at common expense, and, in addition, you should each put a convenient number of troops in the field without leading them in person. He asked me to write this proposal to your majesty.
I can see little hope in what he has said. Such a truce as he suggests would not be to your advantage, and although a simultaneous invasion of France next May by three armies would be a good plan, it would lay almost impossible burdens upon you. But your majesty will be able to consider all these things when you hear the English ambassador.
I then asked Wolsey whether the English contributions to Bourbon's army would be continued, in case Bourbon continued to be successful but the English army did not cross the Channel. He said they would. Suspecting that these were merely words to put me off, I then asked him whether he would not send some further supply of money at once, since the 150,000 crowns already sent would be exhausted by the end of this month. To this he would not agree, alleging your majesty's failures, and saying that, even if the English army did not cross, Bourbon would not be sent a penny until it was known that your majesty had also sent him a considerable sum.
I again asked him what news there was of Jehan Jockin, whereupon he took a solumn oath that matters were still in the same state as before. He said he had recently found Jockin much more reserved, and the enemy would have to be pressed still harder before they came to reason. I do not know how matters are really going, but it is strange Wolsey should let Jockin stay here unless there is some understanding between them. Jockin is well treated, and goes wherever he likes, and lodges with Wolsey's confessor, and goes to the cardinal or sends to him whenever he wishes. This has kept up for three months and more. Moreover, I understand that however friendly Count Carpi seemed at the outset to the proposals for a truce of two years, he has since been much more reserved, refusing to show his powers, and making such excuses as may reasonably arouse a suspicion that there is some understanding between the French and these lords.
London, 28 September.
Signed, Loys de Praet. French. pp. 20.