Nov. 10.
H. H. u. St. A.
Belgien DD
Abt. B. f. 8. |
Louis De Praet to Charles V.
Before September 7th I received your majesty's letters of
August 14th and went at once to Hampton Court where I communicated
to Wolsey everything that seemed to me would serve
your affairs. He began at once to grow heated with me, saying
that he had been advised from several sources that I was fulfilling
my office of ambassador badly and making ill reports of him and
his master, which, in effect, he described as lies. He said that,
since this was so, the king, his master, would be obliged to write
to your majesty and ask for my recall, for it was better to have no
ambassador than a bad one. I replied that I had written nothing
but the truth. It was my duty to inform your majesty of the
state of affairs here according to replies given me and to add, from
time to time, my own opinion based on observation and probable
conjecture, but it would be found that I had written no untruths.
As for demanding my recall, I said, no doubt you would comply
with their wishes and I should be very glad to be replaced by
someone more competent to deal with these affairs, and more
acceptable to him. I begged him to tell me definitely with what I
was charged so that I might reply. He would not do so, but
changed the subject, and began to speak very gently to me, saying
he esteemed me like his brother, and begging me not to misunderstand
him, or to think he was doing anything prejudicial to your
majesty. He swore with a great oath that he and Jockin had
spoken of no details of a peace, but only in general of Madame's
desire for one, and that the king, his master, would never contravene
the treaties. He gave the appearance of being very
satisfied with me, and promised me that, if I continued to do well,
I would find myself highly esteemed and well remunerated.
After this prelude, Wolsey replied to the points contained in
your letters as follows. As for the contribution to Bourbon, he
said he was informed by letters from Pace and Russell, dated the
19th of last month, that although your majesty wrote that you
had sent 200,000 ducats, there had not at that time arrived more
than about 100,000, the rest of the sum having been used by the
viceroy for Italian affairs, and the costs of finance. Therefore he
held that careful accounting would show the king, his master, to
have contributed as much or more to the cost of Bourbon's army
as your majesty had, even without counting the 50,000 crowns he
had sent recently, which were now ready at Viterbo, and which
Russell had gone to fetch, so as to be ready to pay them over
should your majesty make a similar contribution. Wolsey
said he was surprised you were so strict in your bargain with the
king, his master, and that even if you did spend somewhat more on
Bourbon's army than he, that would be only reasonable, since the
campaign was principally for the benefit of Italy, and you should
consider the assistance Henry had given the Low Countries, and
the fact that you now owed nearly 500,000 crowns for loans and
for the indemnity. He said he would send no more money until
there were more signs that your majesty had sent some, and it was
not enough you had ordered the viceroy to send Bourbon 100,000
ducats, since Bourbon and Pace both wrote that the sum was to be
raised on the marriage expectations of Madame Catherine, your
sister and by the sale of charges on the revenues of Naples, both
unusual and uncertain methods of raising money. I could not
persuade him to reply more favourably, and he finally said you
need not worry about his master's money ; and that he could
assure me there would be no failure on their side.
He was pleased with your decision to embark the Germans now
at Perpignan, but declared they should not be paid at common
expense until they reached Bourbon's army, except in so far as
the pay intended for soldiers with Bourbon who had died in the
campaign could be stretched. He said Henry would not agree to
more than the half of 100,000 crowns a month, according to the
estimate Bourbon had sent here before he had invaded Provence.
Wolsey wishes me to congratulate your majesty on Madame
Catherine's marriage.
Wolsey then gave me the news he had received from Bourbon
and from Pace. On the 19th of last month, Francis' army was at
a place called Cavaillon, and showed signs of advancing. If it did
so, Bourbon was determined to give battle ; if not, to continue
his siege of Marseilles for a time, but if he failed to take it, march
against the French. He said Bourbon's letter seemed very hopeful
and showed no fear of all the power of France. Wolsey seemed
very pleased at this confidence, and suggested to me that a part of
Bourbon's army ought to winter this year in Marseilles, Toulon or
some other strong place in Provence, while the rest of it could be
dismissed until spring, at which time the "Great Enterprise"
could be carried out, or at least three armies be equipped to
invade France as I wrote in my last letter. To facilitate the
co-ordination of this plan and avoid the difficulty of communicating
by sea during the winter, he said that truce should be
concluded until next April, and he held me in conversation a
long time on this point, though he ended by saying that he would
have to consult the king, his master, before giving me a final
decision. I have written all this that your majesty can see what
help you might have expected from these people even had Bourbon
captured Marseilles. You know by this time, of course, that he
did not do so, but is in retreat towards Nice.
The news of Bourbon's retreat was first brought here by a
courier of Jehan Jockin's, who had left the French court on
October 5th and reached here on the 11th, riding post. He reported
Bourbon's army in flight, covering five or six leagues a
day, having abandoned the heavier artillery, and so closely
pressed by the French light cavalry that, in passing Toulon, some
of his troops tried to embark on Moncada's galleys, offering thirty
or forty crowns each to be taken on board. This news Jockin
spread throughout the whole town. The following day he went
to Hampton Court, and remained there four whole days. On his
return, he sent a courier at once to France. During this time I
was unwilling to go to the cardinal without being sent for, both
because of his feeling toward me, and because I was daily expecting
letters from Madame. On October 18th, Wolsey returned to
London and the following day I called on him, both as a usual
courtesy and to communicate the contents of your letters sent by
Richard Boulanger, who had just arrived. Wolsey heard my
charge and showed himself very sorry that your majesty had been
ill, though he said he hoped, according to my report and that of
Dr. Sampson's, that you would soon be better. He then began
to speak of Jehan Jockin, and said your majesty and Gattinara
had spoken very harshly to Sampson about the affair, saying
Wolsey had been negotiating with Jockin without your majesty's
knowledge and consent, and that Henry and he had infringed the
treaties. Wolsey said he was very surprised at such language,
and did not know in whom your majesty could trust if not in the
king, his master, and in himself, who had done so much to preserve
the alliance between you, and would do everything in his power
to maintain it, as the future would show. He called me to witness
that he had always sworn to me that Jockin had never gone
farther than general expressions of Queen Louise's desire for
peace and for her son's rights, and he took this opportunity to tell
me the news about Bourbon, pretending not to believe it, since
things could not have changed so greatly since his last letters from
Bourbon and Pace.
In accordance with your majesty's orders, I said I could not
believe you had spoken harshly of him, and I gave him a copy of
what you had written on the subject, or of as much of it as seemed
advisable, with which he seemed to be satisfied. I then gave
him to understand as gently as I could that he ought not to be
surprised if your majesty found Jockin's long residence here somewhat
strange, since it had been the cause of considerable injury
to your majesty's affairs through rumours spread by the French.
I said it was to be feared that, in negotiating with Jockin, he had
done his master's affairs more harm than good, for it seemed likely,
if Jockin had had nothing but generalities to say, that he had come
here to act as a spy and send Francis accurate information of the
English preparations for war, according to which Francis would
increase or diminish the army he was sending against Bourbon,
and meanwhile to lull the English with fine words so as to be
better able to deal with them after he had finished with Bourbon.
It appeared, I said, that a part of this purpose had been accomplished,
and, now Bourbon was in retreat, Jockin would be kept
here only until Francis could estimate the success of his attack on
Milan. If this went well, Jockin would be recalled, having fulfilled
his real mission, and being well provided with information
gathered from Italian merchants here about the power of this
kingdom, and other things which it was better the enemy should
not know. Wolsey replied coldly that he was quite willing
Jockin should inform King Francis of all he had seen and heard
here, and that, if he left in this fashion, he would be known henceforward
as a spy, and a man willing to do evil under the colour of
doing good. This seemed to me a very feeble answer, for, as I
told him, it would matter very little to Jockin what reputation he
had here, and he would be glad to deceive Wolsey at that price,
provided he could serve his master.
Wolsey said he would give me no reply to the rest of your
majesty's letters at this time, but would wait until we had more certain
news about Bourbon, for if Jockin's news was correct, all your
present proposals were in vain and new plans would have to be made.
On October 24th a courier arrived from Madame with news of
Bourbon's retreat, and a copy of a letter from the viceroy. I
went at once to Wolsey and tried to persuade him to induce Henry
to send some contribution for the defence of Milan, and to send
powers and instructions to Rome for concluding a truce of considerable
duration. On these points we had a considerable
conversation. Wolsey's words expressed great sorrow at the
news about Bourbon, though I could read no sadness in his face.
He said the news was the worst possible, and that it was very
strange neither Russell nor Pace had written him anything about
it. He was astonished that Francis had not let Capua go to
Spain, and thought the pope ought to be very dissatisfied. But,
when it came to the point about the contribution, he said that
they would do nothing about it, and I was unable to move him
even to permit the use of the fifty thousand crowns which Russell
has at Viterbo. He said he would rather have his tongue cut out,
than speak a single word on the subject to the king, his master ;
for the princes of Italy had behaved very badly about Bourbon's
army, and had made no contribution to it, even though it entered
Provence principally for their protection.
After much discussion, he finally promised me to move Henry
to consent to a truce at least until May, 1526, with a provision for
prolonging it if that seemed desirable to your two majesties,
although he objected that any truce would be contrary to Henry's
honour and profit, since he had conquered nothing in this war,
while your majesty would retain Italy. He put off any final
decision in the matter, however, until he had news from Pace. This
was delayed until October 31st. On that day Gregory Casale
arrived with a full account of the retreat, and I had letters from
the viceroy and M. de Roeulx, by which I understand that de
Roeulx has gone to Italy in haste to concert measures of defence,
and to discover Bourbon's opinion about the war for next year.
Copies of these letters enclosed.
As soon as I heard of Master Gregory's arrival, I went to see
Wolsey. I found him very angry ; he began at once to blame the
viceroy for not having furnished the army with money, and having
sent only half the Neapolitan men-at-arms. These, he said, were
the reasons for Bourbon's failure. I did my best to soothe him,
and pointed out that the English money also was not ready at
the place where it was needed, for cash at Viterbo was of little use
before Marseilles, but he continued to insist on his opinion, and
would not admit that any part of the blame rested with them, but
all upon the agents of your majesty and upon the Italian princes,
who had not aided Bourbon's army. Wolsey added that, since
they had been so cold in matters that might redound to the benefit
of the king, his master, he, in turn, would now abandon them in
their great need, and would not help them with a single penny. I
was unable to budge him from this decision, but he did say that a
truce now seemed very necessary, and he gave me an appointment
for an audience with the king at Greenwich on Sunday, November
6th, at which time Henry would make a decisive reply to my
requests, and also to that of the papal envoy, who had asked
again for the sending of his powers to Rome, since King Francis
had now sent his, and English co-operation alone was lacking.
On the appointed day I went to Greenwich in company with the
papal and Milanese ambassadors. After we had each delivered
our charge, Henry first spoke bitterly of the marquis of Pescara,
who, he said, had prevented Bourbon from fighting the French,
and then replied to us in very few words that it was vain to talk
to him of giving money for the defence of Italy. He would not
do so, no matter who asked him. He had been a fool with his
money up to now, he said, but he intended to be wise hereafter.
As for truce, though it was not to his advantage, he was willing to
consent to one for the common good, and to comply with the
pope's wishes as far as was reasonable. Wolsey then promised to
send the requisite power to Rome in two days. He added that he
had just received letters from Pace, dated at Milan October 22nd,
saying King Francis had arrived in person at Turin with all his
army, and was advancing rapidly in the hope of cutting off the
imperialist troops. It was much regretted that the duke [of
Milan] had taken refuge in Cremona, not daring to trust himself
in Milan. Pace wrote that Bourbon and Pescara had reached
Alexandria, and Lannoy had arrived at Pavia the same night
with seven hundred men-at-arms and five thousand foot, intending
to throw himself into Milan and defend it until he was joined
by Bourbon and Pescara with the rest of their army. If he did so,
Pace thought things might still go well; otherwise, he said, the
whole state would be lost.
After this interview Henry drew me apart and asked me to
make two requests of your majesty, in his name. First, that you
would consider favourably the petition of the audiencer about the
bishopric of Malta. He spoke very urgently of this until I told
him what your majesty had just written me, whereupon he said
he would not have you do anything which would prejudice your
right of patronage, but he hoped that you would recompense the
person in question with another bishopric or a pension. The
second request was that you would give the duke of Milan the
investiture of his duchy, for, he said, he was informed that your
delay had much weakened the duke, and diminished the love and
obedience of his subjects. He said he was writing to Dr. Sampson
on this point. As far as I can see, Wolsey takes no interest in
the matter ; he told me later that Henry's requests had only been
made at the instance of the papal and Milanese ambassadors, and
that your majesty would know what to do.
Since writing the above I have been informed that a courier
has come here to Jehan Jockin. Fusil, the bearer, also arrived
with letters for me from Madame, somewhat old, and letters to
you about the affairs of Flanders and Germany which I understand
are not going too well. Although these letters contain
nothing worth communicating to the cardinal, I took the opportunity
of calling on him to tell him that Fusil was on his way to
your majesty. I found the papal ambassador also about to call
on him, and it seemed from Wolsey's words that he was not
overjoyed at our visit. He complained of being tired, but finally
told us he had seen and read letters from King Francis to Queen
Louise which Jockin had given him, which letters reported that
Francis had pushed forward so vigorously that he had driven
Bourbon, the viceroy, and the marquis of Pescara out of the town
of Milan, although they had been occupying it with 17,000 infantry,
besides the men-at-arms. He said he had captured all their
baggage, and most of their powder and artillery, and hoped to
destroy them utterly in a few days. He asked Madame for a
present supply of money, and said she would not have to worry
about the future, for a great part of Italy would soon be his, and
the people of Milan had welcomed him with incredible enthusiasm.
He also asked her to dispatch Renche-de-Chere with the fleet to
attack the kingdom of Naples at once. This is indeed bad news,
and may have worse consequences. Wolsey seemed much
astonished, and not without cause, for he must understand that
this is a great blow to his master's affairs and will tend to diminish
the friendship between your two majesties, for if Wolsey had sent
his instructions about the truce when the papal ambassador and I
asked him to do so, none of this would have happened. We
pointed this out to him, and he had no excuse except that Pace
had always written so enthusiastically of Bourbon's successes in
Provence that he could not believe such great changes could
occur in so short a time. However this may be, in my opinion,
we should choose the lesser of two evils, and your majesty should
dissimulate with these people now more than ever, for if they
suspect you of imputing this failure to them, they may fear your
future vengeance, and combine with the enemy to keep you weak,
from which combination may follow the loss of Naples, Sicily and
the Low Countries ; while as for abandoning them and trusting to
King Francis, I fear that that would be your ruin, unless Francis
was bound to you by straight alliances of marriage. Even then,
there would be little safety, seeing that so far he has never kept
his promises to you, and his principal object is to possess Italy
in safety, for which purpose he must keep your majesty weak,
since you are the only person who could drive him out of it once
he has conquered it.
As I say, Wolsey seemed very sorry to hear the news, and asked
me to think things over until the next day when he would show
me the originals of Jockin's letters which the king was now reading,
and tell me, for your information, how matters stood between
him and Jockin. He said he would also send copies of everything
to Dr. Sampson, to prove that his king wished to act in accordance
with the treaties.
I visited him after dinner to-day, and read the originals of
Robertet's letters to Jockin and copies of Francis' letters from
Milan. The copies contain about the news Wolsey gave me, except
that they indicate that our people merely withdrew a little way,
into Pavia and Lodi,and had time to arm the citadel of Milan, as
it is to be hoped they did. If they did, matters do not seem so
hopeless, and your majesty might either arrange a truce for some
time, each side to hold what it now holds, or provide yourself with
money and friends, and, in case the truce fails, carry on the war
with some hope of victory. I realize that a truce would not be
much to your honour at this time, but considering the state of
your finances, which may not suffice to raise the great new armies
necessary, and considering that the Italian princes will probably
not now contribute to the defence of Milan or Genoa, I can see no
better hope of preserving such positions as you still hold, than to
agree to a short truce, for Wolsey is unalterably opposed to a
longer one.
After describing Francis' successful campaign, Robertet's
letter went on to say that Queen Louise was pleased with Wolsey's
overtures for peace, and hoped to aid them to the good of Christendom,
but it was quite vain to talk of the cession of French territory,
for even if the king, her son were willing to part with such
territory, the estates of his realm would not consent. A final
reply, however, was postponed until King Francis signified his
pleasure by a certain Don Andrea, Jockin's chaplain.
Wolsey then undertook to explain to me the course of the
negotiations. He swore to me on his order as presbyter, that
nothing had passed between Jockin and him, except his telling
Jockin, some time ago, that if Queen Louise wished to arrange a
peace, she must first persuade the king, her son, to restore the
territories which he unjustly withheld from your two majesties,
as for instance Guienne, Normandy and Burgundy. In return,
Wolsey undertook to arrange matters among you three for the
peace of Christendom. To this proposal Queen Louise had never
made a decisive reply, but had drawn the negotiations out until
this present response which, in Wolsey's opinion, was valueless.
He said he saw clearly that King Francis intended to offer no
compensation in lands or towns to the king, his master, and to you
unless he was constrained by force. Therefore, he said, your
majesties should remain closely united, since this was the only
means to maintain your prestige. Since the enemy now had the
upper hand in Milan, he thought it well to send powers to Rome
to accept a truce until May, 1526, each side to hold what it now
holds. To this he thought King Francis would agree, because he
lacked money, and because, as Wolsey hoped, the pope and the
Venetians would continue for some time to resist him. If, however,
Francis refused the truce, conquered all the duchy of Milan,
and prepared to march on Naples, Wolsey thought the "Great
Enterprise" should be executed according to the treaty of
Windsor, or, if it was not possible for you to carry it out in that
form, you should advise Henry at once, so that other plans could
be made. If you were unable to engage in any sort of offensive
war next year, as he feared you might be according to the news
from Spain, he advised that your two majesties stand on the
defensive until you were better provided for an enterprise befitting
your greatness, for, he said, he would never advise the king,
his master, to abandon your majesty in prosperity or adversity,
unless you gave him occasion to do so, as he hoped you never
would.
I thanked him, and asked him again to allow the 50,000 crowns
of English money now in Italy to be used in this present necessity,
and, also, to frame the powers to be sent to Rome so that a truce
for a longer period could be concluded if that seemed more practicable
to the pope and the ambassadors there. Wolsey would not
agree to either proposal. He said it was useless for me to continue
to talk about the 50,000 crowns, and that a truce until May, 1526
seemed long enough to begin with. It would allow ample time
for the proposed peace conference, and for you to raise money for
the "Great Enterprise" in case the conference failed. He said
that, if at the expiration of the time your affairs were still not in
order, the king, his master, would never abandon you, and would
then agree to a prolongation of the truce.
This is the best answer I could get from Wolsey, and I suppose
we must make the best of it. That can be done, I think, by means
of the truce. Indeed, fearing some change of this kind, I have
several times exhorted your majesty during the past six months, to
agree to a peace or truce, without too much regard for details, for
considering the tone these people have taken for the last eight or
ten months, and especially since they have been in touch with the
French, and considering the neutrality of the pope, and the plague
in Italy, it was easy enough to see that those who were able to aid
you were striving to throw all the burden of the war on your
shoulders, and those who were willing to aid you were unable,
so that it was reasonable to fear that, in the long run, you would
be unable to sustain such great expenses.
I must remind your majesty that if you wish to maintain this
alliance, you must take steps to pay Wolsey his pensions, which
he has not yet received, for in truth he does everything here, and
the king has never taken less interest in affairs than he does at
present. I have told him that your majesty would certainly
recognize his services if a favourable peace could be arranged, and
he has promised to do his utmost in that direction, provided it is
possible to obtain a truce. In fact, he has spoken to me of your
affairs with great good-will, though I cannot say with what
sincerity. I believe he has begun to recognize that I was right
about Jockin, and that instead of increasing the authority and
reputation of this kingdom by these negotiations, he has merely
given the French an opportunity to spy out the power of this
realm, which they now esteem less than formerly.
Wolsey had nothing to tell me about Scottish affairs. The
ambassadors of the Scottish king have not come here, and the
English ambassadors are still at the border and fear to cross it. I
am still of my former opinion that these lords value nothing so
much as a permanent understanding with Scotland, and are
unlikely to get one except through King Francis.
Wolsey told me of the plans proposed by Bourbon for the war
next year which, I suppose, M. de Roeulx has communicated to
your majesty. They are that the king of England should land a
great English army in Normandy, and that the cavalry to be
raised for him in Flanders and a strong force of German infantry
should enter France by way of Guise, and join the English at
Rouen. Meanwhile Bourbon, at the head of a strong army
equipped by your majesty, would invade Burgundy, and the two
armies would both march on Paris. By this plan King Francis
would either lose the strongest part of his kingdom, or be obliged
to fight both armies at once, for the two armies will be so close
together they will be able to effect a junction before Francis can
raise a force strong enough to oppose them. This seems an
excellent plan, if your majesty can manage to provide for carrying
it out, for it is likely that a number of the French nobility would,
in this case, declare for Bourbon. Wolsey will not hear of it,
however, and says he does not believe Bourbon has any large
party in France, since he has already made two attempts to raise
his friends without success. He says henceforward the king, his
master, and your majesty should rely on your own forces.
Yesterday the pope's ambassador here received letters from the
archbishop of Capua, dated at Lyons, October 29th, reporting the
French invasion of Milan, and confirming Jockin's letters, except
that he said that Bourbon, Lannoy, Pescara and their men had
withdrawn safely within Lodi and Pavia. He said that King
Francis had with him a great army which cost 220,000 crowns a
month, and indicated covertly that he did not think Francis would
be able to pay it very long. He also said that Renche-de-Chere
had gone with diligence to Marseilles, to undertake the enterprise
by sea against Naples, but at the date of these letters had not yet
left Marseilles. Capua said he had been unable, so far, to obtain
permission to leave France, but he hoped to do so soon, and would
come straight to your majesty, and go from your court to England.
This seems to me good news, for if the French let Capua depart,
it shows they are not so confident as they might be, and are still
willing to conclude a peace or truce.
London, 10 November, 1524.
Signed, Loys de Praet. French. pp. 26.
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