Spain: Appendix

Pages 547-575

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 6 Part 2, 1542-1543. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1895.

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273. The Queen of Hungary to Eustace Chapuys.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Corresp. Engl., 9.
"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—Both your dispatches of the 5th inst. and 22nd ult. have come to hand, and been forwarded by Us to the Emperor, Our lord and brother, by express messenger, in order that he may be acquainted as soon as possible with the news of that country. Should the innovations you speak of in mercantile matters take place, We Ourselves shall know how to act in retaliation; but still We should like to hear beforehand the Emperor's view on the subject. That is why We have forwarded to him both your dispatches, as well as a copy of the papers appended to them. We hope, however, that with a little patience We shall be able to make the English understand that it is their interest to leave matters as they are now, and not make innovations in trade likely to affect the merchants of both countries alike. As soon as you can ascertain what those innovations are, and what sort of measures are likely to be introduced into the English Parliament, We request you to inform Us thereof, because We are sure that if the measures are, as you imagine, injurious to the trade of these Low Countries, the Emperor, Our brother, will no doubt instantly retaliate in Spain, and the English will have to look twice before they venture upon such an arbitrary course.
The Court-master (Consul) of the English, residing in this city, called the other day on the President of the Imperial Privy Council (fn. n1) to inquire whether the Emperor, Our lord and brother, had, or had not, ordered the revocation of the edict proclaimed some time ago in these Low Countries. The President's answer was that nothing of the sort had happened; he (the President) had not heard of the edict having been revoked. He said more; he told the Court-master that it was quite unreasonable for the English to ask for the revocation of the edict unless their king consented first to moderate, if not revoke altogether, his late ordinances in matters of trade, and allow the merchants and shipowners of the Low Countries to purchase in, and freely export from, England all manner of goods and merchandise. Without some preliminary concession of this sort (observed the President), there was not the least chance of the Emperor consenting to revoke or modify the edict of which the English complained.
Hearing this, the Court-master of the English merchants replied that the King, his master, would never consent to that, upon which the President argued that English merchants ought to bear in mind that from time immemorial they had been more favoured and better treated in the Low Countries than those of any other nation in the world, nay, better than the Spaniards and the Dutch themselves, who were besides the Emperor's subjects. The English (added the President) had never been hindered or prevented from trading with these Low Countries, and although commercial treaties between nations had often been modified or altered, We Ourselves had never done this with respect to England, until the English themselves obliged Us to adopt measures of retaliation.
Unless the people of England choose to live on good terms with Us, as far as the intercourse of trade is concerned, there is no saying what mischief the recently proposed innovations may make; they may be the cause of still stronger measures being adopted on Our side as means of retaliation. Indeed, were the English merchants trading with the Low Countries to lose the privileges they have hitherto enjoyed in virtue of past treaties, there is no saying what mischief might ensue, for certainly it would be a long while before they recovered them.
We have expressly entered into these details in order that you, Chapuys, when interrogated by the Privy Council on the subject, may know what Our intentions are, and shape your answer accordingly.
And whereas the rumour which, you say, has circulated there in England of the Emperor, Our lord and brother, being on the point of ordering the revocation of his own edict, promulgated by way of retaliation, has probably originated and been spread in England for the express purpose of pleasing certain of the King's subjects, We need not tell you how expedient it will be under present circumstances to delay for a while the question of the revocation, and make in the Privy Council a solemn declaration in conformity with His Imperial Majesty's views and Our own as above stated, the more so that most likely the Emperor, Our lord and brother, has by this time signified to the Bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner) his intentions and wishes in the matter.
We therefore lay before you the above considerations that you may use your usual discretion in this affair, and, if interrogated on the subject, answer whatever you may deem most proper and convenient, and especially procure some delay; for, if you can in the meantime obtain from that king's ministers that a day be fixed for discussing the bases of a new treaty with these Low Countries, We have no doubt that We shall after all be the winners. (fn. n2)
French. Original draft. pp. 2.
19 April.
274. The Queen of Hungary to Eustace Chapuys.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P. Fasc. 233.
"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—We can fully understand the reason why you have been prevented from fulfilling the charge entrusted to you by the Emperor, Our lord and brother, in his letter of the 14th ult., owing to the English refusing to consider as sufficient the powers which We sent you in obedience to His Imperial Majesty's commands. Indeed, We should never have intervened in the matter had not the Emperor, Our brother, positively ordered Us to do so. It is, however, out of Our power at present to add anything to the Instructions contained in Our letter to you of the 31st of March. (fn. n3) Indeed, unless We hear again from Spain, (fn. n4) We cannot possibly say more about the affair. You are therefore to temporize as long as you can with the king of England and his Privy Councillors, and wait for fresh instructions from the Emperor, which cannot tarry long if, as We are informed, Monseigneur de Grantvelle (sic) has already taken his departure from Piedmont for the Imperial Court [in Spain]. You may allege this as an excuse, as well as the fact that a Spanish courier who left [Barcelona] for Piedmont, with letters for the Emperor's Lord Privy Seal, was stopped and arrested in France, and that another, who went to Italy by sea, found, on his landing at Genoa, that the Lord Privy Seal had already sailed off for Spain, in consequence of which the Imperial ambassador to that Republic (Suarez de Figueroa), without opening the letters or taking cognizance of their contents, had returned them to Spain. All these things put together have been the cause of a most lamentable delay in the business of which you have charge, as well as in other affairs concerning the government and administration of these Low Countries, so much so, that We cannot do otherwise than have patience and wait for fresh and fuller instructions from the Emperor, Our brother, which instructions, as We said above, cannot fail to arrive shortly.
On the other hand, information has reached Us that in the last English Parliament a motion has been made and carried forbidding the export of valuable woollen cloth, unless prepared, dyed and thoroughly dressed (fn. n5), which prohibition will eventually turn out to the damage of the merchants of these Low Countries, accustomed, as they are, to import English woollen cloth, have it dressed and prepared, and then sell it here or elsewhere. Indeed, the measure proposed would be so injurious to the Emperor's subjects in these parts, that instead of the closer alliance about to be contracted between the two nations being beneficial to both, there is fear of the present negotiation receiving a check through it. You shall, therefore, whilst trying to ascertain if there be any truth in the report, and letting matters remain as they are at present, (fn. n6) seize every opportunity of privately representing to some of the King's privy councillors how injurious the said measure would be to the trade of England with foreign countries, and especially with Flanders and the Netherlands, and how seriously it would affect and impede the treaty of closer friendship and alliance now being negotiated.—Brussels, 19 April 1542.
Addressed: "To the Imperial ambassador, on the 19th of April 1542, after Easter."
French. Original, entirely ciphered.
8 Feb.
275. The Count of Alcaudete (fn. n7) to the Emperor.
S. E., Africa. From Oran, where I was preparing for the expedition to Mostagan, in pursuance of Your Majesty's instructions and orders, I had occasion to write. As the river Chuquisua, owing to the late rains, was unfordable; as provisions in Oran were becoming scarce, and it would have been imprudent to place the forces under my command in jeopardy, I was obliged to come to Tremecen (Telemsen), where our friend and ally, Muley Boabdila (Abu Abdiliah), was then and is now ruling. There was still another reason for my deciding to march on Tremecen, namely, that Muley Mohamete (Mohammad) was then in treaty with Cenaga (Sinan-Aga), as Your Majesty may have heard by my preceding dispatches.
I left Oran on Monday, the 27th of January, and after two days' march from that city rain began to fall in torrents, so much so that during three consecutive days and nights it hardly ever ceased pouring. Notwithstanding that I marched till about three leagues from Tibida, where we found a good number of Moors disposed to prevent our advance and to fight. (fn. n8) On Friday, the 2nd, the enemy took up position on our rear-guard and began to attack us. Their force amounted to about 1,500 lances and seven or eight thousand foot, who, just as we were crossing a narrow pass, attacked our rear-guard so furiously as to pierce with their lances some of the horsemen in the rear. The captains in command of it were Don Martin de Cordoba, my cousin, elder brother of Andres Ponce, and Don Francisco [de Cordoba], my son; they had under them fifty lances each, besides a company of infantry composed of gunners (escopeteros) and cross-bow men (ballesteros). Seeing from the rear-guard, where I was at the time, that the Moors in large numbers were attacking our rear, I detached my son, Don Alonso, with the two companies of Don Juan de Villareal and Don Alonso Hernandez, making in all 100 lances and 200 more detached horse (hombres sueltos). This help was most opportune, for when they reached the spot the Moors were already fighting hand to hand with the Christians. An engagement took place, during which many of the former were slain before they could turn round and leave the field, which they did soon after. On our side, God be praised for it, we had only one man wounded. The battle over, we marched until we reached a spot half a league from Tibida, where we encamped.
On the following day information was brought to me that the enemy was waiting in ambush to dispute the passage of a, river in those parts, and that an immense number of Moors of this kingdom were on the other side of the river prepared to give us battle. The news was received with great pleasure by the men, sure as they were that God had given us the opportunity of obtaining a signal victory over the enemy. Having raised the tents early in the morning, and inspected the disposition of the ground, I placed my men in battle array and went on. On my arrival at the river I found the Moors were there in large numbers, cavalry as well as infantry, and so formed and distributed on both banks as to be able to attack us on four sides; yet so confident and spirited were the men when they first saw the enemy, that they begged to be led on, as if the Moors were not men like ourselves. As soon as I saw on which side the enemy was likely to attack us, I divided my small force into four squadrons. To Field-Marshal Don Alonso de Villareal I gave the command of the right and left wings, space between for the luggage. In the van-guard I placed 1,500 infantry (hombres sueltos) and 200 horse, together with 50 hackbutiers (arcabuzeros) or archers (ballesteros), this force to be under the command of Alonso Hernandez, my nephew, and Luis de Rueda, governor of Oran. In the right wing another of my nephews, Don Mendo, commanded, and in the left Field Marshal Don Alonso do Villareal. In the van-guard were the cavalry squadrons led by their respective ordinary captains, whilst the commanders of the whole force were, on the right, my son Don Alonso, with a few knights of the Military Orders (cavalleros), and on the left, the above-mentioned Don Juan de Villareal. In the centre (batalla) was another of my nephews named Don Juan Pacheco, with the rest of the cavalry. I myself, with the royal standard, rode in the midst of them, ready to help in case of need either the van-guard or the wings.
In this manner we marched to the bank of the river, which happened to be much swollen owing to the late rains. We met there a number of Moorish riflemen (escopeteros) and mounted archers. Our men, after saying their prayers, dashed into the river, which they crossed deliberately with the water up to their breasts. This was done by the infantry as easily as if they were passing the river over a bridge. With still greater ease and rapidity did the cavalry cross. Once on the other side, the men formed themselves into a squadron, charged the Moors, put them to flight with considerable loss, and pursued them to the foot of a mountain close by, where they had an entrenched camp of their own, fancying that they could prevent our passage. Meanwhile, I was on the river bank waiting until the whole force had crossed over. This being done, and perceiving that the enemy did not dare to attack us, I continued the march to Tibida, where we arrived on Saturday, the 3rd of February, at night. According to all accounts, the Moors, who tried, though in vain, to defend the passage of the river, numbered 5,000 lances, and from 13 to 14,000 foot. Their loss was considerable; we ourselves had only one man killed and three or four wounded among the very first who crossed the river.
The night of Saturday, and the following Sunday till the hour of noon, I encamped in front of Tibida,owing to my having plenty of food for the men. There was also another reason for my halting at that spot. I wanted the men to dry their garments thoroughly, and rest and refresh themselves after so much fatigue and fighting hand to hand with the enemy for three consecutive days. Sunday night was also passed in a strong camp near this city, owing to a large number of Moors having suddenly made their appearance in the neighbourhood, and to the intelligence brought by the scouts that the King [of Tremecen] intended to come out and give us battle. That very night I sent him a challenge in writing, defying him to come out and fight, but having heard that on the preceding days, Friday and Saturday, I had defeated twice the "caid" of the Benarax, (fn. n9) on Sunday night he (the King) and most of his people left Tremecen, taking away with them their wives, their sons and property, went up to the Sierra (mountains), deposited there their valuables, and returned [to Tremecen]. Meanwhile I was marching towards the city. On the road thither I met some Moors, who told me where the enemy intended to make a stand, and where the king of Tremecen, himself at the head of all the forces of his kingdom, besides 300 or 400 Turks, lately arrived from the frontiers of Tunis, and other places in Barbary, was encamped.
My preparations for the approaching battle were as follows:— I gave the command of the van-guard on the right to my son Don Alonso, and, with other captains under him, the left to Don Juan de Villareal. In the centre, with the banners and standards, I placed half the infantry, with their respective captains and volunteer gentlemen; the hackbutiers and sharpshooters (tiradores) being placed on both sides of the force, as was done at Tibida. I myself was in the centre with about 400 lances, whilst Don Mendo, my nephew, Don Alonso de Villa Real, with 1,500 men (sueltos), supported the cavalry right and left. The command of the rear-guard was entrusted to Don Francisco, my son, with seven or eight more knights (cavalleros) of the Military Orders under him.
So many were the Moors, that I dare not make a guess at their number for fear of falling short of the mark. Orders were issued for each man to do his duty in the position in which he was placed; no one was to ask for help or assistance except in cases of extreme necessity; if required they were to apply for it by means of express messengers, not verbally, for fear of the renegades in the Moorish camp, who understood Spanish, becoming thus aware of the weakest point for them to attack. The Moors, on the other hand, made also their preparations, and disposed their forces in the following order:—In the vanguard they had the standard of the king of Tremecen, with upwards of 1,500 lances of the royal guard, principal citizens, and a few of the Benarax, besides 2,000 cross-bow men (scopeteros y ballesteros), some archers, and an immense number of foot in the rear-guard. They charged us with upwards of 3,000 lances, two-thirds of whom were picked men (gente erugida) haying shields (adargas), besides 400 or 500 cross-bow men (scopeteros y ballesteros) and horse and foot. The onset was terrible, for the Moors, thinking that the right wing was the weakest point of all, had chosen it for their attack. They accordingly came on, their cavalry in front and their infantry behind. So numerous were they that I assure Your Majesty that it looked as if the small force under my command was to be completely surrounded; but, so elated were our men with their late successes, that, though the enemy was within a hackbut shot, the Christians considered themselves invincible. In this manner we marched to the foot of a mountain, where a considerable force of the enemy lay in ambush. Then and there the King's riflemen (escopeteros), with about 200 lances, charged most vigorously, as if they cared nought for our small band. A Moorish rifleman (escopetero) then rode in front of his squadron, and, coming up to the spot where Don Alonso de Villareal was challenged him to single combat. Seeing which from the place where I was, and observing that the Moor had advanced a considerable distance from his own squadron and approached our ranks, I concluded that he was about to desert his companions and turn Christian; and, yet, soon after I plainly saw him aim with his gun (espingarda) at Don Alonso, who, little intimidated by it, spurred on his horse, rode at the Moor, and slew him before he had time to apply the fire to his matchlock. (fn. n10) After this the Moors fired a volley at us; so tremendous it was that I thought they would have killed a good number of us, but God would not permit that one single man of our host should be wounded or hurt. I nevertheless pushed on with the van-guard, and saw the Moorish cavalry retreat. That convinced me, as I had suspected from the beginning that there was somewhere in the neighbourhood of that hill some ambush of the enemy. I immediately sent orders to the commanders of the force, that if they saw me go forward with the van-guard, they were to follow behind at a short distance without stopping to skirmish unless actually obliged; if, on the contrary, they saw the Moors in great number attack me in the rear or on the sides, they were to advance in order and do their best to relieve me. A similar order was sent to the centre, where the royal standard was, as well as to the rear-guard.
Having then said our prayers we advanced towards the hill, of which, as aforesaid, the Moors (escopeteros) had taken possession, but before we reached it there came out of an ambush thereabouts a body of Moorish cavalry and infantry, who charged us with great fury and courage and their usual war cries. I myself was then in the van-guard with Don Martin [de Cordoba], my cousin, and several more knights. So sudden and fierce was the attack, and the enemy so superior in number, that we had all of us to fight hand to hand with the Moors. Indeed, we were so hard pressed at one time, that had not Don Juan Pacheco, who was with the royal standard in the centre, come to the rescue with fifty lances, we should not have been able to repulse the enemy, as we did in the end.
All the men, horse and foot, as well as the. volunteers (gente sueltoa), did this day perform feats of valour such as never were heard of before. Not only did we slay on this occasion most of their captains and principal men, besides the greatest part of the Turks, and numbers of their infantry, but we pulled down two of their standards, one of which was taken, whilst the other was picked from the ground and carried away by the Moors, owing to Don Martin's horse having been killed under him.
My said cousin had slain with his own hand the Moorish standard bearer (alferez), and seized the colours, when his own horse fell pierced by an arrow. This might have proved fatal to Don Martin; had not some men come to his assistance, he himself would have been killed by the Moors. As it is he lost (as aforesaid) the standard which he had won.
The fight in the van-guard lasted for upwards of two hours and a half; in the rear-guard only three, because the enemy, finding that they could not break the rear, lost courage, and their attack on the centre was comparatively feeble, besides which Don Francisco, my son, behaved so well, that although he himself was wounded at the beginning of the fray, as well as many of his captains, the Moors could never make him retrace one single step. As the enemy's attack in the van-guard had been unsuccessful, and we were victorious everywhere, I sent to his relief two companies of volunteers (garde suelta) under Don Mendo, my nephew, and Don Juan de Villanueva, who, arriving on the spot, did great execution among the Moors with their cross-bows and hackbuts, (fn. n11) so much so that the enemy took to flight and went away. In short, after the battle my small band was in as good order of march as at the beginning.
Again on the road [to Tremecen] about 2,000 lances of the enemy made their appearance as if they intended to attack us. I sent against them a force of cavalry and volunteers (gente suelta), but the Moors would not wait; they all ran away, and one hour after not one was in sight. All the time the King [of Tremecen] was out of his capital, about one league from the spot where this last battle was fought. On the defeat of his army fire signals (ahumadas) were made to him, and he fled. Indeed, I do not hesitate to say that had I had on that occasion 1,000 lances more, and had the King dared to wait for us and accept battle, I should have gained a more signal victory over the enemy, and covered the field with the bodies of 20,000 Moors. May God be praised for his allowing me to achieve for His service, and that of Your Majesty, that which I have been desiring for so many years back, namely, such prosperous success for the Christian arms, and such an overthrow and shame for those of the Moors, that our superiority over them may for ever be established; for I do really believe that they are now completely powerless and can no longer resist Your Majesty's armies.
All the knights under my command have behaved admirably, and performed great feats of valour. There was scarcely one who did not fight single-handed with three or four Moors at a time, some of them with many more. This I can aver to Your Majesty, for being so few in number, when compared with the Moors, I had every opportunity of observing what each man did individually. Of the Christians only eight were slain, none of them of note; the wounded were ten or twelve, among them two knights (cavalleros). I hold it as a miracle that, riflemen (escopeteros) being so numerous among the Moors, not one of our men should have died from shots, and that there should be only three wounded, also that the greater part of the killed and wounded should have been from cross-bows, though the Moors had scarcely one hundred men so armed. (fn. n12)
I arrived in this city of Tremecen half an hour before sunset, and as the men were leaving the ranks to sack it, I did all I could to keep them outside the walls. That night I encamped with the whole force in an olive plantation (olivar) outside Tremecen, lest the men in attempting to sack the city should kill each other in the dark, or should deposit their arms at the doors of the houses, and the Moors should come and take them away. (fn. n13)
Tuesday morning I myself entered the city quietly (fn. n14) and without noise. After giving order that all articles of food should be collected and stored in a building, I did my best to persuade the inhabitants, who had fled from the city in the first instance, to return home and take service under Your Majesty, so as to leave matters in the best, possible order before, returning to Mostagan.
This last point once settled, I will dispatch to Your Majesty in haste my son, Don Alonso, that he may report on the whole.—From the Mexuar (fn. n15) of Tremecen, 18 February 1543.
Spanish. Draft. pp. 7.
13 June. 276. The Duke of Florence's Bond.
S.E., Italia, L.
B. M. Add. 28,492.
f. 48.
The Most Illustrious Cosmo de' Medici, duke of Florence, engages to pay to the Sacred, Imperial, and Catholic Majesty of the Emperor Charles V., king of Spain, etc., the sum of 150,000 gold crowns (scutti d'oro), the very moment that the keys of the castles of Firenze (Florence), Leghorn, Pisa, and others, are delivered unto him according to agreement.— Pavia, (fn. n16) 13 of June, 1543.
Spanish translation from the Italian.
27 June. 277. Capt. Polino to the Governor of Terracina.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
C. 23, Fasc. 111.
Assures him that the Grand Turk has given orders to Barbarossa not to attack the domains of the king of France, nor those of his allies.
Italian. Contemporary copy. p. 1. (fn. n17)
1 July, 278. The Privy Council to Chapuys.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P. Fasc. C., 23.
Beg him to write to the officers in charge of the "commissariat" in Flanders to prepare and get ready eighty good-sized waggons (carriages suffisantz), furnished with draft horses and every other thing else required, as well as one hundred and sixty more horses of the class called "limoniers" to drag artillery, ammunition, and covered carts (clos chariotz), the whole train to be at Guisnes for the 16th inst.—London, 1 July 1543.
French. Original. p. 1.
4 July. 279. King Henry to the Queen of Hungary.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P. Fasc. C., 23.
Informs her that he has recalled one of his ambassadors, that is Messire Thomas Seymour, who is to come back [to England], leaving behind his colleague the dean of Canterbury (Nicholas Wotton).
Signed: "Henry."
Addressed: "To the Dowager Queen of Hungary."
French. Original. p. 1.
10 July. 280. King Henry's Privy Council to Eustace Chapuys.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Corresp. Engl., 11.
In obedience to the King's commands, and in his name, We beg leave to inform you of the military preparations which the kings of Denmark and Sweden are making. It is reported that they have already twenty warships at sea, and intend, as it is rumoured, assailing the coasts of Holland and Zeeland.
In two or three days the King Our master's fleet will be ready to go to sea. Please let Mr. de Chantonnay know of it that he may report to the Emperor.—10 July 1543.
French. Original. p. 1.
10 July. 281. King Henry to the Dowager Queen of Hungary.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Corresp. Engl.
She may dispose of 40,000 ducats, which he is willing to lend to the Emperor for the expenses of the war against the Turk.—Hampton Court, 10 July 1543.
French. Original. p. 1.
4 July. 282. The Emperor's Instructions to Juan de Vega, his Ambassador at Rome.
S.E., L. 1.
f. 93,
The Marquis de Aguilar, (fn. n18) Our late ambassador in Rome, having petitioned Us to employ him somewhere else, and to appoint another person in his room to represent Us in that court, We have selected you, Juan de Vega, to fill his place near the person of His Holiness the Pope, &c.
Ever since Our landing at Genoa you have had cognizance of, and taken part in, most of the political affiairs treated of and discussed here in Italy, chiefly those relating to Rome and the interview (abocamiento) which We held with His Holiness at Bossa, (fn. n19) since you yourself were one of those selected to treat with His Holiness' deputies. You must, therefore, be well informed of the present state of public affairs in Christendom, of the proposed meeting of the General Council at Trent, of the defence and resistance against the Turk, the war with France, and other matters, public as well as private, concerning Our Imperial person and dominions. But though We consider you, owing to your above-mentioned intervention in those affairs, sufficiently well acquainted with the state of politics at present, yet We must remind you of what passed at Our conference (abocamiento) with His Holiness and his ministers at Bossa, in order that you may proceed in the mission on which you are now sent with perfect knowledge.
And to begin by the conference (abocamiento) with the Pope, We declare that notwithstanding the mistrust and suspicions cleverly instilled into His Holiness' mind respecting Our treaty of alliance with England and other particulars, of which you have since been informed, the interview, as you saw, was cordial and friendly on both sides. We gave His Holiness ample reasons to justify Our conduct with respect to the King of England, and proved to him that We could not under the circumstances have acted otherwise, and His Holiness seemed quite satisfied with Our reasoning.
In a like manner Our personal communication with His Holiness, the conferences which you and other ministers held with the Papal deputies on the proposed peace with France, the assistance against the Turk, the General Council of the Church, the disposal of the duchy of Milan, Ascanio Colonna's affair, the creation of cardinals, the daily abuses, grievances, and wrongs (suirazones) of the Apostolic See against the prelates and churches of Our Spanish kingdoms, and last not least, the compensation due to the bishop of Valencia, passed off very well.
Concerning the peace with France, His Holiness the Pope tried to influence Us, as you saw, by various ways and offers which as many well-intentioned and zealous persons, even the cardinals there present, have since owned, were not only insufficient, but more general and uncertain than those proposed on former occasions, especially as His Holiness gave Us to understand that the offers did not proceed from king Francis or by his will, only that he (the Pope) imagined that the King would approve of them. We excused Ourselves from listening to such offers and conditions, all the time touching lightly on the reasons and arguments that served most Our purpose, saying, among other things, that We saw no security nor trust in a negociation of that sort, which We peremptorily and at once refused to entertain. Otherwise (We said), matters being in the condition in which they were and still are, people might say that proposals of peace, under the circumstances, were only intended to deceive Us, make Us lose time, and impede all remedy against the Turk and against king Francis. Even if the latter had then chosen to part company with the Infidel, of which, however, We saw no sign or appearance, this would have been of no use at all to Us. The Grand Turk (Solyman) has already advanced so far that he cannot retreat, since he has actually reached Bellgrado (Belgrade), whilst his fleet is in sight of the coast of Messina. To these arguments of Ours neither the Pope nor his cardinals had anything to reply, thus showing plainly enough that all admonitions and persuasions on their part were merely intended to accomplish their mission of peace with little or no hope at all of bringing it about.
Then We tried to persuade His Holiness to declare against king Francis, since (said We) the truce of Nizza had been professedly infringed by him, and he had also done other malicious acts, such as being in actual league and confederacy with the Turk, and bringing him down against Christendom at large. The Pope, however, excused him (king Francis) by saying that he was not quite sure of the above-mentioned confederacy and alliance between the King of France and the Grand Turk having been effected, and suggesting that We had better wait until the galleys and galleons of France (las galeras y galeazas) ready to sail from the ports of that country had actually joined the Turkish fleet. That was perhaps the fit time for the declaration, though His Holiness still insisted particularly on the inconvenience and danger of making it at this juncture, and on the harm which it might entail upon the Holy See, for should he (the Pope) make it as requested, king Francis might perhaps out of spite forsake his obedience to the Church.
Perceiving that the Pope could not be persuaded to issue the declaration asked of him, We urged him to make at least some sort of manifestation of his readiness to help against the Turk by sea, as well as by land, and that in consideration of the imminent danger in which Christendom lay, and the great expense We have already sustained, and are likely to sustain in future, against king Francis and the Infidel Turk, he should help Us with men and money. His Holiness then engaged to send to Hungary 4,000 Italian foot, adding that he could not possibly furnish a larger contingent owing to the necessity in which he was of providing for the defence of the maritime towns on the Mediterranean coast belonging to the Church. He also made use of fine words respecting his own help and assistance by sea, in case it should be wanted.
With regard to the General Council, His Holiness' deputies at the conference proposed in his name the suspension thereof until the present troubles in Christendom had passed away, and the Turk's powerful fleet had sailed off from these seas. They also proposed that instead of Traento (Trent) another place should be designated for the meeting of the Council, that town being (they said) notoriously badly situated, unhealthy, and insufficiently provided with food, suitable lodgings, &c.,besides open to suspicion (sospechosa) to many people. To this proposition Our ministers objected, alleging that at the diet of Ratisbon His Holiness' deputies had been the first to name Trent as the most commodious and fit place to hold a Council in. Now that the necessity of a Council of the Church was greater than ever, the States of the Empire insisted upon its being held immediately, and We Ourselves could not consent to its suspension, nor to the proposed change without consulting them first thereupon, both they (the States) and Ourselves having conjointly made an application for it. Indeed, before introducing an innovation in that particular, it would be requisite to consult the States of the Empire lest more confusion should be created in the affair than there is at present, and the people of the States be thrown into a state of exasperation through it. (fn. n20) The above considerations in an affair of such importance His Holiness promised to take into account, and, after hearing the report of the cardinals assembled at Parma for the purpose, take his final resolution on the whole.
Respecting the State of Milan, after the Papal ministers calling the attention of Our deputies to the heavy and dangerous charge imposed upon their master, the Pope, of declaring war to king Francis on account of that duchy, and the unnatural indignation of king Francis and his people on hearing of that declaration against him and them, and of a war proclaimed to expel them out of Italy, the Pope's ministers did nevertheless hint that they would make no difficulty as to that and other points connected with it. Of the duke of Castro's proposition no particular mention was made, nor was any difficulty raised about it; neither was there any remark made respecting the form of the investiture, or the nature of the fief. With regard to the fortresses and castles, the Papal ministers agreed to their remaining in the hands of trusty persons and governors appointed by Us, provided in the deed of investiture no mention was made of the said security, (fn. n21) lest the rest of the princes and powers of Italy should think that by doing so We want to retain possession of them indefinitely. With regard to Parma and Plasencia (Piacenza), they proposed that a legal investigation should be made as to whether those two cities are or are not dependencies of the State of Milan, because if they are, there will be no difficulty in incorporating them, whereas if they are found to belong to the Church, His Holiness will not take them away; by which words the Papal deputies meant, as We presume, that His Holiness would be glad that means were found for their incorporation with the State of Milan. As to the price to be paid for the investiture, there was a great difference between the sum offered in the first instance [by Pier Luigi Farnese] and the one afterwards proposed, for although the Papal deputies described the investiture as a most important act, extolled Our willingness to facilitate the cession of the Duchy, and showed great desire that it should take place, yet when it came to fixing the sum, they merely said that they would do their best to pay down one million of gold pieces at such dates as might be fixed upon beforehand. Having, however, represented to them the great difference there was between this sum and the two millions originally offered, it was agreed that they will see on their side what more they can do, if We Ourselves promise to look out for the means of splitting the difference. We have already written for the opinion of councillors and other persons, whose advice We intend to follow in these and other matters, so that after two or three months at the utmost We shall be able to state what Our resolution on the whole is. All this has been done with a view not to take any definite engagement in the matter, nor destroy the hopes which the Pope and his family may have conceived, and in the meantime decide what is best and most convenient for Us to do. We must also add for your information that the Pope's ministers, when questioned as to the price offered by them for the investiture, affirmed that the offer of two millions never came from His Holiness, (fn. n22) but from the people commissioned to that effect, who had by far exceeded their instructions.
In the Colonna business His Holiness and his ministers are satisfied that a marriage between his own grand-daughter and Ascanio's son should be arranged, as by that means the differences existing between the two families, and the expenses of the war against Ascanio (for which His Holiness claims to be paid), might be settled more favourably. As far as can be gathered His Holiness insists upon being paid, and will not abate his demand unless the proposed marriage be effected. As soon as We can ascertain what Ascanio Colonna's intentions are, and what his son (Fabricio) thinks of it, We will try and do Our best in that affair.
If that marriage is effected, of course all negociations respecting that of the Duke of Orleans must fall to the ground. Most probably His Holiness will go on negociating without coming to a final resolution until he sees the turn present affairs will take, and whether the investiture of Milan is given over to his grandson in the manner and form and for the price he offers; though, on the other hand, if We are to believe what his ministers say, and the intelligence We have received from other quarters, there is little appearance of that marriage being concluded, especially since the Pope has refused to give Parma and Piacenza as a dower for his grand-daughter, and, even if the Pope makes an offer likely to tempt the King of France—such as to help and assist him in his wars—We do not think he will ever carry it out, however inclined he may be to do so, in order to avoid expense, and not get into new difficulties. (fn. n23)
Respecting the creation of Cardinals, His Holiness, despite the persuasions and arguments of Our ambassadors, seems still determined not to bestow any hats on prelates of Our various realms without first giving two to the French. Indeed it is rumoured that his intention is to give one to the brother of Mr. de Hannibalt, and another to the brother of the French ambassador residing at the Roman court, all the time giving Us to understand that should We treat with him, he might (podria) appoint as many as eight of Our subjects, whether Germans or Italians, who would therefore be at Our devotion. We have replied that We much prefer having no cardinals at all in the college than to furnish His Holiness with an occasion for appointing more Frenchmen, since king Francis alone has already more cardinals than all the rest of the Christian princes put together, so much so, that when a new Papal election comes to take place, he will be able to make a Pope entirely to his own taste; God knows what people the French are to be trusted with such a power! In conclusion, this point of the cardinals' hats remained unsettled, though His Holiness promised to act in the matter in such a way that We shall have no reason to complain, and both Santa Croce and Farnese—the two cardinals appointed by His Holiness to treat with Our ministers—assured the latter that were We to treat with His Holiness about Milan, and should he in consequence declare against France, he would act in this and other matters at Our pleasure. To these assurances on the part of the two cardinals, Our ministers did not fail to reply that the creation of cardinals had nothing to do with Milan and its investiture; it was an entirely independent matter, and it was quite unnecessary to lay down conditions about things to which His Holiness was bound by honesty and reason.
With regard to the harm and injury (fn. n24) done to Spain [in ecclesiastical matters] His Holiness and his family (los suyos) did certainly shew great resentment at the warrant (pragmatica) issued by Us, whilst on Our side We have represented to him, in the most moderate and respectful terms, the just causes We had for issuing the said warrant, and how scandalous and intolerable were the grievances of which the Spanish prelates complained, so much so, that those who came over with Us to Italy, begged His Holiness to remedy the many abuses and extortions complained of. It was definitely agreed between His Holiness and Us, that you (Vega) should hold a conference with the deputies appointed by him, and devise means for the remedy of the grievances complained of, His Holiness at the same time giving Us to understand that the grievances in question would be redressed. It is for you (Vega) to solicit and procure the required remedy in conformity with the Instructions of Our Council of Castillo, as well as the memoranda of the prelates themselves herein inclosed, or which may be sent to you hereafter.
Respecting the archbishop of Valencia, His Holiness and his ministers, as well as the rest of his cardinals, did certainly shew much displeasure and sorrow at hearing of the offence done to him, as well as to the Holy Apostolic See and the Church in general. They did not fail to speak with the greatest reprobation of the fact that a dignitary of the Christian Church should have been obliged to pay a heavy ransom, besides being kept under restraint, unless he paid down the excessive sum demanded of him. (fn. n25) His Holiness has promised to dispense the Archbishop of any promissory oaths he may make, and We on our part have taken the engagement, that on his arrival at Parma His Holiness will lay the whole affair before the Sacred College of Cardinals that they may well consider the affair, and will himself decide according to their deliberations. All this His Holiness has agreed and promised in full to do; it is for you, Vega, to remind His Holiness of his promise; for as the affair was discussed in Consistory, it was then and there surmised that similar acts of violence might, perhaps, be practised upon especial members of the Sacred College of cardinals, and the threat must needs produce its effect. (fn. n26)
In short, We endeavoured at Our conference to persuade His Holiness that We wished to live in good harmony and intelligence with him, to help and assist him in anything concerning his own authority and the welfare of Christendom, to continue to be the protector of his family without scruples of any sort, trusting that he and his family will reciprocally do that kind of work which is most conducive to those ends. As far as We can judge from appearances His Holiness and his ministers seem contented and satisfied with the arrangement; the only difficulty that remains is that His Holiness is very ambitious of the prosperity and aggrandizement of his family, and his own relatives are very desirous of it. This will be a matter of consideration for Us, and We shall act according as they themselves do, and as the course of events may dictate. (fn. n27)
As future events shall determine Our tone of conduct, We will write to you frequently as to what you are to say and do in your negociations with His Holiness. Every day and hour novelties and changes occur in politics, which render it necessary, according to time and circumstances, to change Our advice. We recommend you to take especial care, now and in future, to keep on good terms with His Holiness' ministers, and by all means in your power which you may consider profitable try and maintain good relations, agreement in Our line of action, and goodwill between Him and Us, which is not only very important and necessary now for Our own private affairs, but likewise for those of Christendom at large, and those of Italy in particular. You (Vega) shall be on the alert and try to ascertain what attempts are being made there in Italy by princes, powers or private persons, to thwart Our plans, so that such attempts, if made, may be defeated and counteracted in the best way possible according to time and circumstances, all the time assuring His Holiness in Our name that as far as We are concerned We shall do Our best, and never fail in acting as may be most convenient and proper for the continuance of Our mutual good relations as aforesaid. You shall, moreover, take care to call the attention of His Holiness and of his ministers and cardinals to public affairs and to Our own, and admonish the latter to look upon them with such interest, as is befitting and reasonable. (fn. n28)
There is no need for Us to recommend to you the Duchess of Camarino's affairs. (fn. n29) We trust that you will take the same care of them as if they were Our own. You shall, however, attend most particularly to what you may deem most convenient and suitable to secure her remaining in His Holiness' favour and on good terms with the Papal family; and let this be done in such a manner that His Holiness and his family may hold her in the esteem that she deserves, and that no displeasure (sin sabor) comes to her from that quarter. This you shall endeavour to accomplish and procure by dint of wise talking with and proposing to the one and to the other of the parties what you may deem just and reasonable, taking care that as far as Our daughter herself is concerned, no novelty be introduced in her household, nor provision made therein from which she may receive displeasure or harm. You are to take particular care of that, and see that Our said daughter, and Lope de Guzman, the chief of her household, may be completely satisfied on all points. Let, however, this be done with dexterity and discretion.
You must have heard of the treaty and capitulation lately made between Us and the Most Serene king of England, and what passed between Us and His Holiness on account of that, and likewise what was said in the conferences We had on the subject. In conformity with that You will try and do Your best to prevent the Pope from proceeding de facto and urgently against that King at the request or instigation of king Francis, or assisting the latter against England on the plea that the King of that country has denied and still denies his Apostolical authority, for the differences and enmity now existing between the kings of England and France have nothing in common with the Pope, but have arisen out of the failure by king Francis to pay money and interests due, and other causes, as We are informed.
With regard to the Venetians, their Republic has made with Us a league and confederacy for the defence of the duchy of Milan, and although of late years they have been strongly, and in various ways solicited and requested by the king of France and by the Pope also, to break that friendship and unite with them, the Republic has constantly refused to listen to and enter into negociation with them, declaring that they intend to remain faithful to Us, and keep Our friendship, as their acts have since proved. On Our side everything has been done to preserve that friendship and gain time (para entretenellos) as it is fit and convenient to do. You are, therefore, to continue in that path, availing yourself for the purpose of the intelligence possessed by Our ambassador to the Republic, Don Diego de Mendoza, by whom We Ourselves are fully informed of whatever occurs there, as well as of any negociations they may enter into with the Turk or with other powers. It must, however, be observed that although they (the Venetians) must always be told and assured that We entirely trust in them, and firmly believe that they will keep their engagements faithfully and be Our good friends and confederates; though they must be also told that in case of need they will be attended to, and helped by all suitable and convenient means, yet it is very important to keep a vigilant eye on them, and prudently and artfully watch their movements, which are always directed to their own profit and gain. Indeed, it is a known fact that the Signory of Venice has been at all times, and at this moment more than ever, solicited by the king of France and also by the Turk, as above said, to forsake Our friendship and alliance and make a league against Us. Even the Pope, as We are told, has often solicited the same from the Venetians, asking them to make a league with him on the plea that Italy must needs be defended against foreign aggression. It is very important that, conjointly and in common with Don Diego, you (Vega) keep watch over the Venetians, and should His Holiness resume the past negociations with their Republic, you are to take care and prevent anything being done or concluded in that line without Our knowledge, for there are plenty of reasons for that; besides which it is highly important for Our Royal and Imperial crowns, as well as for the minor Italian powers, that a league of the kind be at any rate prevented. Nor could the Pope on the above considerations, and owing to the obligation under which he stands to Us by former treaties (conciertos), as well as by the fief of Naples, take such a step without Our intervention and participation (comprehension) in such a league.
Genoa is under the Holy Roman Empire, and consequently under Our protection, and therefore that Republic having always shown affection for Our service, We have constantly attended to its protection and defence, and intend doing so in future. You, Vega, are to do the same in Our name, and favor it to the utmost of your abilities. Prince Doria being the sort of person you know, it is very important that as far as the preservation of the Republic itself, the defence of Our duchy of Milan, and Our general service in Italy are concerned, you treat him with respect and confidence, writing frequently to him and informing him of all occurrences and events likely to disturb the peace of Italy, at the same time trying to please him in any particular thing he may require of you; for Prince Doria is a person of such quality and parts that he must needs be considered and attended to in every way personally and politically.
The duke of Ferrara, though married to a sister of the king of France, (fn. n30) has shewn and is still shewing goodwill towards Us and Our affairs, and We, on the other hand, have shewn trust and reliance in him. You are accordingly to manifest towards him and his subjects that same confidence with which We treat him, but at the same time be exceedingly watchful and vigilant (though without shewing mistrust), so as to see how he will act in future. Should you have any suspicion about him, you, Vega, are to let Us know immediately. Meanwhile, should the Duke happen to ask you for any favour at Rome, either with His Holiness or with his cardinals, you shall render such offices as may seem to you most convenient, so as to let him know that it is Our intention to befriend and protect him, being as he is a vassal of the Holy Roman Empire for Modena, Rezzo (Reggio) and Rubiera, and also in return for the friendship he has hitherto shewn towards Us. This, however, to be done in such a manner that His Holiness may not take offence, and that the Duke may perceive that We wish him well and intend to protect him.
The Gonzaga of Mantua have always been, and are now particularly attached to Our service. We implicitly trust in them, and firmly believe that whatever may be the course of political events, the Duke (fn. n31) and his family will continue as hitherto to serve Us affectionately, not only out of gratitude for the favours We have bestowed on them, but also on account of the close relationship which now unites Us to him, the present Duke having married one of the daughters (fn. n32) of the King of the Romans, Our brother. In short, you, Vega, are to favour the Duke's affairs and those of his family at Rome as if they were those of a prince belonging to Our own family.
For the duke of Florence We did lately what you must have heard of. Not only did We place him at the head of his Ducal State, and protect him afterwards in the possession of it, but We have since delivered to him the castles of Florence and Liorna (Leghorn), which We held as security. We are sure that the Duke fully acknowledges this and other favours of Ours, and therefore he is to be helped and assisted by you in whatever he may need or that may be requisite for the pacification and preservation of his state, and especially in any ecclesiastical business he may have at the Roman Court, shewing him and his ministers that trust which he well deserves.
The Republic of Sine (Siena) has always shewn affection for the Holy Roman Empire and for the Emperor, Our predecessors, as well as for the Catholic king of Spain (Ferdinand), Our grandsire of glorious memory, and for Us; but by cause of the parties, enmities, and feuds that have arisen amongst its citizens, several riots and revolutions have naturally occurred, bringing in their train death, loss of property and other damages, so much so, that had We not interfered from time to time and tried to set the Sienese at peace, helping them efficiently when they were in need, the ruin of their Republic would surely have been accomplished.
A few years ago the duke of Malphi, (fn. n33) by Our appointment and in Our name, resided among the Sienese, and managed to keep them in order and at peace. After him came count Sfrondato, the Milanese senator, who was also there in Our name. We are now sending thither Don Juan de Luna, who by enforcing the laws and ordinances now in force in the Republic, will keep the citizens at peace and in tranquillity. With him you are to live in harmony and good intelligence, and should he have to apply to you for favor and help in affairs concerning the community, or likely to promote the welfare of the inhabitants, you are to help and assist him with your influence [at Rome], always bearing in mind that the Pope has constantly kept his eye fixed on Siena, and has at times spoken to Us about certain property of his, and even solicited Our co-operation to that effect. This, however, We have always refused, owing to Siena being a dependency of the Holy Empire. Should the Papal ministers or the Sienese themselves speak to you on the subject, you will refer them to Us, without entering into particulars or stating your opinion in the matter, lest the Holy Father or his family should entertain further hopes, or the suspicions and fears which the Sienese still have of Our giving them up to the Pope should be strengthened.
As to Lucca, its citizens are living at peace with each other, and are quiet. Though the inhabitants are chiefly in mercantile relations with France, they have always shewn respect and consideration for Us and for the Holy Roman Empire, and whenever they have wanted and applied for Our help and protection, We have willingly granted it to them. You, Vega, are to treat them like the Sienese.
The duke of Urbino (fn. n34) has constantly shewn affection to Our service, and gratitude also for what We did for him when We conferred on his brother the Duchy of Sora in the kingdom of Naples. This We did, believing that he and his family would for ever remain in Our service; nor have We been mistaken in Our calculations. The Duke has hitherto done his duty towards Us, and We have protected him and favored him whenever there was need. Though he has openly made a contract with the Venetians, and entered the service of their Republic, We are not afraid of his turning against Us, though it may be said that some time ago a rumour was afloat that he was in secret intelligence with king Francis, and likely to enter his service soon. The Duke, however, is still in that of the Venetians, and no objection has been raised on Our part. It is incumbent upon you (Vega) to show confidence and trust in him and in his agents, and to go on favoring him as much ns possible as long as lie continues friendly.
College of Cardinals.—
The duke of Castro (Pier Luigi Farnese), previously to his father's elevation to the Pontificate, (fn. n35) had employment and pay (essiento y provision) from Us. He has since then shewn great attachment to Our person, and done good offices for Us with his father, the Pope. On that account, and principally out of respect for His Holiness, besides bestowing on the Cardinal his brother, the archbishopric of Montreale, We granted to him (the Duke) an annual pension of 15,000 ducats, payable in the State of Milan, and also conferred on him the marquisate of Novara. After that We gave to his son, (fn. n36) the duke of Camarino, the hand of Madame Margaret, Our daughter. He (the duke of Castro) has always shewn Us due gratitude. You shall take particular care to shew him every consideration and trust, communicating to him such of Our own affairs as you may deem convenient to reveal according to time and circumstances, and soliciting his help for the good issue of affairs, having regard to the terms the Pope may use, and the favorable or unfavorable disposition which he himself may manifest. (fn. n37)
The very same conduct is to be observed by you with regard to cardinal Farnese, the Pope's grandson, as well as cardinals Sanctafiore and Sancta Croce. This, however, to be done with the care and vigilance recommended by Us in similar cases.
With Our viceroy at Naples (D. Pedro de Toledo y Osorio, marquis de Villafranca), the marquis del Gasto, Our governor in the State of Milan, and commander in chief (capitan general) of Our armies in Italy, at this present moment carrying on war in Piedmont, you shall keep up close and confidential correspondence, informing them both of whatever may come to your knowledge at Rome, or from other countries likely to affect Our present views, political plans, or affairs in which We are now engaged. The same to be done with the ambassador now residing, or who may hereafter reside for Us in Venice, and with any other, and each of Our ministers in Italy.
We say the same respecting the person whom Our brother, the king of the Romans (Ferdinand), may now or in future have to represent him in that capital. Besides keeping on the best possible terms with him, as is proper and due, you shall communicate without reserve all our plans and negociations, and at the same time help and favor him in whatever he may need, so that he himself may reciprocally help you in your negociations. If, however, you should deem it necessary, you may address yourself to the king of the Romans, directly and without his (the ambassador's) intervention, especially if the affair be a personal one concerning the said prince and king, Our brother. With the ambassadors of the Italian powers now residing, or who may reside in future at Rome, such as those of the republics of Venice, Genoa, Siena and Lucca, or the dukes of Ferrara, Mantua, Urbino, and others, you shall keep on courteous terms, showing friendship and trust in those whom you know to be sincerely attached to Our person, trying to gain over those who may not feel disposed to favor Our views, and above all endeavouring to secure the success of Our political schemes.
As to the ambassador of The Most Serene king of Portugal, Our brother, you shall communicate confidently with him as the representative of a Sovereign, who has always been, and still continues to be, Our friend.
You shall take care to keep up epistolary correspondence with queen Mary, Our sister, who is now governing for Us Flanders and the Low Countries. It is fit and convenient that she be informed as quickly and as often as possible of all events occurring there [at Rome], and especially in France, likely to affect or disturb Our political plans; and should she want at Rome any help in ecclesiastical affairs for herself or Our subjects in those countries, you shall do your best towards the accomplishment of her wishes.
The people of Rome, and the courtiers—Ascanio Colonna, and the rest of his family, have always been sincerely attached to the crown of Aragon, and to Our own of Spain. It is, therefore, incumbent upon Us to protect and favour them, and make them feel that We hold them in esteem and appreciate their services. This, however, must be done cautiously, with a certain moderation, and in such a manner as not to give offence to His Holiness, or arouse his suspicions. As to Ascanio himself, and his own private affairs, let Our conversation with the Pope, the substance of which is already in your hands, with other papers and memoranda, be a guide for your conduct. In short, should the Pope persist in the prosecution against Ascanio, you will receive orders from Us as to what you are to say and do. We need scarcely add that all the Colonnese, in or out of Rome, as well as all others attached to Our service and to the Holy Roman Empire, such as the Sienese, the people of Forli, the inhabitants of Viterbo and other Italian towns, are to be treated by you with similar attention and courtesy.
Towards the rival factions of the Orsini, you shall act as you can, talking to, and treating with them according to time and circumstances; you shall do your best to gain some of them over to Our party, or at least try that they do not become Our enemies.
Our advocates and solicitors at Rome.—For many years past Our ambassadors and ministers in that city, have been assisted in legal and ecclesiastical affairs by Alonso de Cuevas, a worthy man (buen hombre), who has served this office for many years. But as the accumulation of business at Rome might one of these days be such as to require more hands, you shall make enquiries among the Spanish community at Rome, and look out for trusty and experienced lawyers to replace him in case of his death, or help him in his labours if alive.
Respecting the affairs of Our lordships (Señorios) of Flanders and Burgundy, you shall assist and favor, as much as is in your power, the ecclesiastic whom Our sister the Dowager queen of Hungary may name, in substitution of the dean of Antwerp, taking of course particular care that all business at Rome of Flanders and Burgundy be quickly and satisfactorily dispatched through his agency.
Every year, on St. Peter's day, We are obliged to present to His Holiness and to the Apostolic See, in acknowledgment of the kingdom of Naples, one white steed, richly caparisoned. (fn. n38) To this end a sum of one thousand ducats is yearly remitted to Our ambassador at Rome, that he may purchase the said steed, have it caparisoned and kept in readiness for St. Peter's day. The money for this year has already been provided for; and the white steed has most probably been presented by Conchano. In like manner it is customary to present to His Holiness, on that very day and occasion, a sum of 6,000 or 7,000 ducats by way of annuity (de censo). Our viceroy at Naples, Don Pedro de Toledo, marquis de Villafranca, has received orders to this effect, and We have no doubt that he will attend to it punctually. Should he, however, tarry in making the necessary provision, it will be your duty to solicit and urge him to fulfil this important item of the deed of infeudation (infeodacion), so that every formality is complied with.
Some Neapolitans, who, having embraced the French party, were once judicially prosecuted and declared traitors, fled from their native country, and took refuge in Rome, a free city. Hitherto Our ambassadors and others have taken care that those exiles (fuerusciti) should do no mischief, and by applying to the Pope personally in Our name, have succeeded in having them expelled therefrom under some pretext or other. We are not aware of there being now at Rome any such exiles (fuerusciti), but if there are, it shall be your duty to deal with them as dexterously as your predecessors in that embassy have done, so that Our authority be upheld and Our service complied with.
The protection of the churches of Castille has been entrusted by Us to Cardinal Farnese, (fn. n39) and that of Aragon to the Cardinal of Mantua. Cardinal Cibo has the protection of those of Germany. To each of those cardinals protectors you can apply for help and assistance when required and convenient.
As to the prince-electors and German Lutherans, it will be your duty to be vigilant and watch their movements, so as to ascertain whether they are or are not in intelligence or treaty with Rome or with France, with the Grand Turk, or with the party opposed to that of the king of the Romans in Hungary. Should you hear of any such intrigues, you are to let Us know immediately, so that We may in time apply a remedy to the danger threatening Christendom at large and Our own affairs in particular.
The business of the Holy Office of the Inquisition at Rome must likewise be attended to; Doctor Taurique, its present proctor (procurador) will inform you of any solicitation he may have addressed in the name of the Holy Office, or of the Grand Inquisitor, (fn. n40) for which he requires your help and assistance.
The Marquis de Aguilar, Our late ambassador, had often been written to by Our command, with orders to try and procure the expediting of certain affairs belonging to churches, monasteries, and private individuals of these Our realms and lordships. Should any of them be still pending, especially those relating to the reformation of the Religious Orders, and monasteries in Our kingdoms of Castille, Our chapel and royal hospital, as well as the University of Granada, you shall do your best to obtain from His Holiness a prompt and favorable decision thereon.
Conchano the Secretary, who after the departure of Our late ambassador (Marquis de Aguilar), took charge of Our affairs in that Court, is consequently well informed respecting the above and similar applications, and others of less importance. He has been ordered to remain [at Rome] two or three months by your side, so as to instruct you in any particulars and sundry minor matters which have passed through his hands. You shall ascertain through him who among the Pope's ministers and cardinals, as well as principal men in Rome, are sincerely attached to Our person, and who are not, that you may know those in whom you can trust, and how you are to behave towards them.
You shall continually keep Us well informed of the course of affairs in that capital, either through the ordinary post of Rome and Naples, or, if the urgency of the case requires it, by express messengers dispatched in all haste, and you are likewise authorized to draw bills on the general Post Master to the amount required for such service.
The preaching of the bull of the Holy Crusade, in these Our Spanish realms, was of old granted to the Catholic Sovereigns (Ferdinand and Isabella), Our predecessors, as it was also to Us who have succeeded them. This grant was generally made every three years, and its yieldings were and have been employed in the war against the Infidel, and the defence of Our frontier towns in Africa. Just now His Holiness has reserved the grant, as well as the bull, for the works (fabrica) of St. Peter. According to Conchano's last dispatch on this subject, there is every probability of the bull and breves being issued very shortly. Should there be any delay in this, it will be your duty to display all activity, and urge the expedition and delivery of the bull and papers joined to it, and once in possession of them shall address the whole to Our ambassador Figueroa, at Genoa, that he may, according to orders, forward the whole to Spain.
We did once obtain from the Apostolic See the concession of the fourth and a half fruits of all ecclesiastical rents in Our Spanish dominions, by means of a subvention towards the war against the Infidel. The present Pope lately confirmed the said concession, and when the marquis de Aguilar left Rome he brought with him to Spain the Papal bull and breves to that effect; but there remained still behind certain breves for the cardinals in that country which are indispensable for the Clergy in general. Conchano had orders to see to that, and procure that the breves should be expedited as soon as possible, as without them the execution cannot take place. Should the breves not be ready on your arrival at Rome, you will take care and solicit that they be at once drawn, signed, sealed, and forwarded to the Prince, Our son, in Spain.
Together with these Instructions you will receive two letters addressed to yourself, and another of credence for His Holiness the Pope, in which We beg him to grant that We may take possession of, and sell to Our profit, all the vassals and rents of the monasteries and abbeys in Castille, prepared as We are to give them in perpetuity such annuities (juros) in money, as will be equivalent to the ecclesiastical revenues enjoyed by the said monasteries and abbeys. The whole of the money derived from the sale to be spent chiefly in Our African frontiers and in war with the Infidels, as well as on other matters of urgency at this present moment, (fn. n41) the Papal concession to be made out in the same form and manner as the one which Pope Clement [VII.] once granted Us for the sale of the vassals and property of the Military Orders. A similar concession is now wanted from Pope Paul, only that it would be desirable that in exchange for the annuities (juros), which some monasteries and abbeys still possess on the royal revenue, they should get as equivalent a certain portion of the rents of the dismembered ecclesiastical benefices (prestamos) that may happen to become vacant, with a view to the said annuities (juros) returning again to Our Royal Chamber, as will be better explained in Our letters. (fn. n42)
The above two concessions being most important for Our service, you are particularly requested to attend to them most carefully, not allowing the thing to drop until the grant has been obtained, and the bulls and breves made out. Should you meet with difficulties in the matter of the annuities (juros), you must still insist on the sale of the vassals and property belonging to the monasteries and abbeys of Castille, so that at least one part of the grant take effect as soon as possible.
We need not add here that respecting the injuries and wrongs which the Apostolic See is daily inflicting upon Our Castillian realms, (fn. n43) you are to do your best to procure the remedy thereof according to the memoranda and reports which Our Privy Council or the prelates themselves have already sent or will hereafter send you.
The dispensation procured for the marriage of Our son (Prince Philip), with the infanta of Portugal (Doña Maria) was defective in many places, owing to the names of some of their relatives having been mis-spelt. The breve itself was sent back to Rome for the errors to be corrected, and Conchano, the secretary, writes that another breve has been made out and will be sent forthwith. But as in the opinion of Our councillors it is important that the amended dispensation should be first sent to Us here, to have it torn in Our presence, you will take care that this be done before the bulls and breve for the Prince's marriage are expedited.
Some time before Our departure from Castille We wrote to the marquis de Aguilar to procure from His Holiness certain breves for the conversion and instruction of the Valencian moriscoes; but as the Marquis left Italy soon after that, We have not heard any more about it. Should Our request to His Holiness be dormant, let it be renewed and reproduced, according substantially with the papers then sent to your predecessor, because the matter is urgent and of the utmost importance for the security of that kingdom.
Azequia [Imperial Canal] of Aragon.
A Papal breve is wanted for the bishop of Elna, whom We have now presented to the bishopric of Lerida, (fn. n44) at the same time authorising him to punish (castigar) certain officials of the kingdom of Aragon, who were found guilty in the visitation and enquiry made by Our order. The papers and documents relating to this, and to the two preceding points, must be in the hands of Conchano, who will tell you whether anything has, or has not, been done about them. It will be your duty to see that every one of these three, or any other pending affairs, be despatched quickly, and as favorably as possible.
The expedition of bulls and breves, bearing on matters of Our own person, generally takes place gratis. Should money be required for things relating to Spain, you shall draw on Our treasury as is the custom and as Conchano will tell you.
Together with these Instructions You shall receive the presentation that We have thought fit to make for the churches of Segovia, Calahorra, Lerida, and Elna. (fn. n45) You will beg for their respective bulls, and procure them without loss of time, lest the interested parties should suffer from the delay. Where the provision of other Castillian churches is still awaiting His Holiness' approbation, you had better solicit the despatch of the bulls, &c.—Trent, 4 July 1543.
Signed: "Yo el Rey."
Countersigned: "Idiaquez," with Seal.
Spanish. Original. pp. 36.


  • n1. Dr. Schore(?).
  • n2. This is evidently the draft of a letter of queen Mary to Chapuys. It is undated, and wrongly placed among papers and dispatches of the year 1542, with this note in the hand of a clerk in the Archives at Brussels: "Lettre de la Reine de Hongrie à l'ambassadeur en Angleterre, du mois de May de 1542." This statement is altogether wrong, for allusion is made in the letter to dispatches from England of the 6th and 22nd ultimo (du mois passé), and there are none of Chapuys' with those dates in 1542. Besides that, the revocation of the Emperor's edict on navigation and trade with England, so strongly insisted upon by king Henry and his ministers, had already taken place in May of that year, whereas in March 1543—probably the date of the draft—Henry's ministers were still pressing for the revocation. (See Vol. V., Part IX., Nos. 152 and 153,. which happen to be in reality the two letters alluded to in the above draft.)
  • n3. See Vol. VI., Part I., pp. 481–7.
  • n4. The Emperor, according to Vandenesse's "Itinerary of Charles V." p. 532, was then at Valladolid.
  • n5. "Daultre part nous avons eu quelque advertence que au dernier Parlement d'angleterre auroit este conclut que on defendroit de mener hors d'angleterre aulcuns draps de valeur ne fust [il] quilz fussent entierement parez (sic) taintz et accoutrez."
  • n6. 'Vous ferez bien dascentir ce quen est, et si trouvez convenable en pourrez touscher a aulcuns du Conscil en particulier, afin quilz y ayent regard et ne fassent nouvelleté."
  • n7. D. Alonso de Cordoba y Velasco, co. de Alcaudete, about whom see Vol. VI., Part I., p. 373.
  • n8. "Y hasta tres leguas de Tibida no pudieron juntar caudal de moros para pelear comigo."
  • n9. "El alcayde de Benarax."
  • n10. "Yo pensé que se venia [á] tornar cristians, y puso la mano en la cara para tirar à don Alonso, y él (este?) arremetió y matole antes que pudiesse dar fuego."
  • n11. "En llegando estas compañias, hicieron les [á los Moros] mucho daño con las ballestas y arcabuzes, y retiraronse [los Moros]."
  • n12. "Tengo por gran milagro que haviendo en la hueste enemiga el numero de escopteros que he dicho no se hallasse hombre muerto de escopeta, ny heridos mas que tres, y que la mayor parte de los muertos y heridos seau de ballesta, y cuando es bien sabido que no trahyan cieu bellesteros."
  • n13. "Y porque la gente se me desordenava por entrar al saco, hize gran diligencia en detenerlos, y alojarlos aquelle noche en un olivar cerea de la ciudad, porque no se matasse la gente en la ciudad siguiendo la noche y no me dejasse las armas à las pnertas [de las casas?], y me las llevasen los Moros."
  • n14. "Martes por le mañano entré en la ciudad quedo."
  • n15. Mexuar (in Arabic meshwár) means council-room, seat of government, palace.
  • n16. According to Vandenesse's "Itinerary of Charles V.," p. 536, the bond was signed at Pavia on the 12th. The delivery, however, must have taken place shortly after, for, as it will be shown hereafter, on the 4th of the ensuing July the Emperor, writing to Juan de Vega, his ambassador, says to him: "The Duke Cosmo has always been sincerely attached to Our Service, and We in return have constantly favoured and protected him. Lately We have given orders for the castles of Pisa, Leghorn, and Florence itself, which we held on security, to be delivered to him." Besides which, a modern Florentine historian adds: "Dopo haver Cosimo accompagnato l'Imperatore sino al stato de Milano, se ne ritornò à Firenze, ed il 3 di Juglio prese possesse della Fortezza [di Firenze] di dove ne uscirono le truppe Spagnuole, e per procuratore prese possesse delle fortezze di Pisa e Livorno (Leghorn), il che finalmente lo rese Principe independente."—Compendio della Storie Fiorentina. Firenze, 1811. 8o, p. 119.
  • n17. This is inclosed in another of King Henry's Privy Council to Chapuys, dated Aug. the 7th, which is preserved in the Imperial Archives of Vienna. It is in Italian, a copy of it was procured by the king's agent in Venice (Harvel?) and forwarded to England. As to Polino himself, his true name was Antoine Paulin, baron de la Garde, at the time Francis' agent in Constantinople. See Vol. VI., Part I., pp. 406, 464.
  • n18. Don Juan Fernandez Manrique left Genoa for Spain in June. See above, p. 384.
  • n19. "Bossa," thus in the original draft, of which I have obtained a copy from Simancas; but Bassetto or Bussetto must be meant,
  • n20. "Y que seria muy necessario que antes que se inovasse cossa alguna con los dichos estados, por no hacer cossa de mas grande confussion, ó por ventura de extrema desesperacion."
  • n21. "Con que se hiciesse de manera que en la dicha investidura no se haga mencion dello."
  • n22. The copy has "Su Magestad," which is decidedly a mistake of the writer or copyist. "Que la oferta de los dos millones no habia procedido de Su Magestad (r. Su Santidad), mas que los que habian hablado en ello, se habian alargado."
  • n23. "Si el Papa no passa mas adelante á offrescer alguna assistencia particular al dicho Rey de Francia, en sus guerras, lo qual es de creer que no hará aunque tuviese voluntad para ello, por excusar gasto y no se obligar à mas grande peso."
  • n24. "Agravios y sinrazones."
  • n25. "Y vituperaron reciamente el rescate que le ban hecho pagar, y la obligacion en que quieren tener al dicho arçobispo, y ban ofrescido de dispensar en el en todas promesas."
  • n26. "Y la cosa se ha hablado de manera que podrian entender que se podria usar de hazer otro tanto especialmente contra algunos cardenales."
  • n27. "Sobre lo qual se mirará de ussar segun los terminos que tenran, y el successo de las cosas lo mostrará."
  • n28. "Assegurando à Su Santd para este effecto por nuestra parte de lo que à Nos tocará de hacer, y que en ello no habrá falta en ningun tiempo, y dizien-do lo que mas à proposito conviniere para conservarla como eatá dicho, no dex-ando por eso de avisar à Su Santd y amonestar à los suyos para que las cosas publicas y nuestras sean miradai como es razon."
  • n29. Margaret, the Emperor's natural daughter, first married to Alessandro de Medici, duke of Florence, and afterwards to Ottavio Farnese, duke of Camarino.
  • n30. The duke of Ferrara (Alfonso I. d'Este) died in 1534. He was succeeded by his son Hercole II. (b. 2 April 1508, d. 3 Oct. 1558), who, in 1527, married Renée, second daughter of Louis XII., king of France, and Anne de Bretagne. Claude, the eldest, had since 1514 been married to François, count of Angoulême, and duke of Valois, who succeeded Louis XII. on the throne as Francis I of France.
  • n31. That is, Francesco III., who succeeded his father Frederico in 1540. He died on the 21st February 1552, and was succeeded by his brother Guglielmo.
  • n32. That is, Francesco Gonzaga III., married to Catharine of Austria, daughter of Ferdinand, king of the Romans.
  • n33. Piccolomini, duke of Malphi (Amalfi). See Vol. VI., Part I.
  • n34. Guidobaldo II., from 1535 to 1578. He had a brother named Giulio della Rovere, who in 1549 became cardinal and archbishop of Ravenna.
  • n35. Pope Paul III. (Alessandro Farnese) was elected in 1534. Pier Luigi was his son.
  • n36. Ottavio, who, in 1538, married Margaret, the Emperor's natural daughter.
  • n37. "Y ayudaros de él para la buena enderesce (sic) de ellos, teniendo respecto á los terminos que usará el Papa y el contentamiento ó por el contrario que él tuviere."
  • n38. "Una hacanea blanca guarnecida."
  • n39. Alessandro Farnese, Paul III.'s grandson.
  • n40. At this time D. Fernando Tavera, who died on the 1st of August 1545.
  • n41. "Para que nos podamos ayudar desto para los gastos de la provision de las fronteras de Africa y guerra contra infieles, y otros gastos que de presenta se nos afrecen."
  • n42. "Y assi mismo para que en lugar de los juros que tienen de las rentas reales algunas abbadias y monesterios se les anexen de los prestamos que vacaren otra tanta renta para que los dichos juros buelvan à nuestra Camara Real como mas particularmente vereis por las dichas nuestras cartas."
  • n43. "En lo que toca à los abusos, agravios y sinrazones que por la Sede Apostolica se hacen cada dia á nuestros reynos de Castilla, etc."
  • n44. Martin Valero, who, however, died before taking possession of his see, or executing the Emperor's commission. See Gams' Notitia Episcoporum, &c.
  • n45. For Segovia, Antonio Ramirez, who occupied the see till his death in 1549; for Calahorra, Juan Ramirez, after whose death in December 1544, Juan Bernal Diaz de Luco, or Lugo, succeeded. For Lerida, Martin Valero, who died before taking possession of his bishopric, when Fernando Loazes was appointed.