Spain: August 1544, 16-31

Pages 297-310

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1899.

This free content was digitised by double rekeying and sponsored by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. All rights reserved.


August 1544, 16–31

17 Aug. 183. The Queen of Hungary to the Imperial Ambassadors in England.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Messieurs,”—The Sieur de Torcquayne (sic) has arrived here riding post by the Emperor's commands, and is now sent to England in haste to visit the King in his name, and at the same time inform him of the conditions under which the town and garrison of St. Dizier surrendered, as you will see by the letter of which the Sieur de Torequayne will be the bearer, and which he has orders to show you, besides giving any verbal information that may be requisite. You are particularly requested to give him every help and assistance for seeing the King, and delivering the Emperor's letter, and saying or doing anything else that you may think proper or convenient.
As it seems that our common enemy is hardly enough pressed by the King's army, and in consequence, all their forces are being withdrawn from Picardy, and as is well known marching towards Champagne, there would be no harm, We think, in letting that King know of it in passing, and hinting as if it came from you exclusively that the enemy's withdrawal from Picardy and the countries nearest to the English is chiefly due to the fact that His Imperial Majesty is advancing towards the centre of the kingdom of France, whilst he himself (the King) remains at the limit or extremity of it, and that he can scarcely harm them, and that in Our opinion it would be reasonable and at the same time highly convenient that, according to his agreement with the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga), when he was last in England, he would push on his forces into the enemy's country, now that the French, by the withdrawal of their own, are giving him greater facilities for an advance. He might thus inflict a good blow on the enemy, and make a breach into France. That is Our own individual opinion in the matter, but We leave it to you to make use of the suggestion, at a time and when the urgency of the Emperor's affairs and his service may demand it.—Anvers (Antwerp) 17 August, 1544.
Addressed: “Au sieur de Courrières et Messire Chapuys.”
French. Original draft. 1 p.
18 Aug 184. The Emperor to his Ambassadors in England.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Tres chiers et feaulx,”—Three days ago, on the 15th, your joint despatch of the 3rd inst. (fn. 1) was received, by which We learned what the king of England, Our very dear and good brother, and his ministers told you respecting the charge entrusted to the Sieur de Fremozelles, and what you yourselves had been able to find out in the matter. The King's ambassador residing at this Our Court (fn. 2) has also been interrogated on the subject, and shown Us the very letter which king Francis had sent him through Fremozelle, as well as the articles he (Francis) proposed, (fn. 3) and the copy of the answer which that King made upon the whole. The English ambassador further requested Us to acquaint his master with Our intentions of peace, and the terms and conditions which We should like to stipulate for it. Our answer to the ambassador has been that We thank the King, his master, for the frankness with which he has proceeded in this as in other matters in conformity with the perfect and very close friendship between Us and him, and that his answer to king Francis' letter is an excellent token of his very great magnanimity, constancy, and virtue, and so wisely conceived and worded that it could not be better. Thus the English ambassador was told, and the truth is that the King's answer to Francis' letter is very well written and expressive. We send you a copy of it, as well as of the two other letters and articles proposed.
As to the King's requisition through his ambassador that We should let him know what Our wish is, Our answer has been that We will gladly listen, in union with him, to overtures of peace in the manner and on the conditions detailed in his own letter to king Francis, and will take care that the points, conditions, and means touching Our person be transmitted to him.
At the same time, We deemed it fit and convenient to inform the English ambassador that king Francis, after the return to him of the Sieur de Bertheville, which happened about a week ago, and especially since he heard of the St. Desir capitulation and surrender, had again sent to request Us to intervene in the peace. For that purpose Our nephew, the duke of Lorraine, had come here [to Spire] to request and persuade Us to allow the cardinal of Lorraine (Jean), his uncle, to come with a safe-conduct to that effect. After the Duke came the friar, of whom We wrote in one of Our letters to you (Chapuys). We likewise informed the English ambassador of his arrival and mission, which was that, although We had already refused to treat of the marriage of Our daughter Maria with the duke of Orleans, Francis' son, or put forward instead other conditions and means of peace, yet a safe-conduct should be placed at the disposal of Hannebault, the Admiral [of France], then staying at Chalons, near Us, at the express command of king Francis. (fn. 4) The safe-conduct, as We were told, was to be personal for the said Hannebault, accompanied only by one other personage not named. It was granted as requested, and Francis' commissioners then brought forward four different sets of overtures for Us, to choose that one which seemed to Us best, or else to compose out of the four one to Our taste. You must know, for you were informed of it at the time, that We declined to receive the cardinal of Lorraine on the plea that We were not aware of his coming here by king Francis' commands, and also that he was too high a personage to come thus to Us on a private business of his own, and without Our knowing who sent him, and what was his object in coming. As to the Admiral, since his avowed purpose was to treat of peace, and he had instructions to that effect from the King, his master, to conform Ourselves with that King's wishes, We had no difficulty in conforming Ourselves to that King's wishes, and answered that the Admiral might come to Us by himself, or accompanied by another person of quality, such as king Francis would designate or appoint, and a suite or escort of not more than 20 mounted servants. Safe-conducts were then issued for Hannebault and his suite to last only for ten days. Should the Admiral come We will let the King know of it, and at the same time inform him of every step in the negociation, corresponding in this manner to the honourable and upright behaviour on this occasion.
It is for you to address the King on the precise terms of this Our letter, and in conformity with the above facts and in the best possible manner, so that the King may not be surprised at the arrival of the French admiral under the circumstances above related. After Our repeated refusals and Our many excuses to receive the cardinal of Lorraine and Mr. de Longueval, We could not persist in that determination. You will tell the King that if We have consented at last to receive king Francis' commissioners, it is solely to conform with his wishes and conduct in that affair, and not to appear as if We wished to render the peace impossible by rejecting every sort of overtures to Ourselves.
In order to satisfy that King and comply with his wishes, We inclose, for his inspection and yours, a copy of the Articles that have been drawn out by Our ministers as necessary conditions of peace—if there is to be one—as far as We are concerned. Perhaps they will be found too exacting, but We consider them reasonable and well founded, and We are now writing to the dowager queen of Hungary, Madame Our sister, to send you her opinion on the whole. Should she add or retrench anything from the said Articles, of which a copy is also inclosed, it will be your duty to exhibit them to the King thus amended, and after representing to him whatever you may deem most convenient for their justification, should the King still persist in wishing to know how far We consent to reduce Our demands, and what will be Our last word as to the conditions We ask for, you can tell him, if there be a fit opportunity for it, that he must bear in mind Our own obligations towards the Holy Empire by reason of Our Imperial dignity, and the great damage which the whole of the Christian Republic, We Ourselves, Our kingdoms, and countries have received through the patent, notorious, and inexcusable wrongs inflicted by king Francis, and that he be pleased to let Us know, under the above-explained considerations, what he thinks of the Articles proposed by Us, and if there is anything in them of which he disapproves; for being, as they are, founded on justice—as the King himself can see and judge—and not knowing of any particular thing more than another to which king Francis would rather submit—We could naturally not omit those acts of his by which he has caused Us manifest wrongs, for which he is bound to offer reparation. Again, We could not, if We had wished it, reform and moderate the said Articles before We knew for certain, through king Francis' formal overtures, what his principal aim is. It would have been, in Our opinion, far more reasonable that the king of England himself should have informed Us beforehand of the proposals made to him by king Francis, and what his own intentions are concerning them. Indeed, We doubt whether in acting thus the king of England is not sounding Us on that particular point, and wishing to know our final intention with a view to embody in himself or assume the leadership of the whole negociation. (fn. 5) Should the King speak to you of the moderation of the Articles, you can tell him that you believe that We shall be tractable enough as far as We can perceive what his own intentions are, and provided good security be obtained from the king of France that the treaty shall be carried into effect. This is a sort of thing to which great attention should be paid, not only for the sake of the king of England, of Our own particular and individual affairs, and of those of Our kingdoms and subjects, but of all Christendom at large, so that the French King may not have the power of breaking whatever conditions he himself has agreed to and resuming war, as he has done before in spite of' all his promises and oaths. From which conduct on the French King's part, were We again deceived by him, the greatest harm, damage, and loss of reputation might ensue for the king of England and for Ourselves, since both of us have so frequently experienced the little trust and confidence, if any, that is to be placed in his acts or in his promises. The shame and loss of reputation to Ourselves in particular would be immense, since We have experienced Francis's want of faith more than once to Our great cost and damage.
In addition to the above remarks and warnings, which you are instructed to lay before the King, it would be advisable that both of you—and especially you (Chapuys)—should look out for every possible occasion and opportunity of representing to him, as if it came from yourself, that in order to prepare the way for the said peace—supposing that king Francis really and seriously thinks of it, and intends to proceed on righteously, and willingly consents and submits to the ways and means, as well as with the necessities proposed by the allies—it would be advisable that the king of England should first try to ascertain as far as possible what are the will and intentions of king Francis respecting him, and that We Ourselves should endeavour to do the same on Our side, on the condition, however, that nothing shall be concluded by one or the other of Us two without the common and mutual agreement and consent of both parties, not only as regards the individual interests of both, but also with reference to the conditions to be stipulated and the securities to be demanded, each party continually and consecutively advising the other of the progress and incidents of the negotiation, always declaring and protesting to king Francis' ministers or commissioners that the allies will conclude nothing separately but only with the mutual agreement and consent of both. In that manner, as We take it, one might arrive sooner at the conclusion of the peace, for the king of England knows best what suits his own interest, just as We understand and know what is most convenient for Us. By acting thus each of the parties will promote his own individual interests, and We in particular shall attend to Our obligations and duties in what concerns Our Imperial dignity and authority, according to former treaties and late events, and the state of Our affairs at the present' moment in Our various kingdoms and dominions.
It would likewise be just and convenient that in their negociations for peace with the common enemy both the allied parties should pay particular attention to one important feature, which is, that king Francis—knowing, as he does know, that Our union is the only means of bringing him to reason, and making him keep to his promises and engagements—will do his utmost to divide and sow dissension and jealousy between us.
The affair being of such importance as you two—and more particularly you, Chapuys, who know by long experience what dexterity and tact are requisite to treat with the king of England, and are well acquainted with all the treaties between that country and the Empire, the last of which passed through your hands—cannot fail to acknowledge, it is very desirable that you attend with the utmost care to the above points. We beg you most affectionately that if you possibly can be near the King's person when he happens to cross over to Calais, you do your best to be by his side, even if you had to be carried in a sedan chair, or in any other conveyance, as it may be, (fn. 6) that you may negociate and treat of the above points, holding this as an axiom (maxime), that the King must be first persuaded and made to understand that We have done Our best to please him touching the above-mentioned Articles, and to show him that they are reasonable. That respecting the coming of the Admiral, or any other whom king Francis may send to this Our camp, We have granted it merely to give him pleasure, and imitate his own conduct in giving audience to the Sieur de Fremozelles (sic), and ascertain whether there be any foundation in the overtures which Francis is trying to put forward, all the time assuring him that whatever offers the king of France may cause to be made to Us, We most certainly will not accept any of them without consulting him first, and that in the same way We trust that he will with Us.
Of this you both shall take particular and assiduous care. Should French practices for the peace with England continue and progress, you are to watch closely, and try to ascertain how far the king of England's interests and Our own are safe-guarded and looked after, without allowing Our own personal and individual one to be submitted one way or other to the king of England's arbitration should he attempt it. That would never do. Indeed, it would be quite an unreasonable and dishonourable act considering the quality of each of us two, and We should be blamed hereafter and fall into disrepute for having placed in the king of England's hands that which concerns Christendom at large and the Holy Empire in particular, which We have promised under oath to protect and defend. Besides which, Our claims and pretensions against Francis are much greater and better qualified than those of the king of England, for that We have more frequently treated with the former, are more accustomed than he himself is to deal politically with the French; and last, but not least, that We have at present in the field a much larger force than that of the King, without counting in its number the foot and horse We have sent to his assistance at Our own expense.
For the above causes, and others which We need not specify here, the king of England ought to consider and bear in mind. Should you see an opportunity of laying them before him or his ministers, or else get the duke of Alburquerque to do so in his own name as if coming from him, We shall be glad, leaving entirely at your discretion to use either of the means proposed.
In conformity with what you (the Sieur de Courrières) have written, the inclosed letter for the duke of Alburquerque has been prepared. We trust that the latter will do his best offices in this affair. The same may be said of the Sieur de Buren, whom you will take care to instruct as to what he is to say to the King if consulted in the matter. We send you two words by way of credence to him.
We expect an answer to this letter as soon as possible, that We may know what you have done and what your advice is, and request you most particularly not to cease writing to Our sister in Flanders, and apprising her of all events.
No express mention is made in the inclosed Articles of the restitution of Hesdin, or of that of St. Pol and other towns, chiefly because nothing is said therein of St. Desir, Ligny, and Comersy, which We have since occupied, because the king of France is obliged to restore every town mentioned in the said Articles as having been unjustly taken or kept from Us since the rupture of the truce and commencement of the war, whereas the three above-named towns were taken only a few weeks ago, and there is no similarity at all between towns taken from Us—and which ought to have been restored long ago according to the letter of the treaty of Cambray—and the three last-named fortresses; for whenever the point comes to be discussed, Our first demand will be that all fortresses and castles of Ours taken from Us by the French before the breaking of the truce of Nizza, which king Francis still retains, are to be immediately restored, as well as other towns in Flanders or the Low Countries, which according to the note We expect to receive from Our sister, the Queen, may be exchanged for those We Ourselves have taken since We invaded France.
We have considered it necessary to inform you of these particulars, because if there should be a question there of St, Desir, Ligny, and Comersy, you may say that the taking and retention by Us of those three towns has nothing in common with the restitution by Us demanded of Hesdin, St. Pol, and others; and, above all, giving the King and his ministers to understand that the former are very important, especially so St. Desir, which is situated in the heart of France.
You may tell the King that on this very day, the 17th of August, the Count of Sancerre went out of St. Desir, and delivered the keys of it into our hands. The town was really and truly much stronger than was thought at first. Its garrison, when they came out, numbered upwards of 2,000 foot and 200 horse. We were glad that the town surrendered by capitulation, not only for the sake of the men We might have lost in storming it, but because had We had its walls battered with artillery, We should not have been able to repair the damage.
We are about to take a resolution and advance into France. Of the road which We may take, and what will be done next, the king of England will be apprised by Our first letter. We are very glad to hear of the good hope that the King has of the taking of Boulogne, and also of that of Montreuil. If the King could make his army, or a portion of it, march further into France, that would be the true means of bringing to reason the king of France.—Camp in front of St. Desir, 18 August 1544.
French, Original draft. 5 pp.
18 Aug. 185. The Articles of the Peace proposed by the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Whereas His Most Serene Majesty of the king of England has condescended for the weal of Christendom at large, and the remedy of its public affairs, to listen to the overtures of peace made by the most Christian king of France through the Sieur de Fremozelle and others of his ministers, provided the Emperor, himself, consents to do the same, and so treat of it, on means equally acceptable for both princes, as the close and perfect friendship between them requires; and whereas the king of England wishes to know what the Emperor's intentions and pretensions are on the whole, that he (the king of England) may inform king Francis thereof. His Imperial Majesty has been pleased to answer as follows:—
His Imperial Majesty conforms willingly and entirely with the king of England as to treating of peace for the very same reasons and considerations above-mentioned, that is, that God may be served, and Christendom at large benefitted through it, by means of the measures.
In the first place, regard should be had to the notorious harm and damage inflicted by king Francis upon the whole of Christendom, chiefly during the last war, the most Christian having successively, or at the same time, attacked the Holy German Empire, the king of the Romans, the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, Italy, the kingdom of Naples, the duke of Savoy, the Republic of Gennes (Genoa), and even several of the kingdoms depending from the Spanish crown.
As the damage and loss caused in so many countries and places were without excuse, and His Imperial Majesty is bound by duty as a Christian prince, he could not do less than defend and protect the sacred German Empire and the rest of the European powers, and repair the injuries and damages caused by king Francis' armies and fleets, frequently combined with those of the infidel Turk, not only on the side of Spain, but also at Nyce and its citadel at Gennes (Genoa), and in the kingdom of Naples.
The king of France in particular shall be obliged to restore to the Emperor all and every one of the provinces, districts, or towns which he has occupied and still retains, with compensation for the damage caused by the said occupation since the beginning of the last war, which he suddenly recommenced [on July 1542] without any legitimate cause or reason, and without the previous usual challenge; for when His Imperial Majesty was most confident, and trusted in the truce of Nizza, and thinking of nothing else but of attacking the Turk with all his forces, when he had at great cost made, and was still making, immense preparations to attack the Infidel in his own dominions, he (king Francis) suddenly, and without notice, invaded Flanders and the Low Countries, and so commenced hostilities, which the Emperor was naturally obliged to resist.
The aforesaid restitution and satisfaction is also to comprise Estenay (Stenai), which is notoriously a fief of the Empire, which king Francis has lately obtained in a most strange manner from the last duke of Lorraine (Antoine “le Bon”), without making the slightest duty or acknowledgment for that Duchy, and having, on the contrary, occupied and retained it, very much against the will of the Duke, to whose ancestors the German Emperors committed it to be held in fief. The more so, that king Francis has made of the said Estenay a convenient place wherefrom to invade, as he has done, the neighbouring duchy of Luxenburgh, of which Estenay is a moveable fief. (fn. 7)
For the same uncontrovertible reason, the king of France is bound before all things to restore to the duke of Savoy (Carlo) whatever he has taken from him since the beginning of the war in Piedmont, as well as in other parts [of Italy]; for not only is this duke expressly named in the treaty of Nizza, but king Francis can hardly allege justifiable reasons for having made war against him and usurped part of his patrimonial estates.
As to king Francis' renewed pretensions about Milan, which he now brings forward as the means of ensuring a lasting peace between us, this must be said with regard to them: that by renewing his application, king Francis gives the World to understand that he will rather have war than give up his claims to that duchy, since it has been fully proved and demonstrated, as is notorious, that neither he nor any member of his family has, or ever had, the least right to its possession. On the contrary, that the peace may be made just, reasonable, and lasting, it is necessary, nay indispensable, that the king of France restore the duchy of Bourgoigne (Burgundy) and vicounty of Auxerre, which belong by right (irreflagablement) to His Imperial Majesty, and to his heirs whoever they may be, as their own and exclusive property and patrimonial estate, the occupation and retention of which is so unjust, that king Francis is bound to restore the whole of it, besides the fruits and taxes collected or levied therein during his violent occupation of the same.
In order, therefore, to arrive at a peace, if it is to be secure and lasting, it is also requisite that the king of France restore entirely to the duke of Savoy the whole of the provinces, districts, towns, and lands taken from him, on this as well as on the other side of the Alps, since it is notorious and manifest to all peoples that the said violent occupation and retention of the Duke's various patrimonial estates is unjustifiable in the eyes of God and of the World. His Imperial Majesty cannot do less than persist in the aforesaid restitution, not only out of duty towards the Holy German Empire, but also because the Duke himself and the princes his sons, his confederates, and near relatives are Our allies and friends and consequently intitled to all the benefits and advantages of a treaty made between Us and the king of France.
Besides the points above touched upon, it will be necessary that king Francis and his ministers promise to observe and keep really and truly all and every one of the stipulations contained in the Madrid Convention and subsequent treaty of Cambray.
With regard to the rights and claims of the king of England, no particular mention is herein made, because although His Imperial Majesty has as much at heart the king of England's affairs as his own, yet up to this hour he does not know what those claims and demands are or may be. (fn. 8) His Imperial Majesty, however, trusts that as the King's affairs and his own are and will be in future one and the same as the union between the two Majesties, Imperial and Royal, promises to be everlasting and indissoluble, the king of England will one of these days declare and explain what his own views respecting the peace are as is befitting and convenient for him and his people to do.
Should, however, peace be made, with God's pleasure, their two Majesties, Imperial and Royal, ought to take particular care that before signing the treaty, securities should be obtained of all and every one of its conditions being faithfully kept and observed hereafter for the public welfare of Christendom at large, as well as the common and particular advantage of the contracting parties, their persons, kingdoms, and estates.
Indorsed: “Articles de paix proposes par l'Empereur ajoutés à la lettre de l'Empereur à ses ambassadeurs en Angleterre.”
French. Original draft. 5 pp.
— Aug. 186. The Emperor to King Henry.
Wien, Imp. Arch. His Imperial Majesty begs the Majesty of England to take the above statements into consideration and weigh the very great justice, reason and equity of the points above specified and the duty and obligation under which His Majesty is of adhering to, and demanding them from the king of France. Should the Emperor's demands seem excessive, it must be borne in mind that the causes given by the king of France are still more so, and the reasons which His Imperial Majesty has for putting them forward.
No mention is made in the above paper of the allies and confederates of the two Majesties, Imperial and Royal, under the supposition that they will be expressly named at the proper time and place, but His Imperial Majesty particularly presumes that the Holy German Empire will be comprised in the present peace, as well as in any convention or treaty likely to ensure the future welfare, tranquillity and safety of all and every one of the states comprising that Empire, and that the same be understood with regard to Italy, considering His Imperial Majesty's close union with that country, and its various Powers and Republics. (fn. 9)
French. Original draft. 1 p.
18 Aug. 187. Jehan De Montmorency and Eustace Chapuys to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Sire”—Having heard by a letter from Mr. de Roulx (sic) that the forces the French have in these parts were about to join the Dauphin's army in the district of Amiens (lez Amiens), and thence march all together against Your Majesty, and moreover, that the French themselves are spreading the rumour, that they and their King are now on pretty good terms with the English, and have almost made some sort of treaty with them, we (Be Courrières and I) considered it convenient and opportune to call on this King's privy councillors, and represent to them, the personal danger in which Your Majesty would be, if by adhering strictly to the treaties and capitulations made in London last year—and trusting, as Your Imperial Majesty no doubt does, and will do, that the king of England, your ally, would reciprocally do the same, and—taking the route traced in the agreement to march on Paris, conjointly with or separately from Your Imperial Majesty—you had penetrated, as you fully intended to do, into the heart of France. (fn. 10) We told them that considering the force the French have, should they join together, as rumoured, and go away from where they now are, there would be no fear of their attacking or otherwise molesting the English camp, even supposing their number to be much less than it really is. It seemed to us (we said) that since military operations on our side required much time and consideration, it would be advisable, and at the same time very convenient, as far as the victualling and provisioning of the English army is concerned, that a number of horse and foot be detached from it and invade some part of French territory, which would prevent, or at least delay the Dauphin's reported advance, or diminish his forces (fn. 11) by obliging him to detach part of it, towards the threatened frontier. There was besides every probability that if the English, in a sudden attack of the French frontier, should find the towns and villages of the invaded district unprovided for the defence, some molestation (fascherie) and harm would be caused to the enemy, especially if the attack was directed against Saincte, Ricquerque, and other neighbouring places, it would be desirable, that to Mons. de Beuren and Landenberger's, cavalry a number of English infantry considered sufficient for the enterprise should be joined.
With regard to the rumour spread by the French of their being in intelligence with the English, we said to them that the report seemed to be a pure invention of theirs. We told the privy councillors that we believed, as the Gospel, that a prince so virtuous as the King, their master, was, and having such regard for his own honour and reputation, would never do that without first informing Your Imperial Majesty of it. Yet that on many considerations of their own it was to make use of the occasion of such rumour and reports, which will, no doubt, be increased by the sudden arrival of Monsr. de Ryon at the English camp before Montreuil, on the 12th, when he came accompanied by eleven more gentlemen with the permission (congé) and safe-conduct of Monsr. de Norfolk.
The privy councillors' answer to the above observations of ours, was as follows: As to the first point, that they would report to the King fully, and in detail, and let me know his answer, and secondly that we might be sure that their master's constant affection and regard for Your Imperial Majesty continues as strong as we believed it to be. As to the arrival of Monsr. de Ryon at the camp of Montreuil, they knew nothing of it, and thought that if it had really taken place the King, their master, would be anything but pleased with it.
On the ensuing morning we sent for the answer and our man was told that the King himself would summon us to his presence after dinner, the privy councillors adding that the King, their master, was a virtuous prince (de vertu), and never forgot anything.
21 Aug. 188. Eustace Chapuys to the Queen Of Hungary.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Madame,”—By the enclosed copy of my letter to the Emperor Your Majesty will see the news of this country. I, myself, could add nothing save to say that this King has requested me to beg Your Majesty to prepare and get ready the transport ships, which he wants for the passage of his troops across the Channel and, principally, to hasten the fitting out of the warships, which are to be of the size, tonnage and armament most convenient for the service. They are to be royal vessels, with crews paid by Your Majesty, and not like last year's private vessels (navires aventurieres), for otherwise it will be impossible to retain and make use of them in the service as long as they will be wanted.
Certainly the King wants a good deal of help in the way of draft-horses for this his expedition to France, for besides those, of which he intends employing for the carriage of provisions for his army, at least for 20 days, he has caused several wooden towers (forts) to be constructed, to go on the top of carts, and also several mills to grind as they move along. As Your Majesty wrote to me lately about the great difficulty there was in Flanders to procure horses, I have suggested to these privy councillors that since they are sending across the Channel some thousands of live oxen for the supply of meat to their troops, they might employ part of them in the dragging of the said carts; but they have not approved of the suggestion, either for want of men to drive the oxen, or because they do not like them to be so much worked, but to be kept as fat as possible.—London, 21 August 1544.
Signed: “Eustace Chapuys.”
French. Original draft. 1 p.
23 Aug. 189. The Queen Of Hungary to the Imperial Ambassadors In England.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Messieurs,”—After seeing the two letters of the Emperor, my lord, to you of the 18th inst., in one of which he refers entirely to me, to add or retrench anything from them that might appear ambiguous or indiscreet, (fn. 12) I really did not know what to add to the contents of the said letters, you being so wise and discreet, especially knowing as I do know your ability, and diligence, and being sure that you both will make the best possible use of the instructions therein contained, as the importance of the affair requires.
This, however, I must state, that although in both the Emperor's letters to you, it is positively asserted that the King's answer in writing to the overtures and offers made by the Sieur de Framoselle, in the name of the king of France was inclosed, I have in vain looked for it among the documents annexed; I have only found two copies of the King's offers, one of which I suppose was included in the packet instead of that King's answer to Framozelle, which, as I say, is missing.
I take this opportunity of requesting you to let me know as soon as possible how that King has taken, or will take, the fact of His Imperial Majesty having granted a safe-conduct to the Admiral of France (Hannebault), and everything else you may hear about this King's intentions and designs.—Brussels, 23 August 1544.
Addressed: “A Courrières et Chapuys, du XXIIIe, d'Aougst (sic) 1544.
French. Original. 1 p.
31 Aug. 190. The Emperor to King Henry.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Tres hault, etc.”—We are now writing a few words to Our good and beloved sister, the dowager queen of Hungary, that she may put herself in communication with you through Our ambassadors at your Royal Court. Please to attach faith to whatever she may impart to you in Our name, as if Our letter to her had been addressed to you.—From Our camp, three short leagues from Chalons, (fn. 13) on the last day of August 1544.
French. Original draft. 1 p.


  • 1. No. 17.1, p. 283.
  • 2. Nicholas Wotton, dean of Canterbury, and, by this time, of York.
  • 3. No. 134, p. 219.
  • 4. “Comme aussi avyons fait le dit ambassadeur requerir tres instamment que, non obstant que euasions reffusè de non traicter le mariaige de la princessc nostre fille avec le due d'Orleans, et de mectre en avant autres moyens de paix, que voulsissions accorder assheurance pour le sicur de Hannebault, admiral de France, estant au costel de Chalon prochain de nous.”
  • 5. “Et doubtons que le dit roy d'angleterre nous reserche sur ce point de sçavoir nostre finale inteneion pour embrusser tout le traicte.”
  • 6. “Quant oyres vous y devries faire pourter en litiere ou autrement comme quil soit.”
  • 7. The whole paragraph is rather obscure; I reproduce it as in the copy before me: “Estenay estant notoirement du fief de sa dite mate et le quel il a, ce nonobstant estrangement obtenu du feu due de Lorrayne, et sans en avoir faict aucun debvoir ni recognaissance, aynsi celluy occupé et detenu violentement (sic), tellement quil a esté commis et devolu, et apparticnt entierement à sa dite mate imple tant plus que le dit sieur roy de france a faict du dit Estenay la guerre au pays de Luxembourg, dont il est mouvant (?) de fief.”
  • 8. “L'on ne s'avança en ceçy de riens toucher quant aux droits, actions et pretensions du dit sr roy d'angleterre, combien que sa dite mate imple ne les aye moins à cœur que les syennes propres, comme s'est, et sera tousiours une mesme chose et perpetuelle unyon de leurs deux mate et leurs (sic) successours, royaulmes et pays pour aultant que sa dite mate imple confye entierement que sa maiesté royale les declairera et esclercira comnie il est requis et convient à lay et aux syens.”
  • 9. There is no date to this paper, but as it seems to form part of the preceding I have not hesitated to calender it here.
  • 10. At this time, on the 18th of August, St. Dizier had been taken after a siege of several weeks, and the Emperor was about to penetrate further into France.
  • 11. “Du moins de lui faire disminuer sa vende” says the original, but sa bande is no doubt meant.
  • 12. “Qui sont si bien et discretement escriptes auxquelles je ne sçauroys, etc.” A marginal note in the hand-writing of one of queen Mary's secretaries, has the following: —“Les mots soulignés doibvent estre cancellés.”
  • 13. That is at La Chaussée, near Chalons, in the dep. of La Marne.