Spain: September 1544, 1-5

Pages 310-327

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1899.

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September 1544, 1–5

2 Sept 191. King Henry to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Varia, Fasc. 23.
Has duly received the Emperor's letter brought by the Sieur de Tourcoigne, (fn. 1) and heard from the lips of the latter the news of his successes against the common enemy. Hopes soon to be able to report similar news of his own. Tourcoigne, who is now returning home, will inform him in detail of what he, himself, has seen and witnessed here at Our camp before Boulogne.—September the 2nd, 1544.
Signed: “Henry.”
French. Original. 1 p.
2 Sept. 192. The Queen of Hungary to the Imperial Ambassadors in England.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Messieurs,”—The English ambassador residing at this Our Court, called the day before yesterday (31st of August), on Us, and said that the King, his master, wished that 100 lasts of gunpowder should be purchased for his service, (fn. 2) and commissaries appointed to procure it in this country; adding that the price of the said gunpowder ought, by no means, to be higher than that which the Emperor pays for his. That at the same time the King wants a good number of carts and waggons (chariots), to carry the gunpowder to his Royal camp, and lastly wishes that We be pleased to order the release from prison of an Italian named Jehan de Salerne, whom be (the King) intends employing in matters of his Royal service.
And first of all, We find the quantity of gunpowder called for by the King, namely, 1,200 casks (tonnels), each cask being of 300 pounds weight, very excessive. We have this very day sent a message to the ambassador representing to him that in the King's last letter the supply of gunpowder applied for in this instance was only 40 casks—already a large quantity—whereas, now, the demand is more than double, i.e., one hundred, which can by no means be procured here, or bought at this present moment. (fn. 3) As the ambassador insists upon having the last named quantity, We have given him. permission to export the quantity asked for, if he can find it in this country, and granted to the English commissaries the requisite license to purchase the same, &c.
As to Ourselves executing their commission that is a thing never done before, even in the case of the provisions of that article for the Emperor's army; that is not in Our power to do. Even if the Emperor, Our brother, wanted gunpowder for his army, he would send his own agents to contract with the merchants for the quantity and price of it, without obliging the manufacturers themselves to agree to his own terms. All We can do to please the King in this respect is to order Our master of the ordnance to accompany the King's commissary or commissaries to the powder mills, and bestow on them such advice and help, as he would to His Imperial Majesty's agents.
Respecting the carts, which constitutes the second demand of the English ambassador, Our answer has been that We very much regret that owing to the great quantity of them required for His Imperial Majesty's and the King's army at the commencement of the late war, it is materially impossible for Us to furnish the number now asked for, especially at the present moment, when daily requisitions are on foot to send provisions, ammunition, money, and all manner of things for the Emperor's army, besides which it would be much cheaper and quicker to send the gunpowder by sea. Yet We assured the ambassador that should there be means of furnishing the said carts, which We very much doubt, no effort shall be spared to accommodate the King, and We would do Our best to give him pleasure in that respect.
At this reasoning of Our ministers' the English ambassador seemed at first rather dissatisfied, and said hurriedly (fn. 4) that if the King, his master, cannot have from this country all he requires for his army, he will have to raise his camp and go elsewhere since he cannot be supplied from his own Kingdom, which words from the lips of an English ambassador We find rather impertinent and ill-natured, since they seem to imply that should the king of England experience any want in his camp, he would raise it and excuse himself from keeping faith with Us. The ambassador's words, however, are matter for serious thought, and We urgently request you to speak to the King about this, and, whenever the opportunity offers, represent to him, with due modesty, and make him understand, that at all times and on all occasions, We have done for him all We could do, and that We are still ready to do his pleasure. As a proof of this We have just signed an order for the master of the ordnance to help and assist the ministers of the king of England to procure and purchase the said gunpowder, and likewise the carts for its transport, whether by land or sea, on the best terms. You both are particularly requested to speak confidentially to the King on these subjects, and let Us know the result of your conference.
As to Jehan de Salerne, We are glad to have been able to order his release from prison at the King's request, so that he may go wherever he pleases.—Brussels, 2 September 1544.
Addressed: “To the ambassadors of the Emperor in England.” (fn. 5)
French. Original draft. 2 pp.
3 Sept. 193. Eustace Chapuys to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Sire,”—On the 18th of August Monsr. de Tourcoing arrived here, (fn. 6) Next day both of us accompanied him to the King who received him most kindly, and showed much pleasure and joy at the letters which he brought from Your Majesty, with news of your good health, respecting which he made most particular inquiries. The King was also most pleased to hear the news of the surrender and capitulation of St. Disier, the terms and conditions of which Mons. de Courrières and I (Chapuys) detailed and explained to him according to, and in conformity with, a paragraph of Your Majesty's letter to the Queen Regent, which we happened to have with us. The King was also glad to hear through us two that Your Majesty had been delighted to hear by our letters that there was a good hope of this town (Boulogne) and Montreuil being soon taken. This hope the King failed not to confirm, telling us that before long there would be a fine exploit against the town, for his men had already gained much ground in advance, and were close to the walls. (fn. 7) And upon our remarking that it was very important for Your Majesty and for him that all military operations against Montreuil should be accelerated for fear of the many inconveniences that might arise, such as plague in his own camp, or revictualling of the town by the French, he replied that there was no fear of that, inasmuch as the enemy had no great forces in that quarter, having sent the most of their army to encounter Your Majesty. This last sentence from, the King's lips opened the way for us to represent to him, that if so, all the weight of the war would fall on Your Majesty, since, trusting that the English would invade France by another frontier, Your Majesty had placed yourself in the hazardous position in which you now were (fn. 8) and that in our opinion, it would be advisable that he (the King) should detach part of his own forces towards Abbeville and its vicinity. To this the King replied in the same terms he had done on a former occasion, adding that even if he chose he could not do it for he had not sufficient force with him to invest Montreuil on every side, besides which (the King said) there is little, or no appearance at all, of king Francis wishing to fight a pitched battle, knowing, as he must know, how strong and well provided for the Emperor is. Landenberg's four thousand foot must since have joined him, and increased his army; the garrisons of Lingny (Ligny), Commersy and other fortified towns taken from the French, had been recalled to the Imperial camp. Even supposing that the French really wish to fight a battle with the Emperor, it will certainly not be on account of the towns and fortresses taken from them—which after all are not so important as they are represented to be—but because they expect the suceour of 12,000 infantry from Switzerland.
This last remark on the part of the King aroused my attention and that of my colleague (De Courrières), for only a few days before, whilst treating of the Swiss, and of the means to be employed to prevent them from enlisting for French service, the King said openly that he did not care a straw for the Swiss; he was sure they would not enlist for the service of king Francis, or if they did, that it would not be so soon as people imagined and circulated, for they (the Swiss) wanted first to be paid in cash certain arrears of pay due to them, and asked for other conditions far more advantageous than those under which they had served France at other times.
In this way did the king meet every one of our arguments until, perceiving that we could not convince him, my colleague and I passed on to another no less important point. As the King, himself, had not said a word to us concerning Framozelle's arrival at the camp of Montreuil, we asked him what news he had of the French envoy, since the period of twenty days fixed for his return to the camp before Boulogne had nearly expired. The King answered without hesitation that Framozelle had arrived at the camp [before Montreuil]; had been entertained and well taken care of thereat, until he himself (the King), had received news from Your Majesty that Framozelle had whilst there [at Montreuil] forged the copy of a letter, (fn. 9) which he affirmed had been written to him by Monsr. de Saint Martin, in which letter it was expressly stated that king Francis had spoken at some length with the said Saint Martin on the renewal of the old friendship [between him and king Henry]. That in consequence of that he had sent for Monsr. de Saint Martin (who denied altogether having written the said letter), in order to have him confronted with Framozelle.
Such was the King's answer to our joint interpolation on Framozelle's business. He (the King) has since told us (De Courrières and me) that the Frenchman no longer maintains that the letter in question was actually written by Saint Martin; he now says that it was a blunder on the part of the scribe, who, when transcribing the letter for him (fn. 10) made the mistake; and the King, I must say, showed discontent and annoyance at all this, and especially at Framozelle having positively asserted that the King, his master, had never solicited Your Majesty for peace and friendship and that “nothing in this world would induce him to do so” (fn. 11) —an assertion (remarked the King), which I know to be completely false and contrary to truth, not only by the reports of my own ambassadors, resident at the Emperor's Court but by what you, yourselves, have told me. Another cause for the King's displeasure, which, however, has since turned out to be well founded, is that Framozelle's wife had left Boulogne during the siege of that town, and that her husband's negociations at the English camp were connected with some intrigue or other for the relief of Boulogne in combination with the garrison and the people of that town.
Since then, on the 27th ult, Your Majesty's letter of the 18th, together with the articles, (fn. 12) which it is your intention to propose on the matter of the peace, has come duly to hand. On the following day, my colleague and I waited on the King, to whom, for the justification of the contents of that letter as well as of the articles therein inclosed., we failed not to make use of the same remarks and representations as contained in Your Majesty's letter, adding, moreover, to them whatever else came to our minds as most fit and opportune to accelerate one way or other the conclusion of the affair, at the same time requesting him (the King) to be phased to let us know his intentions as soon as possible. In short, we told him that haste on this occasion was more needed than ever owing to the Admiral's (fn. 13) announced visit to Your Majesty's camp. Should he (Hannebault) go thither much good might be done for the conclusion of a peace so desirable on all hands. Should he (the king of England) send, in writing, as Your Majesty has already done, a resumé of what his intentions and demands are (said we) all overtures relating to union, intelligence, truce or peace, friendship and mutual confidence will be better understood if they relate especially to Tour Imperial Majesty, than if they are treated in general terms, (fn. 14) and, therefore, we begged him to declare to us as soon as possible his final intention on the whole.
The King seemed pleased at this suggestion of ours, declaring to us that since he found it reasonable, and approved of it entirely, he would set about it without loss of time, and let us know.
From the above and similar expressions my colleague and I gather that the King has taken in good part your Majesty's interference in the affair, as well as our trying to ascertain with the respect and discretion used in such cases what the French will say about it; in fact he again owned to us, as he did on a former occasion, that it was always desirable for both the allies to know beforehand what the then common enemy is aiming at.
Yet with all this we cannot help suspecting that whatever mien he (the King) may put on he is displeased at, and resents the appointment of, so high a personage as the Admiral of France (Claude Hannebault) to go to the Emperor on a mission of peace, when those sent to him on a similar errand like Framozelle and others, were of much inferior class. True it is that my colleague and I have heard him often say that he cares not for that, and that he is perfectly indifferent as to whom the French send; but we think otherwise, and suspect that the personages chosen by king Francis as plenipotentiaries at Your Majesty's court are for some reason or other distasteful to him, for he keeps saying to his courtiers and ministers that the Admiral is not a man of ability (homme d'espoit) capable of treating such matters, and as to the Cardinal of Lorraine that he has no credit at all either with king Francis in or France. He, however, said nothing to us concerning the arrival of Mons. Byon at the camp before Montreuil, nor of a servant of a gentleman named Mons. Lavigne, (fn. 15) who two days before had brought to Boulogne a letter of king Francis for him. (fn. 16)
In the course of our representations to the King respecting the care to be taken and attention to be paid to the security and observance of the stipulations and articles in the future treaty of peace, not only as to its chief points but as to its details, we told him that the French, being as they are, cautious, subtle and malicious, might easily grant in the first instance all that was ashed of them, with a view to extricate themselves out of present difficulties placed, as as it were, between the binding clauses of the treaty of closer alliance and the appearance of everlasting confraternity and friendship of your two Majesties. As long (said we) as the observancy of the treaties remained in their hands, and, as it were, at the will and discretion of the French, the latter are sure to do what they have done hitherto on many occasions—that is, turn the negociation to their profit in cases of less importance—and Tour Majesty and he (the King) had so often experienced their bad faith that the utmost care was needed in treating with them.
The King's answer was that he knew that well; had it not been for the sake of Christendom and its weal, which he cherished as much as any one, he would have refused to treat with the French owing to thevr total want of faith in political matters. He held it as certain that, as we had just pointed out to him, the French were evidently looking out for means and ways of creating jealousy and separation between the allies, thinking that in a game between two players a third may be found to pay the scot (fn. 17) “You may well believe (continued the King) that I am not so deficient in common sense as to forget taking my precautions with the French.”
Coming afterwards to the point of hostages for the security of the stipulated conditions, we (my colleague and I) failed not to call his attention to the many inconveniences that might arise therefrom, especially in case of the death of one or more of the hostages. To this the King replied that the right way to proceed in such matters was to ask for fortified towns or castles to be retained as security for the conditions of the treaty; but as that would not be granted by France he believed that all insistence on that point would end in a rupture of the negociations. On our again representing to him how important it was that he should take a resolution in this affair of the peace, he told us that the proposition ought to come from the French rather than from Your Majesty or himself, for the longer they (the allies) waited the less profit would the French gain by their endeavours to make a separate peace with the two allies, as, in the meantime, Your Majesty's good success might continue, and he, himself might take possession of this town of Boulogne and Montreuil also, which would place the allies in a much better position. (fn. 18)
We will not omit to say, while on this subject, that after the King had expatiated at length, and with a certain complacency on the number and quality of the personages likely to compose the embassy coming to him in representation of king Francis—of which embassy, by the way, he (the king of England) seemed both proud and vain-glorious—my colleague and I remarked that he was individually entitled to so much honour and regard, that were king Francis to come to him in person, that honour and regard could not possibly be thereby increased. Indeed, that one might very well say of the proposed French embassy what a certain [politician] said in a similar case: “If the ambassadors come with bad intentions and as enemies, they are too few for that, if, on the contrary, to treat exclusively of peace, they are too many; for to go straight to the point without noise no such number was required” Truth persuades itself; in short, even for treating [of peace] and setting people to sleep [about their future plans], no such numbers were wanted (fn. 19)
The King was evidently pleased and flattered at this observation of ours respecting the honour and glory attached to his individual person, for he took in good part all we said to him on the subject, and ended by stating that he laughed at the stratagems employed by the French, (fn. 20) and did not care for them. If so, my colleague and I can very well say “Amen” though, to judge from various trifles in which he (the King) has already tried to indulge the French, it may be doubted whether his opinion of them, as expressed to us, is really sincere. We must add that the King at this audience did not tell us whether safe-conducts for the French ambassador had or had not been prepared, and if they had, whether the embassy would be received or not; but one of the gentlemen of his Royal household has given my colleague and me to understand that a castle named Ardelot, halfway between this town and Montreuil was at first designated as the place of meeting of the deputies of both nations, but that since then the King had changed his mind, and given orders for some other place nearer to this town, to be looked for and selected. As to the safe-conducts for the French deputies, they had not yet been drawn out owing to the King's privy councillors wishing to know beforehand the day when the respective deputies or commissioners were to assemble and hold their conferences, as well as the number of horse which Your Imperial Majesty had agreed should constitute the Admiral of France's escort. (fn. 21)
We have not considered it opportune to touch upon the point about which Your Majesty wrote to us on the 18th, namely that this affair of the peace should be treated in Your Imperial Majesty's presence, for that would require that each of the contracting parties should try to understand well, nay ascertain, the intentions of the enemy, and at the same time learn thoroughly what the pretensions of the allies are in common and separately. (fn. 22)
Next day, however, we begged Secretary Paget to come to us, which he did, and then, as if the idea originated entirely with Ourselves, and adding of course such protestations as the affair itself required, we represented to him what seemed to us most convenient respecting the above points. Paget made no other answer to our request than a promise to lay the matter before the Privy Council, and take care that after deliberating upon it a report should be addressed to the King.
On the evening of the preceding day the above-mentioned Secretary (Sir William Paget) sent us a copy of the articles, against which my colleague and I had protested, requesting us in the King's name to append our signatures to them according to the promise made to their ambassador at the Imperial Court by the viceroy Ferrante Gonzaga and Monseigneur de Granvelle. We at first refused to sign that paper on the plea that we had no instructions whatever from home concerning it, either directly from Your Majesty, or from the above two ministers (Granvelle and Gonzaga). Then Paget renewed his application and prayer, exhibiting and giving us to read the original letter of the English ambassador, stating under his signature and seal, that both those Imperial ministers (that is Granvelle and Gonzaga) had really and truly told him that instructions would be sent to us to sign the paper above alluded to.
Seeing the insistence of these people we promised to do so, provided their ambassador should do the same, respecting the articles presented to Your Majesty by this King, of which we had also a copy. The said Secretary also said that Your Majesty's articles had been approved by the King, their master, who had found them good, only that it seemed to him as if they had not been drawn up exactly as the King wished them to be, that is gradually (de degré en degré) so that after ascending to the top of the ladder, one might descend step by step according to the exigency of the case, or the pressure of time and circumstances, to which remark of the Secretary's we replied that we thought Your Imperial Majesty had gone down the least number of steps possible on the ladder (fn. 23) In short, the Secretary's visit this time was exclusively for the purpose of making my colleague and myself append our signatures to the articles, which we did on the spot.
Since then we have never ceased soliciting daily the King's final resolution on this and other pending matters, but, as the privy councillors tell us, the affair is so important, and they, themselves, are so much engaged with the daily occurrences here that they can very seldom meet and deliberate and come to a resolution thereupon, they cannot send their report to the King as soon as they might wish. This is the answer we got every day of this week from them, until yesterday, the 2nd, when we received that of which we will write hereafter, which answer, as we take it, has been delayed at least 48 hours, inasmuch as Sunday, the 30th of August, the King received a holograph letter from king Francis, begging for a safe-conduct for the cardinal of Paris (Jean du Bellay), the first president of [the Parliament of] Rouen, the marshal of France (Claude Hannebault), his first Secretary, and a gentleman of his chamber, and a captain of the Dauphin's body-guard, all of whom went hastily to Abbeville in order to meet afterwards at Calais, Guisnes (Guînes), or elsewhere, as this King should decide. The King, himself, told us on the very day that he received king Francis' letter, for as my colleague De Courrières was out in the street he met the King, who stopped and told him the news. I (Chapuys) came up soon after, and witnessed the conversation, and it strikes me, to judge from his mien and manner, that the King was not only glad, but glorious and self-satisfied at having received from king Francis a letter of the sort and the offer of an embassy which, compared with that which king Francis is said to be preparing to send to Your Imperial Majesty, is likely to increase his own reputation, to which he attaches great importance. (fn. 24)
Yesterday morning, having sent a message to Secretary Paget to know whether the King had mistaken his resolution in the matter of the peace and would receive Monsr. de Torquaing (fn. 25) who was to apply for his congé to return home, he sent us word that since that envoy (Tourcoign) had received a full answer to the mission he brought from Your Majesty, and that besides the English ambassador resident at the Imperial Court had been written to, there was no need of his going to the King. Since then, however, having again applied to the Secretary and stated that the King had positively assured us that before Monsr de Tourcoign's departure for the Continent we should hear the King's final resolution on the whole, and that we were anxious to forward the same to the Emperor, he (Paget) sent us word that we might either go to the King at the same time as Monsr. de Tourcoin, or to the Privy Council, as we chose, and there ask for the Royal resolution, which would be communicated to us without fail. Of the two means proposed, ray colleague and I preferred going personally to the King, not only for the more prompt execution of the special charge entrusted to us, but because we wished particularly to hear that resolution from his Royal lips, as well as any observations he might make on the subject. Accordingly that very day, after dinner, all of us went and presented to him the queen of Hungary's letter of excuse for not being able to remit to him the 40 lasts of gunpowder he had asked for, but promising that if that amount could be found in private hands, she would do her best to accommodate the Royal commissaries with it.
Having heard the contents of the Queen's letter, and her excuses, which he seemed to accept graciously, the King thinking that he had done with us, and that our only object in soliciting an audience had been for the purpose of putting the said letter into his hands—not recollecting, perhaps, that he had promised to give us a definite answer on the occasion, and before Monsr. de Tourcoign's departure, or rather feigning that he had suddenly forgotten the fact—he abruptly turned towards the Imperial messenger and began to speak to him. We then mixed in the conversation, and took the very first opportunity that offered of reminding him of his promise, saying to him that he knew well where Your Majesty was and how you were situated, and how important it was for you to hear, as soon as possible, what his intention and resolution was respecting peace or war, for the expense of keeping up an army as considerable as Your Majesty's was very great. “That army (we said to him) has so far advanced into the enemy's country that it is necessary, nay indispensable, that the Emperor should be apprised beforehand of what he (the king of England) intends doing.” The situation of the parties, we added, is very different; he (the King) is, as it were, at home, (fn. 26) in a place from which he might withdraw and go away at pleasure; and, as we have more than once represented to him, in war as well as in peace, that diligence and opportunity are the chief factors, he could very well understand that, if this affair of the peace with France is to go on as slowly as hitherto, there will be no end to the negociations. In short, we again begged him to tell us what means and ways he thought there were of hastening a solution of the present difficulty.
The King's answer was that he knew of none; upon which we proposed to him, as coming exclusively from us, that since Your Majesty was so near to him, and he himself seemed so desirous of peace, there would be in our opinion no difficulty at all in your undertaking the management of the affair, having as you had as much and more regard for his interests than for those of the enemy (fn. 27) however for the cause above specified. Thus much did my colleague and I impart to him though we did not particularly insist upon it.
The duke of Alburquerque has gratefully received the. letter which Your Majesty caused to be written to him. There is, as he says, nothing he desires so much as to be of service to Your Majesty anywhere and in everything. We are sure that he will do his best to please Your Majesty. He is so annoyed at the procrastination and coldness of these people that every day that passes seems to him one year. Among other wishes of his he has the very natural one of going back to Spain (fn. 28) and attending to his own private affairs. This he intends to do as soon as the present war comes to an end one way or other.
With regard to Mons. de Buren and his letter we have spoken to the King. Though owing to his absence he (Buren) has been unable to take any part in these last occurrences; his letter will be of use in future, especially if the practices that have begun should continue.
Respecting the siege of this town we will not trouble Your Majesty with further details, especially as Mons. de Tourquaing, who has carefully inquired into everything, will soon take his departure. As to Montreuil the generals in command of the English before that town, even the duke, of Norfolk and the Lord Privy Seal (Sir John Russel), who have come here, and stayed several days, despair of taking it by force of arms unless the King sends a larger force than that which they have under their orders, so as to allow them to surround and invest other towns in the neighbourhood as well as to prevent the garrison of Montreuil from receiving victuals by one of the gates. (fn. 29) Already scarcity of provisions begins to be felt therein, so much so that no meat can be obtained, and the men eat horse's flesh when they can get it. Even bread was getting scarce according to the report of deserters, two of whom had arrived at the English camp. Indeed, certain ciphered letters of Monsr. de Bietz (sic) to king Francis had fallen into the hands of the besiegers, which being deciphered were found to contain the following words:—“It seems to me as if the English are more confident to take me by the beak than by the hands, (fn. 30) and therefore I beg and entreat Your Majesty to provide for the wants of this garrison and send us wheat and other provisions, in the manner and way that the bearer of this, my letter, will point out.”
The above-mentioned Monsr. de Tourcoign and we two, have made every possible effort to get a definite and final answer to Your Majesty's proposals; but the King has intentionally delayed the same from day to day, telling Tourcoign and us (De Courrières and myself) whenever we have pressed him too hard, that we must have patience and wait a little longer, for he wishes and hopes that at the same time that he sends his answer he will be able to send also some good piece of news—meaning, no doubt, the taking of this town. Then recollecting suddenly that the term he, himself, had fixed for his answer was the day of Monsr. de Tourcoign's departure, he again begged us to retain that Imperial messenger a few days longer at the camp, at least until the arrival of another, who might be the bearer of this dispatch. (fn. 31)
Shortly after our return from the King, one of the gentlemen of his Chamber brought us a copy of the articles, which he said his master was about to remit to his own ambassador at the Imperial Court, the exorbitance of which, by the way, needs no enhancing on our part, for the gentleman in question boasted of it, and whoever peruses them will at once pronounce them to be exceedingly harsh. The articles were drawn in English, and, when interpreted to us, and compared with those of Your Majesty, it seemed to us as if they differed materially. We applied for copies of them in French, but hitherto not one has been sent to us. (fn. 32)
As Your Imperial Majesty, by your incredible and inestimable wisdom, is more able than we ourselves are to judge what this King's intentions and inclinations may be at the present moment, all remarks and observations of our own would be perfectly superfluous, and our poor and valueless advice upon the whole quite unnecessary. Yet in obedience to Your Majesty's express commands we will state our opinion in two words: this King has for the present no other intention, wish or desire, than to gain possession of this town. He has frequently told us so, and has since repeated it to us many a time with a certain emphasis is more important to him than Paris itself. (fn. 33) Indeed he already considers Boulogne as his own, so much so, that he is thinking of erecting inside and out several buildings in the way of fortifications and pleasure houses.
In short we have no doubt that once master of Boulogne, which he keeps telling us is of more importance to him than a march on Paris, he will not move further unto France unless he saw a fair chance of gaining also Montreuil. To this latter enterprise he would perhaps attend with all care and energy, not indeed as we think to add it to his other acquisitions, but to keep it with a view to making a better bargain in the event of peace, for unwilling as he is to spend his money, and not having abundance of it at present, he is not likely to undergo willingly the expense of raising new fortifications there and elsewhere to guard and defend his conquests. Indeed we really think that once Boulogne and Montreuil are taken the King will gladly listen to proposals of peace with France, more expeditiously and lightly perhaps than it would be suitable for the effect and security of it, especially if the French commissioners, who came here for the purpose, endeavour, as most certainly they will, to gain by fair words, or otherwise corrupt and bribe with money and presents, those who surround this King, which attempt, however, we shall take the utmost possible care to prevent.
It seems, moreover, to my colleague (De Courrières) and to me (Chapuys) that should Your Imperial Majesty entertain the least idea of distributing pensions [among this King's privy councillors] this would be the fit season and time for doing so. May Tour Majesty be pleased to think of this and likewise of the expediency of gratifying the King by sending us, as he himself has requested, due powers to represent Tour Majesty at the meeting of the Commissioners. If so, Tour Majesty may be sure that your commands and Instructions will be punctually executed.
At this very moment, whilst writing the above lines, the privy councillors send to my colleague and to me two copies of the “Articles and Conditions” which the king of England demands for his peace with France. Both are in English, (fn. 34) the councillors having made excuses on the ground of the excessive and troublesome work they have in hand, and the press of time which, as they say, has prevented them from having a French translation made. Another copy has been forwarded to their ambassador at Your Majesty's Court with orders to have it put into French; but as it often happens that translations from English into French and vice versâ, made abroad or here by two different persons, though similar in context, do not exactly agree in words, as happened last year with English papers and documents translated here and at Brussels, my colleague and I are of opinion that besides the translation, which the King should have ordered his own ambassador to make, another one be made [at Brussels] so as to have them compared together and kept in reserve. (fn. 35) —Camp before Boulogne, 3rd September 1544.
French. Original, partly in cipher.
n. d. 194. The King of England's Articles for the Peace.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Whereas the Emperor is contented in respect of the common weal of Christendom, and for the redress of the affairs of the same, and at the instance and request made unto him on the behalf of the French king by the Sieur Dannebault, (fn. 36) admiral of France and the bailif of Dijon, to give ear to a treaty for peace, having given them safeconducts for that purpose with protestation that his kingly Majesty do the semblable, and that such means be set forth by the said French king as may be agreeable to both their Majesties, for as much as the kingly Majesty has been desired by the Emperor's ambassadors in the name of their Majesty to [make] known his intention in that behalf to the intent [that] they might advertise to the French king thereof His Royal Majesty thought good to declare the same as follows:
That is to say: His Majesty Royal is well contented, as the said Emperor is, to treat of peace for the same respects and considerations of Christendom that the Emperor does, and so that such covenants and agreements be made, and with such assurances as be reasonable, and required for both their Majesties.
Firstly, whereas, notwithstanding [that] the duchies of Normandy, Guyenne, and Aquitaine do belong, and of right belong, and as is well and probably known do appertain to His Majesty Royal is his own proper inheritance, His Majesty for the avoiding of the shedding of Christian blood, and in the hope to have preserved with the forbearing of his particular right the universal state of Christendom more quiet and [in] tranquillity has been pleased to accept of the aforesaid French king a yearly pension of one hundred thousand crowns or thereabout, which the said French king has, contrary to his promises and treaties, withheld from His Majesty's hands nearly eleven years. His Majesty requires that all the arrears of the said pension may be presently paid to him off hand, and likewise all such sums of money as His Majesty has by means of the aforesaid French king been obliged to disburse both by sea and by land, as well as for the recovery of his right—which the said French king detains [for his armaments] from him as of such other charges as His Majesty has been put to by the wars of Scotland, procured and much maintained by his aid, counsel and support. (fn. 37)
Secondly, His Majesty requires to have restored to him and delivered into his possession the realm of France, the duchies of Normandy, Guyenne, and Aquitaine (fn. 38) —over which His Majesty has so just and evident title and right that the said French king might so restore, allowing His Majesty all such profits as the same—usurping now of a long time the possession of the said realms and duchies of Normandy, Guyenne, and Aquitaine—has perceived and taken; and albeit His Majesty Royal has the cause of his good brother, the Emperor, no less to heart than his own, even as to the amity does appertain, desirous that such assurances may be made for both their parts as may be to the benefices of them and their posterity, yet His Majesty Royal makes no mention of the right, titles, and interests that the Emperor pretends against the said French king, and by cause he has already caused the same to be presented to His Majesty Royal by Messieurs Eustace Chapuys and the Sieur de Courrières, his ambassadors, not doubting but that the said demands before expressed for the part of His Majesty Royal seem reasonable to the said Emperor, and meant to be performed, and satisfied as well as in respect of the just causes His Majesty Royal had to make the same, as for that also His Majesty requires restitution or accomplishment of some other things than is expressed in the treaty passed between their Majesties, and therefore trusts his said good brother will the rather see them performed as the amity between their Majesties does require.
Indorsed: “Double des articles du roi d'Angleterre. (fn. 39)
English. Contemporary copy forwarded from England to the Emperor's Court. 3 pp.


  • 1. The same individual elsewhere named Turcoin (Tourcoigne) or Torquain; but there must be some mistake in the date of the King's letter (the 12th instead of the 2nd?) for, as will be seen hereafter, on the 8th of the same month queen Mary announced to the Imperial ambassadors in England the departure of Tourcoigne for Boulogne.
  • 2. “Que le roi, son maistre, desiroit provision estre faicte par deça de cent lastz de pouldre.”
  • 3. “Sur quoy, en premier lieu, quant à la dicte quantité de pouldre trouvant icelle bien grande et excessive, comme de XII tonnelz, chascun tonnel d'environ IIIc [livres] pesant, lui ai aujourd'hui faict remonstrer que le dit sieur roy par ses dernieres n'en avoit demandé que XL 'lastz,' qu'estoit encoires beaucoup et que doubtons les pouvoir recouvrer de par decha.”
  • 4. “Dont le dit ambassadeur du commenchement ne se monstra assez satisfait, ains luy eschappa [de dire] si le dit roy nauroit diçy ce que luy seroit besoing, que luy (qu'il lui) conviendroit lever son camp puisque de son roiaulme ne le povoit recouvrer [ce] que je trouve propos bieu fachieux et tendans ad (sic) ce que survenant quelque faulte au camp du roy, il le leveroit et prendroit excuse sur moy. Sur quoy gist bien à penser, vous requerant bien instanment en faire discours par boune modestie et convenable opportunité au dit roy, et luy faire bien entendre que par le passé n'ay cessé donner toute la meilleure addresse que m'a esté possible au bien de ses affaires, comme encoires suis preste faire en ec qu'est en ma possibilité.”
  • 5. A note on the dorse, in a contemporary hand, states that a duplicate of this letter was forwarded to the Emperor on the 4th of September.
  • 6. “Au dixhuitieme du mois passé (August)” are the words in the text, but there is a remarkable contradiction, for, as it has been said (p. 310, n.), Tourcoigne (here called Tourquan) is said to have left Brussels on the 1st of September. Only by supposing that instead of the 1st of September the 21st of August is meant, and. that his arrival at the camp took place on the twenty-eighth of the said month of September, can the dates he made to agree.
  • 7. The passage stands thus in the copy:—“Disant que bien tost I'on en verroit quelque bon exploit, puisque ses gens avoient desja gaigné pays jusques pres de la muraille, et que d'ailleurs ilz approuchoient de beaucolp (beaucoup) plus pres deux (de ceulx) de dedens (du dedans), veuillans estre avancees (sic) oultre de la muraille.”
  • 8. “La quelle en confiance que see gens marcheroient en France par aultre coustel s'estoit mise en l'hazart (le hazard) ou elle se retrouvoit.”
  • 9. “Que le dit Framezelle (sic) avoit forgé la copie d'une lectre qu'il affirmoit luy avoir esté escripte par le sieur de Saint Martin.”
  • 10. Monsr. de Saint Martin, see above p. 295. The passage reads thus:—“Et quil avoit la envoye [chercher] le sieur de Sainct Martin, que nyoit avoir escript telles choses pourle confronter avec le dit Framozelles. Et à ce que nous a dit depuys le dit roy, le dit Framozelles n'a voulu soustenir cela avoir este escript par le dit de Sainct Martin le tout à la culpe de celuy qui avoit escript la dite copie.”
  • 11. “Tant pour cela que pour luy avoir donne [à] entendre et affirmé bien expressement que le dit roy n'avoit onques fait solliciter de paix et amitió v[ost]re. mate, et ne le vouldroit faire pour chose du monde.”
  • 12. See above No. 154. p. 298. “Depuis, à sçavoir le vingt septieme du dit mois passé.”
  • 13. Claude Hannebault.
  • 14. “Joint que l'union, intelligence, tresve faicte, amitié, et confidence se congnoistroient trop mieulx parlant de vostre mate particulierement [an sujet] des affaires et dicte, intention du dit sr roy, que settlement de tenir propos en general.”
  • 15. “Ne aussy dung serviteur dung gentilhomme, nommé monsy de Lavigne.”
  • 16. That of the 20th of July, No. 155, p. 253.
  • 17. “Et quil tenoit pour certain qne, comme luy disions, les dits françois ne taschoient à riens plus que de mectre quelque desunion, suspection ou jalousye entre v[ost]re. mate et luy pour parvenir au dit effect, pensant que le tiers payeroit premier le dot (l'eschot?) et que l'aultre apres en payeroit sa part.”
  • 18. “Il nous reprint (respondit) que le geste devoit estre plus tost du coustel de France que de vfe. mate, car quant plus ilz attendroient ilz en feroient tant moins leur profit pour austant, que cependant v[ost]re mate pourroit continuer en son bon success, et luy de l'aultre coustel prendre ceste dicte ville et Monstreul (sic), que leur encheriroit bien leur marchie.”
  • 19. “Et que l'on pourroit dire d'iceulx ce que disoit l'aultre, que s'ilz viennent pour enemys ilz sont trop peu, si pour ambassadeurs ilz estoient trop, et que pour aller secretement (directement?) et à la realité ny falloit tant de gens, car la verité se persuade de soy mesme, mais que pour practiquer et endormir le monde tost estoit dobsoing (tant n'estoit de besoing?)”
  • 20. “Qui'l se gaudissoit des ruses et finesses des françois.”
  • 21. “Et que quant au dit saufconduit il n'avoit encoires esté expedié pour aultant que ceulx du Conseil du dit sr roy vouloient premierement adviser de respectivement se conformer au temps et nombre de chevaulx que v[ost]re. mate accordoit au dit admiral de France.”
  • 22. “Ce que besoigneroit qae chescun (sic) en son endroit, se parforce (parforçat) d'entendre jusques au bout l'intencion des enemys et ce que compestoit (compettoit) à sa prestance.”
  • 23. “A quoy respondimes qu'il nous sembloit que vre. mate avoit condescendu sur iceulx le moins quelle pouvoit.”
  • 24. “Et sembl [er]oit aux gestes et façons de faire da dit sr roy qu'il estoit non seulement joyeux mais assez glorieux des dites nouvelles pour sa reputation, ou il est fort fondé.”
  • 25. Here, as in other letters and papers, written “Torquen and Torquoing.” His name was Baudoin de Lanoy, sieur (lord) of Tourcoing or Tourcoigno in Belgium.
  • 26. “Et quil ne luy en prenoit ainsi comme à v[ost]re. mate pour estre içy comme en sa maison et en lieu dont il pourroit repartir et y sejourner à son plaisir.”
  • 27. “Ayant austant et plus de respect à donner à eon interest que à celuy des ennomis.”
  • 28. “Que les offres de par deça ne se avancent mieulx, et est si triste et ennuyé de la longueur et froideur de la procedure de ceulx-çy que chascun jour lui semble un an, pour entre aultres choses le desir quil a de soy retirer en Espagne.”
  • 29. “Et quant à ceulx de Montreuil les chiefs qui sont devant, mesmes le due de Norfolk et le Privisel quont esté içy divers jours desperans (desesperant) d'en pouvoir avoir bonne yscue [si] ce n'estoit [que] le dit sr roy leur envoye plus largement de gens afin de pouvoir environner toutes les villes et serrer l'une des portes. Mais que içy (que jusqu' içy) leur a esté libre. Tant y a qu'il y a plusieurs jours quilz sont en trez grande dizette de chair, et ont mangé de celle de cheval quant ilz en ont, comme ont rapporté deux qu'en sont sortis.”
  • 30. “Les anglois ont plus de confidence de me prendre par le beq que par les mains.”
  • 31. “Et inspiré du premier terme quil avoit donné, nous pria quil, Monsr. de Tourcoign, attendist un peu plus, pour [ung] aultre [courier], au moins pour emporter ce present depesche.”
  • 32. “Les quels n'estoit besoing quil nous blasonna[st] estre exhorbitants comme dit est, car il le temoignoit assez de soy mesme. Il les nous envoya on Anglois, et à ce quil nous fust interpreté, la narration estoit fort different[e] et comme contraire de celle des dits articles de v[ost]re. mate. Nous le priames de les avoir en françois, mais encore ne les nous ont rapporté.”
  • 33. “Toutesfois pour obeyr à v[ost]re. mate disons que le dit sr roy n'a autre intention principalement que de gaigner et empourter ceste ville, la quelle comme desja aultresfois nous a dit, et de rechief nous a refresche (rafraiché?) luy importe trop plus que Paris, la quelle [ville] il tient quainsi comme pour sienne, devisant desja de faire en icelle et dehors plusieurs edifices tant de fortz que de plaisance, et [est] à doubter que 1'ayant obtenue ne se souciera de marcher plus avant, n'estoit qu'il eust grand espoir de soubdainement empourter Monstreul (sir) à la quelle emprinse en tel cas entendroit volontiers non point, comme croyons, pour la tenir que pour en faire ses conditions meilleures, car comme il despent (depense) mal volontiers, et ne se trouve trop furny d'argent, il ne se vouldra mectre en plus grandz fraiz pour la fortification et garde d'icelle, et pensons qu'ayant conquis ceste ville il entendra volontiers à la paix, et plus legierement quil ne convicndroit à la seureté d'icelle, mesmes venant devers luy telz causseurs quilz [qui] ne fauldront par parolles et presantz (sic) à gaigner et suborner ceulx qui sont autour de luy. Et nous sembleroit, si v[ost]re. mate avoit oncques envye (envie) de donner pensions à quelqungs de ceulx [çy], il en pourroit bientost estre la propre saisou. Il plaira à v[ost]re. mate y avoir de 1'advis, et aussi quant à gratiffier au dit sr roy à l'endroit des pouvoirs, quil demande pour nous, du quel [envoy] ne s'en usera que puntuellement comme commandera v[ost]re. mate.”
  • 34. Two copies in English exactly alike are in the Imperial Archives besides a French translation made at Brussels.
  • 35. “Pourroit estre que ores que la substance fust tout une, toutesfois les motz des deux translateurs pourroient estre divers, [ce] que sonneroit aucunement mal, et que quant au proheme ne leur avons semblé y riens changer pour non estre chose d'importance, aussi ne 1'eussent ilz osró faire sans cousulter le dit sieur roy leur maistre, dont ce (sic) depesche se fust par trop prolonguée.”
  • 36. Claude d'Annebault or d'llannebaut, who succeeded Brion-Chabot in the charge of Admiral of France.
  • 37. “Supportacion” in one of the copies.
  • 38. These demands of French territory are substantially the same as those contained in the challenge and intimation of war read by the duke of Norfolk to the French ambassador in June 1543 at Westminster. See Vol. VI., Part. II., pp. 407–11.
  • 39. Evidently one of the two copies mentioned by Chapuys in his preceding letter of the 3rd to the Emperor; see above No. 193, p. 323.