Spain: October 1544, 1-5 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1899.

'Spain: October 1544, 1-5', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544, (London, 1899) pp. 377-393. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol7/pp377-393 [accessed 25 April 2024]

September 1544, 26–30



1 Oct.	216. The Emperor to his Ambassadors in England.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Hof. Corresp.	“Tres chiers et fealx,”—The day before yesterday, on Cur arrival at Mons, your joint despatch of the 26th and 27th ult, (fn. 1) came duly to hand. Yet as We were then, and are still, on Our way [to Brussels], “We could not answer you as fully as We might have desired. Even now We have only leisure to state, in as few words as possible, that your two despatches of the 20th and 22nd of September, (fn. 2) containing a summary of the conversation you held with the King and his ministers on the subject of Our peace with France, have been duly received, and their contents carefully examined in Our Privy Council.
	As to your answers to the objections made by that King's privy councillors and ministers, We can only say that We have found them pertinent enough, and that We approve of them in every way; (fn. 3) for the truth is, that We have done nothing of which the king of England can possibly complain, nor have We, since Our peace with France, omitted to do whatever We deemed proper and fit for the preservation—and, if possible, for the increase—of that sincere affection and friendship which unites Us both.
	As to what Secretary Paget told you of Germans quitting Our service and. going over to that of king Francis, it will be found upon inquiry that, on the contrary, measures have been taken expressly to prevent that contingency.\| Orders have been issued for all Germans now leaving Our service to collect at certain spots close to the frontiers of their respective countries.
	Towards that end We Ourselves have sedulously worked, a considerable sum of money having been spent in the execution of Our commands. In fact, it may be confidently asserted that, declining to listen to the various proposals and suggestions which from time to time have been addressed to Us or to Our ministers by the two cardinals, and other great personages of the French Court, We have always taken care not to infringe in any way Our treaty with England. Nor have We, on the other hand, in the least infringed the treaty by ordering Buren's auxiliary division to retire and go home, nor in other matters in which We have constantly been solicited to intervene. (fn. 4)
	As to the objection raised by the King's privy councillors, that in Our treaty with France there should have been a clause stipulating that immediately after the signature of the same, the two armies—the French and the English—were to retire from the field, God knows how much We should have desired that some such stipulation had been inserted, and that the differences standing between the two countries had been quickly and satisfactorily settled; but as you (Chapuys) know, and very properly answered when the objection was raised, the king of England has constantly given Us to understand that he wishes to arrange his own affairs, and that particular one, by himself, without the intervention of anyone; (fn. 5) whilst he kept all the time assuring Us that he would soon become the master of Boulogne, and of Montreuil also. These very sentiments he expressed to the bishop of Arras when the latter spoke to him on the subject while at the camp before Boulogne, this being the chief cause for the French sending the whole of their army in that direction, resolutely determined as they are to recover Boulogne at any cost, even if they lose six different battles before its walls.
	With regard to the last Articles presented by the king of England, detailing the conditions under which he would consent to a peace with France—which Articles he wishes Us to bring forward and recommend to king Francis's ministers, or rather oblige the latter to accept the same, however reluctantly, as well as appoint commissioners or deputies of their own to discuss them with the English—that is a sort of thing which We cannot promise to do as warmly and urgently as the king of England wishes Us to do; and yet We have not failed to speak to the Admiral of France (Claude de Hannebault), to cardinal Lorraine, and to cardinal Tournon, who now happen to have the government of France in their hands, about it. All and every one of them have formally declared to Us that the conditions asked by the king of England are exceedingly hard and exorbitant.
	But to come to the point. Yesterday, after a careful and minute examination of your joint despatch of the 26th, and having previously considered what could be done in this matter in order to please the king of England, We ordered the Sieur de Granvelle to remain at Mons, and wait there for cardinal Tournon, who arrived in that town at 11 o'clock in the morning. (fn. 6) Of what passed between the said Cardinal and Our own Privy Seal (Granvelle), in the presence of the French ambassador, (fn. 7) you (Chapuys) will be apprised by the enclosed copy of the Article, which will be made for the bishop of Arras, and likewise by the Instructions We gave him for his mission. This We did with a view to induce king Francis to send to king Henry an embassy to treat of a peace of some sort, which peace, if concluded, would be immediately followed by the withdrawal of the two armies from the field. This course of action We particularly suggested to the Bishop, and We again recommend it to him and to you, in order that should king Francis send immediately his ambassadors to treat with England, that most desirable object may be attained, and the armies of the belligerents may retire at once from the field. The Bishop and you (Chapuys) shall work sedulously at this, and make every effort for the said French embassy to be sent and received thereat, for the above-mentioned cardinal Tournon has positively declared that there will be no difficulty at all on the part of the King his master. In fact, should both Princes be prepared to mutually accept reasonable conditions, Our intervention in that affair would no longer be required. (fn. 8) Respecting this most important point, and the reasons and arguments to be used by you in your endeavour to carry it out, We refer you particularly to the contents of the said Article, and also to what We may in future have to write on this subject according to the state and disposition of affairs; and We need scarcely say that, in carrying out these Instructions of Ours, We expect you to use the utmost diligence, as well as your never-failing tact and discretion.
	The chief point of the negociation will naturally be that of the town of Boulogne—about which, by the way, you say nothing at all in your joint despatch; for if the king of England has resolutely made up his mind to keep it in his power, there can be no doubt that, on the other hand, king Francis will never consent to treat for peace, as you may judge from the Cardinal's original note on the margin of the Article in question. In fact, it would be extremely difficult, in Our opinion—if not altogether impossible after the Cardinal's formal declaration to that effect—to induce king Francis to let the town of Boulogne remain in the hands of the English. Whatever the other conditions of the future treaty of peace between England and France may be, certain it is that king Francis will never consent to that town remaining for any length of time in the hands of his enemy, not even as a pledge and security for his debt to England, for fear the King should cause its castle to be further strengthened whilst in his possession, and thereby be tempted to retain it somehow. (fn. 9) That being the reason why the Sieur de Granvelle and cardinal Tournon have been of opinion—as you will see by the enclosed copy of the Article in question—that it cannot pass as it is, you (Chapuys) shall devote all your attention to that particular part of the future negociation, and whilst trying to gain the point according to Our wishes, ascertain how far the king of England is inclined to listen to the proposals of France, and what means and ways had better be employed to persuade him to receive the French embassy.
	Among the many remonstrances made by the Cardinal and by Monsr. de Morelte against the last Articles of England, the chief one is that the conditions proposed by the king of England for the peace with France are not only exceedingly harsh and contrary to what has hitherto been done in their former treaties with that country, but also repugnant to all sense of equity and justice, inasmuch as while an annual pension is insisted upon, the English want to retain and keep a portion of French Crown territory. (fn. 10) For nothing in the World, they say, would king Francis consent to the shame of being deprived of a piece of his Crown, as Boulogne is. The king of England (they said) ought to imitate the example We gave him by restituting all places taken during the last war. On the other hand, it ought to be considered that, if the king of England persists in his resolution to retain Boulogne, it will be very difficult for king Francis to attend, as he is in duty bound, to the defence of Christendom threatened by the Turk; and, if so, the fault will not be his own, but that of the king of England and those who advise him.
	It is, moreover, considered certain that should king Henry of England re-cross the Channel and return to his kingdom, the French ambassadors will not cross the Strait and go to England. Indeed, as Cardinal de Bellay (sic) has told Monsr. d'Arras, he and his colleagues in the former embassy were, and are still, much offended at their having been forcibly kept and detained nearly six days at Calais the last time they went thither. (fn. 11)
	To say the truth, it strikes Us that if the King's object is merely to gain time, he may accomplish his purpose more efficiently by waiting for the French ambassadors, and, when they come, treating with them—which, after all, would be by far the best way—or else, after hearing the nature and substance of the ambassadors' mission, finding some excuse or other for returning home suddenly, pretending that his Royal person is wanted in England. This, in Our opinion, would be the best way for the King to gain his purpose; for, as the discussion of the articles is likely to last several days, the King may easily allege in the meantime that his presence is wanted in his own kingdom, whereas his not waiting for the French ambassadors, and going over to England without hearing what they have to say, will probably arouse the suspicion that he (the King) is disinclined to listen to peace overtures.
	There is still another powerful reason why the King should wait for the arrival of the French mission, (fn. 12) which is, that during the discussion of the articles or conditions proposed by each party a suspension of hostilities could easily be obtained, and effectual means found of adjusting the differences between the belligerents, and of the two armies—that is, the English and the French—withdrawing at once from the field. The King then will remain as long as he pleases in his dominions on the Continent, and if, after all, notwithstanding the above-stated and other considerations, he (the King) decides to cross over to England, it would be requisite, nay indispensable, that he should leave behind some of his own privy councillors or ministers to carry on the negotiations in his name; the English deputies to be chosen among the principal and most confidential of the King's privy councillors, for otherwise We hold it as certain that king Francis's ambassadors will not condescend to treat with people of inferior rank and quality; nor would it be suitable and convenient for Us, considering Our intervention in that affair of the peace, and the part We wish and intend to take in it, both through you (Eustace Chapuys) and through the bishop of Arras, who is to be your colleague in the forthcoming negotiation, and whose arrival you must shortly expect. (fn. 13)
	You must, therefore, bear in mind Our instructions on this particular point, and carefully investigate and watch the proceedings, as well as the arguments of the English and French commissioners if they happen to meet.
	The above-mentioned French cardinals, Lorraine and Meudon, (fn. 14) said the other day to one of Our ministers that they were in receipt of reliable intelligence, that Our cousin, the Sieur de Buren, at his withdrawal from the English camp before Montreuil, had pitched his tents some where else in the vicinity of that town, and that they wished to know whether the report was true. The answer returned to them was, that if the news they had was correct, Monsr. de Buren must have chosen that position either from want of forage for his cavalry, of which he was known to stand in need, or else for fear of some contagious disease breaking out among his men, or some other reasonable cause, with the king of England's consent or previous agreement. (fn. 15) It will be desirable that you, Our ambassadors at the Court of England, put yourselves in communication with Our said cousin (count Buren) and procure that his behaviour towards the English in all military matters be so upright and friendly under present circumstances that the latter may feel now the same satisfaction and content at his services as they did on former occasions, and as the English themselves have frequently acknowledged up to this Our last peace with France.
	In addition to the above-stated remarks on the articles of England, and the opinions expressed with regard to them by Cardinal de Lorraine and others, We cannot omit to Eay that having, in conversation with the former, suggested the opportunity and mutual convenience of a suspension of arms between the belligerents, he (the Cardinal) approved thoroughly of Our idea. It seems, therefore, to Us that it would be a good and meritorious piece of work to undertake, more particularly for the English King under present circumstances, to try and bring on a truce between the belligerents, for the suspension of hostilities would naturally be followed by the immediate retreat of the contending armies and a longer truce, during which all differences might be peaceably adjusted or settled according to the state of political affairs in Christendom. We need scarcely add that if during the negotiations for that truce or peace We could intervene, with the perfect consent and agreement of the two parties, We would do the best in Our power to accomplish that aim. We have ordered the Sieur de Granville to speak to that effect to Cardinal de Tournon, who, as aforesaid, is expected here [at Mons]. (fn. 16) Of what may result from their conference, you [Chapuys] and your colleague (De Courrières), as well as the bishop of Arras, (fn. 17) will be duly apprised.
	French. Original draft. 5 pp. (fn. 18)
—Oct.	217. King Henry to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Hof. Corresp.	Is now sending to his ambassador at the Imperial Court (Dr. Nicholas Wotton, dean of York) certain important proposals in writing, which he (Wotton) is to submit to the Emperor or to his ministers personally, and at the same time ask urgently for a quick and definitive answer to them, such as their mutual friendship and close alliance demand.—Greenwich,— (fn. 19) October 1544.
	Signed: “ Henry.”
	French. Original. 1 p.
2 Oct.	218. Chapuys and de Courrieres to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	“Sire,”—The day before yesterday, after dinner, (fn. 20) we both accompanied this King to the place of embarkation, from his lodgings (logis) to the port. On the road thither we conversed with him of various matters, the purport and substance of which conversation being that which we lately communicated to Your Majesty. The King did particularly tell us that, whatever peace was made, he had no doubt that Your Majesty, as a virtuous prince, would faithfully observe the treaties. He was, however, astonished to hear (he said) that the French persevered in their hostility to him, and, therefore, could not conceive how, knowing their malice, Your Majesty had not beforehand informed him of it, and exhorted the French to put down their arms, since he himself had, on the advice and representation of Your Majesty, withdrawn his army and raised the siege of Montreuil. As long (he added) as the French kept theirs on foot Your Majesty was, by the strict terms of the treaty, bound to assist and help him.
	Our answer was that he (the King) might rely as much as ever on Your Majesty's perfect, complete, and sincere friendship, adding in general terms that nothing should be wanting on the part of your Majesty, and that whatever promises You had made would be fulfilled, to which the King replied: “I have always heard fine words; I wish to see them put into effect.”
	Although the chief topic of our conversation with the King was, as above stated, the peace with France, we must own that the King showed no resentment about it; on the contrary, he was more open and frank with us than when he first heard of it. This, in our opinion, is in a certain measure owing to the agreeable intelligence he has lately received of his own army before Montreuil having effected its retreat, and being already close to this place without having been at all molested in their march, save by occasional alarms without consequence. (fn. 21)
	A propos of this retreat of the English army before Montreuil, the King said to us that Mons. de Buren was one of the good lords and princes (this last title the King gave him) that he had ever known. He had so decisively fulfilled his duty all the time he had been at the English camp that he could not possibly have done better. (fn. 22) The King begged us to thank him personally in his name, and likewise to write to Your Imperial Majesty recommending, in the highest possible terms, the services of the said Mons. de Buren.
	The King also repeated to us the very words of secretary Paiget (Sir William Paget) concerning our departure or withdrawal from this place, begging us to remain here until new orders. This request of the King we both granted, promising to remain here, at Boulogne, as long as his own privy councillors, most of whom, as the two dukes, the Lord Privy Seal, the bishop of Winchester, the two treasurers, of the Royal Household and of the army, the Controller, and certain others, remained. The King having signified to us that it would be more useful and convenient that we stayed here, at Boulogne, with his Privy Council, instead of accompanying him to England, we willingly consented to it, subject, of course, to Your Imperial Majesty's commands, or till the arrival of our successors in this embassy.
	This very morning the duke of Norfolk and the bishop of Winchester called on us, saying that the French had massed the greater part of their forces at Ardres, and detached five standards of infantry (cinq enseignes) towards Oudenarde, (fn. 23) where they had been as well received and entertained as if they had been in the heart of France; but that, owing to the country where they are now, and that to which they intend going next, having been completely wasted and exhausted during the late war, it was doubtful whether they could remain forty-eight hours there without Your Majesty's subjects furnishing them the victuals they require; and, if so, it seemed to them (the Duke and the Bishop) that it was a very strange thing, and one much against reason and honesty, as well as amity and alliance treaties. On that account (they said) they had come to complain, and at the same time to request us to write immediately to Your Imperial Majesty, as well as to the queen of Hungary and others, on the subject, and declare that should the French wish for battle they shall have it, for they are determined to wait for their attack, where they now are, so much so that they (the English) are daily improving the defences of this town, and fortifying besides their own camp outside; they have a good number of foot, and a smaller of cavalry force, though it is to be feared that forage for the horses will soon be wanted.
	The carts and waggons they had from Flanders and the Low Countries have been sent away, the drivers paid and dismissed. (fn. 24) The dismissal, however, came rather late, as the French had already occupied the country. For this reason we have deemed it necessary to dispatch a trumpeter to the French camp to inform them of the circumstance, and request them to allow the above carts and waggons to return home without molestation, and were Your Imperial Majesty pleased to back our injunction to the French commanders, we have no doubt that the safety of the men and beasts would be ensured.
	The war ships of which we wrote last, after landing the King at Dover, have returned here for the purpose of their commanders asking our advice as to what they are to do next. We have told the latter that, since the said war ships were back in Boulogne, our advice was that they should, at the present juncture, remain in port until orders come from Your Imperial Majesty. Nothing, we thought, could be so gratifying to the king of England under the circumstances, and, therefore, we shall be glad to hear Your Imperial Majesty's pleasure and commands in that respect.—Boullongne, 2 Oct. 1544.
	Signed: “De Montmorency,” “Eustace Chapuys.”
	French. Original. 3 pp.
5 Oct.	219. The Same to the Same.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	“Sire,”—On Friday last the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk came to us very early in the morning, and said that, although on the previous day they had decided to further strengthen the English camp before Boulogne, and wait for the French, as we wrote to Your Imperial Majesty, yet, imagining that the enemy would be too long in coming and offering battle, and that during that time the provisions stored for the garrison might be entirely consumed, or else that the French, as they suspected, knowing that all their army was now concentrated at Boulogne, might perhaps waste, sack, and burn the flat country, they (the Dukes) had changed their plan of campaign, and decided to come here (to Calais) with all their army, except about 4,000 men, whom they intended leaving at Boulogne well provided, as they said, with victuals for at least four months. After the above communication, the two Dukes begged us to be prepared to follow them to Calais, which we actually did on the following day.
	Immediately after the departure of the two Dukes and of some other members of the Privy Council, as well as of the whole of the English force, Your Majesty's letter of the 1st inst. came to hand, together with the abstract of the article therein mentioned; and yesterday, after our arrival here, we fully declared and explained to the bishop of Winchester, whom the Privy Council had deputed, the contents of the letter and enclosed article as far as we considered it fit and convenient to do. This morning we were summoned to appear before the Privy Council within the Castle, where we did repeat the same statements we had previously made to the Bishop in private.
	With the first point of the above-mentioned article respecting the good, perfect, and affectionate friendship which Your Imperial Majesty bears towards the King their master, the privy councillors seemed quite satisfied, as well as with the arrangements made for the retreat of the German auxiliaries. Nor did the said privy councillors find fault at all with the reasons alleged by Your Imperial Majesty for not interfering with the retreat of the armies on both sides. The point, however, to which they listened with most attention, and concerning which we have reason to think they will require further explanation, was that of the proposed truce, for they fancy it will turn out to their profit; firstly, because it will reduce the expense of keeping up an army in the field, and secondly, because it may give them time to fortify Boulogne. It is, however, to be feared that the French will not agree to any sort of truce, save on the conditions specified in Your Imperial Majesty's letters.
	With regard to Monsr. de Bueren's (fn. 25) leave to quit (conge) we wrote on the 3rd inst. how satisfied this King had been with his services on the occasion, and what fine and praiseworthy words the former had uttered about him. We will, therefore, make no further remark on the subject, save to say that, this King having requested us to remain at Boulogne with his privy councillors, we did so until we came here [to Calais], and are still waiting for Your Imperial Majesty's commands and the appointment of our successors, which, we hope, will come down soon.
	In pursuance of Your Imperial Majesty's orders, we have tried to ascertain if there was any appearance or likelihood of these people being inclined to the restitution of Boulogne. We have no positive information as to that; but, in our opinion, there is very little chance, if any, of their giving up their conquest, not only on account of the profit and advantages which the King expects to derive therefrom, but from fear of the loss of reputation which the abandonment of such a place might entail upon him. Indeed, we are told that he, the King, values this conquest much more than if he had taken ten towns like Paris. (fn. 26)
	After our daily communication with the privy councillors, and also during the various conferences we have held with them, we have been requested, and frequently pressed to put down in writing whatever we have told them on the subject of the proposed truce, that they may report to the King their master. That, however, we have graciously declined to do, believing that their very urgent and frequent requests in that line cover some mysterious plan of their own, the more so that this very afternoon, after dinner, they themselves have dispatched a courier to the King, their master, to inform him of our conversation and arguments in the matter, and at the same time to beg him to send full powers to treat of peace or truce, as it may be. (fn. 27) Nor can we omit to say that these privy councillors have pressed us much to write to Your Imperial Majesty to be phased to issue orders that the French camp should not be allowed to pass through the Northern districts of Picardy, and likewise that a watchful eye should be kept over certain bulwarks (ballivarts) erected close to the swamps (marecages) and river of St Omer, for (said the privy councillors to us), should the French become masters of that bulwark, they might without the least difficulty penetrate into, overrun, and waste the whole country between Gravelinghes and this place [Calais]. (fn. 28) In addition to this they requested us to write a letter to the Governor of Gravelinghes for him to detach a few men from the garrison of that fortress and send them to St. Omer for the defence and guard of the above-mentioned bulwark, which we have done, whilst Your Imperial Majesty's orders to that effect are reaching their destination.—Calais, 5th of October 1544.
	P.S.—After the above was written, Monsr. d'Arras arrived here very late at night. As he has not yet communicated with us, we cannot, at this late hour, say anything about his charge. To-morrow morning we shall call on him, and after taking knowledge of his instructions will, conjointly with him, proceed to their execution, and report by our very first despatch.
	Signed: “J. de Montmorency,” “Eustace Chapuys.”
	French. Original. 3 pp.
	Addressed: “To the Emperor.”
5 Oct.	220. King Francis' Offers.
Wien, Imp. Arch.	The Most Christian king of France did once before, previously to his own peace with the Emperor, send his deputies to the king of England proposing terms for the settlement of their mutual differences. (fn. 29) This he did principally for the sake of Christendom's tranquillity and welfare; but though the terms of conciliation offered were reasonable (honnestes), and such as the king of England might have accepted at once, they were rejected, and the Most Christian King, in consequence of that refusal, was obliged to look out for other ways and means of conciliation, such as the help of arbitrators and fair judges (amigables compositeurs). (fn. 30) That is why, in his treaty with the Emperor, the Most Christian king of France agreed to submit himself to and promised to stand and abide by his judgment in all matters concerning his differences with the king of England, which differences were caused by, and originated in, certain treaties made between them. To this end the Emperor did offer to send commissioners or deputies fully empowered and instructed to do their work.
	As the Emperor, however, was of opinion that before having recourse to the above-mentioned submission, and to the arbitration therein proposed, as well as the appointment of the said commissioners or deputies, it was desirable to ascertain whether some means could not be found for both parties to come willingly to terms of peace, the Most Christian king of France, following the Emperor's kind advice and request, did send to His Imperial Court cardinal du Bellay and president Raymon (sic) (fn. 31) to hold a preliminary conference with the Emperor's deputies as to the best means of arriving at a final settlement of his differences with the king of England.
	Nevertheless, although the above said Cardinal and President were fully prepared to show by arguments and papers of the greatest importance that the obligations under which the Most Christian King stands towards England consist chiefly, as the King maintains, in sums of money borrowed from him from time to time, and that that debt has already been liquidated and acquitted, as his own ministers are prepared to show and demonstrate, the king of England having already, as they say, received more money than his due, and having manifestly violated the very treaty upon which the king of England founds his allegation, (fn. 32) yet the Most Christian king of France, in consideration for the public welfare and out of regard for the Emperor, consents to his deputies making to the English, in his name, the following final offers:—
	Firstly,—The rest of the two millions of crowns, which the king of England claims as owing to him by the treaty of 1525, will be paid by early instalments of 25,000 crowns each. (fn. 33)
	Secondly,—The life pension (pension viagère) of 100,000 crowns will likewise be paid in compliance with the letter of the treaty.
	Thirdly,—As to the other pension of 50,000 crowns in perpetuity, the Most Christian King's deputies shall refer to and call the attention of the Emperor's ministers to the articles of the said treaty with England, wherein it is clearly and expressly stipulated that the aforesaid pension shall be paid by France as long as she is at peace with England; and whereas the king of England has now invaded the Most Christian King's territory, wasted, sacked, and burnt the whole of the Bouloignois (Boullonois) seized and kept the capital of that county itself, it is quite clear that he himself has violated the treaty, and therefore has no right whatever to demand a perpetual pension from France since he has wilfully invaded it, and thereby disturbed the Most Christian King in the peaceful possession of his kingdom. This stipulation not having been complied with, it is evident that the obligation of a perpetual pension falls to the ground, and that the Most Christian king of France is not bound to pay it.
	Although, all things considered, the Most Christian King has every reason to presume that the above-mentioned offers to be made in his name by his commissioners are more than sufficient for the purpose and will be accepted, yet out of deference and regard for the Emperor he (the Most Christian king of France) now consents, though he had resolved to make no further concessions, to pay over and above the one million of gold, or whatever sum France may be owing to England, out of the two millions claimed, two hundred thousand crowns during the present year, that is to say, 100,000 next Easter and 100,000 on All Saints Day of 1545. Also to pay in the course of next year the annual pension of 100,000 crowns, namely, 50,000 crowns on the 1st of May and 50,000 on All Saints Day, which are the terms specified in the treaty. For the future, the Most Christian king of France promises to continue paying annually the said pension (viagère); to pay every year 50,000 crowns until the remainder of the one million of gold said to be owing to England be completely paid, always deducting from it the sums that may have been paid during the current year 1544, or the next, 1545; and to give such securities for the payment of all and each of the above-mentioned sums of money at the dates herein specified and fixed as the Emperor may approve of. (fn. 34)
	With regard to the perpetual pension, though, as above stated, it must be, for the reasons alleged, annulled, yet the Most Christian King will conform himself entirely with the amicable decision of the Emperor in the matter, provided Boulogne is restored to him, without which condition this last, as well as all previous offers, will be nul and void as if they had never been made. Indeed, the Most Christian King begs the Emperor his brother to believe firmly that if it were in his power to make better offers he would willingly do so, more for the welfare of Christendom at large and cut of regard for him than for any other motive or cause. It must also be considered that the offers are considerable if the great expenditure to which he has been put during the last three years is taken into account, and that should the Turk bestir himself and come down upon Christend -m next year, as is most likely, he will be obliged, even if he settles with the king of England, to incur great expenditure in conformity with the treaty between him and the Emperor. (fn. 35)
	Should it happen that, against all reason, the said king of England refuses the above-specitìed terms, the Most Christian king of France will consider himself free and quit of such obligations; and, moreover, will request the Emperor to relieve himself of the intervention, and consider him as entirely free from all engagements or obligations he may have made or contracted with the king of England.
	The Most Christian king of France also begs the Emperor to consider him as quite released and free from his submission (i.e. to arbitration,) since he must have heard and understood that he (the Most Christian king of France) has fulfilled in all its parts the article of the treaty which relates to the aforesaid submission, whereas the king of England absolutely refuses to abide by the Emperor's judgment and sentence of arbitration, to which he (the Most Christian king of France) cannot bow and submit separately and alone. (fn. 36)
	French. Original draft 3 pp. (fn. 37)
Oct.	221. The Emperor to Kino Henry.
Wien, Imp. Arch. Huf. Corresp.	” Monsieur, mon bon frcre,”—Immediately after receiving my ambassadors' answer to what I had written to them on the subject of a peace between you and the king of France, I gave orders that cardinals Loreyne (Lorraine) and Tournon should be communicated with, and I did expressly send on the bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot) to the king of France, to whom I wrote a most affectionate letter recommending him to send an embassy to you. This the Bishop had orders from me to procure with all possible diligence, and, whatever answer he got to his mission, to go over and acquaint you with it.
	I am now writing more specifically on this subject to my own ambassadors, in order that, in the meantime, you may be apprised of the fact. Should the affair come to a good issue, I beg you to agree to that which you will find most fit and convenient for the furtherance of such a good and holy work as peace between two Christian princes is. Attach faith to what the said Bishop and ambassadors will say in my behalf, as if I myself were addressing you, and believe that I shall do the best possible offices in that affair. (fn. 38)
	Addressed: “A Monsieur, mon bon frere et cousin le roy d'Angleterre.”
	French. Original draft. (fn. 39) 1 p.