Spain: February 1545, 16-28 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 8, 1545-1546. Originally published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1904.

'Spain: February 1545, 16-28', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 8, 1545-1546, (London, 1904) pp. 34-44. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol8/pp34-44 [accessed 25 April 2024]

February 1545, 16–28



17 Feb. Simancas E.F. 501 extract.	12. Licentiate Varges (fn. 1) to Francisco de los Cobos. (fn. 2)
	The Pope is liberal of fair words, but sparing of good deeds respecting the enterprises against the Turks and the Protestants. He is saying now that he cannot allow the sale of the monastic property (in Spain) without conferring on the subject with the consistory of Cardinals.
	His Holiness expresses his firm intention to assist the King of France against the English, as he says that a war with the King of England is as praiseworthy as a war with the Turks. Juan de Vega (fn. 3) writes that the Pope is determinedly hostile to the Emperor and will do nothing in his favour “until the water rises as high as his mouth” (i.e. until he is in danger of being drowned).
	Brussels, 17 February, 1545.
17 Feb. Simancas E.F 501.	13. The Emperor to Francisco de los Cobos.
	You will learn the state of current politics by reading the letters addressed to the Prince, but, for your further private information, we send you a copy of the despatch forwarded to Juan de Vega respecting the negotiations with the Pope, and also a summary of the communications with the Nuncio Poggio, and with Sfondato, (fn. 4) touching the assistance to be furnished by the Pope in a war against the Turks and Protestants.
	The Pope's representatives have promised us in general terms his assistance in such a war; but we have decided not to undertake anything, especially against the Protestants, until we see clearly that the Pope is ready to assist us, not by words alone but by deeds. The danger of utter ruin with which the heretics threaten Christendom is so great that the Roman See must help us with a considerable sum of money in the enterprise against the Protestants. Prelates and ecclesiastics should in our opinion contribute most liberally to the expenses of efforts to suppress heresy. From prelates and Churches in Spain much money should be obtained; and we desire you to take the prelimnairy steps which shall enable us in due time to realise such contributions easily and promptly. This must be done with the greatest secrecy; for if the Prelates learn beforehand that they are to be thus taxed, some of them might betray the matter to the Protestants, in order to prevent the execution of the measures intended.
	Brussels, 17 February, 1545. (Spanish Draft.)
	Endorsed. “The last despatches taken by Don Bernardino from Brussels to Spain.”
21 Feb. Vienna Imp. Arch.	14. Chapuys and Van der Delft to the Emperor.
	The bearer of this is Secretary Paget; who in order to prove that he has no desire to slip away unnoticed, has sent to ask us for letters to your Majesty, and to assure us that, if his occupations and the haste in which he is, had allowed him, he would greatly have liked to come personally and inform us of the details of the mission entrusted to him. We expect, from many indications, that the instructions given to him will be more moderate, and his powers more ample, than those given to the Earl of Hertford and the Bishop of Winchester. (fn. 5) Whatever they may be, however, we are quite sure that he will do his best to preserve and increase the friendship between your Majesty and the King, in view of his (Paget's) previous attachment to your Majesty's interests. He not only exerts himself to the utmost to help and favour your ministers, but extends his efforts to the wellbeing of all your subjects; and we think well to give your Majesty notice of this, in order that he may be received favourably, and thus be spurred to still greater devotion and service, which his position enables him to render.
	London, 21st February.
21 Feb. Vienna Imp. Arch	15. The Emperor to Chapuys and Van der Delft.
	We have received your lettters of 5th instant, informing us of the conversation you had with the Master of the Horse and Secretary Paget, especially about the raising of the embargo. By your letters, and also by the reports of our subjects, we understand that the restitution in England has not been effected properly. This is the case with the ships belonging to our subjects, which are still in England by the fault of the English, and also with the herrings, which have been sold there without the owners' consent, and without redress: besides which, other property has been retained in England. Although we presume that you will have made proper representations about all this, we wish you had sent us fuller information on the subject, saying if the property still detained is of great value, and giving your views as to the manner in which the restitution was being carried out; and also your opinion with regard to the release on this side, justly demanded by the King of Englandthrough you, and most importunately urged through his ambassador here. The ambassador strives his utmost to convince us that all the property in England has been restored, fully and generously; and we desire you, as early as possible, to enlighten us on the matter, without omitting reference to the Burgos property, and to the other of our subjects who have been injured, and have had their property seized since the beginning of the late year. In order to please the English ambassador, after saying that we had certain knowledge that the restitution had not been fully effected in England, especially in the case of the ships still there, and the herrings, we told him that we were willing to give up all the English ships, on this side, and also to begin to raise the embargoes on English property, on their giving security, which they could easily obtain, pending the completion of the restitution on the other side. With regard to the Burgos claim, we said the fact of the seizure having been made so long ago as the commencement of the war, only made the claim stronger, as the redress had been so long withheld, and gave another reason against further delay. We added that it was very necessary that some measure should at once be agreed upon, to protect, in future, subjects of both monarchs from these molestations, seizures and detentions, from which our subjects have suffered so severely: and that henceforward friendship, good-neighbourship and reasonable equality should be observed.
	The ambassador thereupon insisted with much earnestness in his enquiry, as to whether it was intended to defer the release on account of the Burgos and other claims arising out of seizures during the war, or only until the above-mentioned security could be obtained. He was informed, as before, that we were ready to begin to raise the embargoes on goods claimed by those who gave security, and on the ships and sailors here: but. that,, as you very well pointed out, the Burgos and other similar claims could be settled very easily and promptly, whilst the arrangement for the future security of subjects on both sides was being discussed. You will keep both these points in hand, the measure for future protection being especially important to our subjects, and necessary n order to avoid troubles which may otherwise arise.
	With regard to the request for safe-conduct for the passage of German and Italian soldiers for the English service, the ambassador has on several occasions pressed the matter vehemently and rudely unconvinced by any arguments of ours; such as we wrote to you, showing that we are not bound to grant such safe-conducts by the treaty, and pointing out the vast damage and danger suffered by our territories and by Liege, last year from Landenberg's horse and foot, and other bands for the King of England. But the ambassador has never been convinced; nor has he suggested any way of avoiding a repetition of the same evils in the future. We told him, moreover, that the Electors, Princes and the States of the Empire, were endeavouring to renew the edicts prohibiting the raising of mercenaries in Germany, owing to the need for soldiers against the Turk: but we said if his master really wanted the troops, we had indicated how he could get them, and had told him that we would look the other way; which was more than we would do for the French. We tell you this for your guidance in talking of the matter there. Touching what was said to you by the English about the declaration against France, urged so pressingly lately by the Earl of Hertford and the Bishop of Winchester, whose mouths, as you say, you so promptly closed, it would have been well for you to write telling us the arguments you employed, and how you closed their mouths. The mere statement of this fact gives us no information; and the matter is of the highest importance, and was the principal reason for our sending you M. Eustace Chapuys to England. The ambassador here is pressing us very hard on the matter; and has gone so far as to say that it is necessary that his master should have an answer yes or no, in order that he may proceed accordingly. As the Earl and the Bishop spoke similarly, it will be well for you to keep your eye on the point. We have always avoided dealing with the requisition; and with this object we sent you and M. Van der Delft to carry on the communication, and to endeavour to satisfy the King with our reasons, and such other arguments as appeared desirable. It would be well for you to write as soon as possible, telling us everything you have heard on the subject, with your own opinions. In the meanwhile, you will do your best to excuse and postpone the declaration, but with all possible dexterity, whilst signifying to the King and his ministers that our intention is to observe faithfully the treaty of friendship, so far as it is possible honestly for us to do so, consistently with the treaty we have now made with France, by the King (of England's) consent. At the same time you must keep to the point of the non-fulfilment of the agreement on the part of England; and you must appear not to know that the English ambassador has been pressing for our final decision, and endeavouring to discover if there is any possibility of our abandoning the French, and declaring war against them. The ambassador approaches us sometimes softly, with the assurance that his master will remain friendly with us through thick and thin, and sometimes roughly. The reply given has been, that we desire sincerely to remain friendly with the King, and to fulfil the treaty of friendship, in so far as is possible, without breaking our treaty with France. Brussels, 21 February, 1545.
25 Feb. Vienna Imp. Arch.	16. Chapuys and Van der Delft to the Emperor.
	We received yesterday your Majesty's letter of the 21st instant. With regard to what has passed in the matter of the restitution of the ships and merchandise seized here, as we recorded in our previous letters, the King and Councillors have displayed great diligence and care in fulfilling the promise of redress. They have amply indemnified the sailors who have lodged complaints, and also the merchants who have produced evidence of their rights. It is, however, the case that very few merchants have hitherto claimed restitution; and the King consequently requested us to appoint a person to whom the property unclaimed in London might be delivered in order that such property might be retained or sold on account of the owners. We did so; nominating Angelon Salvaglio, a Genoese merchant, a man of credit and substance; who after waiting for some time, and finding that no one came to claim the merchandise; not even the herrings which were being injured by keeping, sold them at the highest price obtainable— as good, indeed, as the owners could have got; so that the owners have no ground for complaint, though no one has come to claim the money. It is true that the quantity of herrings is small in comparison with that demanded by the Flemings; not exceeding 140 lasts. The rest of the merchandise, which chiefly consists of pitch and tar, amounting to about 150 lasts, of which a memorandum (fn. 6) is sent herewith, could only be sold here at a loss, and Salvaglio has consequently done nothing with it, pending the arrival of the owners here. The greater part of the merchandise detained must still be at Dover, Calais and Boulogne and we have no means whatever of obtaining an estimate of its value. We are much astonished that those to whom the property belongs have not come to make their claims.
	With regard to our opinion as to whether the restitution has an appearance of being carried out honestly here, we reply that we have not the slightest doubt of it, on condition that the embargo on the other side is retained as the King and everyone else here are so much perplexed at the embargo, and so desirous of getting it raised. It is certain that the prolongation of the embargo would cause scandal and be extremely prejudicial to the English; and in our opinion it would be advisable to raise it, but it should be done with the caution (i.e. security) mentioned in your Majesty's letters. This is reasonable and really necessary, not only on account of the pending claims of the Burgos merchants, but also because the greater part of the property seized, both ships and goods, still remains here. The excuse for further delay in the matter of the Burgos claims, is that the King awaits the reply to his letters to your Majesty demanding that the matter shall be decided by the procedure laid down in the treaty of amity; namely by a conference of arbitrators chosen by himself and your Majesty; as I (Van der Delft) informed your Majesty in my recent letters. This would mean that we should never get to the main business, as we have no doubt that your Majesty in your wisdom will see, and will have regard to the justice and reparation due to your subjects.
	With regard to the safe-conducts for the German and Italian troops, your Majesty's reasons for declining to grant them are so cogent and unanswerable, that no further justification is needful. We will, however, not fail to re-state the reasons when opportunity offers, both to the King and Council.
	In the matter of the demand so persistently and importunately pressed by the King and his ministers, that your Majesty should declare yourself against France, your Majesty will have seen by our letters of the 3rd and 4th January that the King refused to be satisfied with the reply given by your Majesty to the Earl of Hertford and the Bishop of Winchester. We repeated the arguments to the best of our ability; and the King, unable either to meet or controvert our contentions, flew into a passion and angrily alleged things which had already been contradicted, and others which damaged his own case, remaining to the last obstinately unconvinced. Your Majesty will also have learnt that in our two conferences with the Earl of Hertford, the Bishop of Winchester and Secretary Paget, we repeated our conversation with the King, and that they also were unable to extricate themselves, or controvert what we said. Since the two conferences in question the councillors have not referred to this matter, except incidentally, and in a joking, semi-shamefaced, fashion. This was the case recently with Secretary Paget, in the' presence of the Master-of-the-Horse, and we replied to him that, as they only referred to this point in jest, we had somewhat passed it over; but if they were in earnest we thought they were wrong in continuing to talk about it after the unanswerable arguments and reasons we had laid before them. Paget retorted that no person could know better than I (Eustace Chapuys) who had drafted the treaty; and he would like to know if the King of France, who had consented to the reservation of the treaty of alliance between your Majesty and the King of England, had not violated his engagements towards your Majesty by invading English territory; and consequently whether the King of France had not therefore forfeited the benefit of the said treaty. He (Paget) would also be glad to learn if the treaty of friendship between your Majesty and both Kings did not provide that, in case of the invasion of the territory of one of them by the other, the third party to the treaty was bound to declare against the invader. In reply,. I placed before Paget the principal arguments which had already been stated; and, with regard to the latter portion of his remarks I said, that, in the absence of a special clause to that effect, the third party was not bound to declare against the invader. With respect to his (Paget's) first point, I said that, even if the treaty between his master and your Majesty had been specially reserved in your Majesty's treaty with the King of France, his (Paget's) master could not claim any advantage from it, since the King (of England) had from the first refused to acknowledge the Emperor's treaty with France. If, I added, he (Paget) wanted to take so literally the reservation of the treaty (i.e. between Charles and Henry) his master might on the strength of it claim France, and a good many other things mentioned in the treaty, besides the declaration of your Majesty. The reservation of the treaty, I said, must be understood only in so far as it did not clash with the treaty of friendship agreed upon between your Majesty and the King of France, which treaty was made with the consent of the King (of England); the King of France becoming a friend of your Majesty, but still remaining an enemy of the King of England. At the time the King (of England) gave his consent to the treaty the King of France was as much his enemy as he is now: occupying (according to the pretension of the King of England) the latter's realm of France and injuring him in other points of far more importance than the invasion upon which the English now founded their claim for your Majesty's declaration. It could not be said that the invasion complained of made the King of France more of an enemy than he was before. If the King (of England) therefore, was willing, notwithstanding this enmity, to consent to a friendship between your Majesty and the King of France, it was clear that such consent carried with it the customary clauses for the maintenance of the amity thus established, the King of France being no more of an enemy to England than he was before. Paget could only gape at this, and seemed half confused, not saying a single word in reply. We afterwards remarked that we almost believed what several of the courtiers were saying; namely that the King wished to drag your Majesty into war again, not because he needed your present assistance but out of jealousy at the friendship between your Majesty and the Christian King; and in order that he (Henry) might himself slip out of the war and leave your Majesty in the lurch. We repeated more than five or six times, that if each of the allies had fulfilled this part of the agreement for the joint enterprise, there would have been no dispute about Boulogne nor any of these affairs; for a secure and advantageous peace would have been made. They made no answer to this, either, but the Master of the Horse kept shrugging his shoulders all the time, as if to admit what was said, though at the end of the argument he remarked that there was still time to do it. I replied that there was very little chance of it now for many reasons. The King of France was more strongly fortified than ever, and could do more in his defence for a penny than the aggressors for a hundred times as much. However rich their master might be, we said, he would probably be sorry to incur again such an expenditure as he faced last year. Perhaps, indeed, it would be impossible for him to provide for nearly so much. They said nothing in reply, which surprised us, as the Master of the Horse is immoderately inclined to exalt the great wealth of his master.
	Since your Majesty seeks a good pretext for delay in the matter of the declaration, we think there will be no necessity for us to press for a decisive reply from the King, as we are quite certain that any such reply would be curt and obstinate. After all is said, there is but small chance of bringing him to reason, except by means of complaint as to his having failed to fulfil the arrangement (i.e. for the conduct of the war); and we have been careful to keen that point unimpaired. It is only necessary for us to speak to him or his ministers on the point, to prolong affairs. Even if such were not the case, we think it would be better not to press forward the matter of the safe-conducts until we are informed of the particulars of Paget's mission, in order to preserve our liberty of action with regard to his demands; which we doubt not will be more modest and softer than before. We beg your Majesty to instruct us how we are to proceed; and also concerning the steps to be taken to protect your Majesty's subjects in future from insult, pillage and oppression at the hands of the English. The management of this is beyond us, seeing the difficulties which the English will raise in order to continue their usual custom.
	London, 25 February, 1545.
25 Feb. Simancas E.F. 505.extract.	17. The Emperor to Juan de Vega (Ambassador in Rome).
	Regrets that the Pope (fn. 7) has created so few Cardinals of his party, and especially that the hat has been refused to Don Pedro Pacheco, Bishop of Jaen. Notes Vega's remark that the Pope is much alarmed at the Council (of Trent), and even more alarmed at the Diet (of Worms), and the Emperor approves of Vega's device to keep his Holiness in the same mind, neither banishing his fear nor increasing it. Vega must endeavour to bind the Pope to help the Emperor with a large sum of money, and he (the Pope) also ought to send a Nuncio to the Diet, and correspond with M. de Granvelle who is going to Worms to make the necessary preparations. “With regard to the aid which the Pope declares he will give to the King of France against the King of England, you have done well in not openly opposing it, but in taking your principal stand on the importance of resisting the Turk, and redressing religious evils. You will continue the same course until the matter is discussed by the German States, and we see what steps are best to be taken.”
	Brussels, 25 February. (Spanish Draft.)
Feb. S.D. Simancas E Roma 872.	18. Draft of letter to be written from the Emperor to Juan de Vega (Ambassador in Rome).
	You will have learnt by the summary of the treaty of peace we sent you from Cambresis, details of the stipulations made respecting the marriage of the Duke of Orleans with our daughter the Infanta Maria taking with her the States of Flanders and Burgundy, or with the second daughter of our brother the King of the Romans, carrying the duchy of Milan as her dower. As the matter was of vast importance, we consulted our son the Prince and the Council of State who advise him, and also our sister Queen Maria and the Flemish nobles, communicating likewise on the subject with our brother the King of the Romans by letter and confidential envoys, since my indisposition prevented me from visiting him personally, as I had intended. The result has been that which you will see by the enclosed declaration, (fn. 8) which we send you in a Spanish translation from the French for your guidance. We doubt not that you will study its form and contents closely. The declaration has not yet been sent to the King of France, as he has not hitherto restored Stenay to the Duke of Lorraine, as he is pledged to do; and for the same reason we are detaining the hostages, giving them to understand that though the declaration is ready we are deferring its presentation for that reason. As we learn that Stenay is shortly to be restored, we have thought well to inform you of our intention. You will see by the wording of the declaration, that our device is to keep the King of France still hopeful, that if the bid for Flanders was raised, we might still be willing to come to terms about it. (fn. 9) The object of this is to see what the next step of the French will be, and to gain time. The declaration also mentions the various defaults made in fulfilling the terms of the treaty; and the things still undone, which, although not formally set forth as conditions, were tacitly understood to be so; and notification is given that, unless the terms are carried out in their entirety, we shall have to reconsider our position. We have thought well to inform you of this in the strictest secrecy, because, according to their usual manner, the French as soon as they receive our declaration, will at once try to make capital out of it to gain over the Italian Republics, etc., which are, as we know by long experience, apt to welcome novelties, and to give credit lightly to anything that is told them. If, therefore, we send this declaration (to the King of France) it will be advisable that it should at once be known all over Italy. You will, with all due dexterity, inform the Pope of it, without mentioning the considerations set forth above or those that follow, but simply saying that we are honestly anxious to fulfil our part, and doubt not that the King of France will do the same in the interests of peace, which is the thing we most ardently desire. It is the more necessary that we should thus dissemble with the Pope, because of what you say about (his) confidential negotiations with the French. By the wording of the declaration you will see, that all we have to do is to stick to the Milan solution, without going any further; the purpose being to gain time, and see what the French will do. You will see that nothing is said yet about the express consent of the daughter of the King of the Romans, and other means and conditions which would be necessary to consider before giving up possession of the State of Milan. As, moreover, the French have not fulfilled the terms of the treaty within the stipulated period; and, in their usual fickle way, they will be sure to commit fresh breaches, even if they do not enter into plans to upset the whole treaty of peace, it may well happen that cause may be given for us to question or postpone the fulfilment on our part. There is some talk, too, of the ill-feeling between the two brothers; though some people deny it. Still it would not be surprising if this gave rise to some reason for preventing the carrying out of the conditions. Besides this, the investiture is only to be in the male line, and the fortresses of Milan and Cremona are to be retained in our hands, all the commanders of fortresses to be chosen by us. These and similar conditions will have to be discussed and settled at length, and the negotiation will necessarily be delayed. But as the matter is very delicate, we do not wish on any account that there should be the slightest suspicion that we desire to depart from our pledges, except for urgent and legitimate reasons. For public reasons, also, it is most necessary at present, in view of the remedying of religious evils by the Council, and the aid in the war against the Turk, that no ground should be given to the French to hold aloof from these things on the ground that we have failed to carry out our promises, and east the blame upon us. Above all the most complete secrecy must be observed about this.
	Worms, S.D.
	The draft declaration which accompanied the above letter is at (Simancas, E. 67) and sets forth, first that the Emperor for various reasons regrets that the marriage of his daughter the Princess Maria with the Duke of Orleans is not convenient, and that he has consequently chosen the clause stipulating for the marriage of the daughter of the King of the Romans (Catharine) with the Duke. In accordance with the summary given in the letter to Vega, the document then hints that the King of France, if he desires it, may still make fresh proposals for the other alternative marriage: “but he (the Emperor) wishes to say in all friendship that the portion of the Duke of Orleans might well be larger for either of these two marriages.”
	The restitution of Hesdin is claimed (fn. 10) in accordance with the treaty, and that of Charlerois is demanded. The delay in the restoration of Stenay (fn. 11) to Lorraine is complained of, and a great grievance is made of the unreasonable and imperious bearing of the French commissioners at Cambrai for the settlement of the details of the peace. Amidst constantly reiterated professions of a desire to fulfil the terms of the treaty, a cloud of small doubts and questions are raised, such as the depredations of the French on Portuguese shipping, the delay in the restitution of Spanish and Flemish property plundered at sea; and the King of France is finally exhorted to remedy these evils. The whole tenour of the document (8 pages) is admirably calculated to fulfil the Emperor's design of keeping the King of France in suspense as to the prize of Flanders or Milan for his son, until the Turks were rendered harmless, and the Protestants were dealt with by the Council of Trent, or if necessary afterwards by force of arms. As will be seen later, the death of Francis I. and of the young Duke of Orleans soon afterwards put an end to the suggested marriages and relieved the Emperor of his anxiety in this respect.
N.D. Feb. (?) Vienna Imp. Arch	19. Chapuys and Van der Delft to the Queen Dowager.
	Since our arrival here we have received several letters from your Majesty concerning the assaults, pillage and violence committed by the English upon his Majesty's subjects, in the neighbourhoood of Arras and upon sailors from Nieuport, Dunkirk, and Ostend. upon these and innumerable other complaints, and also upon the daily seizure of ships, we have addressed full remonstrances to the Council, and demanded redress. Up to the present we have obtained no satisfaction. We were expecting a definite reply yesterday, when we were informed by the Council that orders had been sent to the admiral to enquire into the matter, and to adopt such measures as he found necessary. No prompt decision can be expected from him; and it is very certain that if no other step but this be taken, his Majesty's subjects will suffer notable injury. The only reply sent to us with regard to the Arras (fn. 12) complaint is that it shall be considered.
	London, N.D.