Spain: August 1546, 16-31

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 8, 1545-1546. Originally published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1904.

This free content was digitised by double rekeying. All rights reserved.

'Spain: August 1546, 16-31', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 8, 1545-1546, (London, 1904) pp. 450-462. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/vol8/pp450-462 [accessed 15 April 2024]

August 1546, 16–31

16 Aug. Vienna. Imp. Arch. 308. Van der Delft to the Emperor.
I am reporting fully to the Queen (Dowager of Hungary) the discourse I have had to-day with Secretary Paget, and I repeat to your Majesty only the substance thereof. Paget came to me on the King's behalf to state that the Duke Philip of Bavaria, Count Palatine, being again on his way hither to see the King, was stopped at Gravelines, where he still remains, forbidden to proceed further. The King was much annoyed and astonished at this, and requested me to write to the Queen, asking her to release the Duke and his followers, as he (the Duke) is in the King's pay and service. I replied that I had received no advice of the matter, but the King might be quite sure that the step had not been taken without just and urgent reasons. The plots and intrigues being carried on in Germany against your Majesty were perfectly well known. Paget replied that he knew nothing of such plots; but the King having been cheated by von Reissenberg during the war with France, had decided to utilise the services of a renowned and trustworthy person; and had, consequently, taken into his pay the said Duke Philip, who in accepting service under the King had not forgotten his duty towards your. Majesty, as his Sovereign lord, from whom he and his house had received great favour. This, if it were necessary, could be proved by the letters and agreements concerning his engagement by the King. It should not be thought that either the Germans or the French had any understanding with them (the English) to the prejudice of your Majesty, for they (the English) would never listen to any such suggestions. (fn. 1) He (Paget) assured me most emphatically of this, and brought forward several reasons in support of it. Continuing the conversation, he remarked that he heard and believed for certain that the French had already a large number of troops with the intention of entering Italy. I asked him whether this was for the purpose of commencing war against your Majesty. “You know very well,” he said, “that the French are always desirous of throwing obstacles in the way of the Emperor's enterprises; and I see plainly, that, as we began the war in alliance with the Emperor (although we were left in the lurch by him) so we shall finish it in alliance with him.” After much other discourse, I quite convinced myself that what I have always said is the fact; namely that the King and the principal members of his Council, of whom the Lord Chancellor (Wriothesley), Paget, and the Bishop of Winchester (Gardiner) are the leaders, are entirely devoted to your Majesty's interests. It is true that they make no secret of their objection to see any increase in the power of our holy father the Pope, who is their enemy; but I can perceive no indication of their having any understanding with the Protestants; except that they (the English) will not conform or submit to a Council presided over by the Pope; which is easily understood, for the reason already mentioned. Apparently all their opposition would cease if your Majesty were yourself to convoke and preside over the Council (i.e. the Council of Trent), and this Paget himself told me in confidence. Our conversation then turned to the war in Germany, and I did not fail to set forth the just causes and reasons which had moved your Majesty to take the course you had done, and to commence the war; which really had nothing whatever to do with religion, but was solely to reduce to obedience those who continually defied your Majesty's imperial authority. He replied: “We are not so lacking in sense as not to recognise that if the Emperor is beaten in this war (which God forbid) all Christendom will suffer from the consequent confusion”; and that he (Paget) could only hope that matters might be settled by some peaceful agreement. With that he left me. I hear from a secret source that an envoy of the King of France, coming from Italy, has had an interview with the King (Henry), for the purpose of conducting some intrigues against our holy father the Pope and your Majesty; the proposal being to surprise some strong places in Italy, which are now in the Pope's hands, but of which some have been promised by his Holiness to your Majesty. I am, however, firmly of opinion that this King (Henry) will do nothing to your Majesty's detriment, however desirous he may be to annoy the Pope.
The Admiral of France has not yet arrived here, though he is looked for from day to day. The Lord Admiral of England returned here four days ago.
London, 16th August, 1546.
16 Aug. Vienna. Imp. Arch. 309. Van der Delft to the Queen Dowager.
(The first portio of this letter is substantially identical with the paragraphs contained in the letter to the Emperor of the same date, detailing Paget's complaint to the ambassador of the detention of Duke Philip of Bavaria at Gravelines. This portion is consequently omitted from the present letter.)
At this juncture I thought it would be appropriate to speak to him (Sir William Paget) about the rumours current in Flanders of a request having been made by the English for an interview with the King of France, for the purpose of planning something against the Emperor. Paget assured me that it was a mere dream: he had never heard such a thing mentioned, except that their ambassador with the Queen Dowager had written that she had spoken of it to him. I replied that I had been informed of it also by your Majesty, who, however, had never believed it, although the French proclaimed it very loudly. Your Majesty, I said, had quite a different opinion, and fully trusted that the King (of England) would not fail to preserve his good friendship and alliance with the Emperor. He (Paget) replied that we ought not to doubt that. They (the English) had, moreover, sufficient experience of war to prevent them from again entering into it lightly. I thought well to ask him if he recollected a Spanish letter sent by the Emperor, and brought and shown to the King by M. d' Eick. (fn. 2) He replied yes, the letter had not been lost sight of; but he thought that the French aimed at a different object, as he had heard, and fully believed, that they had already a large force to enter Italy. (The rest of the conversation on this subject, and on the Council of Trent, is the same as in the letter to the Emperor of this date, and is therefore not repeated here.) He (Paget) also asked me to write to your Majesty begging you to order the Captain of Gravelines to allow the King's servant to converse with Duke Philip, and, above all, to release the latter. He (Paget) thought that it was very desirable, as you would never find Duke Philip culpable in anything, that your Majesty should write a letter to the King (of England) excusing and softening this matter of the Duke's detention; and saying that it was done in ignorance that the Duke was in the King's service.
This seemed a good opportunity for asking Paget how they stood with the Scots. It was, I said, needful for us to know; for they (the Scots) were constantly injuring us, who were only at enmity with them on account of the English, in accordance with the treaty of alliance. If they (the English) were at peace with the Scots we ought to be included. He replied: “We also are suffering a great deal from them, and we do not know yet how it will end. We have sent the clause respecting the inclusion of Scotland to the English ambassador there, with instructions for him to exhibit it.” He (Paget) also promised to send me a copy of the clause. I then related to him what your Majesty wrote to me in your last letters, as to the proceedings of Alexander Paniter in Brussels, (fn. 3) and also as to the subsequent interviews between M. de Granvelle and the Admiral of France at Bruges, with regard to the inclusion of Scotland; my object being to weaken the effect of what the Admiral of France had recently told him, (fn. 4) Paget replied that he perfectly recollected what had passed with Paniter, he (Paget) being there at the same time; but he knew nothing about the matter having been discussed at Bruges. With regard, however, to the positive statement of the Admiral of France, made in the presence of the English Ambassador in Brussels, and of Paniter himself, he (Paget) did not know what to believe. He (Paget) had asked the Admiral of Franc before several gentlemen if he might positively repeat the assertion; whereupon the Admiral had said yes, and that those who had negotiated the treaty (i.e. between the Emperor and France) would never deny it. Even, he said, if the Viceroy of Sicily (i.e. Gonzaga), who was of similar standing to himself (the Admiral of France), maintained that what he said was not true, he (the Admiral of France) would uphold it. To end the subject, I said that all this was but talk, and events would prove the truth: and Paget agreed with me in this. In order to see whether I could not get a copy of their treaty with France, I remarked that the Emperor's subjects who had property in Boulogne were asking how they were to proceed to obtain possession of what belonged to them. Paget replied that the property had been gained by right of conquest, and the King consequently regarded it as his own. Those, therefore, who wished to obtain it should address themselves to the King. This, he said, was one of the difficulties raised by the French on behalf of their own subjects, when the peace treaty had been practically concluded. The treaty had indeed almost fallen through on this point, as the King of England would not listen to any limitation of his right of conquest. When I pressed for a copy of the treaty, Paget told me plainly that the clause referring to the point simply stated, in substance, that such property remained absolutely to the King. As he was leaving me, Paget begged me urgently to use my best efforts to accelerate the release of Duke Philip; and not to forget to suggest to your Majesty to write a letter on the subject to the King (Henry). Your Majesty will know better than I how important it is at the present juncture to keep these people in as good a humour as possible, and to confirm in their attachment those who are well disposed to us. Finally Paget told me that Secretary Dr. Petre and the Dean of St. Paul's were going to Calais to settle a dispute they have with regard to the amount of a debt, which the French allege to be smaller than that which they (the English) claim. I do not think there is any other reason for their journey; having regard to the persons who are going.
(The next paragraph, with regard to the alleged attempt of the French to draw Henry into intrigues against the Emperor and the Pope in Italy, is the same as in the letter to the Emperor of the same date.)
The Admiral of France has not yet arrived, but he is expected from one day to another, and is coming in his galleys. Great preparations are being made for him, the King being at Hampton Court, where he will receive him. The Lord Admiral returned from France four days ago.
London, 16 August, 1546.
17 Aug. Simancas. E. 1192. Italian. 310. Advices from Piedmont.
The King of France has sent to the King of England, complaining that the latter has fortified Boulogne in violation of the treaty, and has begged him not to continue in this course. The answer was that the King of France ought to be very much obliged to him for doing it, because when the territory was restored to him he would have the advantage. The King of England sent his Lord Admiral to the King of France. He remained with the latter for five days, and was received with great rejoicing and pomp.
It appears that a brother of Count Fiesco was recently at the Court of France, and he too has been much caressed, especially by the Admiral. When he left the rumour was current at Court that he had gone to England, and he is publicly blamed for it; but in reality the rumour was only set afloat for the purpose of showing that they were not satisfied with him in the Court, and not because he had gone to England. Some people believe that whithersoever he may have gone he has an understanding with the King (of France). (fn. 5)
20 Aug. Vienna. Imp. Arch. 311. The Emperor to Van der Delft.
We have received your letters and have heard what you wrote to M. de Granvelle. We thank you for your advices and especially for the news that the sacramentarians and other schismatics are being punished in England. Make all the enquiries you can on this point, and on the tendency of the King and his ministers in the matter. But especially try to discover their feeling towards the German Protestants, and whether there is any appearance of a desire to aid or favour the latter. Let us know also if the Protestants are making effort to obtain support in England; and what people are saying there about our enterprise. We may remark that we have heard from France that the King of England was carrying on some negotiations there, with the object of helping them (the Protestants), but we do not believe it; and, certainly, if the King continues to punish so actively the schismatics in England, it does not appear probable that he will help those in Germany. But, nevertheless, it is certain that a Secretary with the English ambassador in Venice has opened a negotiation with the Seigniory in favour of the Protestants; and is urging with much persistence that their (the Protestants') ambassadors should be received by the Seigniory. Letters also have been intercepted from the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse addressed to him (the Secretary) and we have made representations about this to the English ambassador here, who says he has written expressly to his master on the subject in letters that accompany the present, which letters you will forward as addressed. With regard to affairs between England and France, and those concerning Scotland, you will find out everything you can and will report to us from time to time. All we can say at present about affairs here is that we have assembled our forces, both German and Italian, and we are marching against the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse, hoping, with God's help, to punish them. (fn. 6) We send you the declaration of the grievances which we have against them, and which, in addition to other grave and intolerable causes, have led us to take the step we are taking. (fn. 7) It will be well for you to read this declaration to the King and his Council. Camp of Ratisbon, 20 August, 1546.
20 Aug. Simancas. E. R. 873. 312. Juan de Vega to the Emperor.
By a papal courier I wrote on the 17th instant, saying that the Bull for the Flemish half-first-fruits had been despatched. (fn. 8)
After many consultations, and much sorrow at your Majesty's message about the proposed removal of the Council, the Pope has resolved not to cause the removal for the present; and has ordered that none of the prelates are to leave Trent, and those who may have done so are to return.
The Pope had me approached by means of the person who had first spoken to me on the matter; namely Cardinal de Gambara, who said that, since the Pope had consented not to remove the Council, he hoped I would not make a noise about it, as the Pope was much grieved; and more to the same effect. I replied that it was impossible to help making a noise about it, as it was a matter for great regret, and most inconvenient and injurious to the public weal, besides being quite contrary to your Majesty's views. Many other similar attempts were made by them, their case being strengthened by such arguments as they thought would appeal to us.
The question of the commutation of the sale of the monastic manors is being actively dealt with, and is near a decision.
I have been informed by a person of quality as a fact that one of the Cardinals in the Pope's Council said to another Cardinal: “We know now what hitherto we have never been able to understand, namely what are the final aims of the Emperor with regard to the Council.” (fn. 9)
Rome, 20 August, 1546.
20 Aug. Simancas. E. Milan. 1192. Italian. 313. News from Piedmont sent to the Emperor by Fernando de Gonzaga (Governor of Milan).
The King of France has raised a protest against the fortification of Boulogne by the English and has requested that the works, be demolished, as they are in violation of the treaty. The King of England has replied that the fortifications will be for the benefit of the French as they will remain when the place is restored to them. The Admiral of England has been sent on a mission to the King of France and for five days was very splendidly entertained. The Admiral of France will accompany him to England.
20 August, 1546.
23 Aug. Vienna. Imp. Arch. 314. The Queen Dowager to Van der Delft.
We have received your letters of 16th instant; and we are much surprised that at that date no notice had been received in London that the Duke Palatine Philip had crossed over. As soon as we were informed of his detention we had orders written to the Lieutenant of Gravelines, who in the absence of the Captain had stopped the Duke, to allow him to continue his voyage. The King of England and his Council, however, have no just cause for resentment at the detention of the Duke, as he attempted to pass incognito and disguised his name; so that, if the Lieutenant had not noticed that he wore the order of the Golden Fleece (we ourselves having learnt that the Duke had passed through Antwerp), we should probably have considered it necessary to send and investigate who it was before we let him go. We cannot imagine what motive this Count Philip can have in going over to England so often, without once making himself known. This is not customary in Germany, as you may tell the King and his Council, whilst letting them know that we have no intention whatever of hindering the passage of those who wish to go over to see the King. But the passengers themselves are often the cause of their own detention by their adoption of devices which arouse suspicion against them. Affairs in Germany being in their present condition, it is in the highest degree necessary that we should keep a sharp eye on Germans passing through here; as is done in Germany itself, in the case of those leaving the country. (fn. 10) Nevertheless we should not have thought for a moment that Duke Philip, or anyone else, would have tried to hatch any plots in England against the Emperor, believing firmly that the friendship of the King is so sincere that he would never listen to such a thing.
As we released the Duke Philip before any request for us to do so was made by the King, we do not think there is any need for us to make a special excuse by letter. It will be sufficient for you to explain to them how the affair happened, which is really as is written above; but you will notice carefully whether the Duke shows any resentment at his having been stopped, or wishes to throw the blame for it upon us; and you will likewise discover what he is doing or soliciting in England, for our information.
You will have learnt from our letters of the 15th instant, which doubtless have ere this reached you, how the English Ambassador here replied to the two points referred to in the previous correspondence, namely the inclusion of the Scots in the peace treaty; and the reintegration in their estates of the Emperor's subjects in the Boulognais. The replies on both points agreed with what had been said to you on the other side; and we are unable sufficiently to express our surprise at the position taken up with regard to the second point—the restitution of the estates; as it seems to us utterly unreasonable that the Emperor's subjects, who have never served the King of France, but had sided with the English, should be deprived, of their property by the failure of the King of France to retain his hold on Boulogne. We cannot believe that the King of England will persist in his present attitude, particularly as Paget appears to have remarked that the subjects should address their petitions to the King of England; and you will consequently press the King to allow the said claimants to be restored to the enjoyment of their estates, in the same way as before the war, on taking their feudatory oath to the King, as they are bound to do, according to the value of their respective fiefs. They will make no difficulty in doing this, if the King will consent to their returning to their possessions. Let us know the King's intentions in this matter.
Brussels; 23 August, 1546.
30 Aug. Simancas. E. R. 642. 315. The Emperor to Juan de Vega.
Pending receipt of your report as to what has been done about the 200,000 crowns and the other questions you have in hand, we defer answering yours of the 17th and 20th instant, and limit ourselves in the present to giving you an account, for your guidance, of the interviews with Cardinal Farnese here.; since the matter discussed was that of money, of which you know the importance.
The Cardinal arrived at our camp (i.e. Ingolstadt) on St. Bartholomew's day (24 August) in the evening, and having been informed of his coming an hour before he arrived, we sent Prince Maximilian and the Prince of Piedmont to go and receive him with the Bishop of Arras. (fn. 11) They met him on a bridge, and accompanied him to our tent, outside of which we welcomed him with great demonstrations of affection, rejoicing at his coming in good health, and asking after the Pope, with other such general compliments as are usual in first interviews. After a day or two the Cardinal wished to converse with us, and we were equally desirous of doing so with him; but as we were constantly worried, having the enemy so near to us and being uncertain of his design, we were unable to receive the Cardinal until the day before yesterday. He handed us a letter of credence from his Holiness; and, on the Pope's behalf, expressed his pleasure at witnessing the great goodwill we had displayed in this undertaking. He praised very highly what we had done and were doing, said how glad his Holiness would be to learn the present position of affairs, and that the armies had been mustered in such good form, etc. He then handed us the Bull for the half-first-fruits of Flanders; excusing the delay in its dispatch by saying that they had been unable to find the form for the concession, as a similar Bull had only once been granted previously by Pope Clement. In reply we gave him a general account of what had been done about the enterprise; and the gathering of forces previous to the arrival of the Duke of Camarino (Octavio Farnese), to whom, and to Alexander Vitello, we referred him for what had since been done in that respect. (fn. 12) We then proceeded to say that when the enterprise was first decided upon our intention was to employ all our strength and resources in its prosecution, and to carry it through if possible to a successful issue. This we had done so far, and we then re-stated the various reasons why it had been impossible to undertake the execution last year (the reasons in question are here set forth at great length); touching subsequently upon the allegations that had been made about our going to Landshut, which we said was now evident to everyone was for the purpose of collecting and concentrating the troops coming from Italy, and preventing the enemy from interposing between us and them, as was his intention if possible, (fn. 13) Our aims, we said, in this enterprise, were simply to serve God and redress the troubles of His Church, whilst increasing the power of his Holiness; and consequently we cared little what judgments men passed upon us. They had seen that when our troops were, collected we had come in search of the enemy; (fn. 14) and this subject led us to say how appropriately the Bull for the half-first-fruits had come, for we should need them, and all else, to carry through what we had begun. We then reminded him that when Granvelle went thither (to Home) these Flemish half-first-fruits were conceded for a very much less important purpose than the present, and without so much loss of time. But still, we said, we could not avoid thanking his Holiness very earnestly for having sent us the Bull now, and especially since the Cardinal himself had brought it. All this, however, we continued, was absolutely useless if the payment of the 200,000 crowns was to be further delayed. The money was urgently needed, because we had arranged for the payment of our other bills in deferred instalments, in the full confidence that the Papal subsidy would meet the demands for August; and that it would provide the first ready money wanted to pay the many necessary expenses of the beginning of a campaign. We had always understood that this money would be forthcoming promptly, and reminded him of what had passed about it during the Worms negotiations, (fn. 15) and the promises subsequently made by his Holiness' ministers at Utrecht. It was then clearly stated that the expenses of the enterprise were to be drawn from the half-first-fruits of Spain, and the sale of the monastic manors; and as the Bulls for these concessions were unexpectedly delayed we could not obtain the money so promptly as was anticipated. It was always expressly understood that if we agreed (with the Pope) we ourselves, would obtain the funds for the first month's disbursements, which we only succeeded in doing by paying heavy interest, and that the Papal subsidy of 200,000 crowns would be ready to provide for the second month; the succeeding month's expenses being met by us. In consequence of the delay that has occurred we have been obliged to seek money for the first and second months as well; at an interest so onerous, and in places so inconvenient, that we have been put to great trouble. In order the further to enforce this, we added that even if the 200,000 crowns had been paid in time it would not have been nearly sufficient to cover the month's expenditure; for not a month passes in which the payments do not exceed 300,000. This brought us to mention the hope we had that his Holiness would at a later date further aid us to the extent of the 100,000 additional, which he had always hinted that he would do. We pointed out the grave responsibility incurred if any reverse happened owing to want of money. We were staking our own lives and position in the business for the good of God's service, and the defence of the Pope's authority; and his Holiness on his part should use every effort to forward the enterprise as his own, touching, as it did, his dignity and interest. He well knew that we could, if we pleased, settle the questions concerning our own authority without an appeal to force; but, seeing that for the above reasons we had embarked ourselves so far in the business, we would leave to his Holiness' judgment what would be proper for him to do, if we were the commander-in-chief of his forces: bearing in mind that if the result should be different from that which we hope, by God's help, to attain, the Protestants would not satisfy themselves by simply destroying our rule in Germany, but would come down to Italy and to Borne, in order to do the same towards his Holiness. We again dwelt upon the trouble and risk we had incurred in staking our person and resources in the cause of God and religion, for although the enterprise had not been commenced ostensibly on that ground, we had always heartily wished that no other pretext than religion should be given for it. But on consulting with our brother the King of the Romans, the Duke of Bavaria and other Catholics, especially ecclesiastics, it was considered advisable to call it a war against rebels. His Holiness, however, would see that when we had punished the latter the religious question would be easily settled, this having always been our intention. The Cardinal (Farnese) in reply to this, spoke at length on the good offices he had performed, with the object of avoiding further delay in the payment of the subsidy; and finally promised that on the 6th proximo he would provide on account 80,000 ccowns, including the 30,000 now here. He had done no little thing, he said, in getting the Pope to take out of the Castle (i.e. St. Angelo) over 100,000 crowns, and contribute jewels and other valuables worth 60,000 more. We smiled at this; and could not help retorting that his Beatitude might have taken it all out of the Castle, and more besides; only that perhaps he expected to get the money elsewhere. After much discussion about the money, during which we again repeated the trouble and risk that would be caused by the delay, we could succeed in getting nothing further from him, except he would again write to the Pope on the subject, explaining the position to him, etc.; and the other questions, such as the valuation of the specie, etc., would be settled between him (Cardinal Farnese) and our ministers; in order that no loss on exchange should be incurred by us and that the nett sum of 200,000 crowns stipulated should reach our coffers. In this, and in all things, he promised his best offices.
After this matter was disposed of, he enlarged upon the Pope's great satisfaction that we had consented to the commutation of the concession for the sale of the monastic manors (in Spain) and the substitution of other means for raising the money in accordance with the wish of the College of Cardinals. He thanked us very cordially for this. We replied that, after considering your account of the Pope's views on the subject, we had agreed willingly to please his Holiness, with the conditions and limitations stated by us: but it would be necessary that the funds should' be forthcoming promptly; as the promises we had made to the merchants must of course be fulfilled. His Holiness must therefore see that the matter is concluded without delay; as he had always been told that this was one of the principal sources upon which we depended for supply. The Cardinal replied that the Pope was very willing that the necessary documents should be despatched at once: and added that it behoved us also to take steps for carrying the authorisation into effect promptly. We tried to excuse ourselves from this by referring to what the Pope had said to you (de Vega), and suggested that the best way would be for his Holiness to send orders to all the monasteries, to the effect that means must at once be adopted to fulfil the command, and supply us with the sum of 500,000 in aid of the enterprise. These orders should be enforced by the obvious arguments; and the Pope should warn the monasteries that if they failed he would be unable to avoid authorising us to sell their manors and rents to the extent of 800,000 ducats. (fn. 16) In reference to this we told the Cardinal that although our intention was not to take more than 500,000 ducats, it would be advisable to give another turn to the screw, and frighten them into providing the sum required, by hinting that they otherwise might have to pay more. The Cardinal was quite satisfied with this, and said he would convey it to the Pope, begging us also to instruct our ministers in Rome to a similar effect, so that by their united efforts we might receive the funds without delay. You (de Vega) will keep the matter in hand, and see that no time be lost.
The Cardinal then turned to the subject of the Council (of Trent). The Pope, he said, had never been willing to listen to any talk of removing it elsewhere. He had, indeed, been very angry when he heard that some of the prelates had left Trent. The rumour of removal had been raised by the prelates themselves, in consequence of the bad air and unhealthiness of the place, the clearness of provisions, and the fear that the Protestants and Grisons might make a descent upon the town. But, after his Holiness had heard of the threats (braverias) of the Cardinal of Trent, and what had happened at the meetings; together with the message we had sent to Cardinal Santa Cruz, (fn. 17) it seemed to him that the intention existed of depriving the Council of its liberty; and then, at the request of a majority of the prelates, he had granted a Bull for the removal of the Council elsewhere, Lucca, Ferrara or other place to our satisfaction being suggested. The Cardinal tried to persuade us to this course, using the same arguments as those alleged by the prelates, with the addition of a new one; namely that if the Pope were to die, as he might, being so old, whilst the Council was pending, it might result in schism. We replied that the unhealthiness of Trent was not so great as was alleged, nor were victuals at an immoderate price, for the measures adopted by Cardinal Trent and the Consuls had kept the place abundantly supplied. With regard to the fear expressed that the enemy might come down upon the city, we said there might have been some reason for alarm when the country people attacked it; but that now, with our armies near at hand, it was absurd to be afraid, or that the Grisons would venture to move. The message we had sent to Cardinal Santa Cruz was only intended to apply in case he should propose the removal or suspension of the Council without the express order of his Holiness, as it was understood that he wished to do. We answered the Cardinal's argument about the danger of schism, by saying that if schism was to be the outcome of the Council, it would happen if the meetings were held in Lucca, Ferrara or anywhere else. The reasons advanced therefore were, we said, insufficient for removing the Council from Trent. The Cardinal ended by saying that as this point was one that appertained to the Council, he would not discuss it further, but would refer it to the consideration of the Nuncio, who had charge of such matters, and of our ministers. There has been much to do to-day in consequence of the approach of the enemy's headquarters towards our own, and our forces have been always in order of battle. For this reason, we have been unable to confer again with the Cardinal, but will do so on the first opportunity. (Urges Vega to activity in obtaining the despatch of the money questions by the Pope.)
Camp near Ingolstadt, 30 August, 1546.
Note.—In the reply from Vega to the above letter, dated Viterbo, 12 September, Vega informs the Emperor that Cardinal Farnese had not written to the Pope about the money, etc. until the 2nd September; but that the matters in question have since been actively dealt with. He has been unable to induce the Pope to increase the sum to be obtained from the monasteries beyond the 300,000 ducats, for which the Briefs will soon be despatched. He (Vega) has not ventured to mention the additional 100,000 crowns subsidy, for fear of delaying the matter in hand. Has frequently urged the Pope about the prompt payment of the 200,000, but his Holiness always replies that he has already disbursed the money; and has done his best to get the merchants to shorten the instalments. He says that he has fulfilled the treaty, and is surprised that the writer should hint otherwise. Orders, moreover, had been sent for 83,000 crowns of the amount to be paid forthwith in Germany, and in addition to this the legate, Cardinal Trent, and Don Diego de Mendoza have been in negotiation with the merchants. The Pope's ministers say that your Majesty might easily have discounted the whole of the money, and they thought you would have done so. Learns that Cardinal Farnese has now been given a free hand in the matter.

Footnotes

  • 1. With regard to the visits of Duke Philip, see note, page 348.
  • 2. Referring apparently to the alleged plan of the French to deceive Henry by a feigned agreement with regard to the marriage of Prince Edward to Mary of Scotland mentioned in the Emperor's letter to Scepperus of 26 Feb., 1546, and subsequently.
  • 3. Paniter was the Secretary of Arran, who had been sent to Flanders to negotiate.
  • 4. See letter of 16 July, from Van der Delft to the Queen Dowager, in which it is related that Paget had assured the writer that the Admiral of France had positively asserted, that in the peace treaty between the Emperor and France, the Scots had been included by a tacit agreement, not set forth in the formal capitulations. The statement to the contrary is contained in the Queen Dowager's reply to Van der Delft of 31 July.
  • 5. Giovanni Luigi Fiesco Count di Lavagna, the head of the great Geonese conspiracy against the Dorias and the Imperial interest, was naturally bidding for French and Papal support for his desperate scheme; and it will be seen by the above and other letters in this Calender (page 112), that the Imperial agents were suspicious of him.
  • 6. The Emperor moved the following day towards Neuberg, crossing the Danube on the 24th, and being met by Cardinal Farnese and the Prince de Sulmone's contingent on the 25th. He remained before Ingolstadt in close proximity to the Protestant forces from the 27th to the 31st, when a desultory engagement lasting four days began, the Protestant forces being unskilfully led, and allowing the superior generalship of the Emperor to delay a decisive fight, until the arrival of the Flemings under Buren (15 September) and the inevitable divisions occurred in the heterogeneous Protestant army, made the victory of the Imperialists a foregone conclusion.
  • 7. Doubtless the famous, but illegal, ban of the Empire by which the Landgrave and John Frederick of Saxony were declared rebels and outlaws, and divested of all their privileges and possessions on the authority of the Emperor alone.
  • 8. This letter (wrongly dated 27th in the decipher) is in the archives, but it contains nothing more than a repetition of the news given in other communications; with respect to the Bull for the Flemish half-first-fruits, the commutation of the concession for the sale of the monastic manors in Spain, and the Pope's sorrow at the Emperor's firm rebuke of his underhand attempt to transfer the sittings of the Council of Trent to Lucca. As all these points are dealt with more fully in other letters, it has not been considered necessary to transcribe here the despatch referred to.
  • 9. A marginal note against this paragraph says: “If this is notma de clearer farther on it is not very easy to understand.”
  • 10. The Bavarian family generally were neutral in the struggle, although inclining to the Catholic side. The Count Palatine, however, the young man's uncle, was a Lutheran and his sympathies at least were strongly favourable to the Confederates.
  • 11. Prince Maximilian of Austria, son of Ferdinand King of the Romans and afterwards the Emperor Maximilian II., son-in-law of Charles. The Prince of Piedmont was Emmanuel Philibert, afterwards Duke of Savoy. The Bishop of Arras was Antoine de Perrenot, the younger de Granvelle, subsequently Cardinal de Granvelle.
  • 12. The main body of the Papal contingent under Octavio had joined the Imperial camp at Landshut a fortnight previously.
  • 13. The Emperor had been criticised severely for his apparently rash move of abandoning Ratisbon, and advanoing to Landshut, a town on the Iser, where he remained for 10 days, from the 4th to the 15th August. If Philip of Hesse had been an alert general the Emperor's movement might have been made a disastrous one, either by the Protestant capture of Ratisbon, which had been left with a small, weak garrison, or by a bold attack upon the Imperial camp before the arrival of the Papal contingent. The Emperor's tactics were, however, quite sound, as the first consideration for him was at any risk to prevent the Protestants from intercepting the Papal force and beating it before it could reach him. If this had been done the main body of Charles' army might have been dealt with before Buren arrived with the Dutch troops; in which oase the Emperor's cause would have been ruined.
  • 14. The Emperor had marched to Neuberg and Ingolstadt as soon as Octavio and the Papal troops joined him; though he avoided taking the offensive for a decisive engagement pending the arrival of Buren.
  • 15. See page 213 et seq.
  • 16. The meaning of this appears to be that both the Pope and the Emperor were desirous that the odium of first moving in the spoliation of the monasteries, etc. should be borne by the other.
  • 17. See the Emperor's letter to Vega of 31st July, page 443.