Debate concerning a Bill, To prevent the infamous Practice of Stockjobbing.
April 30. An engross'd Bill, To prevent the infamous
Practice of Stockjobbing, was read the third Time, and a
Motion being made, That the Bill do pass; the same was oppos'd by Mr Glanville, who stood up, and spoke as fol
lows:
Mr Glanville.
Mr Speaker,
'There is, in my Opinion, a very great Hardship to be
put, by the Bill now before us, upon the Proprietors of
the Publick Funds. As the Law now stands, a Gentleman
may sell his Estate, a Merchant or Tradesman may sell his
Goods, every Man may dispose of his Property by a Bar
gain for Time, or in whatever Manner he pleases: But by
this Bill the Creditors of the Publick, those who have put
their Trust in the Publick Faith, are to be laid under a particular Restraint; a Restraint which they were no way subject to when they lent their Money to the Publick; and from
henceforth they must not dispose of their Property, but in
the particular Manner by this Bill prescribed!
'I am, Sir, as great an Enemy to Stockjobbing as any
Gentleman in this House, and for preventing that pernicious
Practice I shall be glad to join in any Measures, which are
not destructive to Publick Credit, and injurious to private
Persons, with respect to the free Use of their Property:
But, as I think the Measures proposed by this Bill will certainly be destructive of the one, and injurious to the other,
therefore I cannot let it pass, without taking the Liberty of
offering my Objections against it.
'It is in all Cases a great Hardship put upon People, to
subject them to Penalties, which may often by meer Ignorance
be incurred: But in this Case, the Hardship is the greater,
because there are many Proprietors of the Publick Funds,
particularly Women, who cannot be presumed to be Readers
of Acts of Parliament: They put an entire Confidence in
their Brokers, and, if the Broker happens to neglect some
of the Forms prescribed, the most innocent Persons may be
brought under great Penalties. Nay, I may say, that if
this Bill passes into a Law, it will always be in the Power
of two or three Brokers, to subject those that employ them
to the severe Penalties to be enacted by this Bill; for if two
Brokers should combine together, and enter in their Books
a Bargain for Time, as made between two of their Correspondents, they might easily get a third Person to combine
with them, and to inform against the presumed Buyer and
Seller; the Brokers Books sworn to by the Brokers, whom
they usually employed, would be a strong Proof against
them; and thus two innocent Men might be brought to suffer severely for an Agreement, which had never entered into
either of their Heads.
'It often happens, Sir, that a Gentleman, who foresees
that he shall have Use for his Money in three or four Months
Time, is well satisfied with the Price his Stock then bears;
he cannot then sell out his Stock for ready Money, because
he does not know what to do with his Money in the mean
Time: But as the Law now stands, he may take Advantage
of the then current Price of Stock, he may sell it out at that
Price, or perhaps at an advanced Price, to be delivered only
when he knows he shall have Occasion for the Money; this
he acquaints his Broker of, and the Broker may probably
find him out a Man who likes the then current Price, and
expects Money to be thrown into his Hands in three or four
Months, which he resolves to employ in that Fund: In this
Case the Buying and Selling for Time is convenient for both,
and it is not to be questioned; but that many are encouraged to become Purchasers of Stock upon this very Account,
therefore the forbidding of any such Agreement for the future, will not only prove to be an Inconvenience to many,
who are now possessed of Stock, but will prevent some People becoming Purchasers, which, of Consequence, will do
Harm to the Publick Credit of the Nation.
'It is well known, Sir, that the chief Support of the
Credit of our Publick Funds is owing to the ready Access
People have, at all Times, to the Money they have there
lodged: But this ready Access will, by this Bill, be made
very precarious to all those, who shall hereafter be obliged to
sell at once all the Property they have in any particular
Fund: For, if the Purchaser should fail to comply with his
Agreement, the Seller cannot, upon the Transfer-Day, compound the Difference with him, and sell out his Stock to
another, in order to raise the Money he has immediate Use
for: No, he must sue the Man he sells to, and for that End
he must make a Transfer of his Stock, which Transfer must
stand upon the Books during the whole Continuance of the
Suit; he cannot in the mean Time sell his Stock to another,
for if he did so, he would not be able to shew at the Tryal,
that he had made a specifical Performance on his Part, and
consequently he would certainly be nonsuited, and obliged
to pay Costs. This, Sir, will be a most intolerable Grievance upon all the Proprietors of our Publick Funds, and
will make many of them resolve to turn their Money to
some other Use.
'I must be of Opinion, that the making a Law to prevent Men's coming to an amicable Composition of any Difference that may be between them, seems to me something
extraordinary. This will be such a Discouragement, that
no Man, I believe, will chuse to become a Purchaser of any
of our Funds, when he knows that he cannot afterwards sell
out his Stock, without exposing himself to the Danger of
being involved in a Law-Suit, to which he is by Law expresly prohibited to put any End by an amicable Agreement. And if a Purchaser should, by any Disappointment,
be disabled to comply with the Purchase he had made, but
was willing to pay down, in ready Money, the Difference,
which might not, perhaps, amount to five Pounds, it would
be very hard to oblige him to stand out a Law-Suit to the
very last, which would cost him, at least, treble that Money.
'That Clause, Sir, of obliging a Man to answer upon
Oath, in a Case where great Penalties may be incurred, seems
likewise to me to be a very new and a very extraordinary Sort
of Clause; for it is no way consonant to the Spirit of our Laws,
to oblige any Man to accuse himself: And as it lays a Foundation for every Person, that is inclin'd to be malicious, to
bring a Bill in Chancery against any Man, who is or ever
was possessed of any of the Publick Funds; it will consequently be a great Discouragement to any Man's becoming
a Purchaser, or continuing to be a Proprietor of those Funds,
and will of course tend to the Destruction of all Publick
Credit.
'Another Hardship I shall take Notice of, is, Sir, that if
this Bill passes, no Man for the future can employ a Merchant to buy or sell Stock for him; for if a Merchant
should be employed, and should charge Commission for his
Trouble, he would incur some of the Penalties of this Bill;
unless he kept a regular Book, and fairly entered therein all
such Transactions, in the same Manner as Brokers are by
this Bill obliged to do.
'All these, Sir, are Hardships, which I think the Creditors of the Publick ought not to be subjected to, and therefore I cannot give my Consent to the passing of this Bill. I
would sooner have taken Notice of these Things, but there
happened to be such a Noise and Disturbance in the House,
both upon the second Reading of this Bill, and likewise when
it was in the Committee, that I could not expect to be
heard; and therefore I did not then rise up to say any thing
against it.'
Mr Bowles. ; Sir G. Caswall.
Mr Glanville was seconded by Mr Bowles; and back'd by
Sir George Caswall, as follows,
Mr Speaker,
'It is evident, that this Bill will be extremely inconvenient
to all the Proprietors or Dealers in any of our Publick Securities: The Words of it are so general, that I do not know
but that even Navy-Bills, and Contracts for furnishing the
Navy with Provisions, will be comprehended; and if they
are, the usual way of Dealing in such Affairs will be entirely prevented, which may be of dangerous Consequence to
the Nation; for it is well known, that those who contract
for furnishing the Navy with Provisions, seldom or never
have as much Money of their own, as is sufficient for making
good the Contracts they enter into. It is usual for a Man
who has not perhaps 10,000£. of his own, to contract
for furnishing the Navy with 40,000£. worth of Provisions; and in such Cases the Method always hitherto observed is, for the Contractor, as soon as he has made such
Contract, to go to some monied Man, who furnishes him
with what Money he stands in need of, upon his becoming
bound for the Money advanced with Interest from the Date
and obliging himself to deliver Navy-Bills, at the Price then
agreed on, equal to the Principal Money then advanced, and
the Interest that shall in the mean time grow due.
'These Bills, Sir, I look on as Publick Securities, because
they are generally every Year provided for by Parliament;
and therefore I take them to be within the general Words
of this Bill; and as all such Bills vary a great deal in
their Price, insomuch, Sir, that I have known them at
45£. per Cent. Discount, it will for the future be impossible for those, who contract for furnishing the Navy with
Provisions, to enter into any such Agreement with any monied Man whatever; consequently no Man can hereafter
contract for furnishing the Navy, with more Provisions than
he can purchase with his own Money, which will of course
make the providing for the Navy much more difficult than
heretofore. This, Sir, is one very great Inconvenience
which must arise from this Bill; but there are so many others,
that, in my Opinion, the Title of the Bill ought to be altered, and instead of calling it a Bill for preventing the scandalous Practice of Stock-jobbing, it ought to be called a Bill
for the destroying of Publick Credit.'
Sir John Barnard.
Hereupon Sir John Barnard stood up in Favour of the Bill,
and said,
Mr Speaker,
'I did not offer, Sir, to rise up sooner, because as we are
now upon the third Reading of this Bill, against which there
were few or no Objections made in any Part of its Progress
through this House, I was willing to hear all the Objections
that were to be made against it, before I rose up to answer;
that I might thereby give you as little Trouble as possible
I am, indeed, surprized to hear any Gentleman say, that
there was upon any Occasion such a Noise in the House that
he could not be heard: It is true, when a Bill is passing
which is thought to be a Bill of course, there are but few
Gentlemen give great Attention to it; and upon such Occasions, when Gentlemen are not otherwise employed, they
will fall a talking with one another, which must of course occasion some little Noise in the House: But every Gentleman
knows, that upon any such Occasion, whoever inclines to
speak to the Bill in Hand, may rise up and call to the Chair,
It is then the Duty of the Chair to order Silence, and then
the House will become attentive to the Gentleman who is to
speak. This is the Method of proceeding in this House; and
this, Sir, you have always taken a proper Care to see punctually observed.
'I wish, Sir, with all my Heart, that the Gentlemen had
made their Objections to this Bill, when it was before the
Committee; for then it might have been made to their own
Liking, if it be possible to make any such Bill to their Liking. When any Bill is brought into this House, it is usual
for all Gentlemen, who have a mind that some Bill of that
Nature should pass, to make their Objections to the Parts of
it they find Fault with, either upon the second Reading,
or upon its being committed; because, that if their Objections be well founded, such Amendments may be then made
to the Bill, as may obviate all Objections that can be reasonably made against it: But when Gentlemen have no mind
that any Bill of that Nature should pass, it is well known
that they reserve all their Objections to the very last, in order to throw out the Bill upon its third Reading. For this
Reason I must, Sir, have some Suspicion, that those Gentlemen, who now begin to make their Objections against
the Bill we have at present before us, have no mind that
any such Bill should pass, as would effectually put an End to
the Practice of Stock-jobbing.
'I find, Sir, it is granted upon all Hands, that the Practice of Stockjobbing is pernicious to the Trade, and to the
People of this Nation: This then is an Evil that ought to
be remedied, if possible; and by the Bill now before us, we
are, at least we propose, to remedy this Evil. Now, Sir, in
all such Cases, it is certain that no Remedy can be proposed,
but what will be attended with some Inconveniencies, and
therefore we are to consider on which Side the Balance lies;
whether the Inconveniences, design'd to be remedied by the
Law proposed, are more considerable than the Inconveniences
that may be occasioned thereby; or if the last be more considerable than the first? If we judge that the first are the most
considerable, we are surely to pass the Bill, notwithstanding
those Inconveniences that may be occasioned thereby: If we
judge that the last are the most considerable, we are to
throw out the Bill; and rather continue under the former
Evil than subject ourselves to a greater. This, Sir, is certainly the proper Rule to judge by in the present Case, and
therefore by this Rule let the Bill now before us be tried.
'The many had Consequences of Stockjobbing are, I believe, well known; and that it is high time to put an End
to that infamous Practice, is, what I hope, most Gentlemen
in this House are convinced of. It is a Lottery, or rather a
Gaming-House, publickly set up in the Middle of the City
of London, by which the Heads of our Merchants and
Tradesmen are turned from getting a Livelihood or an
Estate, by the honest Means of Industry and Frugality; and
are enticed to become Gamesters by the Hopes of getting an
Estate at once. It is, Sir, not only a Lottery, but a Lottery
of the very worst Sort; because it is always in the Power of
the principal Managers to bestow the Benefit-Tickets as they
have a mind. It is but lately since, by the Arts and Practices of Stockjobbing, the East-India Stock was run up to
200£. per Cent. and in a little Time after it tumbled down
again below 150£. several Millions were lost and won by this
single Job, and many poor Men were undone; so bare-fac'd were
some Men, at that Time, in the infamous Practice of Stockjobbing, that, after that Stock began to fall, they sold it
cheaper for Time than for ready Money; which no Man
would have done, unless he had been made acquainted with
the Secret which came afterwards to be unfolded, but was
then known to a very few.
'We know, Sir, how apt Mankind are in their own Nature to become Gamesters; but to this Game of Stockjobbing, our Merchants, Tradesmen, and Shop-keepers are
prompted not only by their own Inclinations, but also by
some of their Acquaintance, who have taken up the Trade
of being Brokers in Exchange-Alley. It is natural for Men
to endeavour to make the most of the Business they pursue;
and where there are such a Number of Brokers, we may believe that some of them do endeavour to persuade all those
of their Acquaintance to become Stockjobbers. The Broker
comes perhaps to the Merchant, and talks to him of the
many Fatigues and Dangers, the great Trouble and the small
Profits, that are in the way of Trade; and after having
done all he can to put the Man out of Conceit with his own
Business, which is often too easily effected, he then tells
him, that if he will allow him to dig for him in the rich
Mine of Exchange-Alley, he may get more for him in a Day
than he could get by his Trade in a Twelvemonth. Thus
the Merchant is persuaded; he engages, he goes on for some
Time, but never knows what he is doing 'till he is quite
undone; his just Creditors are surprized; what, say they,
this Man had a good Stock to begin with, he has had a
good Trade for several Years, he never lived extravagantly,
what is become of his Effects and Money? They inquire,
they search into his Affairs, and at last perhaps they find out,
that the whole was gam'd away by his Broker in ExchangeAlley.
'This, Sir, may, for what I know, increase Publick
Credit for a Time; but I am sure it is a great Discouragement to Trade, which is the chief, the only solid Support of
Publick Credit, and it is the Ruin of all private Credit; it
destroys that mutual Faith among Merchants, by which only
our Trade can be made to prosper and flourish. This, Sir,
is a domestick Evil, an Evil which, tho' fatal in its Consequences, yet does not perhaps immediately draw any Money
out of the Nation; but there is a foreign Evil attending the
Game of Stockjobbing, by which the Nation may be plundered of great Sums of Money at once. It is, by the means
of Stockjobbing, always in the Power of every foreign Court,
to raise Contributions upon this Nation whenever they please;
They have no more to do but to send over, and order a
great deal of Stock to be sold out at the current Price for
Time, then raise an Alarm of the Pretender, or some such
Alarm, by which they may make all our Publick Funds fall
perhaps 20£. per Cent. and so purchase Stock 20£. per Cent.
cheaper than they sold; in order to perform their Part of
the Contracts they had before made for Time. Thus, Sir,
they may make a Harvest of the Fall of our Publick Funds;
and as they know best when the Alarm will blow over, they
may make a new Harvest of their Rise.
'These, Sir, are but a few of the many Inconveniences
that arise by Stockjobbing. Give me leave now to examine
those Inconveniences which, 'tis pretended, will be occasioned
by the passing of this Bill into a Law. As to the real and
honest Creditors of the Publick, I have as great a Regard
for that Faith, which ought to be preserved towards them, as
any Gentleman whatever: I shall never be for doing any
Thing that may lessen their Security, as to the Payment either of their Principal or Interest, and I wish that every
Gentleman in this House were of the same Mind: But can
it be said, that the making such Regulations, as the Publick
Good requires for the transferring of their Property from
one to another, is any Impeachment of the Publick Faith?
The preventing of Stockjobbing is so far from being a
Breach of Publick Faith, that I am sure it is what all the
honest Creditors of the Publick wish and desire; and as
there is nothing in the Bill that can be a Hardship upon any
fair Purchaser or Seller, it will be so far from being destructive to Publick Credit, that it will rather increase it;
because it will make the Value of every Man's Property in
the Publick Funds more certain and invariable. All those,
who have no other Aim but to receive their Dividends punctually, and to have their principal Money secure, choose to
be in that Fund which is subject to the fewest and least Mutations; and this is the Reason that we always see the Annuity-Funds bear a higher Price in Proportion than any of
our Trading-Stocks.
'To say, that no Penalty ought to be inflicted on a Practice that is found to be inconsistent with the Publick Good,
because Persons ignorant of the Law may thereby suffer,
seems to me, Sir, to be a very odd Pretence. I hope Gentlemen will, in all other Cases, be as careful of inflicting Penalties upon the Subject; it is indeed what ought never to
be done but in Cases of the utmost Necessity: But where the
Advancement of the Publick Good, or the Security of private Property, can be come at in no other Way, it must be
done; and every Man is obliged to know the Law, or to
apply himself to those that do. In the present Case, no Man
can by Ignorance subject himself to the Penalties proposed
by this Bill, without some dishonest Intent; for I am convinced, that no Man ever did, or ever will either buy or sell
Stock for Time, unless he knows more, or at least thinks
he knows more, about that Stock than the Man to whom he
sells, or from whom he buys; which Intention is certainly
not very fair, tho', when it is not extended too far, it may
be necessary to overlook it in the Way of Commerce.
'This, Sir, leads me to consider the pretended Convenience of Bargains in Stock for Time. Suppose a Gentleman finds he must sell out his Stock three Months hence;
suppose another expects Money in three Months Time, which
he intends to lay out on the Purchase of Stock; I believe
neither the one will purchase, nor the other sell 'till that
Time comes, unless he knows, or thinks he knows, some
Secret relating to that Stock which other People are not
aware of; for if he that is to sell expects no Variation in
the Value of his Property, why should he sell 'till he has
Occasion for his Money ? But granting that he is so much
satisfied with the then current Price, that he absolutely resolves to sell at that very Time, may he not sell for ready
Money, and lodge his Money in the Bank 'till he has Occasion for it, since no Man can pretend but that his Money
is as secure when lodged in the Bank, as it can be in any of
our Publick Funds? And as to the Buyer, I am sure no
wise Man will venture to purchase Stock 'till he has the
Money at Command; unless he does it in Expectation that
the Stock will rise, which is downright Gaming, and what
is intended by this Bill to be prevented.
'As to a Man's being obliged to answer upon Oath to
any Bill filed against him, it can be no Hardship; because
whoever does so answer, and fairly discovers the Agreement
made, is free from all Penalties; he becomes liable to nothing but to return the Money which he received; and as
the Law now stands, whoever receives Money to another's
Use, is obliged to answer upon Oath, and will be obliged
to return the Money he confesses so to have received.
'To pretend, Sir, that by this Bill Men may be subjected to great Penalties, by the Perjury and Conspiracy of two
or three Brokers, is another Objection for which there is no
Foundation; for against Perjuries and Conspiracies there can
be no Guard but that of a fair Trial by an honest Jury; by
such a Tryal any such Conspiracy might probably be discovered; it would be almost impossible for three Rogues to concert their Story so together, but that the Conspiracy would
be discovered by examining them apart, and cross-questioning each, in the Manner usual at all Trials; so that this too
is nothing but an imaginary Evil, and is as strong an Objection against every penal Law, that ever was or ever can be
enacted, as it is against the Bill before us.
'There is nothing in this Bill, Sir, that can oblige any
Man to go to Law, ether as Plaintiff or Defendant, contrary to his Inclinations, or that can prevent his making up
any Difference there may be between him and another; for
tho' the Buyer of the Stock may not perhaps be able to pay
for the Stock he had bought, because of some Disappointment he has in the mean Time met with, yet it is not
to be presumed, that he will not be able to pay the
Difference in ready Money; and if he can pay that in
ready Money at the Books, cannot he immediately sell
out the Stock to another at the then current Price; and
thereby raise the rest of the Money, which he may order to be delivered to the Man who sold to him ? May
not every Bargain be thus specifically performed, if the
Parties are inclined so to do ? In this the only Inconvenience is, that there must be a double Transfer,
which is performed with so little Trouble or Expence,
that, I hope, it will be no way regarded in the present Debate: And as it may be supposed, that, if this Bill passes
into a Law, there will be few or no Purchasers, but such as
are able to perform it the Time they purchase; therefore,
the other Objection of the Seller's being obliged to keep his
Stock 'till the End of a tedious Law-Suit is of no Weight;
for as every Purchaser will be able, and will probably be willing to perform his Part of the Agreement, it is not to be presumed, that there will be any Law-Suits upon that Head.
'I am really surprized, Sir, to hear Gentlemen talk of their
being, by this Bill, prevented from employing a Merchant or
Friend to buy or sell Stock for them; such Gentlemen do
not, it seems, know that Commission and Brokerage are two
different Articles: If a Merchant is employ'd to buy or sell
Stock for another, he may either do it himself, or he may
employ a Broker; if he employs a Broker, he charges both
Brokerage and Commission, and if he does it himself he
charges only Commission: In neither Case does he act as a
Broker, nor will he be obliged to keep any Book for that
Purpose.
'I have now, Sir, gone through all the material Objections I have heard made against the Bill. I hope, I have
shewn that there is no Weight in any of them; I hope, I
have shewn that all the Inconveniencies, which are pretended
to arise from this Bill, are imaginary; and I think, I have
shewn very real Inconveniencies arising from the infamous
Practice of Stockjobbing; and every Gentleman in the
House may suggest to himself a great many more. We ought
to consider that no bad Custom or Practice ever crept into any
Nation, but what some People got by; and, let the Practice
be as pernicious as it will, we may presume that those who
get by it, will endeavour to raise Objections against every
effectual Remedy that can be offered; but as no Gentleman
in this House can be any way concerned in the Gettings by
Stockjobbing, so, I hope, they will not allow themselves
to be missed by any frivolous Objections started, without
Doors, by those who are.'
Mr Brooksbank.
Sir John Barnard having done speaking, Mr Brooksbank
stood up next, and spoke against the Bill as follows:
Mr Speaker,
'I doubt not but there was a great deal of Money lost
and won by the late sudden Rise and Fall of East-India Stock,
and I am persuaded that a great many of those, who became
Purchasers upon the Rise of that Stock, were such as never
intended to hold the Stock for the Sake of the Dividend,
but that they were such as bought only with a View of
making an Advantage, by selling it out again at an advanced
Price: This, 'tis true, is a Sort of Gaming, but it is of
such a Sort as cannot be entirely prevented, even by the Bill
now before us; so that in such a Case no great Benefit can
be expected by the Bill, and in many Cases it will certainly
be attended with great Inconveniencies. I shall mention only two; the first of which is that of the Long Annuities:
It often happens that in the Sale of such Publick Securities,
the Seller must deduce his Title in the same Manner, as if he
were to sell a Land-Estate; so that it will be impossible for
him to compleat the Conveyance in ten Days, which is the
Time limited in this Bill; and therefore I am of Opinion,
that the Sale of such Annuities will, in many Cases, become impracticable, if this Bill should pass into a Law.
'It is certain, Sir, that the Merchants may sell Goods to
be delivered at any Time the Contractors shall agree on:
I know that in the Russian Trade it is usual for the Merchants concerned in that Trade, to enter into Contracts to
deliver Hemp at a certain Price, at a certain future Time,
tho', perhaps, at the Time of making the Contract, the
Hemp is not so much as purchased or contracted for in Russia: This is a Privilege which is enjoyed by all Merchants
with respect to the Goods they deal in, and I can see no
Reason why the Proprietors of our publick Funds should not
enjoy the same Privilege.
'The other Inconvenience I shall mention, is, That of the
Disappointments which some of the publick Creditors may
meet with in the Sale of their Properties, which will certainly be much agravated by this Bill: Suppose a Man enters
into an Agreement for the Purchase of a Land-Estate, and
covenants to pay the Price against such a Day under a great
Penalty; for enabling him to perform his Agreement he
sells out 10,000£. of his Stock, to be delivered some few
Days before that Day on which he is, by his Covenant, obliged to pay for his Estate: Suppose the Purchaser of the
Stock does not come to accept of the Stock, or to pay the
Price; as the Law now stands, the Seller of the Stock may
make a Tender of his Stock at the Books, and may sell it
out next Transfer-Day at the Risk of the Buyer, by which
he is enabled to pay for his Estate, and he may recover from
the Purchaser of his Stock, what he lost by his not accepting and paying for the Stock according to Agreement; But
if this Bill passes into a Law, the Seller of Stock must, I
presume, keep his Stock 'till the End of the Law-Suit between him and the Buyer, in order that he may be always
ready to make a specifical Performance; by which Means,
if he has no other Fund for raising ready Money, he must
subject himself to the Penalty of his Covenant as to the Purchase of the Estate. As these are Inconveniencies which may
often occur, I think it is hard to subject, the Proprietors of
the publick Funds to them; and therefore I shall be against
the Bill's passing in the Form it is at present.'
Sir R. Walpole.
Sir Robert Walpole spoke next:
Mr Speaker,
'I wish the Objections now started against the passing of
this Bill, had been mentioned either upon the second Reading, or in the Committee. I do really think that the Bill
might have been drawn up, as to some Parts of it, with
something more Perspicuity, so as to have intirely obviated the Objections now made to it: But as most of the
Objections now made are founded upon Mistakes, as to the
Meaning and Intention of the Bill, I am therefore of Opinion, that they ought not to be of Weight enough to prevent its passing.
'As to what the honourable Gentleman was pleased to
mention about Navy-Contracts, I cannot think that they
come any Way under the Case now before us. The Navy
always contracted to pay ready Money to all those, who agree
to furnish them with any Stores or Provisions; and after, a
Man has entered into such a Contract, he may certainly sell,
or assign any Interest, or any Share of the Interest he has
therein to another, notwithstanding the Bill now before us.
Upon such Contracts the Money is indeed generally paid by
Navy-Bills, but that cannot hinder the private Contracter to
raise Money upon his Contract after what Manner he pleases;
he may even oblige himself to deliver Navy-Bills at such a
Price; for, before they are issued, they cannot be deemed
to be Publick Securities; and if, upon delivering the Stores
and Provisions, the Navy should actually pay ready Money
to the private Contractor, can it be so much as pretended,
that he would be then obliged to deliver Navy-Bills to the
Person, from whom he had borrowed Money upon his Contract with the Navy: Would not, in such a Case, the Repayment of the Money borrowed with Interest be a full Performance of his Engagement with the Lender? Navy-Bills,
indeed, after they are once issued, do certainly become Publick Securities, and then they are to be bought and sold in
the Manner prescribed by this Bill, which can no way injure
Publick Credit.
'As to the Objection against compounding, or voluntarily
receiving any Difference, I cannot think, that the Laws, as
to the Performance on the Seller's Part, is any way altered
by this Bill. He is not by this Bill obliged to keep the
Stock sold, in his Possession, any longer than he was before;
he may certainly perform upon his Part by a Tender of the
Stock, in the same Manner as he could have done before;
he may then sell out his Stock, and he may bring his Action against the Buyer for not performing his Part of the
Contract, upon which Action he will recover the Difference
by way of Damages.
'Indeed, that Objection relating to the long Annuities
has something more in it, and therefore, I wish it had
been provided against by some Words, or some Clause in
the Bill; but it is a Case that will happen but seldom, and
the Difficulty may be, by proper Management and Dispatch,
in all Cases surmounted, and therefore I do not think it sufficient for throwing out the Bill; for the Practice of Stockjobbing has been so prejudicial to this Nation, that no trivial
Objection ought to take Place against a Bill by which, I
think, that Practice will be prevented for the future.
'I have, Sir, long wished for some such Bill: Every one
knows, how even the Administration has been sometimes distressed by the Practices of Stockjobbers: They have Correspondents settled at all the Courts of Europe, and upon all
Occasions of Moment they have their Expresses, who make
much greater Dispatch than the Government's Expresses can
do, because they are generally much better paid, and better
appointed for that Purpose.
'I must say, Sir, that the late Practices in the East-India
Stock were really something surprizing; there might perhaps be some, who upon its Rise bought only with a View
of selling out again at an advanced Price; but I am persuaded there were others, who bought even at the highest
Price with an honest Intention, and without any other View
but that of holding the Stock they bought, and taking their
Dividends as they should become due. The Price of that
Stock, and of every other Stock, must always be according
to the Value of Money at that Time, and the Dividend
made; or that may probably be made upon the Stock: At
that Time our 4£. per Cent. were selling at a Premium,
even our 3£. per Cent. were selling at very near Par; and
therefore we must conclude, that according to the Value of
Money at that Time, an Annuity of 4£. per Cent. was very
well worth 100£. principal Money. That Company had
divided eight per Cent. for many Years; they but just before paid 200,000£. to the Government for a Prolongation
of their Term; and at the same Time they had declared
they were able to do all this, and likewise to pay off 4 or
500,000£. of their Bonds, out of the Profits of their Trade:
From all which, those who were not in the deepest Secret of
their Affairs, had very good Reason to conclude, that they
would have been able to have continued the same Dividend for many Years to come, and that therefore 100£.
East-India Stock was a cheap Purchase when bought even for
200£. The Resolution was soon after taken for diminishing
their Dividend, and that was as natural a Reason for the
Fall of their Stock, as their former Declarations had been
for its Rise. What were the Motives for this Management
I shall not pretend to determine; but I am afraid, that the
Game of Stock Jobbing is often the Cause of Managements
in that, and all other publick Funds: If we destroy the
Cause, the Effects must cease; and of Consequence the
Price of all publick Stocks will become more certain and
fixed, which will, I am sure, make them more valuable to
all honest Purchasers. The fluctuating of the Price can be
no Advantage to any but Brokers, and to those who have
a Mind to make indirect Advantages by Stockjobbing:
Those Practices will, I think, be prevented by this Bill;
consequently it will tend to the Improvement of publick
Credit, and therefore I shall be for its passing.'
Lord Hervey.
Then Lord Hervey spoke against the Bill:
Mr Speaker,
'In the Debate now before us, I cannot agree with my
honourable Friend over the Way. I must be of Opinion,
that if this Bill passes, no Seller can sue for any Difference
upon the Stock sold, nor can he recover Damage, which I
take to be the same with Difference, unless he has the Stock
in his Possession the whole Time of the Suit: By this Bill
every Bargain is to be specifically performed, and therefore
the Seller, as I take it, must sue only for a specifical Performance, which no Seller can pretend to sue for, unless he
is, at all Times, during the Continuance of the Suit, in a
Condition and ready to perform specifically upon his Part,
for which End he must always have of that Stock which he
has sold, at least as much as he is obliged to deliver to the
Buyer; and therefore, if a Man has sold all the Share he
has in any publick Fund, in order to enable him to perform
his Part of an Agreement about something else, if the
Buyer does not come to take the Stock, and pay the Price,
the Seller must subject himself to the Penalty of his other
Agreement, or he must give up all Pretences for recovering
any thing from the Buyer of his Stock, either by way of
Difference or Damages. This will be a great Hardship upon
all Stockholders, and as they will, by this Bill, be subjected to a great many other Inconveniences, and to several
dangerous and heavy Penalties, I shall therefore be against
its passing.'
Sir W. Yonge.
Sir William Yonge spoke next for the Bill:
Mr Speaker,
'In the Case now before us, I take it to be of no Consequence, whether or no the Seller can recover either Difference or Damages, and therefore, whether or no they be
in effect the same is no material Question. I am very well
convinced, that no Circumstances can everday a Man under
the Necessity of selling or buying for Time; no Man can
so much as have an Inclination that Way, unless he be endued with something of the Spirit of Gaming, or unless he
knows a Secret, by which he thinks he can make an unjust
Advantage of the Person he sells to, or purchases from; and
therefore, Sir, I look upon the putting a final End to this
Practice to be one of the principal Aims of this Bill. I really, Sir, must say, that I have not heard one material Objection offered against this Bill, and as I was one of those
appointed to bring it in, I can say, that all possible Care
was taken to make the Words as plain, and the Terms as
easy, as were consistent with putting an effectual End to the Evils against which the Bill was originally proposed. However, as the Bill is to go to the other House, I do not know
but some few Words may be added or altered, in order to
obviate, as much as possible, all Objections that have been
or may be made to the Bill.'
Then Sir John Barnard spoke again,
Sir John Barnard.
Sir,
'It is very certain that Long Annuities are included in
this Bill; they must not be bought or sold hereafter but according to the Manner perscribed by this Bill: But I am
certain this can be no Objection to the passing of it; for no
wise Man, no honest Man, will presume to sell any thing
'till he has made his Title to it as clear as the Nature of
the Thing can admit of; and therefore I think, that no
Possessor of a Long Annuity will presume to sell 'till after he
has deduced his Title, and made it so clear, that no Difficulty can be made in approving of it, in which Case all
such Bargains may be specifically performed within ten Days
after the making thereof; but if any accidental Delay should
in the mean Time happen, the Parties may, by mutual Consent, put off the specifical Performance for what Time they
please; there is nothing in this Bill that can prevent such a
mutual Indulgence.
'I did not before take Notice of the Objection made,
That this Bill, if it passes, may be the Occasion of the
bringing many Suits in Equity against the Possessors of our
publick Funds. This, I must say, I am surprized at. What
Guard has any Man, as the Law now stands, against Chancery Suits? May not any Man now bring a Bill in Equity
against me, and set forth, that I owe him a large Sum of
Money, tho' I never had any Dealings with the Man in
my Life? Such a Bill may certainly be brought, but I
know what would be the Fate of it; I know it would be
dismissed with Costs: This is my Dependence, I know I have
never done any Thing that may render me liable to the having of such a Bill brought against me, and therefore I depend on it that no such Bill will ever be brought. And
would it not be the same if the Bill now before us should
pass? Is it to be supposed, that any Man would subject himself to the immediate Expence of ten or twelve Pounds,
and the Danger of being obliged to pay twenty or thirty
more, unless he had very strong Proofs against the Man
whom he made Defendant to his Bill? This, Sir, is really
putting Cases almost impossible, in order from thence to
raise Objections against a Bill, for the Remedy of what is,
by every Gentleman in this House acknowledged to be, a
most insufferable Evil.'
Then Mr Glanville stood up again, and said;
Mr Glanville.
Sir,
'I must observe, that the Possessor of a Long Annuity, who
has a Mind to sell, may think his Title as clear as the Sun
at Noon-Day, and yet when he comes to shew it to the
Purchaser, he may find several Objections: In such Case it
must be laid before the Purchaser's Counsel, he must examine all the Title Deeds, and a Conveyance must be drawn
up and settled by Counsel, both for the Seller and Buyer;
and this will be admitted, I believe, not to be practicable in
ten Days, so that I must still be of Opinion, that the Sale
of such publick Securities will, by this Bill, be made very
dangerous and difficult, if not altogether impossible.
'As to Bills in Equity it is certain, that no Man will
ever file such a Bill unless he expects some Discovery by the
Defendant's Answer. As the Law now stands, no Man can
expect any Discovery from a Man with whom he never had
any Transactions: But by the Bill now before us, every Man
will have some Encouragement to expect a Discovery of
something he may make an Advantage of by the Defendant's
Answer, if such Defendant ever was a Dealer in any of
our Publick Funds; because, if he ever made a Contract
contrary to the Terms of this Bill, he will be obliged to discover it by his Answer, and tho' he may be thereby discharged from the Penalty, yet the other Party contracting
with him is not; so that the Person who files the Bill, may
thereby make an Advantage, either by recovering the Money received by the Defendant upon an unlawful Contract,
or by grounding an Information upon that Answer for recovering a Penalty from the other Party concerned in such
unlawful Contract or Composition; and therefore, I think,
it is evident, that if this Bill passes, the Proprietors of the
Publick Funds will be more liable to have Bills in Equity
preferred against them than any other Persons in the Kingdom are.
'I shall conclude, Sir, with taking Notice of one Case
where People are often obliged to sell before they can be
ready to deliver, and that is in the Case of Executors and
Trustees, where the Trust-Stock must generally be sold by
a Bill in Chancery. In such Cases, according to the Practice now observed, they must sell before they bring their
Bill, because the Purchaser is always made a Party to the
Suit; and every Man knows that a Chancery Suit cannot be
begun and ended, and the Bargain specifically performed in
ten Days Time.'
Mr Bootle.
Mr Bootle spoke next:
Sir,
'I rise up only to rectify some Mistakes that I find Gentlemen seem to be in, with respect to the present Practice of
the Law. According to the present Practice, no Man that
sells Stock is obliged to keep his Stock for any Time after
the Day, on which he contracted to deliver it: If the Buyer
do not come on that Day to accept the Stock, and pay the
Price he agreed to give for it, the Seller makes Publication
at the Books for him to come and accept, and pay for the
Stock which he is then ready to deliver according to his
Contract: Then an actual Transfer is made upon the Books,
and that Transfer stands 'till the shutting up of the Books for
that Day; if, in that Time, the Buyer do not come to accept of, and pay for the Stock so transferred, the Transfer
is then cancelled; and upon next Transfer-Day the Seller may
sell his Stock to whomsoever he pleases at the current Price
of that Day; and if he sells it at a Loss, he has an Action
upon a Breach of Covenant against the Buyer, upon which
Action he always recovers the Difference by way of Damages. The Publication and Transfer, made at the Books upon
the Day agreed on and proved duly in Court, is always
taken for a specifical Performance on the part of the Seller; and the Buyer has no Title to come, at any Time after
that Day, to demand a new specifical Performance. This is
the present Practice in all such Cases, and I am sure there
is nothing in the Bill now before us which can alter the
present Practice in that Respect; and therefore I must conclude, that as to this Case, no Stockholder can be brought
under any Difficulty or Hardship by the Bill now before
us.
'With respect, Sir, to the Long Annuities, why may not
they be sold as Land-Estates generally are ? In the Sale of
Land-Estates, when the Seller finds out one who is willing
to be the Purchaser, the first Thing he does is to satisfy him
about the Title, before they so much as talk about the Price,
or examine particularly into the Value of the Estate to be
sold. If this Method be observed with respect to the Sale of
Long Annuities, it cannot be said, but that the Agreement
may be specifically performed by both Parties, within ten
Days after making the same.
'As to the Sale of Stock vested in Executors or Trustees,
there is no Necessity of selling it before the Bill in Chancery
be filed; there is no Necessity of selling it before a Decree
passes for that Purpose: It may be suggested in the Bill, that
such a Man is willing to, become a Purchaser, and he may
be made a Party to the Suit, as well as if he had actually
become a Purchaser; the Effect would be the same, and he
would get his Costs in the one Case as well as in the other.
'And as to Stockholders being exposed to the Danger of
having Bills in Chancery filed frequently against them, there
is nothing in it; no fair Dealer in Stocks can ever be exposed to such a Danger, for whoever files such a Bill must set
forth the unlawful Contract particularly; we are not to imagine, that, from any Clause in this Bill, a Man will be allowed to bring a Bill in Equity, and suggest generally that
the Defendant has made some unlawful Contracts in Stocks,
and pray that he may be obliged to discover all his Dealings;
no, the Plaintiff must certainly set forth the particular Contract of which he prays a Discovery; and this he cannot do,
unless there has not only been some such unlawful Contract,
but such an unlawful Contract as he has had some Information of; and if upon the Issue of the Cause his Information
appears to be groundless, he may expect to be made pay all
Costs of Suit; so that no Man can have Reason to be afraid
of any such Bills being filed against him, unless he has actually made some unlawful Contract; and that no such Man
should rest in Security is the very Design of this Bill.
'In short, Sir, from all the Objections that have been
started, and all the Cases that have been put, I can see nothing but pretended or imaginary Difficulties; and as the
Bill now before us will, in my Opinion, put an End to many
real Evils, which are of the most dangerous Consequence
both to the Trade and Credit of this Nation, therefore I
shall with all my Heart be for its passing in this House, and
I hope it will be passed into a Law.'
The Bill against Stockjobbing passes the Commons: But is afterwards drop'd, on account of the Alterations made therein by the Lords.
Then the Question being put, That the Bill do pass,
it was carried in the Affirmative by 55 against 49; and
was sent up to the Lords, who made so many Alterations
therein, that it was afterwards drop'd.
Ld. Tyrconnell moves for a Lottery of 1000000£. for Relief of the Sufferers by the Charitable Corporation.
May 4. The House being in a Grand Committee to consider of Methods for Relief of the Sufferers by the Charitable Corporation, the Lord Tyrconnel mov'd, That a Sum
not exceeding one Million be raised, by way of Lottery,
for that Purpose. His Lordship was opposed by Mr Sandys;
who was answer'd by Sir William Yonge. Hereupon Mr
Erle stood up and said,
Debate thereon.
Sir,
'I am very much for giving all the Relief we can to
such as are Objects of Charity, but I ám as much against
doing it by way of Lottery; for by such a Method, in order
to relieve those who have been cheated and undone, we shall
give a Handle, by which a much greater Number of weak
and simple Persons may be undone.'
Mr Palmer.
Mr Palmer spoke next:
Sir,
'I always was, and always shall be against Lotteries, of whatever Kind, or on whatever Occasion, and therefore I cannot but be against the Proposition now made to
us. I shall be glad to see those poor, unhappy People relieved, and I hope that some effectual Methods may be fallen on for procuring that Relief; but do not let us think of
giving them Relief by setting up what has been always deemed a publick Nusance; I believe it will be a better Way for
us to grant a Sum of Money to the Crown, for the Relief of
those of the Sufferers who are really Objects of Compassion:
This Method I mention only to the Committee; but, whatever Relief is to be granted, I think it ought to be very
much consined, for as to all those who shall appear to have
been Gamesters in that Stock, they no more merit the Compassion of the Publick, than those who are undone at a Gaming-Table. I doubt much if any of the Men who became
Adventurers in that Corporation deserve much Compassion;
I am afraid, that most of them purchased, either with a
View of making an unjust Profit by the advanced Price of
the Shares they bought, or with a View to have a higher Interest for their Money, than what they were by Law intitled
to, and in either Case they are almost as fradulent as those
who were the Managers; for he that cheats, or extorts from
a Man a Shilling, is as much guilty of Fraud, as he that
cheats him out of 1000£. Indeed, as to the Ladies, a great
many of them may have been innocently drawn in by those,
to whom they intrusted the Management of their Affairs,
or by those who, from the Beginning, had a formed Design
of cheating them out of their Money: Their Case is really
to be pitied, but in my Opinion, of all the Sufferers, they
only are the proper Objects of Compassion, and therefore I
hope, that whatever Relief is to be given, will be consined to
the fair Sex only.'
Lord Tyrconnel.
To this Lord Tyrconnel replied,
Sir,
'I have as great a Regard for the fair Sex as the Gentleman who spoke last, and with him I think, that they are
really the greatest Objects of Compassion; but, Sir, let us
consider, that many of those Gentlemen, who have been undone, have Wives and Daughters; and I cannot but look
upon the Wives and Daughters of such Men to be at least
as great Objects of Compassion, as any of those Ladies
who have been undone by their own Act and Deed.'
Sir Charles Wager.
Hereupon Sir Charles Wager said,
Sir,
'I must think, that the only Means we can think of
for relieving the unhappy Sufferers in that Corporation, is to
make a Lottery for their Benefit; but I must likewise be of
Opinion, that a Lottery of a Million will be too large; I
believe one of 500,000£. may be sufficient; and therefore I
shall second the Motion to the Amount of that Sum.'
Sir Joseph Jekyll.
Then Sir Joseph Jekyll spoke against the Motion as
follows:
Sir,
'Before we think of granting any Money to the Crown, or
of granting Money in any other Way, for the Relief of
those Sufferers, we ought first to consider, whether or no
we have any Power or Authority to tax the People, or to
grant away the publick Money for the Relief of any private Persons. I must really be of Opinion, that we have
no such Power; we are indeed to dispose of the publick
Money, but then we are to dispose of it for publick Uses;
we are not to convert it either to our own Use, or to the
Use of any private Person: 'Tis true, we have sometimes
granted Money to the King for the rewarding of private
Persons, but such Grants have always been made for some
Services rendered by those Persons to the Publick; and
therefore, what Money was in that way granted, was really
for the Use of the Publick. Even the raising of Money by
a Lottery is raising Money upon the People, and if any
Part of the Money so raised is granted away to private Persons, I must look upon it to be a converting the publick
Money to the Use of private Persons, which I think we
have no Power to do; and upon that Account, as well as on
account of the many Inconveniences that attend Lotteries,
I must be against the Motion.'
Mr Winnington.
Mr Winnington spoke next in behalf of the Motion:
Sir,
'I have always had a great Regard for the Opinion of the
honourable and learned Gentleman who spoke last, but I
hope he will excuse me, if I say that I do not think the
Objections he has now made against the Proposition in
Hand, are near so strong as those usually made by him.
As to our Power of granting Money for the Relief in Question, I do not know what Power we may have in that Respect; but I am sure there are several Instances, where we
have granted even a publick Tax for the Relief of private
Persons. One such Instance, Sir, is within my Knowledge,
and is so late, that every Gentleman in this House may remember it; that is, the Case of the Suitors in Chancery,
whose Money had been lost by the Misconduct of the late
Lord Chancellor, and the then Masters in Chancery: It is
well known that this House laid a Tax upon the Law, which
I take to be a Tax upon the People, because the whole is
paid by the Clients in that Court, and not by the Lawyers;
and the Money to arise by this Tax was appropriated towards making good the Loss, which the Suitors in that
Court had sustained. Another Instance of the same Nature
is that Tax, which was granted for Relief of the Orphans
within the City of London; and I believe several other Instances could be given, if we were to examine the Journals of
this House.
'However, Sir, I do not take this to be the Question now
before us. It is not proposed to impose any Tax, or to
grant any Money to the Crown for the Relief of those unhappy Sufferers; for I cannot imagine how it can be thought,
that the granting a Lottery is either a Tax or an Imposition
upon the Publick. By granting a Lottery we do not oblige
any Man to pay towards it, no Man is to be forc'd to become an Adventurer; it is not really so much a Grant of
Money, as it is a Repeal in so far of an Act of Parliament
lately made against private Lotteries; for, if it were not for
that Statute, the Charitable Corporation could of themselves
set up such a Lottery as is now proposed: And as the making of that Law was occasioned by the many Frauds that
were committed by the means of private Lotteries, and the
downright Bites that were often put upon People under
that Name, the Cause entirely ceases with respect to the
Lottery now proposed, from which no Fraud or Bite can be
so much as suspected.'
Sir William Wyndham.
After him Sir William Wyndham stood up, and said,
Sir,
'As to the Affair before us, I am afraid we are beginning at the wrong End. We are now in a Committee, to
consider of Ways and Means for relieving such of the Sufferers in the Charitable Corporation, as shall be deemed Objects of Compassion, and we are now going to resolve upon
a certain Sum to be appropriated for that Relief, before we
know any Thing about the Sufferers; whether there be any,
or how many of them there be Objects of Compassion; or
what Sum will be necessary for giving them a proper Relief?
All these Questions ought, I think, to be resolv'd, before we
proceed to grant any Sum for that Purpose, either by way of
Lottery or any other way. I am, Sir, firmly of Opinion,
that we have no Power to lay on any publick Imposition for
the Relief of private Persons; and to think of giving a Relief by way of Lottery, is to establish by Law a new Deceit,
for the Relief of those who have suffered by an old one.
As to our having it in our Power to relieve private Persons
by publick Taxes, the Instances mentioned by the honourable
Gentleman who spoke last, are not at all to the present Case.
The Suitors in Chancery were in a very different Situation
from those we are now about to relieve: The Court of
Chancery is one of the publick Courts of the Kingdom, and
consequently is the same with the Publick; whatever Money was put into the Custody of that Court, was put into the
Custody of the Publick, and if any of it was purloined
by those Officers who are appointed by the Publick, there
is no Question but that the Publick is obliged to make it
good: Besides, those who had their Money in that Court
did not voluntarily put it there; they were all obliged, contrary to their Inclination, to leave it in that Court; they
could not get it out again without an Order of Court for that
Purpose; they could not so much as inquire in what Manner their Money was disposed of; whereas, with respect to
the Sufferers in the Charitable Corporation, they have no
Pretence of having trusted the Publick with their Money;
they voluntarily put their Money there; they might have
taken it out when they would, and they might have every
Day inquired into the Management of it; so that what they
have lost is entirely owing to their own Act and Deed, or
at least to their own Neglect; they have nothing but Compassion to plead for granting them any Relief from the Publick, and I am afraid, if we consider the Publick aright,
and the Loads it already labours under, we must conclude it
is not in a proper Condition for granting such large Charities.
That other Instance, Sir, relating to the Tax for relieving
the Orphans of the City of London, is still less to the present
Case; it is a local Tax; it extends no farther than the City
of London; and it was most reasonable that the Citizens of
London should be obliged to make good the Loss, that was
sustained by Persons who were under a Necessity of trusting
their Money to them, or at least to the Officers appointed
by them.
'Now as to Lotteries, Sir, the honourable Gentleman
mistakes it, if he imagines that the Frauds committed in private Lotteries, was the only Reason for prohibiting by an express Law the setting up of any such. Every Lottery, publick or private, is a publick Nusance, because it makes a
great many poor unthinking People ruin themselves by venturing more Money in that Way than their Circumstances
can admit of; and, as all Lotteries are a Sort of GamingTables, they give great Encouragement to Idleness and Extravagance, by buoying up weak People with the Hopes of
getting Riches in another Way than that of Industry and
Frugality, which is the only Way of getting Riches that
ought to be encouraged by a wise People; therefore, Sir,
the Cause of the Law does not cease with respect to the Lottery now proposed, but will, I believe, grow more strong against it than against any publick Lottery that ever was proposed; for, considering the Expences of Management, it is
certain that the Corporation, or the Sufferers therein, can
make little or nothing by a Lottery, unless it be made so
disadvantageous to the Adventurers, that no Man but a Madman will put any Money into it; and if such a Lottery
should fill, it would be a very powerful Argument against
this and every such Lottery that can be proposed; for it is
really granting a Licence by Act of Parliament to cheat
People out of their Money, which in a Sort of Project for
raising Money that this House will never, I hope, agree to
in any Case whatever.'
Lord Hervey.
Lord Hervey spoke next in Favour of the Motion:
Sir,
'There is, in my Opinion, no possible Relief to be given
to those unfortunate People, but what must be attended with
some Inconveniencies. I am, in general, as much against encouraging Lotteries as any Gentleman in this House; but
where no real Fraud is committed, I cannot think that a Lottery is a Thing of so bad Consequence; where the Money
thereby raised is duly applied, and no underhand Dealings
allowed to be put in Practice, which, to be sure, will be taken
Care of in the present Case, it cannot be attended with many Inconveniencies; and as a Lottery is the only Method
which I have yet heard mentioned, or can think of, for
giving Relief to those Objects of Compassion we have now
under our Consideration; I have so much Pity for them,
that I think the few Inconveniencies, that can attend such a
small Lottery as that of 500,000£. ought in the present Case
to be overlooked.
'Upon the Petition of the Proprietors of this Corporation,
we have all had two Things under our Consideration. The
first was that of doing Justice by punishing the Guilty; in
this we have gone on as we ought to do in all such Cases;
we have proceeded with the utmost Caution; because, if we
had been rigorous in that Point, we might readily have deviated into Severity, which in all Cases ought to be carefully
avoided; but as to the other Point, which is that of giving
Relief to the unfortunate Sufferers, and which is the Point
now before us, there is no need of so great Caution: If in
this we should go a little too far, it is erring upon the safe
Side; the greatest Fault we can be guilty of, is that of
shewing too much Compassion and Pity for those innocent
Persons, who have by the Frauds of others become proper
Objects of Compassion.
'It cannot, I think, be said, that we are beginning at the
wrong End, by voting for a 500,000£. Lottery, before we
know the Number of the Sufferers that are Objects of Compassion, or the Sum that will be wanted for giving them a proper Relief; because, Sir, we are not now to settle the Scheme
of the Lottery: Before that is settled, there will be Time
to inquire into what Sum will be necessary for giving such
Relief, and according as that Sum is large or small, the
Lottery may be made the more or the less advantageous for
the Adventurers; If 100,000£. should be found to be necessary for relieving all those of the Sufferers, who are really
Objects of Compassion, there must be a fifth Part of the Money
contributed by the Adventurers sunk for the Use of the Sufferers; and, if it should be found, that half that Sum will
be sufficient for the End proposed, then it will not be necessary to sink above one tenth of the Money contributed by
the Adventurers; and whatever is thus sunk by the Adventurers, is not really to be looked on as Money thrown away,
it is to be looked on as so much Money given by them for
a charitable Use; and the raising of this Charity by way of
Lottery, is proposed only as an Inducement for some People
to contribute towards a charitable Use, who would not perhaps otherwise contribute to the most charitable Use that
can be imagined.'
Sir Joseph Jekyll.
Then Sir Joseph Jekyll spoke again:
Sir,
'I am very much convinced, and I find it is generally
allowed, that a Lottery is in itself a bad Thing; and, I
think it is likewise allowed, that there is no Reason for our
coming into such a Measure at present, but only the Necessity we are under, and because no other Means of Relief
can be thought of. There is no Sort of Lottery can be set
up, but what must expose Multitudes of People to be undone; and it is impossible to prevent several of those fraudulent Practices, which are always set up under the Sanction
of every Publick Lottery. If then a Lottery be in itself a
bad Thing, surely the less we have of it the better; why
should we vote for a Lottery of 500,000£. if one of 250,000£.
will do the Business? This Consideration alone makes it, Sir,
in my Opinion, necessary first to consider who are Objects of
Compassion, and what Sum will be sufficient to relieve
them; for if upon such Inquiry it be found that a Lottery of 250,000£. will be sufficient for the End proposed, it
would certainly be very wrong in us to vote a Lottery of
500,000£. for we seem all to be convinced, that a Lottery
for any Sum will do Mischief; but a Lottery for a small Sum
can never do so much Mischief as one for a larger.'
Mr Heathcote.
Mr Heathcote spoke next as follows:
Sir,
'I must confess that what is now proposed seems to be
a new Method of raising Charity; but I hope the charitable
Disposition of the People of this Nation is not as yet so
much decayed, as to make it necessary to trick them into
the giving of Charity; when they are fully convinced that
the Use, for which the Money is raised, is really charitable,
in such Cases I have never as yet observed the People backward in their Contributions; I am, indeed, afraid that the
Objects of Charity now under our Consideration would not
meet with any great Relief from the People; for the Generality of the People do generally think, that those who
are undone by any sort of Gaming or Stockjobbing, are not
proper Objects of Charity. Those who are ruined by Shipwrecks, by Fire, or such Accidents, are certainly much
greater Objects of Charity, and more intitled to a Parliamentary Relief, than those who ever were or ever can be undone
by the Management of any Publick Stock whatever; because every Proprietor may look into the Affairs of the Company, and may prevent the Mismanagement, if he is but tolerably careful of his own Interest; and yet we have never
seen any of the former so much as claim a Relief from Parliament.
'I must observe, Sir, that what we are now about may
come to be a very bad Precedent; it will for the future make
all Proprietors of Publick Funds less careful of their Directors
and Managers; so that I am afraid, we may have many Applications of the same Nature. There is now a Company
under our Consideration, which will likewise, I believe,
stand in need of the same sort of Relief; and I do not know,
but that in nine or ten Years, another great Company may
find themselves under a Necessity of applying for something
of the same Nature; especially if they should go on with
their present Scheme of diminishing so considerably their
Trading Capital, and loading it with all the Debts they now
owe. For these Reasons, Sir, as well as a great many others, I cannot but be against the Motion now in hand.'
A Lottery of 500,00£. voted for Relief of the Sufferers by the Charitable Corporation.
This Debate being over, a Motion was made, That the
Chairman leave the Chair: But the Question being put thereupon, it was carried in the Negative by 85 to 61; after
which the Committee came to several Resolutions, which
upon the Report were agreed to; and a Bill brought in for
the Relief of the Sufferers by a Lottery of 500,000£. which
passed into a Law.
June 11. The King came to the House of Lords, and the
Commons attending, his Majesty made the following Speech
to both Houses.
King's Speech at putting an End to the Sixth Session.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
THE Season of the Year, and the Dispatch you have
given to the Publick Business, make it proper for
me to put an End to this Session of Parliament.
Gentlemen of the House of Commons,
"I return you my Thanks for the Provisions you have
made for the Service of the current Year. I have never
demanded any Supplies of my People, but what were absolutely necessary for the Honour, Safety and Defence of
me and my Kingdom; and I am always best pleased, when
the Publick Expences are supply'd in a Manner least burthensome to my Subjects.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
"I cannot pass by unobserved, the wicked Endeavours,
that have lately been made Use of to inflame the Minds
of the People, and by the most unjust Misrepresentations,
to raise Tumults and Disorders, that almost threatned the
Peace of the Kingdom; but I depend upon the Force of
Truth, to remove the groundless Jealousies, that have
been raised, of Designs carrying on against the Liberties
of my People, and upon your known Fidelity, to defeat
and frustrate the Expectations of such as delight in Confusion. It is my Inclination, and has always been my
Study, to preserve the Religious and Civil Rights of all
my Subjects.
'Let it be your Care to undeceive the Deluded, and to
make them sensible of their present Happiness, and the
Hazard they run of being unwarily drawn, by specious
Pretences, into their own Destruction."
The Parliament prorogued.
After which, the Lord Chancellor, by his Majesty's Command, prorogued the Parliament to the 26th of July:
They were afterwards farther prorogued to the 17th of January.
The End of the Second Volume.