Mr Hampden's SPEECH In Defence of the PEERAGE-BILL.
[See Page 202.]
Mr Speaker,
AS a Member of this House, I consider myself as
the Trustee of those whom I represent; engaged in
Honour to guard those important Trusts that are reposed in
me, as well as to defend the Privileges of the House I belong to. By this Rule I measure my Duty, that whatever
new Law is contrary to, or destructive of, those Trusts, I
am bound to oppose it: but that whatever new Law is agreeable to them, considered in their natural Intent and Meaning,
and consistent with the Dignity and Privileges of our House,
I am at Liberty to vote for it; nay, I am indeed obliged to
do so, if it be found for the Good of the whole Community, or to have any Tendency towards making the future
Condition of those I represent, and those with whom I fit,
better and happier.
'I make no Exception here, even of those Laws which
more nearly touch the principal Branches of our Constitution, provided they touch not the Vitals and Essentials of
it. Every new Law is certainly an Alteration of the Constitution in some Sense, as it gives or takes away some Power
or Privilege not enjoyed, or enjoyed before, by the Crown.
But these new Laws added, or old ones abolished, every
Day, do not affect the Vitals of the Constitution. The
King is still the Executor of the Laws, tho' those Alterations
make a daily Change in his executive Power; but in the
Case before us, because the Bill propos'd is expresly declared
to be designed to alter the present Condition of the House
of Lords, and because that House is one of the States of
the Realm; this seems to have affected some Members, as if
it were something more essential to our Constitution than the
Alteration of the King's Power, with his own Consent, in
any other new Law. But as the Essence of the Constitution
consists not in having the Number of Lords unbounded, any
more than the Number of the Commons; the Limitation of
the Royal Power, with Respect to this, is no more an Alteration of the Constitution in its Essentials, than the Alteration of many other old Laws or Customs. The King's
Power of adding new Lords in infinitum, is indeed by the
Intent of this Bill stopt and cut off. But there still remains
a House of Lords, and in the Crown the Prerogative of
making new Lords upon all Extinctions and Failures that
may be. And this being no more than the turning an unlimited Power into a limited, or an Alteration of the Exercise of one of the Powers of the Crown, it cannot possibly
be said to disturb or affect our Constitution in its essential
Parts.
The Design of the Bill in short is this, 'That, on the
Part of Scotland, in lieu of Sixteen Elective Peers, Twenty five shall have Hereditary Seats in Parliament, to be
filled up, upon any Extinction, out of the Peers of Scotland; and that on the Part of England not more than Six
Peers may be added by the King, to the present Number;
and all Failures to be supplied by the Crown, out of the
natural born Subjects of Great Britain.' 'This is the
Design of the Bill: And the only Point of Moment is,
Whether this Alteration be of that Nature as that it can be
honourable and becoming us, as Members of the House of
Commons, to concur in it.
'In the first Part of this Design which relates to Scotland,
the increasing the Number of Scotch Peers, by the Addition
of Nine, is the reasonable Consequence of the Increase of
English Lords since the Union, in which it was always designed that some Proportion should be kept between the
Lords of each Part of the Kingdom. Nor can we, in the
whole, think this Proportion too great. The changing their
Election into Hereditary Succession, is to accommodate their
Condition to the Condition of those Peers with whom they
sit. Besides, by this Means the Heads of the Noblest Families in Scotland may sit in Parliament; and they particularly
who have former Claims by Patents may be called thither,
to prevent the fatal Consequences of a repeated Refusal of
those Claims, which is universally in that Country look'd
upon as an open Breach of the Union.
'I have heard several of the Scots Peers declare in the
strongest Terms possible, that they would never have submitted to sit by way of Election, but in Hopes of meeting
with such a favourable Opportunity of altering it; and that
all their Acquaintance, and their Principals themselves,
knew their Sentiments upon this Subject. And if such an
Alteration, supposing it for the better, as it makes the Scots
Lords much more independent upon Courts and Ministers,
ought not to be made without the express Consent of their
Principals, who have a present Personal Right to be Electors
and Elected, I would only propose then, that it is impossible to come to such a Consent, because the Argument
being taken from Personal Right, will make the express Consent of every individual Peer necessary, and not only the
Consent of a Majority: That the Peers not nominated at
first have still a Chance of being Hereditary Peers of Parliament upon any Failure; which is certainly a more honourable Condition than their present: And that the Union itself,
of which this is only a Circumstance, was effected by elected
Persons altering, in the most essential and important Points,
the Condition and State of their Electors, without any Consent of theirs, obtained or sought after, or supposed. If
therefore there is an Union, notwithstanding that the Principals of the Scots Commons were never so much as supposed
to give any Consent; there may be an Alteration of the
Circumstances of that Union, without any such Condition.
And they who insist so zealously upon this Argument, should
first declare that there is and can be no Union, before they
declare it impossible in Justice to mend any such Circumstance belonging to it. For if this be impossible, the Union
is none at all; but if the Union be good and right, or to be
maintained, then this Alteration is not impossible in Justice
and Equity. I might add, that tho' some other Articles of
the Union are declared Fundamental and Essential, yet nothing of this Sort is declared, in the Act of Parliament,
concerning the Election of the Scots Peers.
'The great Point to us, I think, is the determining the
Number of Peers in the House of Lords for the Future, and
the limiting the Crown in the Prerogative of making Lords.
How this can affect the Publick, of which we are the Guardians; or the several Branches of the Legislature, for all
which we ought to have a Concern; or our House in particular in its Dignity or Power of doing Good: These are
what properly lie before us.
'As a Member of the House of Commons, I am obliged
not only to have a great Concern for that Part of the Legislature in particular, but the Whole and every Part of it;
that no One Part encroaches upon Another to the Detriment of the Whole; that the Ballance be as strictly and as
nicely preserv'd as possible; that no One of the States be
brought into Contempt or Disability; and that our own
House in particular, or those we represent, do not suffer in
any Instance, by the Loss of any Good, or by the Accession
of any Evil.
'With a View to these Points, I consider what will be
the Effect, if this Bill passes; and what will be the Consequence, if this, or something like it, does not pass. As to
the Crown it self, supposing the Bill to pass, there will indeed be a Power restrained in the Exercise of it. But what
Power? Why truly the Power of making Lords upon all
Occasions, in all Events, and for all Purposes imaginable:
And this Power lodged in every King for ever. This Bill
therefore restrains a Power almost too vast to be conceived;
carried already to a great Excess; proceeding in every Reign
to greater; and still to go on, as long as such a Government, with such a House of Lords as must be in time, can
keep up any Dignity; I might have said, can preserve any
Being. It restrains a Power which must of Necessity, in the
natural Course of many Reigns, destroy all the Honour and
Dignity of the States, which I am concerned and obliged
to preserve. And besides this, as a Commoner, can it possibly be disagreeable to me, that a Power in the Crown
should be restrained, which is at least as liable to be abused,
as to be well used; perhaps more so, if we consider what
Men, vested with Power and Passions and Imperfections, too
generally shew themselves to be.
'If we come now to the House of Lords it self; this
Bill, if it passes into a Law, will confine the Number of
Peers in it to what it is at present, with the Additions before mentioned. What evil Consequences, or ill Effects, this
can have in the House it self, in Comparison of the Contrary, will the better appear, if you will give me Leave to
make a Supposition, which is very allowable in Argument,
tho' I fear it would never be verified in Practice. Suppose
therefore that the present, and all succeeding Kings, should
take an absolute Resolution not to add to the Number of
Peers, but to keep them exactly what they are, only by
filling up the Failures in Families which may happen. Let
me ask you, Is there a Man, is there a Member of the House
of Commons, who, abstracted from private and restless Ambition and Impatience of waiting, would not rather commend such a Resolution, as Wisdom and Regard to the Publick; than condemn it as Weakness or Folly? And yet,
with respect to any accidental evil Consequences, this would
put the House of Lords exactly into the same State, in
which the present Bill would leave it. The Increase or
Decrease of the Influence of a Court in that House; the
Management of a Ministry, and the Effects of that Management; nay, and the Formidableness of that noble Body it
self; would, in all Respects, stand exactly where they will
now stand if this Bill passes into a Law. And yet no one,
I presume, would tax such a Resolution, either with Weakness or evil Design; because it is evident that, by this
Means, one Way at least of forcing through the House of
Lords what is agreeable to a Court, tho' never so bad in it
self, or of hindering what is disagreeable, tho' never so good
in it self, is entirely cut off. It is our Interest, and the Interest of the Publick, that the Consultations of that House
should be free; which they could not be said to be, at a
Time when the Crown poured in a Number of Lords to
carry a Question in Danger. And by this Bill one Way, at
least, to that Freedom is laid open and made secure for ever.
'With respect to Our Selves in this Affair: One Thing
the Commons, as the Guardians of Liberty, have to wish
for, is, that the Lords should be as little under the Influence
of a Court, as such a Body can be supposed to be. Now I
would ask, Is it a small Number, or a great Number, in
that House, which can render it most liable to this great
Evil? I am confident, it will be granted that it is the Smallness of their Numbers which does it. Nor have we ever
heard of so many and so constant Compliances with Courts,
as in those Times when they were not half the Number of
what they are now. This Evil is prevented by the great
Number which is still to be left; and without doubt will be
constantly kept full: A Number a little too large, I hope,
for the Purse of a Court, considering how great an Occasion there is for Money in other Places, supposing the Conduct of Men to be influenced by so bad and so base a Motive. Where therefore can we stop better, than where we
should applaud our Kings for stopping themselves; when
there is a Number (as nearly as such Things can be calculated) great enough to take off the Superfluity of Dignity
and Power in that House; great enough to be a Bar against
the most fatal Managements of bad Ministers, by the sole
Influence of Posts and Profits; and yet not great enough to
create any Danger to the Whole, in any other Respect, if
it be stop'd at once effectually. I appeal to you, if any
Commoner can ever wish or hope for the Good of the Publick, to see a Number of Lords exceeding Two Hundred
and Thirty Five; nay, whether we ever wished to see such
a Number as there is at present; or ever thought any otherwise of the Additions made in late Years, than as of something not very wise or politick. And if so, I hardly think
we can justly dissent, upon any very plain Reason, from the
Confinement of that Number now designed.
'Another Wish I have, as a Commoner, is, that there
may not be a perpetual Incentive to the Ambition of our
Members, to leave their Seats with us; as has been of late
observed; which I have always thought to reflect a Dishonour and Ignominy upon our selves. Nor should there be
wanting, at the same Time, as many Opportunities as can
reasonably be thought sufficient, for the rewarding of the
Merits of Commoners. This Bill, if it passes, will, as far
as can be judged, very much contribute to these two Points.
I do not mean, it will perfectly put a Stop to Applications
and Solicitations; because there can be no such Thing hoped for, whilst there is such a Thing as a House of Lords.
But as, on one Hand; many cannot be called up together;
and, on the other, there will be some few Vacancies generally in Expectation; One cannot think of a better Medium
than this, at once for the Encouragement of good Services
in Commoners, and for the making them more content and
easy, in applying themselves to the Business of the House,
and less restless and impatient to be called out of it. And
this you will easily agree in, that, after the Passing of this
Bill, when a Commoner shall be called up for the future,
he will be called up to an Honour much more valuable and
distinguishing; than he is, in the present Condition of that
House. I have often thought that the Dignity and Reputation of our House has sunk, in Proportion to the great
Levies, if I may so say, made out of it; or to our Members
voluntarily pressing and thronging into the other. And I
think here is a Remedy as effectual as can be expected.
'But there is another Way of considering this Question,
and that is, by supposing this Bill not to pass; and this Power
in the Crown to continue infinite and unlimited, as it now
is; and by weighing the Consequences upon this Supposition in future Ages; to which I hope we all mean to transmit our Constitution, unhurt in its essential Parts.
'Supposing this, I say; the Crown will indeed remain
possessed of a Prerogative: But a Prerogative; the Exercise
of which will come to reflect Shame upon itself, as well as
upon those who will still partake of the Benefit of it. The
Crown will have a Power, which will, I suppose, be from
Time to Time exercised; nay, which must be supposed to
be exercised to a great Extent, whenever any Ministry shall
have any Designs to carry forward by it. The Power of
the Crown will be untouched indeed; but the true Dignity
and Glory of the Crown will be far from being untouched.
It will be a Power, the Benefit of which at last no Man
of Honour will either seek after, or accept; and so must be
exercised, whenever there arises a real or supposed Necessity, upon Men of a different Character.
'The House of Lords, supposing the Exercise of this
Royal Prerogative to remain unlimited by the rejecting this
Bill; which too probably will be the last, as it is the first
of the Sort: The House of Lords, I say, what will it become in Time? Who would not envy our Posterity the
Sight of double or treble the present Number of Peers? Or,
who would not applaud the Figure our Constitution must
make, at such a Time; if it can be then called Our Constitution; when it is impossible to suppose that Men of Worth
and Virtue will be prevailed upon to help to fill that House;
and when yet it must be supposed that others will do it, to
answer the particular Occasions of a Court, and their own
Necessities, or Ends, at the same Time? We cannot have
a meaner Idea of a House of Parliament, than this gives
us; nor a more destructive one to the Nature of our Constitution; nor a more fatal one to the whole Community,
And as we ought equally to guard against the formidable,
and the ignominious Estate of that House; as well as the
Dishonour and Injury of the whole Constitution; I think
we cannot wish to see the Number of Peers to go on and increase, as they must do.
'But if you say, the Nature of Things will stop this
Evil without a Law for this Purpose: I wish it were so, in
Probability; because then I am sure this Bill would be proved reasonable by this very Argument. For if it be reasonable that this Increase of Numbers should stop; you must
either find out that Point at which such an Evil will stop
itself, which is beyond the Wit of Man to do; or you
must concur to stop it the first Opportunity you have, at
such a Number as might be thought tolerably reasonable,
as far as such a Matter can be calculated. And again, if
it be reasonable that this Increase should stop somewhere;
certainly there can be no Argument against stopping it now,
unless it be this, that the Number of Peers proposed is too
little; nay, that it is remarkably very much too little;
for there is no standing upon Niceties in such a Case. But
no One, I believe, will say that the Numbers of Peers
proposed is too little. Hitherto the Complaints have been
on the contrary Part; and no One could say this, who must
not, by the same Breath, condemn our Princes, should they
all resolve never to augment the Number. But indeed it
is so far from being likely that this Increase will ever stop
of itself, in the Course and Nature of Things; that the Contrary must be certain, as long as it is certain that there will
be too often, in all Ages and all Reigns, Designs to be carried
on which will call for a sudden Increase of this Number;
and always Men in the World capable of accepting a Call,
for the Benefit of such Designs. And this I think a very
deplorable Consideration, supposing this Bill not to pass.
'As to our House, and its Members; and the Interest
of the Commons as such; besides that it is our strict Interest and Duty to preserve the whole, by the due Balance
of its several Parts; I shall only say, upon Supposition of
the Number of Lords continual Increase upon the rejecting
this Bill, that neither our Freedom in our Elections or our
Votes, nor our Honour in being at any Time called up to
the House of Peers, can be said to be so great and so valuable, as it will otherwise be. In the Affair of our Elections
before we sit, and our Proceedings whilst we sit, the increasing Number of Peers, which must be vast in Time,
will have a great Effect, and not a very good one; perhaps indeed in a smaller Proportion in our Days, but in
a more fatal Manner in Process of Time; in those future
Times, to which we ought to extend our Concern, if we
have any true Regard for our Country. It will be a
small Comfort to the Commoners of Great Britain, even if they have a Mind to keep up too remarkable a Distinction between themselves and the Peers, to think that
the Number of Peers increasing (as it must do without this
Bill) does itself make the Peers contemptible and mean in
their own House and in some other Respects; whilst this
very Number, so perpetually increasing, must itself, as I
apprehend, give them a much greater Power and Influence
without their own Doors, and within ours, than they could
otherwise have. For, even supposing them, in Time, to
be many of them Persons but of indifferent Fortunes in the
World, or the like; yet by their great Numbers, being
dispersed every where in every Corner of the Land, and having numerous Descendents, Relations, Acquaintances and
Dependents, this very immense Number must be a Weight,
and a very great one. Their Influence in Elections of the
Commoners must be vast; and their Influence afterwards, in
the House of Commons, must be proportionable, after the
Election; in carrying Votes, in forwarding or hindring any
Law; and the like.
'There is another Evil for which the Commons of Great
Britain have always used to wish to see some Remedy;
and that is, the skreening of evil Ministers and evil Counsellors from the Censures and Impeachments of our House.
What more natural Way for a Court to do this, especially
since a late Experiment, than to croud into the House of
Lords a Number of Peers upon such a great Occasion? Supposing this Bill not to pass, this Evil remains without a Remedy: And it is an Evil which ought to affect every Member of the House of Commons, in a very peculiar Manner.
'It has been alledged that upon fixing thus the Number of Peers, they will think themselves the more powerful;
and many of them living in a very Expensive Manner, and
perhaps the more so after this, that the Fate of our Laws
may come to depend upon such as have made themselves
poor, and consequently Slaves to a Court. This is a Speculation, I confess, which may possibly prove true in Fact, if
you can suppose any Person to resolve to make himself
poor merely for the Pleasure of being a Slave; or that there
will be one Peer more or less expensive on this sole Account. But supposing this to be possible and probable both;
I still say, it is better to run the Risque of this which is uncertain, and to have the Fate of your Laws depend upon
some who shall voluntarily make themselves indigent; than
to have the Fate of your Laws, or of any publick Designs,
depend upon a Number of Persons at any Time to be called
up, as a King or a Ministry shall think fit: Which is not
the possible uncertain Consequence of not passing this Law,
but the certain and unavoidable one in Times to come. And
to prevent an uncertain Evil, I can never persuade myself to
run into a certain one.
'It may be said perhaps, that our Liberties have hitherto
subsisted under the Exercise of this unlimited Power of the
Crown; and therefore may still go on, and continue in a
very good Estate, without any Limitation to it. But this
Way of arguing is very unhappy, because it is equally good
against making any new Laws; and especially against preventing any probable Dangers to the Publick; which is the
great Business of a Parliament to do; and of much greater
Importance, than to wait 'till they become perhaps too big
to be remedied. We have not been ruined, therefore we
need not take Care to prevent Ruin, is but a very weak
Way of Reasoning; and worse than weak, where the Whole
is concerned. The Attempt has once, in a very remarkable Manner, been made; and there were few, I believe,
who did not think it a fatal Precedent, supposing it to have
been made even for a good Cause and a praise-worthy End.
What has been done may be done; what has been done in
a great Degree may be done in a greater still. What might
have ruined us once, may ruin us another Time. To prevent that Danger which might have come heretofore, and
may come hereafter, in one certain Method at least, is one
End which will be answered by this Bill.
'But it may be said, that all the Evils arising from the
Crown's making a great Number of Lords at one Time, to
carry any one great Point, may be prevented in another
Way, either by enacting, That Lords shall not vote in the
House till a Year or two after they are created; or by confining the Crown to a very small Number every Year. It
must be owned, that this might possibly remedy those Evils
particularly; but it is not at all certain that this would do it
effectually, supposing Courts to lay their own Designs long
before-hand, and to have any Skill, as some have had, in
the Choice of proper Persons. We Commons should remember, I think particularly, that there was a Time when
the Power of the Crown was unlimited as to our own
House; and could give to new Boroughs the Privilege of
sending Members. And was it not a great Evil, that Courts
could choose such Boroughs for this Purpose, as they knew
wou'd carry on their Designs, and elect such as they should
nominate? We reckon it a Happiness that this Evil, which
threaten'd the Freedom of our own House, is now cured by
the Confinement of our Numbers. And shall we envy the
other House the same Freedom, equally good for the Publick, which cannot be procured so effectually, as by the
same Confinement upon which we reckon our own to subsist; especially, considering that the Method proposed instead
of this, must by Degrees make an Increase of Lords vastly
disproportionate to the Commons; and, by calling up rich
Commoners, must make that House, of which we are so
jealous peculiarly on the Account of Property, I will not
say, to represent Property, but what is more, to possess almost all the Property in the Nation.
'Let us be as jealous of Ministers as we ought; that is,
as jealous as they give us Occasion to be. But let not that
Jealousy drive us out of the Temper, with which every
Thing proposed to us demands to be considered; nor divert
us from balancing the Good and Evil on both Sides; and
determining our selves by that Balance. I leave my self
open to new Light; but, 'till that comes, I will be so
free as to add, 'Let it not be said by our Posterity (if it
be, I fear it will be said with no very kind Reflections
upon us their Fore-fathers) that there was a Time in Great
Britain, when there was a King upon the Throne who
had the Goodness so uncommon, as to be ready to recede
from his Prerogative, in order to put our Constitution
upon a Foot of greater Certainty and greater Freedom;
and that there was a House of Commons not disposed to
make Use of a Conjuncture, which the Nation has little
Reason to hope ever to see again as long it continues in
Being.'