CHAPTER XXIV - Modern Docklands
No other part of London underwent a more rapid and
radical redevelopment in the 1980s and early 1990s than
the Isle of Dogs. This resulted from the response to the
decline and eventual closure of the docks, particularly
the creation of the London Docklands Development
Corporation (LDDC) in 1981. The background to the
setting up of the LDDC is described in Chapter I, while
the designation as an Enterprise Zone of a large part of
the area around the docks on the Isle of Dogs in 1982 is
discussed below.
The Background to Redevelopment
According to the LDDC's first Chief Architect and
Planner, Edward Hollamby:
'The great problem for the LDDC was how to obtain quick
results, yet set high standards in planning and design. This was
necessary if the confidence of the private sector, the public and
the Government were to be secured. Such immediacy of action
necessarily precluded the lengthy time scale involved in standing
back and preparing for an unknown and uncertain future an
overall plan.' (ref. 1)
The LDDC, therefore, eschewed the idea of any sort of
master-plan and preferred to rely on market-led redevelopment. Even its design guide for the Isle of Dogs,
published in 1982, was quite unlike a normal planning
document, for it also showed development opportunities
and was not based on precise land-use proposals. The
underlying message throughout was that the LDDC's
attitude to developments would be flexible and, in any
case, the Corporation's chief executive, Reg Ward, later
admitted that he stopped the plan from becoming 'prescriptive'. (ref. 2) Indeed, the Evening Standard, writing of the
Canary Wharf development, argued that 'no docklands
plan could have anticipated this event, or allowed the
ambitious plans, wildly outside any reasonable expectation, to go ahead'. (ref. 3) Such an approach was based on the
thesis that conventional land-use planning was inhibiting
the entrepreneurial flair and investment necessary to
regenerate Britain's run-down industrial and inner-city
areas. This argument can be traced back to an article in
New Society in 1969. The question posed was 'what
would happen if there were no plan', and an experiment
in 'non-planning' was suggested, the setting up of which
would not be difficult legally. 'No land-use pattern could
be regarded as sacrosanct' and people would be allowed
to build what they liked. Yet the article contained a
significant caveat in relation to Docklands: such an experiment could not be tried everywhere, because 'some knots
— like London - are, by now, too Gordian for that'. (ref. 4)
Although the LDDC was accused of allowing a virtual
planning free-for-all in its area, it did involve itself in
detailed design matters. At the London Telehouse building, for example, it insisted that windows be included
for the sake of appearance, although the clients, to
maintain secrecy and security, did not wish to have any. (ref. 5)
At City Harbour the LDDC demanded that plans for a
20-storey hotel (as yet unbuilt) on the edge of the Millwall
Dock be amended, after tests suggested that the proposed
block would affect sailing and windsurfing in the dock. (ref. 6)
For Heron Quays, the LDDC approved a new masterplan (revised by the developer in the light of the Canary
Wharf proposals) in November 1987, yet a month later
decided to replace this with its own master-plan, drawn
up by its own architect and outside consultants. The
Corporation was able to justify such interference within
the Enterprise Zone on the basis that it was the owner
of the freehold of the site. Guidelines were given for
acceptable heights for buildings, massing and materials.
The three different designs subsequently submitted by
Scott Brownrigg & Turner on behalf of the developers,
Tarmac Brookglade, for the rebuilding of the existing
part of the Heron Quays development, were all rejected
by the Corporation. The main reason for the rejections
seems to have been that the schemes would have been
out of harmony with the Canary Wharf scheme, a view
supported by the fact that Olympia & York's own masterplan for the eastern part of Heron Quays was approved
by the LDDC within four months of submission and
before detailed design work had been carried out. (ref. 7) At
Skylines, the LDDC involved itself in making changes
to the winning entry, and also insisted that another
developer take over the modified scheme. (ref. 8)
The LDDC frequently offered its own sites on a
competitive basis. At Caledonian Wharf and Friars Mead
it prepared development and layout briefs, and then
invited selected developers to submit housing schemes
and tender for the site. In the case of Caledonian Wharf
the successful developer was Thomas Bates & Son, whose
scheme was designed by Alan Turner & Associates, a
combination which had previously been runner-up for
another LDDC-owned site elsewhere and had impressed
its officers. (ref. 9) At Compass Point, the LDDC commissioned
Jeremy Dixon and Building Design Partnership to
produce designs for a housing scheme, which were incorporated into the tendering documents. Costains, who
were the successful tenderers, largely adopted that
scheme, although they preferred to use their own staff to
execute it (see page 698). At London Yard the LDDC
was keen to attract foreign investment, and successfully
invited a Dutch-based property group, VOM, to submit
a residential scheme for the site. In that case the LDDC
entered into a related agreement with the developer and
with house-purchasers on both land values and purchase
prices, so that more ambitious landscaping could be
provided and larger dwellings than normal could be built
for relatively modest prices. (ref. 10)
On many of the sites which it owned, the LDDC undertook infrastructure works such as roads and water, gas,
electricity and drainage services (as part of a programme to
provide a completely new infrastructure for the whole of
the Isle of Dogs), (ref. 11) and this sometimes involved elaborate
and costly works. For instance, on the East India Dock site,
where the dock had already been filled in, the LDDC
constructed a series of canals to link with the river and the
other docks, and to provide a framework for subsequent
commercial development ( 139b ). At London Yard
it spent several million pounds on eradicating methane
pollution and on reclamation and river works, so that
housing could be built there. (ref. 12)
In the 1970s the GLC argued that 'the first condition
for a successful comprehensive development of the area
must clearly be easier access', (ref. 13) while the Docklands Joint
Committee regarded public transport 'as the key to
the future prosperity of docklands'. (ref. 14) The Committee
advocated, in the London Docklands Strategic Plan (1976),
a step-by-step, but concerted, approach to development
so that 'at any point there is adequate provision for a
viable community to live in the area'. It also pointed out
that the large areas of undeveloped land in Docklands
offered the opportunity to build and improve roads
'without social disruption on the scale that usually follows
in established urban areas'. (ref. 15)
In 1980 the Isle of Dogs had no passenger railway and
no service by river. A single main road circled its periphery, with access off the congested A13 (East India
Dock Road), and there were only two bus routes. The
improvement of this system, however, presented the
classic dilemma of any major reconstruction scheme:
whether first to install a massive new transport infrastructure in the hope that subsequent development would
justify the expense, or to wait and see what sort of system
the actual level of development required. In reality, the
LDDC had little choice but to follow the latter course.
In the first place, its own decision to rely on market-led
development and have no master-plan meant that it was
almost impossible, at the outset, to predict traffic needs
and levels. As a result the transport infrastructure was
installed in a piecemeal fashion and incrementally, and
development was allowed to proceed with little regard
for the effect it might have on the transport system. (ref. 16)
Secondly, in 1980 the Government and the GLC
announced that the plans, suggested in the 1976 Docklands
Strategic Plan, for spending £760 million on new rail
and road links for the area, were to be abandoned, and
only £100 million would be available for these purposes
over the following 15 years. Among the projects cancelled
was an extension of the Jubilee Line from Charing
Cross to Woolwich. (ref. 17) Only very considerable government
funding could have provided, at the outset, the new
transport system Docklands required, for, as the LDDC
admitted, its own public money was 'small in relation to
the size of the task'. (ref. 18)
The LDDC's initial objective was, therefore, relatively
modest: 'to bring the roads and public transport network
up to the standard enjoyed in other parts of London.' (ref. 19)
It went for quickly constructed, apparently cheap solutions: the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and the 'red
brick roads'. But, almost as soon as they were built, they
were found to be hopelessly inadequate to cope with the
greatly increased amounts of new development.
Nor, in respect of road provision, were the local
authorities blameless. Delays in building the Poplar
section of the Docklands Highway, vital to easing the
congestion on the A13 and providing better access to the
Isle of Dogs, were partly due to protracted wrangles
between the GLC and Tower Hamlets Borough Council.
To make matters worse, the already inadequate transport system was put under even more pressure as
improvements and extensions had to be carried out,
during and after the periods of major general development
of the area. (ref. 20) In 1988, for instance, construction vehicles
accounted for about 45 per cent of the new traffic on
Docklands roads. (ref. 21) In that year there was evidence that
potential tenants were being deterred from moving to
Docklands because of the transport problems. (ref. 22)
It had become obvious that without costly investment
in the transport infrastructure the redevelopment of
Docklands might flounder. The Government, having
persuaded Olympia & York to contribute to the costs of
extensions to the DLR and the Jubilee Line, was hopeful
that developers might finance all the major transport
improvements. However, such an approach was beginning
to be regarded as unfair, as it was difficult to identify
exactly who the beneficiaries of a particular scheme were
or might be in the future. The Financial Times concluded
that general taxation was often 'the least unfair way' of
financing such projects. (ref. 23)
Redevelopment had initially been carried out with little
apparent cost to the public purse, although generous tax
and rate concessions were available within the Enterprise
Zone. (fn. a) Up to September 1989, the LDDC had, since its
establishment, attracted £6.85 billion in private investment in Docklands, at a cost to itself of only £706
million, raised from government grants and sales of land.
By then, however, it had also accumulated a daunting
programme of outstanding projects to be funded.
By 1988 the cost of the LDDC's road programme had
risen to more than £550 million, nearly three times that
estimated when the programme was launched in 1986. (ref. 25)
The cost of the DLR similarly escalated, from the initial
figure of £77 million, to a projected £800 million for
an expanded network, when the Lewisham extension is
built. (ref. 26) To signal its concern, the Government, in January
1989, appointed a Minister of State with special responsibility for Docklands transport. (ref. 27) In that year the LDDC
announced that 'over the next few years the Corporation
will spend more than £1 billion, three quarters of which
will be invested in new roads and railways'. (ref. 28) In view of
the LDDC's own financial problems, the Government
increased the Corporation's grant for 1989–90 by £91
million to improve the transport infrastructure, chiefly
the roads. (ref. 29) Indeed, critics have argued that 'the LDDC's
approach to transport has been predominantly roadsbased, overthrowing the GLC's major roads restraint
policy, and is the exception to the general London-wide
policy of not building new motorways into the heart of
the capital'. (ref. 30)
This expenditure came at a time when the LDDC's
income from sales of land had drastically dwindled, and
the value of the land it still held had fallen steeply. As a
result, in 1990, the LDDC went into deficit by £4 million.
Following the resignations of several senior officers it
reduced its commitments and staffing levels. Nevertheless, for the year ending 31 March 1992, the Corporation showed a deficit of £55 million, and land in
Docklands was then valued by the LDDC at only
£100,000 an acre. (ref. 31) In February 1991 Eric Sorensen, a
Civil Servant from the Department of the Environment,
became its Chief Executive, with the main tasks of
completing sales in the Royal Docks and winding up the
Corporation during the 1990s. (ref. 32) In October 1990 the
Chairman of the LDDC, David Hardy, admitted that the
Corporation had learnt the lessons of the Isle of Dogs
and was putting infrastructure into the Royal Docks
before development began, (ref. 33) while Michael Heseltine,
who had been responsible for the birth of the Corporation
and who was again Secretary of State for the Environment, was, by April 1991, calling for local authorities to
join in partnership with the private sector to eradicate
'centres of urban deprivation'. (ref. 34)
Roads and Road Transport
The problem of road provision on and to the Isle of
Dogs was particularly difficult. The creation of new roads,
especially through the densely populated areas at the
north-western approaches, would arouse political, social
and environmental controversies. In addition, no one
authority had overall responsibility. Some new roads were
privately built as part of individual development schemes,
while others were built by the LDDC to open up the
area to development. More major roads, providing access
to the Island, were the responsibility of the GLC until
its demise in 1986, while the principal strategic routes,
such as the A13, came under the Department of Transport. (ref. 35)
The LDDC constructed a new public road, Marsh
Wall, at a cost of £2½ million, in order to give entry into
the heart of the formerly enclosed docks area and the
newly designated Enterprise Zone. Opened in 1983, it
was three-quarters of a mile long, and ran from Westferry
Road, through the site of the main gate of the West India
Docks, round the south-west corner of the South West
India Dock, and between the West India and Millwall
Docks, to join Manchester Road on the eastern side of
the Island (see plan C). It was dubbed the 'red brick
road' because it was paved with over two million 'bricks'
(actually red concrete blocks), laid in herringbone fashion,
for ease and cheapness of maintenance. (ref. 36) At the same
time, shorter but similarly constructed roads — Lighterman's Road, Limeharbour, Mastmaker Road and Millharbour — were opened to give access off Marsh Wall to
development sites on either side of the Millwall Dock.
All of these roads were so narrow that two-way traffic
could not pass parked vehicles, and they were built to
cope with the traffic generated by between five and eight
million sq.ft of commercial space, whereas by 1988 a
total of about 25 million sq.ft was planned. (ref. 37) The LDDC,
therefore, had to carry out improvements to these roads
between 1989 and 1991, at an estimated cost of £5
million. (ref. 38) Also, Marsh Wall was reconstructed so
that it terminated at its north-western end at Westferry
Circus. (ref. 39)
Improving access to the Isle of Dogs was more difficult
and took much longer to accomplish. The necessary
widening of the northern ends of the two main roads to
the Island, Westferry and Preston's Roads, was not carried
out until the second half of the 1980s. (ref. 40) More serious
was the delay in constructing a major new road to the
north of the Isle of Dogs, which would both provide a
southern relief route to the heavily congested East India
Dock Road (A13) and give better access to the Island.
Such a road had been proposed by the GLC in the 1970s
and early 1980s, but the precise route was the source of
considerable disagreement between the GLC and Tower
Hamlets Borough Council. (ref. 41) In the event, this scheme was
superseded by the more ambitious 'Docklands Highway'
proposed by the LDDC to run from Wapping to the
Royal Docks. (ref. 42) The Poplar section was built in three
parts: the Limehouse, East India, and Poplar Links, all
of which were completed in 1993 (see plan C). The last
linked the other two, and merely extended and widened
the western section of Aspen Way, built by the LDDC
in about 1987. (ref. 43)
The Limehouse Link, from The Highway to Westferry
Road, was approved in principle in 1986. The initial
estimate was £41 million, but the successful tender,
announced in September 1989, from Balfour Beatty,
in association with Fairclough, was £171 million. The
decision to build the 1.8km-long road in a tunnel added
considerably to the cost and was made largely on environmental grounds, as the road runs through densely populated housing estates. Delays in handing over land to
contractors, unforeseen problems with soil conditions,
and stricter than expected noise abatement requirements
led to further increases in the costs of the road, which
by October 1992 were said to be about £345 million
(including rehousing and the purchase of the land). Early
in 1992 the LDDC took over direct management of the
construction of the scheme, bringing in engineers from
the American firm of Bechtel. The Limehouse Link was
opened by the Prime Minister, John Major, in May 1993.
The western portal is decorated by a mural sculpture,
'Restless Dream', by Zadock Ben David, while further
sculptures, both untitled, by Michael Kenny and Nigel
Hall adorn respectively the eastern portals from the Isle
of Dogs and from Aspen Way. (ref. 44)
For the East India Dock Link, a contract worth £32
million to construct the 1km-long dual carriageway and
the associated Preston's Road flyover was awarded by the
LDDC to Edmund Nuttall Ltd in November 1990. (ref. 45)
This section of the road supersedes the eastern section
of Aspen Way, which was built in 1987–9 by Wimpey
for the LDDC at a cost of £6.9 million. (ref. 46) Near the site
of Brunswick Wharf Power Station the East India Dock
Link divides. One part runs north-east to join the A13,
and is in a 350m-long tunnel which avoids compromising
development along the line of the road, particularly the
former East India Dock site. (ref. 47) The other part continues
eastwards to link with the Leamouth roundabout and the
Lower Lea Crossing, designed to give a direct connection
between the Isle of Dogs and the Royal Docks (see plan
C and page 13). (ref. 48)
Docklands Light Railway
In 1967 a monorail was suggested as an alternative to an
underground railway as a means of improving Docklands
transport and of boosting commercial growth in the area.
It was pointed out that the tracks of the former Broad
Street to the Isle of Dogs railway could be utilized, and
a further line from South London to Stratford was
envisaged. (ref. 49) In 1973 a study team, commissioned jointly
by the GLC and the Department of the Environment
to draw up redevelopment proposals for East London,
suggested a rapid transit route through Docklands,
employing 'minitrams', running under automatic control
and operating on much sharper track alignments than a
conventional railway. (ref. 50)
Despite the urgings of the Light Railway Transport
League, (ref. 51) the 1976 London Docklands Strategic Plan,
produced by the Docklands Joint Committee, was rather
wary of any tramway or light rapid transit scheme, being
particularly concerned about the technical and operational
problems. (ref. 52) Nevertheless, the shelving of plans to extend
the Jubilee underground line forced the GLC, in conjunction with the LDDC, to explore low-cost alternatives.
As a result, in June 1982, a report called Public Transport
Provision for Docklands, jointly prepared by the LDDC,
the GLC, London Transport, and the Departments of
Transport, the Environment and Industry, advocated the
construction of two new light-railway routes, totalling
about 7½ miles. A quick decision was required and the
Government responded remarkably rapidly, agreeing to
provide the £77 million needed to establish the railway.
London Transport, on behalf of the GLC and the LDDC,
was responsible for preparing the Parliamentary plans,
and constructing and running the railway. (fn. b) Parliamentary
approval for the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) route
from Tower Hill to the Isle of Dogs was received in
April 1984, and that from Poplar to Stratford in April
1985. (ref. 53) Such a railway could be built cheaply and quickly,
while its innovative nature ensured extensive publicity.
Thus, given the need to attract developers to a poorly
served area, the DLR seemed to offer 'a credible, highprofile passenger transport system with an air of permanence and reliability, free of the notorious congestion
of some East End roads'. (ref. 54)
In advance of Parliamentary approval, Arup Associates,
as design consultants, in conjunction with Design House,
Pentagram, G. Maunsell & Partners, Kennedy & Donkin,
and Henderson Busby, had, from April 1983, been producing detailed designs and specifications for signs, trains,
stations and structures. The contract, valued at £58.4
million, to design (using the Arup team's proposals as
guidelines), build and equip the DLR was awarded to a
consortium of GEC and John Mowlem in August 1984,
and construction began in that year. (ref. 55) The railway was
officially opened by the Queen on 30 July 1987, but,
because of safety problems, the first public trains did not
run until 31 August. (ref. 56)
Strictly, the DLR is not a light railway but a fully
fledged one. Nevertheless, the system is entirely separate
from both those of British Rail and London Underground, and does not have to conform to their standards.
It operates on much sharper bends, for example, and the
trains are more akin to trams than to conventional railway
carriages.
The DLR uses standard-gauge track, and electric
power is supplied at 750 volts direct current from a lowlevel third rail. All trains are automatically driven and
controlled by a central computer at Poplar. No drivers
are required, but there is a 'Train Captain' who controls
the opening and closing of doors at stations, and can, in
certain circumstances, manually drive the train. (ref. 57)
Lines from Tower Gateway and Stratford meet just
north of West India Quay station, and the southern
terminus is at Island Gardens (see plan C). The route
through the Isle of Dogs betrays the fact that the DLR
was meant to serve the commercial developments within
the Enterprise Zone, rather than those of the residential
areas around the periphery of the Island.
Approximately two-thirds of the first phase of the
DLR was built on disused or under-used railway lines.
East of Limehouse it is carried on the former London
and Blackwall Railway viaduct, built in 1840, and south
of Mudchute station on a 27-arch viaduct built in 1872
and totally disused since 1926. New bridges, utilizing
specially fabricated 65m-wide steel spans, carry the
railway over the three West India docks. (ref. 58) Earlier schemes
for a Docklands railway had envisaged tunnelling under
the docks, but their closure made bridging possible. The
dramatic way in which the railway crosses the water
draws attention to its presence in the heart of the
Enterprise Zone. (ref. 59)
The stations closely follow the designs suggested by
Arup and their collaborators. They relied on a 'kit
of parts' approach, employing standard prefabricated
components to provide only very basic facilities, which
could be improved as the need arose and finance permitted. (ref. 60) Platforms were initially 30m long, with simple
bus-shelter-type canopies, which have curved tops. They
are made of metal and are glazed with polycarbonate. (ref. 61)
The terminus at Island Gardens is more elaborate, with
a domed staircase-tower which echoes that of the nearby
Greenwich Foot Tunnel. (ref. 62) The grandest of all is the
station at Canary Wharf, protected by an overall roof (see
page 714 and Plate 154b ). The stations have ticketvending machines at street level. (ref. 63)
Even as the DLR was being built, the vast number
of jobs expected to be created by the Canary Wharf
development rendered the railway incapable of coping
with the predicted quantities of passengers (from an
original estimate of 1,500 per hour, to 13,000 per hour). (ref. 64)
In June 1987, therefore, even before the railway was
officially opened, a contract worth £50 million was
awarded to GEC-Mowlem to carry out immediate
improvements. These included new trains, the lengthening of platforms to allow double-length trains, and
additional track facilities at Canary Wharf. (ref. 65) The first of
the double-length trains came into service in February
1991. (ref. 66)
After its opening the DLR was beset with operating
difficulties. (ref. 67) These were partly due to the innovative
nature of the system, and its technical complexities. For
example, any failure of the central computer brought the
whole system to a standstill. (ref. 68) Its very success added to
the problems, for it was almost overwhelmed by the
numbers of passengers. In particular, its popularity with
tourists, who were curious to see the new system or who
used it as a route to Greenwich, seems to have been
grossly underestimated. (ref. 69) By 1989, well before the
opening of Canary Wharf, the DLR was carrying 30,000
passengers a day, (ref. 70) whereas the original forecast had been
a maximum of 22,000 a day by 1991. (ref. 71) The work required
to improve and extend the railway in itself caused considerable disruption to the existing services. (ref. 72)
The advantage of linking Canary Wharf to the heart
of the City with a new DLR terminus at Bank station
was recognized in the Public Transport Provision for
Docklands (1982). The provision of this link was one of
the requirements of the developers of Canary Wharf from
the earliest days, under G. Ware Travelstead. (ref. 73) Such a
link was psychologically important as Canary Wharf was
being promoted as an extension of, or even an alternative
to, the City. (ref. 74) Parliamentary approval was granted in 1986
and Olympia & York, having taken over the Canary
Wharf development, agreed to pay a half of the original
estimated cost of £150 million, with the Government
providing the remainder. (ref. 75) Work commenced in that year,
a limited service began in July 1991 and the work was
completed by the end of that year. (ref. 76)
Work began on a further 8km-long extension, to the
Royal Docks at Beckton, in 1989. (ref. 77) It was designed by
G. Maunsell & Partners, with architectural design by
Ahrends, Burton & Koralek. (ref. 78) The estimated cost of
£240 million was paid by the LDDC, with funding
provided entirely by the Government, after private developers had declined to provide financial support. (ref. 79) The
section between West India Dock Road and Preston's
Road, including the reconstruction of Poplar station (with
a footbridge to North Quay, opened in October 1992)
(Plate 141a ), was carried out by Balfour Beatty, at a cost
of £22 million, while construction of the main section
from Preston's Road to Beckton (involving a new Blackwall Station at Preston's Road) was carried out by a
combination of Mowlem and Taylor Woodrow for £116
million. The Beckton extension came into service in
March 1994. (ref. 80)
In November 1990 the Transport Secretary announced
the intention to build a three-mile-long southern extension to the DLR, running under the Thames to Greenwich and Lewisham, but he insisted that the £130million scheme was to be built and operated by the
private sector. (ref. 81) Although work was expected to start in
1992, the Bill authorizing the line did not receive the
Royal Assent until the summer of 1993. (ref. 82)
In 1991 work began on a project costing £8 million to
add two further tracks between North Quay and Canary
Wharf. This involved the demolition and rebuilding of
West India Quay station. The main contractor was
Mowlem Civil Engineering and the work was completed
in 1993. (ref. 83)
Following Ministerial complaints and lobbying from
Olympia & York, in April 1992 ownership of the DLR
was transferred from London Transport to the LDDC. (ref. 84)
The figures for March to May 1992 showed that reliability
had greatly improved and in one week the DLR had the
best reliability figure for any railway line in London. In
the same period passenger numbers rose to 32,000 a day,
compared with 23,000 in 1991. (ref. 85)
The Jubilee Line Extension
Proposals for an eastward extension to the Jubilee underground line had long existed, and it was originally
intended that it should include links with Cannon Street
and Fenchurch Street stations. (ref. 86) However, a report published by London Transport International in 1988 suggested that the Jubilee Line extension was neither an
immediate priority for London's overall transport
network nor even for that of Docklands. (ref. 87) Nevertheless,
Olympia & York, pressed by some of their future tenants,
considered the extension vital to the success of Canary
Wharf, and during 1988 and early 1989 attempted to
introduce a Private Bill into Parliament authorizing the
line. (ref. 88) When this failed, they approached the Government, offering to raise £180 million from private sources
towards the cost of construction, then put at £450 million
(as against £230 million in 1980). (ref. 89) In November 1989
approval was given for a ten-mile extension of the Jubilee
Line, from Green Park via Waterloo and London Bridge
to Canary Wharf and Stratford. But the Government
made it clear that any extension would only be built if
there was 'a very substantial contribution from private
developers'. (ref. 90) The developers (mainly, in fact, Olympia &
York) agreed to contribute £400 million over 25 years
towards the estimated cost, now £1 billion. (ref. 91) When the
developers of Port Greenwich offered to contribute £25
million, the route was altered in 1990 to run southwards
via that development rather than eastwards through the
East India Dock site. (ref. 92) The Bill for the Jubilee Line
extension was submitted in November 1989, (ref. 93) but was
not approved until March 1992. (ref. 94) With Olympia & York
already in financial difficulties, its bankers were unwilling
to sanction the payment of the company's initial contribution of £40 million due on 1 April 1992 (see page
711). (ref. 95) In November 1992 it was announced that the
Government had negotiated a satisfactory arrangement
for the funding of the project. (ref. 96) It is to provide £1.5
billion for the project and Canary Wharf's bankers the
other £400 million. Work on the extension began in
December 1993, and the line is due to open in 1998.
The new Jubilee Line station at Canary Wharf has been
designed by Sir Norman Foster & Partners. (ref. 97)
Docklands River Bus
In 1973 the London Docklands Study Team argued that
river transport could not be a major contributor to public
transport for Docklands, because of its limited capacity
and the difficulties of providing satisfactory links with
other forms of public transport. (ref. 98) Nevertheless, the GLC
and the LDDC explored the possibilities of introducing
such a service. (ref. 99) A trial service using one boat began in
the summer of 1987, (ref. 100) operated by Thames Line, a
private company set up under the Government's Business
Expansion Scheme, whereby individuals could claim tax
relief on amounts invested in the company. (ref. 101) A regular
service commenced in June 1988, using 62-seater catamarans, powered by water-jet. Initially these operated
from Charing Cross and were capable of covering the
journey to West India Dock Pier in 20 minutes. The
service was extended westwards to Chelsea Harbour in
September 1988, and southwards to Greenwich in 1989. (ref. 102)
Following the opening of Canary Wharf to the public in
late July 1991, the River Bus used the new Canary Wharf
Pier instead of West India Dock Pier. (ref. 103)
Within six months of commencing regular services,
Thames Line was experiencing financial difficulties.
Operating problems were caused by rubbish in the river
blocking the water-jets. The service also failed to attract
sufficient passengers, because there were too few people
then working in Docklands, the fares were relatively high,
and, until the service was extended to Greenwich, there
was a lack of tourist traffic. As a result, the service carried
about 5,000 passengers a week, a quarter of the number
required to break even. (ref. 104)
Between 1989 and 1993 several financial rescues were
mounted by a series of consortia formed by companies
involved in Docklands, the LDDC, and local authorities. (ref. 105) Despite these efforts, the River Bus was said to
have lost £2 million in 1992, and the service ceased
abruptly in August 1993, when the operating company
went into liquidation. (ref. 106)