Preface

PREFACE.

The present volume covers a period of fifteen months, from January, 1598, to March, 1599. It was during this period that the battle of Armagh was fought, whereby the Welsh prophecy was in some measure fulfilled, that " the Earl of Tyrone should prevail against the English nation." Vacillation, corruption, and division marked the course of the State. The height of its peril was reached, and nothing remained but to use what Elizabeth called, " the last but worst of all remedies, the sword " (p. 469).

The administration of Ireland was being carried on over barrels of gunpowder. This was true figuratively ; it was also true literally. Writing from the Castle of Dublin, the Lords Justices and Council say (p. 472):—" We have also given order to the Master of the Ordnance to remove such powder as is here, from the tower, where it was laid for safety before, to the old place of store always used for the office of the Ordnance, though with some hazard of danger and inconvenience, by reason it is directly under the public Courts of Law and Justice within the Castle. And where your Lordships have very gravely noted that the stowage of all Her Majesty's store of powder and munition is directly under the same roof, where the ordinary terms are kept, and therefore dangerous, through the concourse of people having cause to follow their business there, in which respect your Lordships require us to take present order for the terms to be kept in some other convenient place in the town; we know not for the present of any means to remove the terms out of the Castle." This did not, however, trouble their Lordships much, for they add in the same despatch, " We see not that there will be as yet any great danger by the terms, for that as, through the troubles in the realm, they have discontinued lately, so, by the same necessity, they are like to be put off still, till it shall please God to send calmer times."

When the volume opens, another parley with Tyrone was over. His submission had been made and received. He had tendered his book of grievances, and this too had been received, though only after a fashion, for the book was " pestered with such arrogant matters." The Council show by their letters that they were anything but satisfied with the demeanour and proposals of the rebel chief. Ormonde had given him a truce for two months from December 22, 1597, and, by this means, had managed to victual the Blackwater fort for five or six months. Such relief could not have been effected otherwise, for, on Ormonde's own showing, the companies were so extremely weak, that, out of eighteen of them, which he had with him on the borders, he could not draw 600 men fit to take the field. The companies in other parts of Ireland were in like condition. Ormonde was of opinion that, if he had had absolute authority to conclude with Tyrone, and to give him peace for two or three years, as the latter desired, he would not have been so arrogant in his demands. Ormonde gathered, and so did his fellow Commissioners, the Bishop of Meath and Sir Geffrey Fenton that Tyrone's meaning in asking for such a prolonged truce was, that he might fully recover Her Majesty's favour, and grow by degrees into an assurance of his personal safety, which he then much doubted ; also that Tyrone's confederates might be wrought to their wonted duty and obedience. The Irish Council could not agree with these conclusions, and argued that Tyrone's object was to make the Queen weary of the great charge of her army in Ireland, in the hope that she would withdraw some part of her forces, and that thus the realm would be more open to his rebellion, and to the invasion of the Spaniards. Fenton supported the surceasing from war for two or three years, on the ground that it would " do more to reclaim the rebels, and recover the Government to some good way of stay and settling" than would another war. However, the Council besought that, whatever was to be done, whether for peace or war, they might know the Queen's resolution out of hand; and they prayed for full supplies of men, money, victuals, and munition. The 900 soldiers promised out of Picardy had not been heard of, nor were there any news of the 2,000 written for by the Council in the beginning of November, 1597. It was the old story over again : the Government in Ireland unable to decide what course to pursue, and flinging all responsibility on the home Government; the latter retorting, pretty much in Elizabeth's words, that the Irish authorities were advertisers, and not advisers ;" further particulars of the situation being wanted in England, and some one from Ireland going to report to the Privy Council; despatches coming and going, and time passing without anything definite being done; troops and supplies sent over, in more or less quantities, but often wasting away whilst the authorities were talking ; some fighting decided on and fresh supplies needed; fighting taking place, spoiling and burning being generally practised alike by friend and foe; then divers negotiations, bringing one back again to the indecision and the despatch making. So the wheel would go round, and this was called " government" and " war." No wonder Fenton said (p. 7) that he was in " no humour to persuade to war, which," he adds, " for these three years I have seen hath brought forth nothing but consumption of Her Majesty's treasure, and a dangerous disjointing of this Government, which, in many years, cannot be put in joint again, what good endeavours soever be used."

Word came from the Queen that Fenton was to assist Ormonde in these treaties with Tyrone. Sir Geffrey said he would do his best, but his grief at the envy and hard interpretations stirred up against him in Ireland had done more hurt to his health than his nineteen years of toilsome service in that country. He thought Ormonde had time, before the expiration of the two months' truce, to turn all his endeavours to compound the troubles of Leinster, whereby he shall have the better commodity to shake the great bear of the north, if he will be obstinate." For Tyrone, in view of the meeting appointed to him on March 4, had sent numbers of Ulstermen and others into Leinster and the English Pale. These were joined by the Geraldines, O'Connors, O'Moores, " and other loose people of all sorts," and did not encounter any resistance worth speaking of. The Council received daily advertisements from Newry, Carrickfergus, Dundalk, Cavan, and other places, that the garrisons there were ready to disband and break for want of relief. Many times did the Government press their demands for supplies from England. They told, not only of the soldiers' complaints and threatenings, but also that they were pestered with the clamour of the country and towns, which had strained themselves to diet the soldiers, and had not received their oft-promised payment for the same. The soldiers, under the pressure of their necessities, "havocked" the subjects, and were driven to take food, " sometimes against all rules of humanity and order." Many of the military officers were ahsent in England. The great majority of the forces were Irish, and were distrusted by their commanders. Sir Henry Brouncker states on his own knowledge that, at the victualling of the Blackwater fort, out of 1,700 soldiers, there was not 300 English. The same proportion, he supposed, would be found in other places.

Examining into the causes of the rebellion in Leinster, Ormonde found that the Molloys and Connors had revolted through the evil courses of " base and bare shifting fellows " to put them from their livings. These things he caused to be remedied by order of the Council, and satisfied tbe principal rebels. He adds that the rebellion in the King's County " proceeded of want of good government among the principal men of the English nation there, grown into factions and mislike one with another." Ormonde was busy with measures for defence of the King's County and the borders adjacent, until the time of his appointed meeting with Tyrone at Dundalk. This had been postponed, at Tyrone's request, from March 4 to March 14. Meantime Ormonde had received from the Queen that absolute authority to conclude which he had desired.

When the meeting took place, Fenton tells us that Tyrone " was very stiff to retain " the dependency of the Irish on him. This the Commissioners did their best to break up, but in vain. There was a confluence of discontented people from all parts of Ireland, expecting from Tyrone a redress of their varied grievances, " as though they were to be relieved upon a parley hill in Ulster by the censure of a traitor, not having first sought their redress by lawful means at the State" (p. 83). The Bishop of Meath, as usual, gives by far the best and most graphic account of this meeting (pp. 86–96), which lasted four days. Tyrone was told that the Queen, having seen his submission, had condescended to pardon him on certain conditions. How reasonable these were may be inferred from Tyrone's own words, " If all other things may be agreed upon, there will be little sticking at these things." The "other things" were the claims he put forward for his confederates. The negotiations thereon occupied the greater part of the four days' parley, but some of the claims were of such a nature that they could not be granted by the Commissioners without previous reference to England. This was exactly what Tyrone wanted, and a further meeting was arranged for April 10, when he promised to perform all things required of him, even if O'Donnell did not come in and submit.

During this parley a great deal had been said to Tyrone in denunciation of the ravages committed by his allies the O'Moores and O'Connors. The Bishop of Meath informs us that the inhabitants of Tyrone vowed to cut the throats of those men, if they came into that county, and the evidence against them was so clear, that the Earl of Tyrone himself get into a rage, " partly against those rascals themselves and partly because he was so strictly charged for them." Yet such was the ascendency of the rebel leader in negotiation, that he actually obtained a protection for both the septs just named. Indeed, the Bishop of Meath records that Ormonde " was enforced (much against his will) to yield to some demands that are inconvenient, only to retain Tyrone, and lest he should grow desperate." The impetuous Brian Reogh O'More thought that the conclusion of peace with Ormonde would be the overthrow of all of Irish birth. Not long after this parley, he engaged some of the forces in Wexford, and defeated them. Finding that Morrish Oge O'Connor had been apprehended, he begged Tyrone to write to Ormonde for his enlargement, and to take better course for these matters, or to suffer them to have open war, " for, by God's grace, there is no stand in the churls, if your Honour would set upon them now, for all Ireland had been at your command by this, if it had not your truces."

The meeting of the Commissioners with Tyrone, appointed for the 10th of April, was postponed to the 11th, owing to the heavy rain on the former day. The Bishop of Meath is again the special correspondent, who describes (pp. 110–120) the conferences of the four days. O'Donnell came to the parley, and took an important share in it. There were the usual claims on behalf of Tyrone's confederates, and the negotiations ended, after the usual fashion, in a truce being agreed upon for six weeks, from April 16. The Bishop's comment on the whole business is amply justified:—" True is the saying, and now verified in them, that a traitor will be a traitor, do what a man can. Tyrone's unhappy success in some bickerings against us, the knowledge of his own strength, expectation of foreign help, and the confidence he hath in the multitude of his partakers in the several parts of this realm, hath puffed him up with such pride and haughtiness of mind, as cannot be reformed but by chastisement and correction" (p. 119). Fenton, though generally for pacific courses, thought that, although the parley had not brought forth peace, " yet it was not without fruit and good success, for that now the traitor being discovered to the bottom, and his conspiracies, practised in effect with all the Irish in the realm, made apparent, Her Majesty seeth now what to trust unto, not to depend more upon treaties and parleys, but to turn her mercy into revenge, and proceed really to his prosecution."

Tyrone had great hope of the coming of Spaniards to Ireland in the summer of this year, and had sent his secretary, Brimegham, into Spain to solicit aid. He had also received promises of assistance from the King of Scotland. As the readiest way to take down Tyrone, and to curb O'Donnell, it was proposed that 1,000 foot and 100 horse should be sent to occupy the mouth of Lough Foyle, and that two pinnaces should be kept in the seas between Scotland and Ulster, to hinder any provision, either of men or munition, reaching Tyrone from the Scottish king. Another matter rendered a prosecution of the rebel leader desirable at this juncture. During the last parley, fearing that certain of the confederates in his camp might go over to the Earl of Ormonde's forces, he had laid violent hands on Tirlogh M'Henry, Maguire, and M'Mahon, and had sent them away in bonds. This high-handed proceeding had caused many of the Irish to fall away from him in heart, and others were expected to turn against him, if once they saw Her Majesty strong in the field, and determined to prosecute the rebel chief.

As to the most effectual methods of suppressing the rebellion that extended all over the country, we have the opinions of various officers. All agree as to the great importance of a strong garrison at Lough Foyle, and Sir Robert Cecil says: "I do agree that it is the best place to discommode the traitor" (p. 163). Captain Dawtrey dwelt on the necessity of having " Captains of honesty and experience." He thought 7,000 foot and 600 horse would suffice, and gives his proposed division of them in the various provinces. When he wrote there were, nominally, ninety-six companies in Ireland, but only a small proportion of these were serviceable, or indeed extant. Captain Dawtrey recommends giving up the expensive and ineffective method of a "frontier war" and urges the planting of strong garrisons in the different parts of the country. Captain Stafford laments that the Government is not committed to one particular man. He states that Her Majesty's forces are "composed of two nations, English and Irish, both subjects to the dignity of her Crown; the first, natural, obedient, and faithful, and the fewest in number; the second, discontented, perfidious, and ungrateful, ever disposed to innovation, and apt to rebellion, and they are by two parts in three the stronger." He points out that Tyrone never sought peace save at two set times in the year, when he might receive the greatest hurt. The first was from February to May, i.e., the time during which he fed up his cattle and sowed his corn; and the second, when the corn was ready to be cut. Captain Stafford gives a list of the horse and foot under Tyrone, with the names of their commanders. Captain Mostyn, who had seen twenty-seven years' service in Ireland, sends later in the year, a plot for the cutting off of " that cruell and tironious traytor of Tiron." He advises the sending over from England of 13,000 foot, with all necessaries for five or six months. These were to be distributed over various parts of Ulster, which are stated in his plan, and one of the chief occupations of the troops would be the lifting of the rebels' cattle; for the establishing of Ulster in dutiful obedience " will never be (by all likelihood) effected so well by the dent of the sword, as if it should also come by the cruelty of famine." If 13,000 men were considered too many for Ulster alone, Captain Mostyn argues that Tyrone and his confederates would draw every traitor they could from the other provinces, which would thus be eased of their troubles. As for the wealth of the rebels in cattle, he says 400,000 head could be taken from them. He himself had seen O'Donnell take 30,000 in one morning, a little above Roscommon. Tyrone, in his territory, possessed an infinite number of kine, as well as of stud mares. Tyrone's secretary told Mostyn that, when the Earl wished to take a subsidy of 12d. on each milch cow, he would take up in the county of Tyrone alone between 6,000l. and 7,000l. That was for milch kine only. Then there were the barren and other cattle, and all the cattle in the countries of O'Donnell, Maguire, M'Mahon, and others. Indeed Mostyn judges that 800,000 rather than 400,000 head might be taken. He also advises the placing of 1,000 horsemen with the garrisons suggested by him, and advocates sudden raids from their several quarters. Sir Ralph Lane, the Mustermaster, in his project for the suppression of the rebellion, says the present unhappiness of the state in Ireland is increased by the want of competent commanders, and of those experienced in " the plots and draughts " of the Irish. He speaks of the " general martial skill " of the latter, " ordered and disciplined for strong fights, both of horse and foot, as well upon hard grounds and plains, which must be certainly expected and provided for, as upon their bogs, passes, and straits" (p. 421). He advises the immediate placing of 1,500 English foot and 100 horse in the Clandeboys and at Coleraine; 600 of the foot to be at Belfast, and 900 foot and 100 horse at Coleraine. Sir Ralph declares that in the Clandeboys the people hated Tyrone, and followed him only for fear. The force at Coleraine would instantly draw the Scots from him, " for fear of the loss of their cows, which they love as their lives, and far better than him." Sir Ralph Lane further advises the planting of two strong camps of 1,500 men each in Leinster. Francis Jobson, who had surveyed Ulster in the time of Sir William Fitzwilliams, recommended the sending of an army of 11,000 men to that province, 2,000 of the number to be horse. He describes the eight different places where he advises the placing of garrisons. The greatest wealth of Ulster was in its herds of cows, goats, and horse, and Jobson says that, so long as these had scope to range up and down in to pasture, the people " both can and will ever at their pleasures (without regard of God, Prince, or humanity), rebel and make havoc." He says further that the people were most savage, and that when in Ulster, he was in hourly danger of losing his head (p. 445).

The Lords Justices write to the Privy Council on June 1 that the last truce taken with " the great Rebel of the North" would expire on the 6th of that month. The rebels had, as usual, taken every advantage of the cessation, and were exceedingly strong. In Leinster the Kavanaghs, the Byrnes, the O'Moores, and the O'Connors, " heretofore accounted but a base and beggarly kind of people," had, by the usual granting of protections unto them" (a hit at Ormonde), grown to such numbers and insolence that they had wasted a great part of that province. The royal pardon had been granted to Phelim M'Feagh, including therein 400 of his followers, and there had also been given him the lands of his father, Feagh M'Hugh. Sir Henry Brouncker considered this step a very bad precedent, as even Feagh M'Hugh had never, in his greatest pride, asked pardon or protection for more than 120 of his followers. Phelim thus enjoyed the name and privilege of a subject, and meantime was quietly working mischief. The Council complained of his haughtiness and ingratitude, and thought he would " still continue an arrant traitor in mind." They wrote that the realm was in peril, and themselves " in daily danger to be massacred. We may well bemoan our miserable and distressed estate, but having no power or authority in ourselves to redress it, otherwise than by advice, we do now make the same known to your Lordships." No wonder such pusillanimity and irresolution prevailed nothing against enemies who knew their own minds.

As soon as the truce expired Tyrone divided his forces into three parts. One he sent to the Blackwater fort, which he surrounded, " swearing by his barbarous hand " that he would not depart till he had carried the same. Another part he thrust into the Brenny, and assaulted the castle of Cavan, promising not to leave the place so long as he could get a cow out of the English Pale to feed his companies. The third part he had in readiness to send into Leinster to strengthen his faction there; and they were on the borders awaiting an opportunity to join the Kavanaghs and the rest. Fenton writes (p. 173):— Against these distresses the State is in weak case to make head, or at least a thorough resistance, the whole forces in the realm consisting in effect upon Irish, and the rest discontented; a lamentable matter to hazard upon their trust the safety and preservation of the kingdom. And yet, touching the Blackwater, I see not but it must be left to the valour and fortune of the garrison there, for that here is no means to put an army on foot to rescue it." Ormonde was preparing, with 2,000 foot, some companies of horse, and the risings out of the adjacent countries, to prosecute the rebels in Leinster; and, for the succour of Cavan, and to repel incursions into the Pale, 1,500 or 1,600 men were to be sent to the borders. This was all that could be done until forces came from England, when an army could march into Ulster, and wrestle with Tyrone in his own territory. The soldiers from Picardy had long since arrived on the south coast, but, though they were nominally over 1,100 strong, they numbered on muster only 612. Other troops also had arrived from England.

Reports were circulated of " terrible news," such as the loss of the Blackwater fort and of Armagh, both of which were said to have been destroyed by the rebels; also that certain companies had been cut up in Leinster. These rumours gave the Council an opportunity of denouncing their originators thus (p. 184):—"We are sorry that those who take upon them to be intelligencers or reporters of the affairs here do not, with better advice, inform themselves before they write or speak." Both the Blackwater fort and Armagh were still held for the Queen, and the reporters were wrong about one at least of the companies said to have been destroyed. " These busy intelligencers " also erred in their advertisements of " an unhappy accident " that occurred in the mountains near Dublin on June 13 or 14. The Council thought it advisable to send a true account of the affair, and related a sharp skirmish that Ormonde had had a few miles from the capital with Cahir M'Hugh and his followers. Similarly, in the preceding April, there had been a rumour of the arrival of five or six Spanish ships at Lough Foyle. Fenton wrote to a spy who was remaining near the Earl of Tyrone, and forwarded to Burghley the letters he received on the subject, " knowing how ready many will be to write over of these matters without any true ground." After six days no confirmation of the rumour came to hand, and Fenton concluded that the ships were not so many as reported, " but rather some poor Scottishman, fallen there with his lading of wines, of which he may make good sale amongst the Irishmen."

The Blackwater fort had for a considerable time been engaging the anxious attention of the Irish Government. The garrison, under Captain Thomas Williams, were resolutely defending their post, though it was fast becoming untenable. As early as January 4 of this year, Ormonde had described it as " built square, without any flankers, and the rampier there falleth daily." Later in the same month, he said the ground where the fort was placed was such that " what they repair in one day, twice as much falleth the next day." On April 19, he wrote to Burghley, forwarding a plan of the fort, which is unfortunately now wanting, and said that, in his own opinion, it "were better never to have been builded or taken in hand." On June 18, Ormonde wrote to Sir Robert Cecil, " I protest to God the state of the scurvy fort of Blackwater, which cannot be long held, doth more touch my heart than all the spoils that ever were made by traitors on my own lands. This fort was always falling, and never victualled but once (by myself) without an army, to Her Majesty's exceeding charges." The garrison consisted of four companies of foot, " such as," write the Council (including Ormonde), "in former attempts made by Tyrone against that place, have behaved themselves with great valour and resolution, whose worthy services have well deserved not to leave them to be exposed to the uttermost hazard and cruelty of the enemy, if there be any way to preserve them" (p. 181).

It did not brighten the outlook to know that Tyrone had received intelligence that the Queen would send no forces to Lough Foyle this year. The information was but partially true, but Tyrone relied on it, and shaped his plans accordingly. Feeling free at home, he bent all his energies against Leinster and the English Pale, which Fenton tells us (p. 189) he made ready to invade in three parts: first, by way of Longford and Westmeath, with a force of 1,000 men, to be led by O'Donnell, Maguire, and the O'Farrells ; secondly, by Meath and Offally (or the King's County), with 800 men, under Captains Tyrrell and Nugent; and thirdly, by way of the Fews, into the county of Louth and Dundalk, with 800 men, under his brother Cormack and the M'Mahons. To give a better passage to these invasions, he had drawn a strong faction in Low Leinster, which he supported with men and means out of Ulster. Thus, as Fenton puts it (p. 189), "he hath made a globe of his forces to comprehend us round, assuring you it will be hard for us to avoid a dangerous blow, without good store of men and victuals to be sent out of England with all possible speed." Fenton feared that Tyrone's thorough fortune" in Leinster would cast Connaught again into a relapse, and stir coals in Minister. It was not to be long before the rebel leader gave the expected dangerous blow."

The 2,000 men asked for in November, 1597, were not ready to embark for Ireland until July 9,1598. Sixteen hundred of them arrived in Dublin on July 18; the remaining four hundred were detained by contrary winds. It was directed that these forces should be used only to supply the deficiencies in the several companies. The Council had also asked for an additional 1,200 foot, and 100 horse to be sent to Lough Foyle. The Queen not only agreed to this, but raised the number of the foot to 2,000. " She is resolved," write the Privy Council (p. 202), " to root Tyrone out by all means possible."

On July 22nd, the Lords Justices write to the Privy Council, " The fort of Blackwater is yet held with great honour and resolution by that valiant gentleman, Captain Thomas Williams, who commandeth it." They tell how Tyrone had lately bent all his forces to surprise the fort, and how a sortie had been made by the garrison, whereby two or three principal leaders of the rebels had been killed, and divers horses captured. They express a hope that Ormonde, on coming to Dublin, will have " an honourable "care for the relief and supply" of the garrison, and promise to assist him with their best advice and furtherance. On July 24, Fenton states that Tyrone had lain before the fort for a month, and had spent the most part of that time in "plashing" (fortifying) the passes, and digging deep holes in the rivers, the more to distress the army that should come to relieve it. On July 31, Ormonde tells Burghley that he does not hold the Blackwater fort worth victualling again, because of the excessive charges, unless the Queen sends forces to Lough Foyle.

We now come to the great disaster of the year, viz., the "battle of the Yellow Ford," as it has been called, or as it should be, more strictly, the battle of Armagh. The words, " encounter," " disaster," " accident," " defeat," and others, are used in these papers with reference to this fight, but those terms are almost invariably coupled with Armagh. There had been, as we have seen, some conference in the Council in June, as to whether the fort at the Blackwater should be relieved or not. The consultation ended in letters being sent on June 17, to Captain Williams, directing him to make the best terms he could with Tyrone.

These letters Ormonde signed along with the other Councillors. Sir Henry Bagenall, however, kept the letters in his own hands, and did not send them to the fort, affirming that the course proposed was dishonourable, and that the fort was yet in case to hold out. Subsequently the Council conferred again on the subject. Some were still of opinion that it was too great a hazard to adventure so many of Her Majesty's forces as were requisite for such an expedition, considering that the loss of the fort, even when put at its highest value, was in no way comparable to the loss that would be sustained by any disaster to the army. Ormonde and Sir Henry Bagenall, however, contended that it greatly concerned the Queen's honour to have the beleaguered garrison rescued, and it was ultimately decided to send the relieving force.

The Lords Justices earnestly pressed Ormonde to go in person on this important service, but he elected to see to affairs in Leinster, and put the expedition under the command of the Marshal, Sir Henry Bagenall. The latter lost no time in starting, with a force of close upon 4,000 foot, and over 300 horse. The 7th of August was the day fixed for the rendezvous at Ardee, whence the troops were to march to Newry, and thence to the Blackwater. The Marshal reached Armagh on the 13th of August, having suffered no loss, save that Captain Ratcliff was taken prisoner by the enemy, and four or five stragglers from the army were cut off in the strait between Dundalk and Newry. On the next day, Monday, the 14th of August, the force set out from their camp about a quarter of a mile beyond Armagh. Bagenall had divided his army into three parts, each composed of two regiments, and had put a distance of 140 paces between each regiment. A council of war, held on the 13th, had decided that the six regiments should march separately, till they saw each other engaged, and then form in three divisions for each other's relief, if they found the ground answerable. On the day of the fight Captains Leigh and Turner, both of whom were slain in this action, were commanded to lead the forlorn hope. The vanguard was led by Colonel Percy, seconded by the Marshal himself. The " battle," or centre, was led by Colonel Cosby, seconded by Sir Thomas Maria Wingfield. The rearguard was led by Colonel Cuney, the Serjeant-Major, seconded by Captain Billings. The path chosen was not the direct one, which was left, in order to march on the right hand of the pass. In other words, Bagenall and his men marched a mile from the common highway, by which Lord Burgh had passed to the Blackwater. The way was hard and hilly ground, within easy shot of the enemy, who had full possession of the wood and bog on either side, and who kept up a continual fire. Their numbers were estimated at between 6,000 and 8,000. The skirmishing began within half a mile from Armagh, and was maintained until the troops reached the trenches prepared by the enemy about a mile and a half further on. One trench was a mile long, some five feet deep, four feet wide, and surmounted by a thorny hedge.

The garrison within the Blackwater fort appear to have descried the English colours, and, according to one writer, "threw up their caps for joy, hoping to have a better supper than the dinner they had that day."

Colonel Percy's men halted often for the Marshal's regiment to come up, but they were soon fully engaged. On the top of a hill, very near the trench, they made the longest stand, and there they were entertained with a sharp skirmish from the woods that lay between them and the trench. In order to do away with the advantage the enemy had by being under cover, whilst his own men were in the open, but especially to relieve the forlorn hope, Colonel Percy drew down from the hill, passed the wood, and carried the trench with a rush, advancing immediately to a place of equal advantage with that possessed by the enemy. Here he put in order his men, who had become scattered through the depth of the bogs, the height of the trench, and the straitness of the pass, and maintained skirmish until Captain Malbie came to him from Sir Henry Bagenall with orders to retreat. Only 500 of the enemy had come in sight at this position, but there were many of them in the adjoining woods, as appeared plainly by their often relieving one another. The retreat was a very disorderly one, on Colonel Percy's own showing. His loose wings, having spent their powder coming in, gave way to the enemy, who charged the regiment with both horse and foot. The new supplies from England, who had been posted in its rear, threw away their arms and bolted; the panic spread, and the whole regiment was put to the sword without resistance. Colonel Percy and Captain George Kingsmill escaped with the help of some horse, and reached the regiment of Sir Henry Bagenall. These men, owing to their Commander's fatal mistake, were so far off, and had become withal so hotly engaged, that they could not by any means come up to second Percy's men. Recovering some order, however, they marched to the trenches, which were won for the second time, but the centre not coming up to their aid, the Marshal's men were cut to pieces. It was at this point of the battle that the Marshal, who had momentarily raised his helmet, was shot in the forehead, and expired.

The advance of the centre had been checked by the sticking fast in the bog of their principal piece of ordnance, and also by the enemy hemming them in in large numbers. The rearguard, meanwhile, had been nearly thrown into a panic by the explosion of two barrels of powder, an accident that called forth loud cheering from the enemy. It was against the rear of the centre that the enemy directed their best horse, knowing that Sir Thomas Wingfield's regiment alone hindered them from cutting off the two regiments of the rearguard from the vanguard and centre. Sir Thomas, who succeeded to the chief command on the death of the Marshal, found the van of the centre whole and unbroken. He consulted with Colonel Cuney, who commanded the van of the rearguard, "as touching the state of the army, which was even then in defeating," and it was concluded to make a retreat on Armagh. Sir Thomas rode to Cosby to ask if he could maintain the rear of the centre with honour. Cosby assured him he both could and would. Thereupon the order to retreat was sent to the rearguard, and Sir Thomas withdrew his regiment from the bog, where it had so long held its ground. Its resistance at this difficult spot was for the sake of securing the large piece of ordnance that had stuck there, but this could not be recovered, both because it was so thoroughly bogged, and because the oxen that drew it were killed. Cosby for some time brought on his men in good order, but at length, contrary to his directions, he again charged the enemy, to protect some of the fugitives from the vanguard. A little before this rash movement was made, a second explosion had occurred in the English ranks. Two barrels of powder had blown up in the centre, killing many men and disordering the division. On seeing Cosby charge, Sir Thomas felt bound to go to his relief, and also sent word to Colonel Cuney to return for the same purpose. Thus the whole of the retreating force was endangered. Before, however, any relief could be sent, for the fatal distances appear to have been maintained, both Cosby's men, and those he attempted to rescue, were routed together, and Cosby himself was taken prisoner. Colonel Cuney had returned to join Sir Thomas Wingfield, and the retreat was proceeded with.

The English horse did splendid service. Their van came to the assistance of what remained of the centre, and their rear to the help of the rearguard. Captain Ferdinando Kingsmill, who was in Colonel Cuney's regiment in the van of the rearguard, said that they had been so hotly engaged with the forces of O'Donnell, Maguire, and Sir James M'Sorley, that, in an hour and a half, they could not advance a quarter of a mile. They had, accordingly, never heard of the death of the Marshal, nor of the rout of the vanguard and of the van of the centre, until they came to fetch off the rear of the centre, with which they joined, and retreated towards Armagh. Captain Billings received from Colonel Cuney direction to make good the ford by which the army had to retire. In retreating, his regiment guarded the corpse of the Marshal, and most of the wounded men, including Sir Calisthenes Brooke, the leader of the horse, and took along with them three pieces of ordnance and the remainder of the munition. On nearing the ford, they saw the enemy, both horse and foot, with the colours flying, which they had captured from the vanguard, evidently intent on seizing the ford before them. Captain Billings, however, reached the ford first, and secured it. He then received direction to occupy a hill between Armagh and the ford, until the rest of the retreating force came up. This movement was noticed by the enemy, whose horse endeavoured to cut off the line of retreat to the city. But the discharge of the biggest of the three pieces of ordnance checked their advance, and the hill was gained. After this, no opposition was encountered (partly because the enemy's ammunition was well spent), and so the wearied troops, splendidly supported by their horse, gained the plain, and reached Armagh in safety. Here the Captains resolved to refresh their men, and then to march directly to Newry. But the enemy had been too quick for them, and were now seen approaching the city. Presently the force was surrounded on all sides. The Captains, "finding the insufficiency both in mind and means of their men," concluded that the best plan was for the horse to cut their way through the rebels, and thus pass into the Pale, and apprise the State of the necessity for immediate succour. This action the horse, under Captain Montague, successfully accomplished, with small loss, although, as they passed out of camp, the enemy gave them " a great volley of shot," and pursued them a considerable distance. The foot, to the number of some 1,500, remained, to use the language of the Council, " cooped up "in the Church at Armagh," having very little munition, and with victuals sufficient for only nine or ten days. During the battle 300 of the " mere Irish " had deserted to the enemy, and even from the Church at Armagh others ran away continually. Montague was afraid they would betray the environed force, for, as he went off with his horse, he heard very hot skirmishing going on behind him. Ormonde tells us that, in the battle, the new supplies from England "never offered to fight, but, as their leaders say, came away most cowardly, casting from them their armour and weapons, as soon as the rebels charged them" (p. 243). The bravery of the several Captains is specially noticed by Lieutenant Taaffe, and the heavy loss among them confirms his words.

In this volume there are the reports of no less than fourteen officers, who were present at this disastrous battle. The accounts are very conflicting, and as regards the numbers of killed and wounded there is considerable diversity. It is a great pity that the report of Sir Thomas Maria Wingfield, enclosed in the letter of the Lords Justices and Council to Cecil, dated September 6, should be awanting. Captain Montague, in his report to the Council on August 16, states that there were " killed and run away to the enemy not less than 1,800 foot, some ten horsemen, and thirty horses"; and that the enemy lost " seven or eight hundred." In his letter of the same date to the Earl of Ormonde, he sends a note of the Captains slain, and adds, "of soldiers I assure myself not less than 2,000, with many officers." Lieutenant Taaffe, on the same date, says there were eighteen Captains lost and above a thousand soldiers. The Lords Justices and Council, also on August 16, tell Ormonde that the Marshal and about thirteen Captains were slain, and their colours lost. Lieutenant Marmaduke Whitechurch, of Sir Henry Bagenall's horse company, and John Lee, Bagenall's secretary, say that in Tyrone's camp it was reported that they had killed 600 of Her Majesty's army, and that there were 120 of themselves slain. Probably the list sent by the Earl of Ormonde on August 24 is the nearest approach to the true state of the case. He gives the numbers of slain as 15 Captains, 9 Lieutenants, 5 ensigns, and 855 men; and adds that 363 men were wounded, and 11 colours lost. Another estimate, dated September 20, states, " there might be lost at the defeat with the Marshal, and runaway, 1,300." From the accounts of Sir Henry Wallop (p. 491), we learn that a reward of 30l. was given to Marmaduke Whitechurch, who had "lost six oxen and their furniture, that drew a piece of the ordnance in the Marshal's journey to Blackwater."

Ormonde is explicit enough in his opinion as to the cause of the defeat. He wrote to Sir Robert Cecil on September 15, "The Lords Justices might have written more advisedly, than to say the whole army was overthrown. Truly it might have been so, if God had not letted it, for their disorder was such as the like hath not been among men of any understanding, dividing the army into six bodies, marching so far asunder, as one of them could not second nor help the other, till those in the vanguard were overthrown. Sure the devil bewitched them, that none of them did prevent this gross error." Again, on October 4 (p. 279), he wrote to Essex and Cecil, " I never in my life heard anything more shamefully handled than the overthrow of the Marshal, considering the greatness of the army, and the numbers of commanders he had with him, who, I think, were all bewitched, and found not the grossness of their own error in marching so far asunder, as the one of them could not second the other, having no carriages to trouble them, but only their small field pieces." Colonel Percy (p. 278) puts down the rash charge of Colonel Cosby as the cause of the disaster. Lieutenant Taaffe says (p. 237), " if you will have my opinion in the cause of our loss, I protest it was only for the great distance that was betwixt us in our march; for, when the vanguard was charged, they were within sight of our battle, and yet not rescued until they were overthrown."

The news of this disaster was like the bursting of a bombshell on the Council table. Ormonde was away in Leinster, and the Lords Justices and Council completely lost their heads. They wrote to the Earl of Tyrone, on the 16th of August, the notorious letter, a copy of which will be found on pages 228, 229. In it they begged him to let the companies at Armagh depart without doing them any further hurt, especially as his "ancient adversary," the Marshal, was dead. Two days after the battle they wrote to the Privy Council (p. 226), "We cannot but fear far more dangerous sequels, even to the utter hazard of the kingdom, and that out of hand, if God and Her Majesty prevent them not." They expected the rebels to pursue their success at Armagh to the best advantage in all other parts of the realm, and prayed for present help from England. Further, they sent urgent messages to Ormonde, to repair with all speed to Dublin. Sir Geffrey Fenton feared that Tyrone would forthwith strike at Dundalk, Carrickfergus, and Newry. He expressed a wish to Cecil that the 2,000 men, destined for Lough Foyle, might be landed at Dublin and Drogheda, for the defence of the Pale. Ormonde wrote in the same strain to the Privy Council, and urged that the force in question should be told of the defeat with all speed, lest they should land at Lough Foyle, and " take any sudden harm" (p. 235).

Meantime news of that force had been working its effect in a way that the authorities at Dublin had not reckoned on, nor had they in their panic made allowance for the possible difficulties of the victorious Tyrone. For one thing, his allies, O'Donnell and Maguire, were in want of victuals, and were about to return home. The besieged troops at Armagh had fortified and maintained their position until the Earl offered composition on the following conditions; first, that the garrison at the Blackwater should quit their fort, leaving behind them their colours, drums, and munition, the Captains being allowed to retain their rapiers and hackneys; and secondly, that the said garrison and the troops at Armagh should march away, with all their carriage and their wounded men, to Dundalk. The heroic resistance of the Blackwater garrison deserved a better fate, and Captain Williams, on his return to Dublin, said he might have made his composition when he listed, " in far more honourable sort than it [the fort] was yielded up." The terms offered by Tyrone were agreed to, and the troops left Armagh "with bag and baggage, and their colours displayed." But they marched to Newry instead of Dundalk, having possibly heard, as the Council did, of the preparations made against them by the Earl in the Moyerie, a pass between Newry and Dundalk. The journey to the latter town was, notwithstanding, accomplished without impediment. The reasons Tyrone gave for according the above conditions were, that he was at 500l. charge per diem in keeping his forces together, and that he supposed the troops had a month's or six weeks' victual with them. Before that time elapsed, he knew that forces would land at Lough Foyle. So he thought it better to save himself his daily charge, to gain the Blackwater fort, and thus to free himself for the task of preventing the landing at Lough Foyle. He little dreamt, then, that that task would be saved him by this very overthrow that he had given to the Queen's forces.

A few words are here necessary with regard to the above-mentioned letter sent by the Lords Justices and Council to Tyrone after the disaster. The reason given for its despatch was (p. 227), "lest Tyrone might use further violence to those distressed companies in Armagh," and the pursuivant was directed, " to learn the true state of the soldiers, with other instructions, which was our chief purpose in sending him to Tyrone." The signatories of the letter were, the Lords Justices Loftus and Gardener, Sir Henry Wallop, Sir Greorge Bourchier, and Sir Geffrey Fenton. Ormonde was absent in Leinster. The original letter is not known to exist; there is only a copy among the papers calendared in this volume. Fenton has added the signatures, and put this endorsement, " A pursuivant sent to Tyrone upon the late disaster at Armagh.—16 August, 1598." This was the copy sent to the Privy Council, and shown to the Queen. The Council, however, felt uneasy at their action, as appears by their letter sent to the Privy Council, dated September 4, in which they write (p. 256), It may be that some dislike may grow upon a letter we thought to send to Tyrone, upon the first report of the accident at Armagh. And though at that time we had some reason to hold that course, yet, upon better deliberation, we revoked the letter, and would not suffer it to be sent, having this device at the first, that the letter should be but a colour to send to see the state of the companies, with direction that, if there were any possibility to fetch off those companies, the letter should not be delivered, which was accordingly performed, and we have at this present the letter in our hands; whieh is true, upon our credit." Thus the Council contradict themselves by stating, first, that the letter was sent, and then, that it was not. Again, they had already stated (p. 226), " we are not able, without present succours out of England, to fetch off those poor distressed companies that are in Armagh." Then why send a pursuivant to learn their true state? And how could a pursuivant accomplish this in the case of men entirely surrounded by enemies? Why, also, was not the original letter, in the hands of the Council, sent unopened to the Queen, and the whole question thus set at rest? It is singular that in a series of State Papers, where few, even of the less remarkable documents, are wanting, this important letter should not be extant. It is quite clear that all the excuses of the Council were invented to cover their panic, and their consequent desire to propitiate Tyrone. As to dislike growing about their letter, the Council were not left long in suspense. Elizabeth was furious on learning its contents, and thus vented her wrath on the authors (pp. 258, 259): "We may not pass over this foul error to our dishonour, when you of our Council framed such a letter to the traitor, after the defeat, as never was read the like, either in form or substance, for baseness, being such as we persuade ourself, if you shall peruse it again, when you are yourselves, that you will be ashamed of your own absurdities, and grieved that any fear or rashness should ever make you authors of an action so much to your Sovereign's dishonour, and to the increasing of the traitor's insolency." This was on September 12. Whilst Elizabeth was thus denouncing the Council, their letter of September 4 arrived, and the Queen adds a postscript to hers in the following terms:—"Since the writing of this letter, we have understood that your letter, which we heard from you was sent to the traitor by you, hath since been stayed by accident; whereof, for our own honour, we are very glad, though for yourselves the former purpose still deserves the same imputation." Soon after the receipt of the Queen's letter, the Council return to their apologies, and confess (pp. 273, 274) their astonishment at the overthrow, and their inability to rescue the besieged in Armagh, and that therefore they thought it good to send a pursuivant " to them," to learn their condition. "And for that we knew how dangerous it was for the pursuivant to pass through so many barbarous rebels, not having something to show for his safety, we caused a letter to be devised and endorsed to the traitor, charging the pursuivant that he should not deliver it otherwise than compelled by some great necessity, or else to bring it back again, which he did without that the traitor either saw it, or knew of any such letter to be written. And therefore, inasmuch as the intention of the letter was rather to serve another turn than to be delivered to the traitor, we let it pass in a base style, agreeable to the purpose it was written for." They then pray for restitution to Her Majesty's wonted grace and favour. Ormonde signed this letter along with the others, noting, however, that he was absent when the missive under discussion was dispatched to Tyrone.

After the disaster near Armagh, there ensued an embittered wrangle between the Council and Ormonde regarding the responsibility for that event. The Council, on the one hand, writing to the Privy Council, argued that, though they were averse to the expedition for the relief of the Blackwater fort, they yielded to the opinion of Ormonde, who had the supreme authority in all martial affairs. But they pressed him earnestly to take the command in person, on the grounds of the influence he would exert on many of the nobility and their followers to attend him, and of the fear he would probably inspire in Tyrone. To these urgent solicitations Ormonde would not give way. The Lords Justices, in a private letter to the Privy Council, enlarge on the same arguments, and state (p. 232) that Ormonde was "either unwilling or unable to endure that troublesome journey," and that he told them he "himself could not be spared from the service in Leinster." It seems almost incredible that Ormonde did not see the importance, nay even the necessity, of his commanding this expedition in person. On this occasion, as on many others, he laid himself open to the imputation, which his enemies were not slow to fasten upon him, of being chiefly concerned in the preservation of his own estates from injury. Although he did not always succeed in this, he was generally within easy distance of his own property, and his constant absence from Dublin was, as will be shown, a frequent source of complaint. It is true the Queen had instructed the Earl to have special regard to the state of affairs in Leinster, but she naturally expected him to use his discretion in the event of a crisis in other parts of Ireland. Accordingly, in a letter to the Council, including Ormonde, she administered to him this sharp rebuke (p. 258), "It was strange unto us, when almost the whole forces of our kingdom were drawn to head, and a main blow like to be stroken for our honour against the capital rebel, that you, whose person would have better daunted the traitors, and would have carried with it another manner of reputation, and strength of the nobility of the kingdom, should employ yourself in an action of less importance, and leave that to so mean a conduction. And, therefore, whosoever of our Council should dissuade you from that course, lacked both judgment and affection to our service, and did that which is repugnant to the writings of divers of the best and greatest of them in that kingdom." Before this letter could have reached him, Ormonde had heard that the Lords Justices had sent over their version of the story, and writes to Cecil in his own defence, denying that the expedition was the result of a plot between Sir Henry Bagenall and himself. He states (p. 262) that the first motion for the victualling of the fort came from the Marshal, that the Council supported this view, and urged himself to see to it; but that, after further deliberations, Captain Williams was directed to make terms with Tyrone. The Earl further indicates the great desire of the Marshal to go on the expedition, and that some solicited his appointment thereto. One writer says that the Lord. Justice Loftus was the only one who advised Ormonde to give Bagenall the command (p. 321). The letters directing the relief were signed at the Council Board, and all means for the same were laid down in full Council. Ormonde declares he had no speech with the Marshal on the subject save at the Board, and winds up by saying that the Marshal was dispatched away by the Lords Justices and Council after he himself had left Dublin. This defence overlooked the fact that the Marshal could not have gone, unless Ormonde had first given his consent. Had Ormonde gone himself, the result would certainly have been different. In the face of all this, and of what they themselves had written, it is strange to find the Council gravely assuring the home Government, with reference to this very "matter of the Blackwater" (p. 263), "neither do we know any cause of private emulation or difference between us and the Lord Lieutenant, but all good correspondency and agreement," which they would labour to maintain ; and that " though the time be universally distracted and broken in the body of this kingdom, yet we have hitherunto holden an honourable unity and agreement in Council, and do hope to continue that course to the end without separation." The divisions of the authorities in Ireland will be further referred to later on in this preface.

A few days before the battle of Armagh, England and Ireland alike had suffered a great loss in the death of Lord Burghley. There are several references to his retirement and final illness, and many eulogies are passed upon him. The only discordant note is in a passage relating to the Lord Treasurer and the Marshal: " Ireland did not mourn for them; for the Marshal (said they) contended with the Earl of Tyrone, and was in some part a cause that he went into action, which bred great woe to the true subjects. The Lord Treasurer (said they) hindered the service of Ireland upon the information of some Captains that would not be out of entertainment, and persuaded the Queen's Majesty from time to time (as a good husband for her treasure) to send a handful of money and a handful of men; both of which no sooner landed in Ireland, but melted away like hoar frost before the sun; and as the service continued, rebellion increased, and the true subjects went to wreck."

Sir Samuel Bagenall, who had at first received instructions to proceed with his forces to Lough Foyle—" a waste place and unhabited," " very ruinous and desolate "— was directed on August 23, in consequence of the defeat given to the Marshal, to go with a portion of his men from Chester to Lambay, near Dublin, and thence, unless otherwise ordered, to Carlingford. His second in command, Colonel Charles Egerton, was likewise ordered to proceed with the greater portion, 1,400 men, from Plymouth to Lambay, and from that place, unless he obtained further direction, to Carlingford. Sir Samuel's men arrived in Dublin by September 13, but Colonel Egerton's were not there till the early days of October. These had been detained by contrary winds, and their numbers had been dimished by 140, stayed in Cork by Sir Thomas Norreys for the better defence of Munster. The death of Sir Henry Bagenall had rendered necessary the appointment of another Marshal of Ireland, and the urgent need of an experienced commander was met by the choice of Sir Richard Bingham on August 31. This completed the restoration to favour of that soldier, and Elizabeth warmly recommended him to the Council in Ireland in her letter of September 12. Sir Richard was ready to embark at Chester on September 26, but the wind was against him, and he did not arrive in Dublin until the middle of October. One thousand men were under orders to go over with him, but he started with his own company of 200 and with 30 horse. The remainder came before the end of the month. Ormonde wrote to Bingham to repair to him with his 200 foot and 50 horse, but the Marshal was detained at Dublin by the state of his health, and also by the action of the Lords Justices and Council, who, although frequently urged by Ormonde, were loath to let him go any distance from them, owing to the ravages of the rebels in the Pale, and their close approach to Dublin.

There was good reason to fear extreme danger, as the papers of the next few months testify. Had Tyrone followed up his victory near Armagh with any promptitude and vigour, the capital must have been lost, and the rebel leader would have been virtual ruler of the whole realm. Three days after the fight, the Lords Justices confess that they have daily advertisements of the entrance of the rebels into the county of Dublin, " and of their purpose, even this day, as we understand, to make head even towards this city, to which, God knoweth, they may make an easy approach." Leinster, their Lordships avow, was in a worse state than this; Connaught weakened; and Munster ready to burst into flame. In October of this year, Tyrone employed some of his instruments to surprise Dublin Castle, to subvert the city, " and consequently to commit to massacre and havoc all the English and their goods." The conspiracy was discovered just in the nick of time. It was to have been " performed by thirty resolute men, set on by twenty-nine priests lying in Dublin." Assistance was to have been given by 1,000 men of Tyrone's forces, and 1,000 more from the mountain rebels. The chief conspirators were Lapley, Cawell, Shelton, Friar Nangle, Leynan, and Bethell, all Irishmen. Leynan revealed the plot, and was spared and recompensed. Friar Nangle escaped. The other four were executed.

Repeatedly there came to the Privy Council accounts of the rebel designs on Dublin. On December 1, Captain Thomas Reade informed Cecil that, on the previous day, the enemy bad burned Dunboyne, within six miles of the city, at nine o'clock in the morning, without any resistance, and that before this action they had spoiled near Dublin without contradiction or loss. He added that there remained in the capital only 200 of the late supplies for the safeguard of the State and city. Four days after Captain Reade's letter, Sir Richard Bingham writes to Cecil that the traitors on all sides were drawing towards Dublin, as though they had a correspondency and purpose to attempt it"; also that the young men and apprentices were going to the rebels daily. On December 9, Captain Thomas Lee informs the Privy Council that the traitors were daily increasing, and spoiling the good subjects near the gates of Dublin, without impeachment either of the State or of the soldier. On the next day, Captain Reade tells Cecil (p. 403), "that the companies of foot Her Majesty hath in Ireland are many, and yet the enemy liveth in small fear of them, because the Irish presume so much of their singular footmanship, that they can take and leave at their pleasures, and make such incursions into the Pale, with so speedy a retreat, that the garrisons adjoining, wanting the assistance of horse, can little annoy them." Whilst he was writing, the enemy had burned within three miles of Dublin without resistance. Before he had finished, intelligence came that they had approached within two miles, and besides the 200 foot mentioned above, there could not be gathered together six horse to discover the enemy's intention. Finally, on December 20, the mountain rebels actually entered the suburbs of Dublin, and took away the cows of sundry poor men, without one bullet being fired to prevent them. Fenton was grieved to consider how deeply " these barbarous bravadoes" (p. 416) blemished the honour of the State. " I can give no other reason thereof," he adds in a postcript (p. 417), "but that God hath blinded our eyes that we cannot see, and bound up our hands that we dare not strike." The rebels' object was to lay waste the whole Pale, and thus deprive the army of its only grange and nursery." Fenton admits" that now the poor English Pale is the whole kingdom, the rest being in effect under the tyranny of the traitors."

In Leinster the Earl of Ormonde found plenty of work ready to hand. Early in August, the rebels had been ravaging on his property during his absence in Dublin. They had obtained full possession of all the Queen's County, with the exception of three or four castles, and these were not in a position to hold out long. They had burned and spoiled a great portion of Kildare, and in the King's County they were doing as they listed, encouraged by the news of the disaster near Armagh. Ormonde had succeeded in victualling the fort of Maryborough, and in cutting off some of the principal traitors. He was setting out against another, Donnell Spainagh, when he was summoned to Dublin in consequence of the great defeat just mentioned. A report spread that there was a purpose in Ireland to conclude another truce with Tyrone. Ormonde indignantly denied it, so far as he was concerned, saying he had not a thought of any such matter. In proof, he stated how he had been burning the corn, and killing the men, of Tyrone in Farney and Clancarroll. But he significantly adds, alluding to the Lords Justices and Council, " what others have done, I know not, for "that they write many things without my privity" (p. 279). Eaving taken measures for the defence of the borders, Ormonde left Dublin and returned to Leinster, complaining, however, that he had no means for the companies that were to go with him. He had received intelligence that the enemy were then burning and spoiling in the counties of Kilkenny and Tipperary, especially on his own lands, and that they were ready to make an incursion into Munster, to stir rebellion there. To prevent this, he marched with all speed after them, but, before his arrival, they had begun their work in the county of Limerick. Thither Ormonde followed them. But leaving Munster to be dealt with separately, we may say that in a few days he was back in Kilkenny. The Privy Council was told (p. 305), " that this province of Leinster, where resteth the little life that is left of the whole kingdom, is so universally infected with the treasons of Ulster that we know no part free, neither is it known that the estate of this realm generally hath been in so great hazard within the memory of man, nor of long time before, as it is now." Feagh M'Hugh's sons, with all the other Irishry bordering upon the counties of Dublin, Kildare, Wexford, and Carlow, were preparing with great forces to break into the Pale, and were considerably heartened by the defection of Viscount Mountgarrett. Ormonde wrote for Sir Richard Bingham to come to him, not only with his immediate companies of horse and foot, but with all the force that was sent over to Ireland with the new Marshal. To this the Lords Justices would not agree, deeming it all important that Bingham should remain to guard Dublin and the surrounding country. This was an instance of the ill-working of the divided authority of the Government. When the Lords Justices wished to defend themselves in the matter of the fatal expedition to the Blackwater, they pointed out, amongst other things, that Ormonde was supreme in martial affairs. On this occasion they disregarded that supremacy, although Ormonde had before taken measures for the defence of the Pale. The Leinster rebels had not only passed into Munster, but they were daily seeking to cross the Shannon into Connaught, to effect a second combination there. Although the Lords Justices were unwilling that Sir Richard Bingham and his men should go to Ormonde, they appointed him to go with 1,600 foot and 244 horse to Naas, to be the readier for any further call on the part of the Earl. The revolt of Viscount Mountgarrett had occasioned the falling into rebellion of "divers of the highest calling" in the counties of Kilkenny, Tipperary, and Wexford. Mountgarrett had three daughters, whom he proposed to marry as follows: one to James FitzThomas, styled " Earl of Desmond"; another to the Earl of Kildare; and the third to Onie M'Rory, one of the chief rebels of Leinster. He was expecting greater reinforcements from Ulster, and had a deep hatred to the townships, especially those of Kilkenny, Thomastown, and Ross. One of the confederates of Mountgarrett was his son-in-law, the Baron of Cahir, and a very graphic account of an interview with the latter will be found on pages 348-350. Sir Henry Warren, by the treachery of some of his people, lost his castle of Bellibrittone in King's County, but its Constable recovered it again. Sir Thomas Moore's castle of Crohorne, or Croghan, was also betrayed, and Sir Thomas received a mortal wound. Lady Moore was taken away prisoner, stripped, and left in a bog to die of cold. Captain Gifford and his wife, who had come only the night before to the castle, were slain. Sir Thomas Moore's eldest son happened to be away that night, but his wife, the daughter of Lord Justice Loftus, had her chamber assaulted, and escaped only by the valour of Captain Gifford's lieutenant, who indeed saved the castle itself. On November 14, Mountgarrett received from Ormonde a protection for twenty-one days, an action that was much denounced by Ormonde's enemies. Most of the castles lost in Leinster were betrayed by Irishmen, whom the owners had nourished and brought up, sometimes from the very cradle. Ormonde was especially annoyed with the carelessness and negligence of the gentlemen and others in the county of Wexford, " being the place whereof Englishmen were first possessed in this realm." The enemy had made an incursion thirty miles from their fastness, and had spoiled and robbed without resistance at a part " where, since the conquest, no Irish Kavanagh or traitor did ever attempt" (p. 422). Yet there were three companies of foot garrisoned, with whom the gentlemen of Wexford might have joined, and done good service on the rebels. One of those who fell into rebellion in this Province was James FitzPiers, the Sheriff of Kildare, and he stated that the cause of his defection was the bad treatment extended to him by Ormonde. FitzPiers broke down the Abbey of Athy, and held the castle over the bridge at that place against the troops sent by Bingham to take it. The latter, however, did a good piece of service by sending some horse to the town of Kildare, where he killed sixty of the enemy, who were well-armed and furnished. Some of the Geraldines coming to the castle of Kildare, which had been warded by Bingham, lost their chief, Captain William FitzOliver. The Marshal notified the general spread of the revolt, and the frequent desertions of Irish soldiers from the bands. The great want was a good supply of horse. Bingham's bad health did not permit him to go and meet Ormonde at Carlow, even if he had not been detained by the Council near Dublin. Ormonde writes on December 17, that as most of the army consisted of " Irish and Connaught men, it will be most dangerous, when it shall come to trial of fight, whom to trust "(sic). Mountgarrett, too, had his doubts, and committed the ward of his castles wholly to Ulster men, displacing those of his own province. The passes were so completely held by the enemy, that it was found impossible to send treasure by land from Dublin to either the further parts of Leinster or to Munster. All money had to be conveyed by sea. State letters also Were being continually intercepted; such for example as those touching the relief of Maryborough, which Ormonde again succeeded in revictualling. The Council had likewise managed to get some provisions into that fort. Mountgarrett was desirous of a further truce for fourteen days from December 6, but Ormonde absolutely refused to grant it. A horseman sent by Mountgarrett to Tyrone boasted amongst other things that there were sixteen or seventeen persons dwelling in Kilkenny who had undertaken to let Mountgarrett and all his forces into the town; further, that his master's purpose was to surprise Kilkenny, and to take Ormonde and Sir Walter Butler prisoners. It was unfortunate for the service that Bingham had been in continuously bad health ever since his arrival in Ireland. As a matter of fact, he and Ormonde never met (p. 454). Several weeks before Bingham's death on January 18, 1599, it was seen that he could hardly recover, and one of the last glimpses we have of the grim old soldier, is when he was fretting his heart out at being physically unfit to deal with the rebels, who were spoiling so audaciously both around and within Dublin (p. 420). Further north, another commander, Sir Samuel Bagenall, had been seriously injured by his horse falling upon him.

Ormonde declared that the Mustermaster's certificate of the strength of the army in Ireland was incorrect. On January 1, 1599, he told the Lords Justices and Council that he had not above, 500 men with him, and that he had reckoned on having from them 1,400 foot and 150 horse. He then required 2,000, or at least 1,600 foot, and 150 horse, in addition to the 400 or 500 men, whom he expected to draw from Kilkenny, where he then was. Notwithstanding this weakness in his forces, Ormonde succeeded in again victualling the fort at Maryborough, despite the difficulties which he alleged the Lords Justices had put in his way. Both in going and returning from the fort (January 11–13) there was some sharp fighting, but the loss was mainly on the rebels' side. On January 18, Ormonde complained that, of the 3,000 men last appointed to the Irish service, only 2,306 had arrived, and that of these companies the Lords Justices had disposed without his privity.

Although the Leinster rebels had, in the early days of January, 1599, burnt Kilmainham and part of Cromlin, their attacks in the neighbourhood of Dublin ceased for a short space, through their want of powder and lead. With these Tyrone soon supplied his allies, and also succeeded in sending them a reinforcement of 800 men, under his son Con. Warnings had been given to Lord Delvin (who commanded in Westmeath), to Sir Conyers Clifford, and to Sir Samuel Bagenall, that these men purposed to pass into Leinster through Westmeath, and yet the rebels safely accomplished their march, even in the middle of the day, having met with only a slight resistance. Lord Delvin and his men never appeared on the scene of the fight at all. Meantime the rebels were composing some of their differences. Tyrone had now become reconciled to Tirlogh M'Henry, whom he had arrested and imprisoned. He set Tirlogh free; summoned O'Donnell, Maguire, and all his northern confederates; and prepared to invade the Pale from several directions. In February, Tyrone was in the King's County, and purposed to go thence, through the Queen's county, towards Waterford and those parts. " He meaneth not to return to Ulster till May, unless he be beaten hence perforce, or drawn down by arrival of some English forces in the north " (p. 476).

In Connaught, Sir Conyers Clifford continued his hard and thankless task. In reply to the Privy Council, who required from him an account of the composition, and of his proceedings in the civil government, of the province, he points out that the land was all wasted and spoiled, and that the Queen would not receive any great revenue from the inhabitants, until the province had been fully settled for one year, during which time they might rebuild their houses and sow their corn. He was endeavouring, amid all the prevailing confusions, to gain their loyalty, upon the best assurance they could give. As it was, the revenue was higher than in the most peaceable days of Sir Richard Bingham's rule, and Sir Conyers reckoned on a large increase in the coming year. With respect to civil government, he thought it unadvisable to call the people to sessions, until troops were in the country for their security. All were " yet living without houses," and they would he the readier to go to O'Donnell, if he pressed them. As soon as Sligo or Ballyshannon was taken and fortified, he would draw the people by gentleness to answer sessions, and such other civil government as would be requisite. Sir Conyers complained of the way in which he had been neglected by the Irish Council. He had spent all his estate, and during seven months, had received but 1,000l. for all the companies in Connaught; or, in eleven months, only two months' lendings, and 500l. for victualling. He asked for 1,000 men from England, partly to replace the Irish in his companies, and partly to station 500 of them in Galway, so that if any attempt were made by the Spaniards, he could secure that place and discourage the rebels by obtaining " so good a back for his retreat." If the rebels were to be prosecuted, he thought 2,000 foot and 120 horse would be sufficient for Connaught and O'Donnell's country. Sir Conyers was very anxious that the latter, or Tyrconnell, and Maguire's country, or Fermanagh, should be added to his province. If O'Rourke made his submission, the Governor thought 1,500 foot and 100 horse would be enough. Towards the close of April, he announced what he considered to be " the full regaining of the whole inhabitants of Connaught." O'Rourke had submitted, M'Dermott and O'Connor Don had been drawn from O'Donnell, M'William was banished, and was "as poor a man as any this day in Ireland." Tibbott Ne Longe had drawn much blood of the traitors. The taking of Ballyshannon, or the constraining of O'Donnell to break it, would absolutely banish that chieftain ; " for as he is a proud malicious traitor to Her Majesty, so is he a tyrannical Governor over all under him, and the most hated man living, and followed in this wicked action by none but for fear" (p. 130). The chiefs in Ulster complained in like manner of the tyranny and extortion of Tyrone; so miserably could we never live under the English " (p. 428). Sir Conyers stated that, if there was any fault in the conclusions he had come to with the Connaught men, it must be remembered that he had to deal with " a most obstinate people, proud and subtle, and so combined with the north, that what I did upon the one, either by by force or policy, I found the encounter of both" (p. 134). Still he assured himself that they would in all things satisfy Her Majesty's commands. The Privy Council hoped he was not being " abused by the Irish " (p. 158). The Council at Dublin put it still more bluntly, wishing that Sir Conyers, "through his over much confidence," was not being " deceived by those Irish treacheries or falsehoods, who have many deep subtleties to abuse such as know them not thoroughly" (p. 181). It may be that the Governor's forecast of events would have proved correct, but there was the usual delay in forwarding to him the necessary supplies of men, money, victuals, and munition. Meanwhile the people of the province, seeing no forces come, joined once more in rebellion, and O'Rourke himself went over to O'Donnell, stating, however, in a letter to Sir Conyers, " if all the magistrates of Ireland were of your mind, these wars of Ireland had been ended long ago" (p. 193). The Governor offered with 1,500 foot and 100 horse to compel O'Rourke to a new submission, and to break O'Donnell. He protested that this offer did not proceed from any trust of his in the Irish, for "never any man came amongst them that affecteth their barbarous customs less than myself." He said all the danger arose from his want of means. On June 15, he wrote to the Lords Justices from Athlone, "I assure your Lordships, this day I have not one barrel of powder" (p. 177). And this about the very time when the Earl of Essex, Master of the Ordnance in the Tower of London, was declaring, " how great the warrants be which I receive for this Irish service, and how thick they come," adding that, unless he got some extraordinary supplies, " the office will be quickly bankrupt of any store" (p. 215). The disaster near Armagh produced its natural effects in Connaught, as in other parts of Ireland, and greatly strengthened the courage and hopes of the rebels. They again set up M'William in the county of Mayo, and that leader had at least 2,000 foot and 200 horse, besides Scots daily coming to him. Tibbott Ne Longe was constrained to live in a boat upon the water. An O'Brien was set up in Thomond. O'Donnell came, and took a prey of 4,000 cows from the O'Connors; and Sir Conyers could not prevent it, for he had only 120 English soldiers in the province, the rest being Irish. It was as much as he could do to hold out in Athlone, the Abbey of Boyle, Tulsk, Roscommon, and Galway. Again the Governor asked earnestly for reinforcements and supplies, or begged to be excused to Her Majesty. He protested he had omitted no consideration to advance her service. Sir Conyers pointed out that the taking of Ballyshannon and Belleek would gain Connaught for the Queen, and keep O'Donnell and Maguire from joining Tyrone; and that by garrisons at Lough Foyle, Ballyshannon, and Belleek, the whole north would be kept during the winter from Leinster and Connaught. Nothing, he said, had hindered the service in his province more than "the taking of the poor people's cattle to relieve the army; which is a burden they will never bear and continue their loyalties" (pp. 315, 316). That Sir Conyers was not alone in deeming he had been neglected by the Irish authorities, is clear from the Queen's reproof of the Council (p. 418), and from Sir Robert Cecil's emphatic statement (p. 401), " I do think that province of yours hath been most pitifully abandoned to all misery by the State at Dublin." Cecil added that, in ten days, 1,000 men under Sir Arthur Savage would be ready to embark for Dublin, and were to be sent thence directly to Connaught. They did not arrive in Dublin until the end of January, 1599.

After the battle of Armagh, the scene of blood and broil changes to the province of Munster. There, too, the news of the great defeat was speedily brought, and roused up all the malcontents to action. But long before then, as early as May, the President, Sir Thomas Norreys, had told of the effect produced in Munster by the wars in the north and by the several " overthrows " given to the Queen's soldiers. He had, in consequence, taken pledges of the several lords, gentlemen, and others of the province, but had bad great difficulty in finding places where he could securely keep them. They were even put into merchants' houses, at the expense of those whose pledges they were. Norreys adds, " There is not within this Province any munition at all of Her Majesty['s], the want whereof I have divers times advertised to the State at Dublin, but have received no order to be supplied." At the end of August, after the defeat of the expedition to the Blackwater, Norreys tells of the weakness and unwillingness of the people to do Her Majesty service, or to defend themselves. The province, in respect of its wealth, was " in reasonable good case," but the dutifully disposed had, through the long peace, grown " secure," and were unfit and unfurnished for war. The only soldiers in pay in Munster were the 100 foot of his own band, twelve horse men of the Provost-Marshal [Thornton], and thirty horsemen of his own. But there were many Englishmen there who, having lost their goods, were fit and willing to serve in the wars. The President continually wrote for reinforcements and supplies, telling of the miserable and almost desperate state of Munster, and of the most execrable mischiefs which daily advertisements showed were committed by the rebels. But there were serious charges brought against Norreys. The pledges he had taken in Munster were said to be "bastards and children, all not worth a rush" (p. 429). If he had animated the inhabitants, and drawn them together, English and Irish, he would, it was affirmed, have been able to withstand the rebel forces. For eight years before, in 1590, when Munster was not so well peopled, there had been mustered 10,490 able men, "furnished and unfurnished." The President was also accused of granting protection to traitors, and even of receiving money for the continuance of the same. When any one came to complain to him that he had lost his cows, "Why," quoth the President, must I keep thy cows?" He would not join Ormonde at Kilmallock, unless a strong guard was sent to convoy him. "And so the Lord President came to him to Kilmallock, and the crew of the Englishry followed him, saying his cowardly disposition was the cause of all their overthrow" (p. 323). It is added (p. 325) that "he ran away first, together with his lady, into Cork, and discouraged all the Englishry about him." The Queen considered that the rebellion might have been prevented, had care been taken beforehand by the Irish Government to send some horse and foot into Munster; and she rated Norreys soundly, that he did not better resist "in the beginning, when the first traitor drew to head with a ragged number of rogues and boys." He was directed to make "a conserving war," until further forces arrived. A similar order was sent to Sir Conyers Clifford in Connaught.

We have seen how, when Ormonde was away at Dublin, some of the rebels in Leinster made their way into Munster to stir up the insurrection there. The way was clear for them, and they entered the Province with 2,000 men, and took several castles and preys of cattle. "The fear of them was so great, blazed by the horseboys and espies of Ireland, the messengers of the devil, that the whole county of Limerick became mutinous" (p. 287). This was at the beginning of October, 1598. Sir Thomas Norreys had stayed at Youghal 140 soldiers of the force belonging to Sir Samuel Bagenall. He assembled the noblemen, gentlemen, and others of Munster, with all their forces, which amounted, however, to only 100 horse and 300 kern, "weakly armed, and accordingly minded." These were all he had wherewith to oppose the enemy. Piers Lacy, sheriff of Limerick, about whom there had been a contention between Ormonde and Sir Thomas Norreys, joined the rebels; so also did John FitzThomas Gerald, second son of Sir Thomas of Desmond. His elder brother, James, soon appears in the field as the Earl of Desmond, despite the warning he received from Ormonde. James FitzThomas said about the English rule of Ireland (p. 504), "Their government is such as Pharaoh never used the like." The Queen, being notified of the insurrection, expressly commanded that present order should be taken "to extinguish that flame, which hereafter will not easily be quenched." Munster was recognised by her to be "of so great consequence, full of good towns and havens, both fit for the enemy, and so well onward toward an absolute quietness, if any care be bad of it in time" (pp. 285, 286). Before October had half gone, Her Majesty ordered a levy of 2,000 men for the province. Meantime, Ormonde, who had been too late to prevent the incursion into Limerick, followed up the rebels to Kilmallock. They, however, kept out of his way, so long as be continued at this time in Munster. He estimated their number at 3,000, and prayed the Privy Council to send over 2,000 or 3,000 trained men, with the necessary supplies. In the Earl's opinion there should be "a sharp and speedy prosecution to the extirpation [of the rebels] by sword, fire, and famine." This programme was almost literally carried out by the rebels against the English, as we shall see. The people in Youghal were weak, and unable to defend their town by reason of the largeness of its walls. From Kilmallock Ormonde went to Mallow, and found the town altogether forsaken of the inhabitants, and the enemy daily threatening to burn it. Here he left a company to increase the garrison. Thence he went to Cork, and took measures for its defence. It was only a portion of Kinsale that he could direct to be defended, for its walls were "so spacious and decayed." Prom Youghal Ormonde returned to Leinster.

It was against the "undertakers" in Munster that the rebels chiefly directed their fury; and, amongst the features of this rebellion, few are more remarkable than the cowardice of these men. Ormonde said (p. 291) that "the greatest part of the undertakers had most shamefully quitted and forsaken their castles and houses of strength before even the traitors came near them, leaving all to their spoils, whereby they furnished themselves with the arms and other munition that before served against them, to Her Majesty's dishonour, and the increasing of the traitors' pride." Sir Robert Cecil wrote of the "weak, or rather cowardly head made by the undertakers" (p. 350). The Queen referred to their many defensible houses and castles," and said they "fled away before the rebels upon the first alarm" (p. 379). A great portion of the letter, dated November 29, in which these words occur, is repeated in another letter by the Queen, dated December 3 (pp. 390, 391). A list of the castles lost will be found on pages 325, 326, and also in Henry Smyth's report, pages 330, 331. One brilliant exception to the general cowardice was the gallant defence of Askeaton Castle by Captain Francis Barkly, of which full details will be found in the text.

The return of Ormonde to Leinster was, in reality, occasioned by his want of men and means to oppose the enemy in Munster. This inability was acknowledged by Elizabeth, and Cecil tells us, on November 17, how much it troubled her. The 2,000 soldiers ordered for the province did not arrive there until early in December, when 1,000 landed at Cork, 600 at Kinsale, and 400 at Waterford. The last-named Ormonde withdrew, and disposed them in other places. Still there was urgent need of horsemen, in which the rebels were very strong.

At the beginning of the rebellion, Cork received a large number of refugees, amongst them being the President, the Bishops of Cork and Down, the Provost-Marshal, the Sheriff of the County of Cork, and the most of the undertakers, with their wives and children. Those from Kerry were in the most miserable plight, for they had been rifled and spoiled, man, woman, and child of all their goods, even of the very clothes from their backs. The Clankennedy were said to be "the greatest destroyers of "Englishmen to their power." Chief Justice Saxey writes (p. 300) of the many execrable murders and cruelties inflicted upon the English in the counties of Limerick, Cork, and Kerry; how infants were taken from the nurses' breasts, and their brains dashed against the walls; how, in one case, the heart was plucked out of the body of a husband in the presence of his wife, who was forced to yield the use of her apron to wipe off the blood from the murderers' fingers; how another English gentleman had his head cleft in several pieces; and how divers were sent into Youghal, some with their throats cut, but not killed, some with their tongues cut out, others with their noses cut off. All the English were "utterly undone, and every one after the rate of his fortune doth smart exceedingly." Arthur Hyde's wife and children escaped to Cork with the help of Lord Barry, but his castle was assaulted and taken, the garrison surrendering on promise of their lives and wearing apparel. When they had got about a mile from the castle, they were robbed and stripped naked, but not slain. Only one English gentleman escaped in those parts, and that was through a priest, who dwelt with him, informing the Earl of Desmond that the gentleman and his family were Catholics. One writer says (p. 324), "the meaner sort (the rebellion having overtaken them) were slain, man, woman, and child; and such as escaped came all naked to the towns, . . . . Their moan was great, the sight lamentable." The same writer adds (p. 326), "William Saxey, Chief Justice of Munster, urchin-wise, like Henry Pyne of Moghelly, afore presaging the mischief to come, which he no doubt secretly learned and concealed, made haste for England cum pannis, as commonly we term it, with bag and baggage, got a bark, and embarked together with him his wife, family, and all that he had, and left the charge committed unto him from Her Majesty at six and seven." As a specimen of the ravages committed by the rebels, we may instance those in the barony of Buttevant, on Lord Barry's lands. The authors of these spoils were Onie M'Rory, James FitzThomas (styled Earl of Desmond), Captain Tyrrell, and others. Here is a summary of the list:—54 "towns" burned (generally altogether"); the following taken: 9,400 cows, 4,800 mares and garrans, 58,800 sheep and hogs, and corn and household stuff to the value of 8,200l.

The object of the Munster rebellion was clear enough, and it is stated explicitly in these papers. The Council write (p. 305), "this rebellion is now thoroughly sorted to an Irish war, whose drifts and pretences are, to shake off all English government, and subtract the kingdom from Her Majesty, as much as in them lieth." Again the Council tell us with respect to the rebels (p. 356), "it may easily be discerned, that the principal end they aspired unto was to supplant all English habitation, and consequently to renounce Her Majesty's laws and government, which assuredly is the main ground of this rebellion, and the only mark that Tyrone and they all do shoot at." In the same letter, the object is put more briefly, "to expel all the English and suppress English government." Captain Reade states on December 10, "the English and the English government was (sic) never so much despised and repugned, as at this present."

Among the most notable of the Englishmen, who lost all in the Munster rebellion, was, as is well known, Edmund Spenser. The despatch written from Cork by Sir Thomas Norreys to the Privy Council, on December 9, 1598, was sent by the hands of the poet, as is proved by the opening passage in Sir Thomas's despatch of December 21 (p. 414). In this same volume of State Papers will be found (see p. 431) a contemporary copy of Spenser's "View of the State of Ireland," and also "A brief Note of Ireland," which, apart from the endorsement, might readily have been assigned to his pen. Some passages of the latter are given in this Calendar. It is worth noting that in the Irish State Papers of the reign of Elizabeth, preserved in the Public Record Office, there are no less than nine signatures of the famous poet, and that one paper is entirely in his hand. This last-named is to be found in Volume CXLIV., No. 70, and is dated in May, 1589. The paper is Spenser's answer to the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the lands passed to the undertakers in Munster, and we learn that, although Kilcolman and Rossack had been assigned him, a great portion of the lands attached thereto were wanting. The references to the other signatures are; in 1581, Volume LXXXI., Nos. 20, 36. I. and 36. II.; Volume LXXXIII., Nos. 6. I. and 6. II.; in 1582, Volume XCIII., No. 64. I.; Volume XCIV., No. 107; and in 1589, Volume CXLVII., No. 16. Nicholas Curteys, Clerk of the Council in Munster, in a letter to Sir Robert Cecil, states (p. 484) that he held that poor and troublesome place" upon the trust of "Lodowick Bryskett and Edmund Spenser (men not unknown to your Honour)." Curteys complains that he had had all his property burned and taken from him by the rebellion, and says that Bryskett is pressing him down to the lowest degree of misery, "Edmund Spenser being lately deceased, the mean and witness of our mutual trust and confidence." It is curious that, in a list of the Irish clergy, dated 1586, December 8 (see Volume CXXVII., No. 18), "Edmondus Spencer" appears as a Prebendary of Effin, co. Limerick. The "Book on the state of Ireland" (see pages 505–507) is not, as some have imagined, to be attributed to Spenser, the initials of the author being "H. C."

There had been a plot to betray the town of Kilmallock to the rebels, who regarded it as the place "of the greatest "annoyance to them in all Munster." The conspiracy, however, was found out on the very day when the rebels were to have been admitted. Ross was also to have been betrayed, but here again the plot was discovered in time; and Sir Thomas Norreys had some little success in its neighbourhood. As late as December 17, Ormonde writes, "The city of Limerick hath no garrison in it as yet," and he points out the importance of the place. From all over the land came the same cry—more men, more money, more necessaries of all kinds to carry on a "royal war," and thus to restore the English ascendency. The proclamation issued by Elizabeth to the Irish people on January 25, 1599, is dignified and politic, and shows considerable skill in concealing the acute stage of the crisis now reached in public affairs. The Queen had decided to send over the the Earl of Essex with an army of 14,000 foot and 1,000 horse. Large quantities of money and victuals were also provided. So clearly was the new policy to be cut off from the old, that Sir Henry Wallop received his longdesired revocation, Sir George Carey was appointed Treasurer of Wars, and the public accounts were ordered to be begun on a new sheet. Fenton, however, gave warning that, unless Essex brought enough money to pay the arrears of the army, the country, and the towns, their clamours would greatly trouble his lordship, and these clamours could not "but be holden just." It is worthy of note that the terms of the commission, granting license to Essex to return to England at such times as he should find cause (see p. 502), will not justify his ultimate departure later on in the year. The vanity of the Queen comes out in the statement that Essex had made suit for such license, "as well to see our person, as to inform us of such things as may be for our important service." The career of Essex in Ireland will be the chief subject of the next volume of this Calendar.

With regard to the divisions among the English authorities, we have already seen the disagreements that arose between the Lords Justices on the one side and the Earl of Ormonde on the other. These differences showed themselves not only after the battle of Armagh, but on many other occasions. The documents calendared in this volume testify to the constant friction between the civil and military authorities. Both sides write directly into England, the one against the other. It was evident that nothing would put an end to such antagonism but the committal of all power, both civil and military, to a Lord Deputy. Sir Geffrey Fenton is continually pressing this point on the attention of the home Government. He begs that "this divided authority may cease," as it is assuredly the ground of many enormities in the Government" (p. 173). The Lords Justices and Council more than once recommend the Queen to settle the whole government entirely in one man's hands, "for the avoiding of many confusions growing in the main government" (p. 226). Fenton said that he thought Ormonde himself would not be offended (p. 229). After the wrangling with regard to the Blackwater disaster, Fenton wrote, on September 16, a very strong letter to Sir Robert Cecil concerning the importance of stopping all these divisions "amongst the principal commanders.'' One sentence may be quoted (p. 264), "And therefore it may please your Honour to move Her Majesty that, by the next, a round and peremptory commandment may come in Her Majesty's name to us all, to surcease all private emulations, and particularly all further proceeding in this contention of the Blackwater, but that we should all bend our uttermost endeavours to recover this kingdom, that is almost gone." Captain Thomas Reade urges the election (p. 341) of "some worthy personage, fit to manage the "present state of this distempered kingdom," pointing out the old age of Ormonde, the ignorance of the Lords Justices in martial affairs, and the ill-health of Sir Richard Bingham. One of the chief causes of discontent and difference was the frequent absence of Ormonde from Dublin. The Lords Justices and Council are constantly pointing out the inconveniences and dangers of the Earl's being away. Among such was the intercepting by the rebels of despatches sent by the Council to Ormonde at Kilkenny, or by the Earl to the Council. On November 17, Cecil writes to Ormonde, "it appeareth, by the Justices' letters, that your absence from them is a great grief unto them, in respect of the ]ack they have thereby of your direction, without whom they forbear to proceed almost in anything." The Earl further got a reminder (p. 382) of "the nature of his charge, not of any part of the army, but of the whole forces and war." He was, therefore, "to have a more general care of all than it seems he hath had, and to hold a better correspondence with the provincial Governors than in times past; as also to repair oftener to Dublin to the State, that they and he may with more unanimity and mature deliberation agree upon their courses, and execute them accordingly." Finally, the Queen wrote to Ormonde (p. 388), We do therefore command you that you make your abode for the most part at Dublin."

Sir Conyers Clifford and Sir Thomas Norreys both complained of their being neglected by the Irish Council. Maurice Kyffin died on the 3rd of January, 1598, but his old enemy, Sir Ralph Lane, the Mustermaster, continued to gird away at what Kyffin had done in the musters, and endeavoured to show how much more he himself gained for the Queen by his system of checks. Sir Geffrey Fenton had a continuous quarrel with Justice Goold, of Munster, over the paltry seignory of Tarbert. At length, when the flames of rebellion were well alight in the province, Justice Goold said (p. 282) that Sir Geffrey might then have seignories " good cheap." Sir Thomas Norreys considered that Sir Henry Wallop, unless overruled, would yield him hard measure. But the sternest quarrel of all was that between the Earl of Ormonde and Captain Thomas Lee. The latter had been charged by Captain Charles Montague with divers treasons and cruelties, and had been committed to the Castle of Dublin. Ormonde seemed inclined to believe the charges, and a report on them by the Attorney-General for Ireland was forwarded to Burghley. The case was thoroughly gone into, and divers witnesses examined, but, after an imprisonment of several months, Captain Lee was set at liberty. Shortly after, he brought a series of accusations against Ormonde, tending to prove that the Jatter was the cause of all the late rebellions in Ireland, and that he was working for his own ambitious projects in league with Tyrone. There was deemed to be sufficient primâ facie evidence to justify the notification of these charges to England. Ormonde had laid himself open to attack on many points, and Captain Lee worked them all into his narrative with considerable skill. The Earl's special care of his own territories, his ofttimes ill-advised protections to rebels, his absences from Dublin, his private talks with Tyrone at the parleys with that leader, his dealings with several Irish chiefs, are all commented on as parts of one broad scheme of treason. There are graphic reports of Captain Lee's appearance before the Council, and of his interviews with divers members of the Government. He proposed turning the rebels on to the estates of Ormonde, to devastate them, and expressed ability to effect this. Such a suggestion, of course, involved treason, and Captain Lee was once more committed to Dublin Castle; but the ostensible reason given for this act was his persuading James FitzPiers, the Sheriff of Kildare, not to answer the summons of the Council for the latter's appearance before them. From his prison Captain Lee wrote to the Privy Council, praying for leave to repair to England, to make known his plot to their Lordships.

The character and drift of the Government may be gathered from such divisions in high places. There is a querulous, pessimist tone running through all the letters and despatches. Some found that it was "in vain for any man to endeavour to serve (or almost to live) in Ireland, but with infinite disparagement, unless he be well backed in England" (p. 53). Fenton, whose position as Secretary of the Council gave him such special opportunities of judging, talks with great frankness of the disorders and corruptions of the Government. He speaks, of "the lamentable confusions" prevailing, and of the poor realm now groaning in misery." He wants to know when Sir Robert Cecil returns from France to the Court, " that I may still trouble you with the intelligences of Ireland, which as yet are far from any delight, either for your Honour to receive them, or for me to write them" (p. 96). In another letter to Cecil, he refers to " the unsavoury events of this kingdom, which daily do multiply to worse" (p. 173). When recommending Sir Anthony Sentleger to the favour of Sir Robert, Fenton states (p. 283), " If many other Her Majesty's Ministers, employed in office here, were of the like temperature, it would give no small furtherance to the recovering of this decayed estate, and repurging the government of sundry corruptions, which, but by changing some capital officers, will hardly be wrought out." Cecil, on his part, writes to Sir Conyers Clifford (p. 401), " we are vexed with a world of difficulties, how to pour out water enough from hence to quench the fire in Ireland"; and tells Sir Henry Wallop (pp. 389, 390), that " in these public misfortunes, and the continual vexations which that kingdom affords, you must pardon us, that are public ministers, if we write sorely, being daily partakers of Her Majesty's mislikes of all things that belong to that country, in which I cannot blame her." If Elizabeth made matters very uncomfortable for the Privy Council in England, she did not spare the Government in Ireland. Having found fault with the Lords Justices for their expenditure on extraordinary charges, she received answer from them that, during the five months they had been in office, they had not charged Her Majesty more than 23l. on that head. This was in April, 1598. Thus early, also, had she noticed the division in the Council. In April, the Lords Justices declare to her that they " have lived together as brethren, and have cherished all good concurrency with the Lord Lieutenant." Next month, in a letter written in conjunction with Ormonde, they state to the Privy Council, that they have been careful amongst themselves " to hold firm unity and agreement." After the disaster near Armagh, Elizabeth sent a characteristic scolding to the Council, in which she declared bluntly that there was " no person, be he never of so vulgar judgment, but doth plainly see notorious errors in that Government" (p. 258). Three months later, the Queen, receiving "nought else but news of new losses and calamities in that State," told the Council that she had determined to " look into the growing causes of these continual streams of miseries and confusion, wherewith all parts of that our kingdom are overflown" (p. 387).

Contention and emulation were rampant among the English in Munster as in Leinster. An important witness tells us (p. 429), "they could not he content to scrape from the Irishry, but one inveighing and suing the other, troubling the courts, and disquieting the country. The English gentleman in Leix and Offally contended among themselves. In Munster they jarred one with another, so that the Mayor of Cork gave forth that most suits depending before him were between the Englishry. The inhabitants of Carryglasse were so famous, [seeing] they were never quiet, while they had a penny in their purses, but arresting and binding to the peace, that they were called the clampers of Curryglasse." This witness gives a graphic sketch (pp. 429431) of the rascaldom that came from England, "and other countries," to various parts of Ireland, even amongst the clergy, but admits there were " many wise, godly, and virtuous " among the immigrants.

The views entertained by the English of the Irish are, in these papers, very much the same as those indicated by the documents in the last volume of this Calendar. Perhaps the views may be summarized in the proverb on page 22, "Irish games have Irish tricks." Sir Conyers Clifford speaks of the Irish as "a fickle, inconstant people, and of necessity sometimes to be humoured, according to their own natures" (p. 192). Ormonde, on more than one occasion, expressed his opinion that no extremity, by fire, sword, famine, or otherwise, was too bad for the rebels. Chief Justice Saxey of Munster speaks of the people in very bitter terms (pp. 396, 397), and considered they ought never to be entrusted with authority, or with the possession of armour and weapons. After charging them with idolatry, treachery, and savagery, this runaway from his post adds, " I had rather be a doorkeeper in the house of my God, than dwell in the tents of the ungodly." The charge of bribery brought against the Irish was, of course, two-edged. The Earl of Clanrickarde was understood to pay a "benevolence" or " black rent" of 200l. or 300l, annually, to some about the State, for helping him to his Earldom, and for bearing him out on all occasions. Sometimes the bribery was in kind. Irishmen would prey the goods of civilians, and yield a portion to some one in authority, to procure their protection and pardon (p. 17). It was said (p, 430) that Sir Thomas Norreys favoured the Irish more than the English in suits before him, for the " Irishman brought somewhat in his hand, and the English came empty, and empty he came away." The same witness also says, " the corruption of the Governors, magistrates, and Council in general, hath deserved this plague [i.e. the rebellion and devastation in Munster]. The Irishry desireth no better than a bad cause, and a great bribe to give; then doubteth he not but he shall speed; and such is the nature of them that, when they have corrupted any, they will be the first that will bewray it" (p. 431). State pledges in Dublin Castle were frequently got out of prison and exchanged for divers sums of money. But perhaps the most barefaced of all the bribes recorded in this volume, is that offered to Sir Robert Cecil by Richard Hadsor, the "Solicitor for Irish causes," on behalf of the sureties of Philip O'Reilly. Hadsor writes, "and for your Honour's furtherance of this their suit, upon the effecting thereof, I will be ready to gratify you with forty pounds " (p. 155).

Bribery, however, is not as bad as assassination. In the last volume of this Calendar, it was shown how Lord Burgh had entertained an offer for the killing of the Earl of Tyrone. On June 25, 1598, Fenton, writing to Cecil, hints at a like method for disposing of the rebel Chief; for now the axe is laid to the tree, I hope some branches will be cut off ere it be long; and it is high time that either the corrupt trunk of the tree be cut down, or some of his principal boughs be shred off" (p. 191). On August 4, in another letter to Cecil, Fenton points still more clearly to assassination; "for the other greater matter mentioned in your Honour's letter, though I know it will be difficult to draw one dog to bite of another, and more desperate to find an axe to strike down at one blow a great oak that hath grown up in many years, yet I will cause the ford to be sounded, to see if there may be found a passage that way " (p. 221). A Scot, writing to Cecil, tells him of a body guard of two hundred musketeers kept by the Earl of Tyrone. The greater part of these were " Argyle men, naturally avaricious, bloody, and covetous; who for money will refuse to enterprise or perform no murder." The Scot " pauds " his head that he will get Tyrone killed by these men, if Cecil will only say, Amen, fiat. Finally, on October 21, Ormonde puts the matter to Cecil in plain words, thus: " My Lord, your father, before his death, did signify unto me Her Majesty's pleasure to give headmoney to such as would cut off any of the principal traitors in action, according to the quality of the rebel to be cut off; which warrant, I pray you, may be now renewed, hoping I may find some willing to take that service in hand." Thus we have not only Lord Burgh and Sir Geffrey Fenton, but the Earl of Ormonde, Sir Robert Cecil, Lord Burghley, and the Queen herself, countenancing the use of assassination.

The scarcity in Ireland continued to be intense and widespread. The Privy Council were certified in February, 1598, that "such is the universal scarcity here of all kinds of victuals, as, in many parts of Leinster and the English Pale, the common people are already driven to eat horseflesh, and do keep shambles for the buying and selling thereof, as they would do for other usual kinds of food" (p. 62). Fenton speaks of "the pitiful cry of the people, entered already into famine" (p. 68). On another occasion he says, "the country is bare, and yieldeth small helps" (p. 124). In a memorial delivered by Sir Calisthenes Brooke to the Privy Council, that officer states that the people in Connaught had already eaten their garrans, which should plough; and, at his coming away, they lived on the ground, and ate dogs' flesh" (p. 153). In another memorial, the people, preyed on by both the soldiers and the rebels, are said to have nothing left to feed upon, "but roots, grass, and boiled nettles" (p. 209). Later in the year there was a good supply of corn in Munster, but a large portion of this was destroyed in the rebellion.

The state of the army in Ireland, during the fifteen months covered by this volume, was one of corruption, discontent and suffering. Maurice Kyffin died in the first few days of 1598, and Sir Ralph Lane obtained once more absolute control of the musters. But there were the usual complaints as to the dilatoriness with which he sent in his certificates. Later on, Birkinshawe was sent over to continue Kyffin's work. At one time the Privy Council asked for an account of the " bodies, armour, and weapons " of 7,466 men, that had been sent at sundry times out of England into Ireland. The Council answered (pp. 63 and 138), that the most of the men had been " altered and transposed" from one Captain to another, before the Lords Justices came into office, that many of them, by the illhandling of their Captains, had been "changed from English to Irish," that many had been discharged without their knowledge, and that it was impossible for them to give any certain account. Long after, Ormonde wrote over to the Queen, "I am yet of opinion that the strength certified is far greater than they are in deed " (p. 455). This is borne out by the completed returns of Birkinshawe, who found (p. 488) that, out of 14,000 men on the list in Ireland, 4,000 were awanting. The Queen, as Fenton says, was " charged to pay shadows and not men." Troops, arms, money, victuals, and munition, were sent from time to time into Ireland, and disappeared, as though in some Serbonian bog. Elizabeth made ordinances for the regulation of her forces in the country, but they were not carried out, and her officers told her so. The Captains, in their " humble requests " to the Privy Council, pray that Her Majesty's instructions for the weekly lendings to the soldiers and for their provant clothes may be observed. They ask also that the lendings may be brought by the paymasters under the protection of convoys to the garrisons distant from Dublin, and that the Captains may not have to fetch the money with the number of eight soldiers, which is dangerous and exceeding chargeable." When any proportion of treasure arrived at Dublin, the State would deliberate and delay over its issue, and thus discontent the army. This further caused the Captains to be lodgers, beggars, and petitioners " in Dublin for means for themselves and the soldiers, when it was requisite that they should be at their commands. According to Sir Ralph Lane, the monthly charge of the army was, 15,038l. 16s. 0¾d. (p. 482). According to Sir Geffrey Fenton, it was 17,000l. (p. 489). The charge of the army for " one year and five long months," viz. October 1, 1597, to February 28, 1599, was 250,963l. 10s. 10d. (p. 483). Fenton tells us how " round proportions of treasure " were sent over expressly for payment of the soldiers' lendings, and yet that the Queen continued greatly indebted to the army, and the country and towns not satisfied of the sums due to them. Fenton adds, "it is beyond my reach."

As to arrears of pay, the case of the garrison at Carrickfergus may serve as an instance. Colonel Egerton writes, on October 9, that they had had no pay whatever from the 26th of the previous May, and that his petitioning of the State was in vain. The garrison had likewise received no victuals during the same period. Ormonde tells how the men under him had received but two months' pay during eight months, and that the soldiers were without " almost any apparel meet for men " (p. 334). The Lords Justices and Council state (p. 357) how it grieves them to see the nakedness and poverty of the soldiers, "who show like prisoners, half-starved for want of cherishing." The Council looked for some great mutiny, borrowed some 4,000l. on their joint bonds, lent their own money, and put their plate to pawn. One document, endorsed by Cecil, "Captains that steal from Ireland " (p. 462), tells how certain officers conveyed away provisions from the country, and sold them at La Rochelle. Sir Samuel Bageuall saw some of the soldiers of the Newry garrison " fall dead in marching, with very poverty and want of victuals" (p. 476). Several garrisons were on the point of disbanding. In the case of that at Newry, in February 1598, the lendings and victuals were apportioned according to Sir Henry Bagenall's certificate, but the Marshal had made no mention of the absent and sick soldiers. A mutiny followed. The result may be told in the words of Richard Wackely (p. 59): "In the end, James Carroll, the paymaster, being sent hither from the State with their lendings, the soldiers having understanding of his entry into the town, a number of them, having set themselves in the streets and in certain ' castels ' for the purpose, did so batter him with a fury of snowballs, that he fell off from his horse; whom they prosecuted nevertheless with that tempest and rage, that, if the Captains, Lieutenants, and officers, had not speedily come in to his rescue, he had died in the place; and much ado they had to thrust him into a house, and to save the treasure; neither durst he, whilst he remained in the town about the issuing of the said treasure, once for his life go out of the door; but, having delivered it to Mr. Marshal in the night, stole away by water." The next day the officers had great difficulty in preventing the men from abandoning the town, and only quieted them by promise of relief before the end of the month.

Soldiers, and generally untrained ones, were sent over to Ireland, and landed without respect to their future victualling. If appointed to remote garrisons, forced marches wearied them, change of diet and lodging (when they got any) weakened them, they lost heart, dispersed and ran away, lost or sold their arms, and thus, within three months, newly arrived companies were reduced to skeleton bands. The Captains state (p. 149), "It is well known, and of truth to be avouched, that there have been divers garrisons in many places of Ireland, which have lived without the taste of bread or drink, but with relief only of beef-water, some the space of six months, some eight, some more." On November 6, Sir Richard Bingham writes to the Queen (p. 340), " It is strange to see how suddenly our new English soldiers doth (sic) decay; for, of the last thousand, one fourth part are run away, and many of the rest so poor and simple as [to be] utterly unserviceable." Partly to counteract this constant loss of men, it was urged by the Council (p. 330), that it would be to good purpose, for the suppressing of Tyrone, to employ some Scots, who were " inured to the manner of the Irish war, and specially to tread the bog and the bush." It was also thought that the waging of these Scots would blight the hopes of the rebels, who expected aid both in men and munition from Scotland, and that thus Tyrone would be deprived of his supplies from that country. Sir Richard Bingham thought that "a regiment or two of Scots would do exceeding good service" (p. 447). A Scot, writing to Cecil, tells (p. 437) "how abundant in people Argyleshire is, and how many men yearly and daily go thence to Tyrone. They are like the Irish in suffering of cold, hunger, and long marches, and are a great deal more desperate." He says they had nothing to look for at Tyrone's hands, but what they could steal, and that they would be glad to serve Elizabeth for even a little pay. Two regiments of "Scottish Irishmen, with English leaders," would be more easily maintained than one English regiment. " They also may at all times be sent forth to all desperate service and enterprises, and will meet the Irish in their own form of fight, and without all question overcome them, if they have cunning commanders and leaders."

Numerous documents in this volume will show how the soldiers were stinted, and often utterly deprived of money, victual, and arms. The consequence was that they lived upon the people, and extortion and violence were the order of the day. Hugh Tuder, the experienced servant of Maurice Kyffin, tells (p. 208) how leisurely the troops marched through the country, taking meat and drink of the best. The officers also would urge their " hosts " every morning " to give them three, four, or five shillings a-piece; to every soldier, 12d. or 2s.; to every one of their women as much; to every boy 6d. or 8d. at least. If they had it not, then they carried away for pawns, garrans, coverlets, mantles, sheets, and other household stuffs, and sold them at their pleasure." Thus the subjects in the Pale, and elsewhere, became "the most miserable, wretched nation under the sun, dying daily for hunger"; and some, for very necessity, revolted and went to the rebels. Tuder himself saw "very ancient men, truly affirmed to have been rich farmers in the English Pale, sufficiently able in their time to have entertained the Lord Deputy for a night or two, go a begging"; and these had been spoiled, not by the rebels, but by the soldiers. Meantime the pay of the men was running on, and the Captains were demanding from the Government large sums as due to them for the entertainment of their companies. Tuder further speaks (p. 209) of the Captains' "rich apparel, to maintain, their pride and lasciviousness, their drunkenness and quaffing carouses, their tobacco, and tobacco pipes." Sometimes the Captains would get into as needy a state as their men, and then they would sell their bills and reckonings for a fraction of their worth. Those Captains of horse, who had estates in the country, made their tenants serve in their bands, and put the whole of the Queen's pay into their own purses. Some Captains of foot companies bribed Councillors with one half of the pay, both of themselves and of their soldiers. As to clothing, Captain Mostyn says he had often seen the soldiers that came from England lie a whole month; or a quarter of a year, in their clothes, " without shifting," and very often travel through cold and wet, the clothes thus becoming in short time unserviceable. Captain Stafford writes of some soldiers, received by him at Chester for transportation to Ireland, that the Buckinghamshire men were " both the worst men and worst apparelled of all the 800. Some of the Londoners, and many of the rest ill apparelled, and all London cassocks made of northern cloth, which by wet doth so much shrink that they will this winter stand them in little stead." The Council announce that, for over 9,000 men in list in Ireland, only 5,000 suits of apparel had been received (p. 458). When the merchants' figures came to he examined, it was found that the suits numbered 2,500, instead of 5,000 (p. 464.) This occurred in the depth of winter, January, 1599; and the Council feared " a dangerous mutiny." Very strong appeals were made to Sir Robert Cecil, as formerly there had been to Lord Burghley, to clothe the soldiers in Irish materials, frieze stockings, brogues, and, above all, the Irish mantle, " for want of which the soldiers lying abroad, marching, and keeping watch and ward in cold and wet in the winter time, die in the Irish ague and in flix most pitifully." It is remarkable that all that Cecil wrote on the margin of this appeal was; " our difficulty in this article is, that by this means the English shall become in apparel barbarous; which hath hitherto been avoided " (p. 251; see also p. 149). And so the soldiers were left to rot, to keep up the fashion.

With regard to gunpowder, Captains and subordinate officers were charged with taking out barrels of the same from store, on pretence of using it in immediate service, and then many times selling, pledging, or otherwise exchanging the same. Further (p. 252), the soldier was very sparing in the powder he took out, as he was charged according to the amount. The result was that the army, and particular forces, were frequently endangered, and opportune service was lost. In the skirmish that Ormonde had with the rebels near Dublin, on June 13, 1598, his men wanted powder at the first attack, but Ormonde managed to keep the affair secret. And it will be remembered that, both in the rout of Sir John Chichester's forces near Carrickfergus, and in the retreat of Sir Conyers Clifford from Ballyshannon, the supply of powder ran short. Even at the disaster near Armagh, related in this volume, a portion of the force were without powder, but this may be accounted for by the double explosion. As to arms, those issued from England were by no means always of the best. Sir George Bourchier writes (p. 79) that formerly the Captains " were wont, at their own charge, to provide amongst merchants such swords, girdles, and like necessaries as the soldiers wanted (the same being never hitherto provided by Her Majesty)," but that they were no longer able to do so. He begs that, if any supply be made at the Queen's charge, either his servant may be imprested the money to provide the swords, or, if Burghley considers the same should be included in the proportion out of the Tower of London, that the provision may be made somewhat by his servant's choice; "for that, if the like be sent hither, which are accustomed to be brought over of the country's provision, when they set forth soldiers, the same will never be issued, but remain in store till rust and decay grow upon them, as it hath done upon curates [cuirasses] and many other arms, which now lie as old remains not worth anything, to Her Majesty's great hindrance."

The fate of wounded soldiers was not encouraging to their more fortunate comrades. Captain Mostyn relates that he had often seen the carriage of two or three "hurted" men the occasion of the killing of a great number; "the longer they be carried, the more danger and trouble shall be with them." Of course, during any expedition some of the men would be hurt each day, and "when they are hurt in any running camps, how little soever it be, unless the wounded man be able to shift for himself, or have great friends in the camp (which every common soldier hath not), he is but lost, and so the longer they are forth, the more will increase their wounded men, and will be troublesome unto the soldiers, and hinder the service. And if the soldiers see their fellows miscarry upon some small hurts, they will have no courage to show themselves forward in service; which to the contrary, if they do see and know, if that they be hurt, they are marching from the service to their garrison place, and to their warm beds to surgery, there is no doubt but each soldier will put forwards his best foot, and show himself most valiant " (p, 386). With all the foregoing troubles and corruption in the army, no wonder Sir Conyers Clifford thought that, though the war in Ireland was not one " of great name," it was " as painful and dangerous as any war, and as necessary for Her Majesty to end; for it is a true sink of her treasure, and a waste of good subjects " (p. 131). The Captains, too, state that " the war in Ireland is well known to be the most miserable war for travail, toil, and famine, in the world" (p. 147).

So dilatory were the Government in paying the towns and country for the diet of the soldiers, that at last many refused to give any supplies except for ready money. This was the case even in Dublin itself, which, as the chief thoroughfare of troops sent over for service in Ireland, had borne peculiarly heavy burdens. It is not generally known, however, that to a Mayor of Dublin belongs the honour of having first proposed the establishment in that city of a hospital for sick and wounded soldiers. Nearly a century before the foundation of the present Royal Hospital, Nicholas Weston, who had so often befriended the army with supplies, sometimes against "the murmur of his brethren," laid down his plan for such an institution, combining with it a plan for the manufacture by the inhabitants of Dublin of better clothes for the soldiers. The papers on this subject will be found on pages 295-298.

In striking contrast with the condition of the English army is the state of the rebel forces. The documents calendared here reveal no hunger, nakedness, non-payment, or bad arms in that quarter. It is true Tyrone's men required little food, clothing, or pay, but there is no complaint from them on those points. As to arms, they bought them, not only in the towns in times of truce, but also from the English soldiers, who sold theirs for food. Powder and munition came to Tyrone from Spain and Scotland, and even English merchants were not above dealing with him. Birmingham and Liverpool sold him arms. The intelligence department of the rebel forces was extremely able and successful. Sometimes Irish soldiers in the Queen's service would give valuable information to their fellow-countrymen in times of truce or protection (p. 249). William Paule, the Commissary in Ulster, says, in reference to one of the expeditions of Lord Burgh, " It was a common[ly] received opinion, settled amongst us in the camp, that the rebels had such certain particular intelligence from us continually that, if the Deputy took horse but at any time to ride abroad, or to take the air, they should forthwith have perfect notice given them, both of the fashion of the apparel which he wore on that day, as likewise of the colour and stature of the horse he rode upon. And further, it cannot be denied but that they were made privy to our wants always as soon as ourselves" (p. 18). Paule thinks this intelligence could not have come only from the enemy's "bare-breeched spies," and speaks of the treachery of English officers, two of whom he mentions by name. Ormonde tells Burghley (p. 66), I am sorry the traitors know our wants as well as ourselves, and the weakness of our forces, which putteth them into exceeding pride; " and Fenton writes to the same effect (p. 124). The Lords Justices and Council say after the disaster near Armagh (p. 227), " the enemies will multiply and insult, knowing how weak we are, as well in commanders as in men." Although the Government, both in England and Ireland, distrusted the Irish soldiers in the service, chiefly for their treachery and desertion, yet the Captains were not slow to recruit their bands with Irishmen, and even to discharge English soldiers, to replace them with Irish ones. In both cases, the object was, as Elizabeth puts it, " to cover their frauds, and to make gain" (p. 258). Thus it came about that three-fourths of the army consisted of Irishmen. Vigorous steps were at last taken to reduce their numbers gradually, for the consequences of a general disbanding were feared. The Lords Justices, Ormonde, and the Council actually suggested (p. 138) that the Irish soldiers should be drawn away to service in the Low Countries or France, under some Commander whom they would trust, " whereby this realm may be rid of them." The Privy Council replied (p. 156), "we see not any opportunity how to effect the same." For the rebel forces there was undisguised respect, so far as their fighting qualities were concerned, and the English authorities sought to counteract the effect of these by endeavouring to sow dissensions amongst the rebel leaders. Sir Ralph Lane's opinion has already been given above. Sir Geffrey Fenton writes (p. 142) to Sir Robert Cecil, "without a strong faction to be raised amongst themselves, it will be a chargeable work to suppress them." He adds, " that it will trouble the greatest captain in "Europe to prevail against these rebels, so borne up by foreign princes, without working some of them to Her Majesty's part, and to serve against them." Sir Richard Bingham thought that nothing had so much overthrown Ireland, as "the universal arming" of the Irish, and considered that strict order would have to be taken thereupon in the future (p. 447). Edmund Spenser wrote of the hatred of the Irish for the English, and gives this opinion as to the suppression of the rebellion (p. 433); " great force must be the instrument, but famine must be the mean; for, till Ireland be famished, it cannot be subdued."

In accordance with the fifth instruction to editors of calendars, given by the Master of the Rolls, by which it is directed that "striking peculiarities of expression, proverbs, manners, &c, are to be noticed," the following examples may be cited, in addition to those already quoted in this preface:—"mischief a brewing" [p. 16]; "palhouiste or sorcerer," " have an use," " I am in for a byrer " [p. 17] ; " such smoke could not be without some secret fire," "maniples or battalions" [p. 19]; "delaied" (diluted) [p. 22]; " to have two strings to his bow," "to keep two strings to his bow " [pp. 24 and 372] ; " voluntary men " (volunteers) [p. 24]; "one mece (? mess) of milk" [p. 25]; "dispended" (expended) [p. 28]; "have an eye to" [p. 30]; "impovereth" [p. 32]; "mortui non mordent" [p. 54] ; "if God had not tentred our garrison" [p. 70] : "recipitur voluntas pro facto"; " cursed Her Majesty, bell, book, and candle " [p. 74] ; "preded," or " preaded " (preyed) [pp. 75 and 77] ; " took a breath in the matter " [p. 81]; "is at a great afterdeal" (disadvantage) [p. 84]; "some pad in the straw" [p. 91]; "regiment" (command) [p. 97]; "turn over the leaf" [p. 115]; "revealing tales out of school" [p. 154]; "carriages" (impedimenta) [p. 161]; "to be a backset (support) for him" [p. 163]; "stop (as the rural proverb is) two bracks with one bush" [p. 164]; "commoning" of wrongs [p. 174]; "temper" (temporise) [p. 177]; "cirichts" [p. 178]; "evicted some islands" (for, evicted people from them) [pp. 179, 327, 355, &c,]; "for anempst" [p. 180]; "was crossing to have any dispatch" (taking measures to prevent any dispatch) [p. 193]; "brabling" [p. 204]; "mala parta mala dilabuntur" [p. 210]; "prepare for my long home" [p. 213]; "one foot is already in my grave" [p. 223]; ten muskets "with their furnitures"; "on seaboard" (on board ship) [p. 245]; "solde" (pay) [p. 255]; "some new overthwarts" (obstacles) [p. 265]; "to put for" (undertake) [p. 274]; "mawgur the berd" (despite the beard) [p. 319]; "cursitors" (runners) [p. 320]; "inland Scots" as opposed to "Scots-Irish" [p. 330]; "fall together by the ears" [p. 332]; "powldred" their prey [p. 336]; "have got such a forehand" [p. 339]; "wear hose or breeches, after the English manner" [p. 342]; "make fair weather with them" [pp. 343, 451]; "build castles vainly in the skies" [p. 349]; "paireth" (groweth worse; French pire) [p. 352]; "to put toys (fancies) into the people's heads" [p. 356]; "to leave (raise; French lever) me up" [p. 359]; "maled up with a malinge corde" (French malle) [p. 385]; "nugation" (trifle) [p. 417]; "judicial" (judicious) [p. 418]; "undertaking courages" [p. 420]; "to himwards" [p. 421]; "conycatchers" [p. 429; cf. "conycatched" p. 369]; "cœlum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt" [p. 429]; "shameless dealings have shameless answers" ; "trooses" (? trews) [p. 430]; "inhabitance" [p. 432]; "brought out of square," "intermixtion" (intermixture) [p. 434]; "did more ambite" (were more ambitious); "unthrifts" (spendthrifts) [p. 435]; "deleve" (deliver) [p. 436]; "dilling"; "paud" (wager) [p. 437]; "break the ice of that enterprise"; "expedite" (expeditious) "homelings" (natives); "valiance" (valour) [p. 439]; "original" (origin); "aneere" (approximate) [p. 440]; "it skills (matters) not" [p. 441]; "new lords, new laws" [p. 442]; "garryzed" (garrisoned); "contain" (continue); "a black swan" [p. 443]; "impedite" (impede) [p. 451]; "mewed me up" [p. 460]; "to be even with" [p. 461]; "have correspondency" (co-operate) [p. 463]; "has made an atonement with" (has been reconciled to) [p. 463]; "could not claw this coast" [p. 488]; "had his hands oiled with the oil of angels" [p. 499]; "powerable" (powerful); "when the thieves go to execution, the judges ride away" [p. 501]; "all was fish that came to net"; "as clean plucked as though he had come from the poulterers" [p. 505]; "gallymanfry knaves"; "as the old proverb is, it was not for nothing the cat winked, when both her eyes were out"; "called a chapel of ill counsel"; "gaped to see which way the world would wag"; "martlemas men"; "to rule the roast "; "I smell him as far as the Old Bailey"; "by the pity of a pilchard"; "Kilkenny visions"; " one wolf will not prey upon another" [p. 506].

Attention may be called to the following:—William Paule's account of Lord Burgh's last illness; the charges against Ormonde's secretary; the papers on the Stanton family ; the letters in commendation of the famous Puritan divine, Provost Travers, of Trinity College, Dublin; the proposal to send State despatches by the post, to save the expense of special messengers (p. 344); the plan for " the reformation of Ulster," by settling Dutch there, as the nation "fittest and aptest" for such an enterprise; the workings of Dr. Cragh, or Creagh, Father Archer, and other priests, against the Government; the state of the clergy in Ireland (pp. 430, 431); the reports by Chief Justice Saxey on the state of Munster; the advices of Spanish preparations against England and Ireland (among the pensioners of the Spanish king is one " Mr. Fawxe," at 15 crowns a month); the Welsh origin of Tyrone (p. 462); Sir Warham Sentleger's losses; the "stages of the new posts laid for the service of Ireland," viâ Holyhead and Bristol; and the "Book on the state of Ireland," with which this volume concludes. The author of the last speaks of the importance of keeping Ireland, " being the part (although chargeable) that doth serve for a back armour to England."

Ernest G. Atkinson.

September, 1895.