Preface.
The present instalment of this series extends from
June, 1586, to June, 1588, a period of twenty-five months.
Since the publication of the last volume some alteration
in the arrangement has been rendered necessary. The
mass of material in the two series "Holland" and
"Flanders" has become so unwieldy that it has seemed
desirable to deal with it in a volume apart, which will be
published as supplementary to the papers contained here.
Consequently these last present only a partial view of the
scene, from which the chief activities of the English
government abroad, and the mainspring of much action
elsewhere, are almost entirely excluded. An introduction
dealing exclusively with the material of the volume must
of necessity be no more than a half told tale, strictly
limited in its scope. The chief interest centres in
Elizabeth's relations with the French king and the king
of Navarre, including her share in the ill fated expedition
of the German reiters into France, and in her relations
with Spain, leading up to the sailing of the Great Armada.
I.
The menacing power of the League in France and the
possibility that the king might become a mere tool in
their hands, made it necessary to seek help from outside
if the Protestant cause in France was to be saved.
Some 18 years before, in 1568, a German force had entered
France to help the Huguenots. An appeal to the
Evangelical Princes of Germany and to the Protestant
Swiss to save their coreligionists in France from extermination seemed to promise the best results. Elizabeth
was not prepared to offer more than a limited subsidy
and so the success of the appeal depended chiefly upon
the public spirit of the German Princes themselves and the
sacrifices which they were prepared to make for the cause.
As was natural, Pallavicino, who had charge of the
negotiations, addressed himself first of all to the chief
among the Protestant Princes, the electors of Saxony
and Brandenburg, of whom the former had only recently
succeeded to the title. He found a friendly and sympathetic reception but no disposition to venture anything for the common cause. They took no real interest
in matters outside Germany, they were fearful of doing
anything to offend the emperor, and would take no
independent action, so that no step could be taken unless
after a consultation among all the princes, which would be
too long and cumbrous a process to allow any hope of
effective assistance (pp. 16, 39). Brandenburg, whom
Pallavicino visited second, spoke to practically the same
effect as his son in law, and it was evident that they had
arranged between them what their reply should be (p.
26). They professed to be waiting for the result of a
mission sent by the German Princes to the French king
to recommend the interests of the Huguenots ; if that
failed, they would be ready to take resolute action and
succour for the Protestant cause in France would be
forthcoming from every quarter of Germany (p. 61).
The hollowness of this assurance soon became apparent,
for though the German mission was treated with unexampled contumely by the French king, the rebuff had
no apparent effect upon the attitude of the German
Princes.
Disappointed in his hopes Pallavicino joined with the
ministers of Navarre to induce John Casimir, of the
Palatinate, who had led the earlier expedition, to raise
a force of Germans and Swiss and take it into France to
fight the League. He had only 100,000 crowns to offer,
or one half that amount if other contributions should be
forthcoming from Germany or Denmark (p. 111). For
this sum he asked for a force of 8,000 reiters and 14,000
foot, to be ready to march in four months, to be
commanded by Duke Casimir himself or by a prince of
the empire and that they should undertake not to leave
France until the King of Navarre had been succoured,
the liberty of the chuches restored and a good peace
established (p. 141). If Elizabeth was sparing of her
money and determined to get good value for it, Casimir,
backed by the Navarrese ministers, meant to extract all
they could out of her, confident that the peril of her
position would force her to be more liberal, and ready, if
necessary, to play upon her fears. Thus Casimir, while
apparently consenting to the terms suggested, wrote to
Guitry, Navarre's minister, that the proposals were
utterly unreasonable, that the queen could not ask for
more if she was furnishing the entire cost of the expedition, and the amount offered was quite inadequate (p.
124). At another time he told Guitry that if Pallavicino
should fail in a single one of his promises, he himself would
fail in all (p. 149). Under such circumstances it is
hardly surprising that Pallavicino found the duke very
difficult to deal with, grasping and elusive, constantly
causing fresh delays, yet unwilling to supply any reason
for them (p. 149). He is so irresolute, so feeble and so
mistrustful, the agent told Stafford, that he is as one dead,
besides which he desires to do nothing unless he can
engage other princes, for he wishes to gain in any case
and so do all those around him (p. 159). Throughout
the negotiations Pallavicino complained that he received
no help from the King of Navarre's ministers, who only
sought their own selfish ends and he suspected that they
were in collusion with the duke to get what they could
out of England (pp. 151, 182). They resorted to all
manner of tricks to extract more money, without a thought
for the queen's interests, and because Pallavicino resisted
and thwarted their efforts, they subjected him to all
manner of slights and petty vexations (p. 160). Things
reached such a pitch that the negotiations seemed on the
point of breaking down altogether, and Pallavicino
seriously contemplated throwing the whole thing up and
opening fresh negotiations with some one else (p. 149).
Finding that nothing was to be done with the agent
Casimir ultimately signed an undertaking in January,
1587, though he asked that it might be kept secret (p.
187). Almost immediately after he despatched his
minister La Huguerie to England to see what he could
do to induce the queen to open her purse strings, without
taking Pallavicino into his confidence in the matter (p.
237). La Huguerie, described by Stafford as being
'as broiling a merchant as any in France,' proceeded to
justify this character by the hectoring tone he adopted,
intimating that his master had been led into a difficult
and dangerous position by delusive offers made to him
(p. 282). He demanded further supplies of money and
threatened that the duke would withdraw altogether
if these were not forthcoming. His instances were
supported by Guitry, on behalf of the King of Navarre,
who held out the brightest hopes of success if sufficient
supplies were provided (p. 293). They found, as they
might have foreseen, that they could get no more satisfaction from the principal than from the agent. Burleigh
sent back La Huguerie with a moderately worded letter
to Duke Casimir, explaining that the queen herself was
so assailed by enemies on all sides that she found it more
necessary than ever to look to her defence at home. He
intimated that the Princes of the Empire might suitably
employ their wealth in defence of the principles they
professed (p. 293). Baffled in his hopes Duke Casimir
grumbled and complained that the queen had deserted
him (p. 330), but he made a virtue of necessity and the
levy went forward. By August the German Swiss army
was ready and marched into Lorraine. Its career
proved brief and inglorious, in a few months the force
had been completely dissipated. Walsingham observed
with some justice that the money furnished by England
had served only for the glorification of the League (p. 638).
Conceived and carried out as it was the expedition
had very few chances of success at any time. Stafford,
the ambassador at Paris, who naturally looked somewhat
askance at an expedition which rendered his position
at the French Court rather ambiguous, pointed out from
the first the difficulties in the way. The country was so
bare that a considerable army would perish for lack of
supplies. The French king's own armies, though divided
up into a number of small bands, found it extremely hard
to get supplies. If the reiters came and found a great
lack of victuals, as they certainly would, he feared
that they would mutiny and go home (pp. 147, 151).
Something very like this actually happened, as the force
was oppressed by hunger and an intolerable shortage of
supplies, causing a great deal of sickness and desertion
(p. 617). The engagements undertaken by the promoters
had never been kept. Instead of 8,000 horse and
14,000 foot, there had never been more than 4,000
reiters (p. 492). Duke Casimir had undertaken either
to lead the force himself or to provide in his place a
prince of the empire of one of the noblest houses, who
would be under the same obligations. When the time
came the duke pleaded the duties of his guardianship
and that he could not safely leave the Palatinate. The
Duke of Bouillon, who was willing to take charge and who
would have been a suitable commander, proved unacceptable to the Germans, and the command ultimately
devolved upon the Baron Fabian von Dohna, a person
of quite minor importance (pp. 579, 619).
The conduct of the King of Navarre was not free from
ambiguity. It can be understood that he would not be
eager to bring a foreign army into the middle of France.
While the levy was in negotiation he used it somewhat
unscrupulously to strengthen his position. The King of
France was amazed at the stiffness of his attitude, in
spite of his apparent weakness, and at his determination
not to ask for peace (p. 37). Stafford believed that he
meant to wait until the succour was actually arriving and
that he would then show the world that he was readiest
to make peace when he was strongest (p. 2). On the
other hand he intimated to England that circumstances
might compel him to make peace (p. 118). It was
represented that he had no hope save in this help from
Germany (p. 163). It was said to be urgent that it
should arrive soon, as the king's affairs were in the
greatest extremity, not so much from the enemy as
because a great number of his best men had died of the
plague (p. 223). What the king most wished was that
the reiters should remain in Lorraine, where they would
create a useful diversion and by ravaging the province
would inflict the maximum amount of injury on his chief
enemies, the Guises (p. 362). He had no wish to unite
his forces with theirs, and made no serious effort to do so,
although after his victory at Coutras it should not have
been difficult. He only hoped to derive advantage to
himself from the damage they did and the terror of their
name (p. 480).
Although Elizabeth was doing her best to introduce a
foreign army into France her relations with the French
crown remained friendly, at least in appearance. The
assumption was that Henry of Navarre was the true
friend of the crown while the League were enemies and
rebels. Stafford's nightmare was an understanding
between France and Spain to the detriment of England.
The League on their side left no means untried to induce
the king to break away from England. On the other
hand popular feeling in France was very strong against
the Spaniards and they took no pains to conceal their
regret at the news of any Spanish success (p. 50). They
would have been much more ready to enlist English
help against Spain (p. 147). What the French most
dreaded was an understanding between England and
Spain and the report of peace negotiations between the
two countries excited their liveliest apprehensions. The
value of this state of mind was appreciated in England
and Stafford had instructions to feed French jealousy
by encouraging reports of negotiations. At the same time
the danger of a breach remained. The chronic lawlessness at sea on both sides was a constant source of irritation. More definitely there followed the trial of Mary
Queen of Scots for her share in the Babington conspiracy,
with the ill success of Bellievre's mission in her favour.
Almost immediately after this came a charge against the
Ambassador Chateauneuf and his secretary Des Trappes
of being concerned in a conspiracy against the queen
with a refusal to receive the ambassador in audience and
the imprisonment of the secretary, finally news arrived
of the execution of the Queen of Scots. This rapid
succession of events undoubtedly brought a breach very
near. The queen's execution aroused a passion of fury
in France (pp. 227, 229), so general that there was scarce
any, no matter what their opinion, who did not condemn it in the strongest terms. The fury was directed
against the queen. I never saw all so desperately bent
against her as they are, wrote Stafford (p. 236). The
French king smiled incredulously when told, that the
execution had been carried out against Elizabeth's will,
for the rest his chief objection was that a sovereign and
an ex-queen of France should die by the hand of the
common executioner (p. 252), it was also deplorable
because it gave favour, pretence and colour to Guise
and the League (p. 289). Henry was much more concerned about the treatment of his ministers. Froude
has treated the charge against Des Trappes as a pure
fabrication of Elizabeth, for some purpose not explained.
These papers hardly bear out that view. The king took
the matter seriously enough. On receiving the news
he ordered that all English ships and goods in French
ports should be seized; guards were set at Stafford's
house and he was confined there (p. 214). When Elizabeth sent over Waad to explain matters, the king refused
to see him and Waad even ran some personal danger.
Before he would listen to anything Henry demanded
that Chateauneuf should be re-admitted at Court and
that Des Trappes should be sent to France to be dealt
with there. For a time Elizabeth steadfastly resisted
these demands, being further incensed at the asylum
which her rebels found at the French Court and at the
king's refusal to deliver them up to her. Stafford became
seriously alarmed that the queen's obstinacy combined
with the unremitting efforts of her enemies to make the
king break with her would end by driving him headlong
into their hands (p. 272). He pleaded that it was no
time to be stiff upon small matters and that such an
attitude would gratify no one so much as the queen's
ill wishers (p. 265). His representations supported by
Waad finally prevailed and Des Trappes was sent over
and Chateauneuf received at Court again.
The crisis passed Henry seemed inclined, if somewhat
furtively, to look for help to England. His faults of
character had brought him into a situation from which
it was difficult to find a way out. In turn he had
deceived his mother, Navarre, Guise, Montmorency,
Epernon, Joyeuse (p. 95). When civil war had reduced
his country to such a plight that thousands died of
hunger and in some parts the people were eating grass his
interests seemed to require that no one party should
prevail over the other, which would mean a perpetual
state of civil war. He hated the League with a deadly
hatred and would have been glad to see all their throats
cut (pp. 66, 481). Joyeuse passed as his favourite and was
supposed to be sent by him against Navarre; but before
Coutras he declared that if Navarre should be beaten
the state was lost (p. 385). He feared nothing so much
as a possible reconciliation between Navarre and Guise
(p. 38). Even the defeat of a foreign invader on French
soil was a disaster for him. He complained that he had
looked to the reiters to defeat the League and thereby
make it easier for him to bring about a religious settlement
in France, but the mismanagement of that expedition
had upset his plans (p. 521). With regard to Navarre,
he made a point of that prince's conversion to Catholicism,
declaring that he could have but one religion in France;
yet if Navarre became a Catholic he would lose his hold
on his present following and so become less useful to the
king, while as next heir to the throne he would be personally much more dangerous and ten times more hateful
to the king than if he remained a Huguenot (p. 148).
Yet the king seems to have come to the conclusion that
this was the only way out. Already in May, 1587,
Villeroy had suggested to Stafford that the queen should
use her influence to persuade Navarre to be ruled by the
king and obey his will (p. 303). Nine months later, when
the toils were closing about the king he sent for Stafford
to meet him at a secret rendezvous at night. There he
definitely asked for the queen's mediation to bring about
peace in France, to induce Navarre to become a Catholic
and unite with him to prevent the League from ruining
him and France as well. It would really seem that in
this most important interview the king expressed his
real feelings upon the situation (pp. 519–27). His
weakness appeared in his insistence that it should be kept
absolutely secret, declaring that he would repudiate
the whole thing if anything were made public. That the
appeal was genuine is indicated by the minister Pinard
returning to the charge a few weeks later. In response
to a letter which Stafford had read to him, purporting
to come from Elizabeth, he exclaimed that he would to
God that the king and all of them were as wise as the
Queen of England. Of the condition of France he
expressed the most dismal view declaring 'Nous sommes
tous perdus; sommes point capables de raison.' (p. 582).
Stafford himself entertained no illusions; he expressed
the opinion that nothing could be done with the king,
because the Queen Mother could make him do whatever
she liked (p. 584). The Leaguers were not so sure and
even after the king had fled from Paris, leaving Guise
in possession, strenuous efforts were made to wean him
from England. On this side all hope was not abandoned
of inducing Henry to adopt a more manly course, and in
May, 1588, Sir Thomas Leighton came over to urge
that Guise and all his faction should be declared traitors
and dealt with as such (p. 633). The king received this
mission in the most friendly spirit, declaring that he found
more kindness in his good sister the Queen of England
than in all the princes, his friends and allies, beside
(pp. 637, 643).
That Navarre might become a Catholic was evidently
considered quite an open question. In 1586 Buzenval
declared that he had received an offer from the King of
Spain of 50,000 crowns a month if he would change
his religion and come over to him. The minister claimed
great credit for his master for having declined a proposal
so obviously advantageous (p. 48). By adhering steadfastly to his faith he was jeopardising his chances of
succeeding to the finest kingdom in Christendom (p. 47).
The pope was well disposed and quite ready to recall
the bull of excommunication and to receive the king back
into the bosom of the Church; knowledge of this caused
considerable searching of heart among the members of
the League (p. 489). With so many inducements to go
over it was believed that jealousy of the Prince of Conde
was the chief reason which kept him faithful to the Huguenots (p. 530), from fear that the Prince would succeed to
his greatness if he should fall away. Consequently
when Condé died suddenly, with strong suspicion of
poison, it was felt that the cause of the Religion had lost
its surest prop (p. 532). These feelings about Henry of
Navarre were very widely shared (p. 544), so that serious
misgivings were felt when it became known that Michael
de Montaigne had been sent by him on a secret mission to
the King of France, without the knowledge of the leaders
of the party (p. 510). This brief appearance on the stage
of the famous essayist is one of the interesting features
of these papers.
II.
Though relations between Spain and England were
strained to the breaking point, peace negotiations of one
kind and another were on the carpet for the whole period.
Conversations between Don Antonio Castillio and Dr.
Hector Nunez seem to have come to an untimely end in
the autumn of 1586 the Babington conspiracy having
created an atmosphere unfavourable to such negotiations
(pp. 79, 83, 98), though the threads seem to have been
taken up a few months later by the Duke of Parma (p.
280). Prince Doria was quite willing to continue the
work he had begun, but he did not receive much
encouragement from Spain (p. 11). Before listening to
any proposals from England Spain required the evacuation of the Netherlands and the payment of compensation
for the damage wrought by Drake in the Indies (p. 40).
As no satisfaction was offered on either of these heads,
the negotiations from this quarter seem to have died a
natural death, also in the autumn of 1586. Another
active move was made at this time by the King of
Denmark, who was anxious to see peace established in
the Netherlands and who sent a mission to Spain to this
end. No particular notice of this move seems to have
been taken in England at the time, but in the following
year, when Parma had the negotiations in hand,
Denmark's mediation was formally accepted in a letter
of the queen, written in June (p. 323), though with
reservations which made Denmark doubt whether the
acceptance was intended seriously (p. 336). A few weeks
later Rogers was sent to Denmark to explain that any
hesitation shown in England was due to the reluctance
of the States to enter into negotiations, and they were
the parties chiefly concerned. He was to intimate that
the chief difficulty would probably be about religion,
and if no satisfaction could be obtained on this head
Denmark should not only come forward to assist the
Netherlands but induce the German Princes to join in
defending the common cause (p. 370). The point is of
importance in view of Froude's statement that Elizabeth
was indifferent about religion in the Netherlands. (fn. 1) On
the other hand a report was current that the queen
intended to force the Dutch to come to terms (p. 421).
But it is doubtful if the English government ever believed
that Parma's negotiations were seriously intended. A
series of questions addressed by Walsingham to Powle,
his agent at Venice indicate his feelings on this subject,
and the answers sent by Powel could only serve to confirm
the secretary's impressions (p. 451). The negotiations
were chiefly useful as a check upon France, where they
were regarded with extreme jealousy, not to say irritation
(p. 552) and where they tried their best, by intrigue, to
upset them (p. 533).
That Spain was preparing some extraordinary expedition against England was suspected at an early date.
In the summer of 1586 the Spanish party at Paris went
about boasting that the queen would soon be attacked
in her own realm (p. 49). Philip himself was not eager
for the enterprise, but was egged on by his Cardinals and
clergy (p. 12). His dominions were indeed in no case
to furnish a great enterprise without excessive strain.
He was at his wits end to find money and disaffection
was rife among his troops for lack of pay and among his
people from over taxation; corn was dear so that the
people went hungry; trade was stagnant and a proclamation forbidding trade with England caused much
murmuring and discontent. Drake's raids in the Indies
had caused immense confusion, disorganising commerce
and, what was worse, depriving the Spaniards of a
quantity of guns, a loss they could not replace. Recognising the superiority of English guns the Spaniards
tried hard to get hold of some. The supply of competent
sailors was also a difficulty and to man the fleets it was
necessary for the most part to fill up the crews with
country clowns (pp. 12, 56–8). An informant of Stafford
who saw the Spanish fleet at Lisbon at this time declared
that six good English merchantmen would beat them all
(p. 93). The English government tried to prevent
supplies for the equipment of this fleet from reaching
Spain. A schedule, issued by the Lords of the Council,
of goods which must not be transported to Spain or the
Spanish dominions, supplies a list of what was considered
contraband of war at the time (p. 90). The prohibition
excited the usual protests from neutrals.
In spite of all the difficulties Philip continued to push
on with his preparations, raising a large loan from the
Fuggers to enable him to proceed (p. 141). All through
the winter of 1586 rumours were circulating of his levies
of money, troops and munitions against England, for an
expedition in the spring (p. 152). Richard Gibbes, an
English shipmaster, being at Lisbon, was closely questioned about English and Scottish ports and soundings
by Santa Cruz, who took him for a Scot (p. 231). A
Spanish memorandum in favour of the enterprise
represented that the prowess of the English at sea had
been much exaggerated and that they had been the
first to turn tail at the action of San Miguel (p. 342).
But Santa Cruz, the victor on that occasion, cherished
no such illusions. He showed almost as much reluctance
to set out as his successor was to do later. He told the
Archduke Albert that if the king would spare him at
home, as he was an old man, he would give half the land
he had (p. 373). On the few occasions when he ventured
to sea his ships returned to port in a shattered condition.
Froude remarks that the Armada had a good chance of
success if it had sailed in January, (fn. 2) but this was not the
opinion of Santa Cruz himself, who said it was much
better to allow the Queen of England a little time to
make ready than to risk the loss of the whole fleet by
putting to sea in the rigour of winter (p. 513). Death
came to relieve the veteran commander of a responsibility
which he evidently did not care to face.
Meanwhile Philip continued to amass his great force
at Lisbon, stripping his dominions of ships and men in
order to furnish forth the fleet. To make up his crews he
even offered free pardon to all outlaws and robbers
(p. 329). Not satisfied with his own resources, vast as
they were, he tried to enlist allies. When Henry III.
of France was approached on the subject he replied that
he would not hinder any enterprise of the pope or the
King of Spain, but he was unable to further the same,
being too much pressed in his own country (p. 453).
Tuscany was drawn upon to supply ships and men,
and it was reported that the pope had applied to the
republic of Venice to take part. Sixtus personally
seems to have entertained a real admiration for Elizabeth.
On one occasion at least, when speaking in the most
contemptuous terms of Philip of Spain and Henry of
France, he declared that she was the one prince in the
world to show any courage, and that he would give all
the treasure that he had gathered together that she
should become a Catholic (p. 365). But as the head of
Christendom he considered it his duty to further a crusade
to put down heresy thinking that it would be a glorious
thing to restore England to the Catholic Church (p. 562).
At Rome the utmost confidence was expressed in the
success of the expedition. When Bandini, as envoy of
the King of France, visited the city at Christmas, 1587,
and laughed at the idea of the King of Spain conquering
England, the Cardinals told him that before he got back
to England he would find it done and England quite
destroyed (p. 552). With the new year the hour seemed
to have arrived and many Italian gentlemen left Italy for
Flanders to serve as volunteers in the expedition and to
share the plunder (pp. 572, 641). In Paris Mendoza
assured Westmoreland and the English exiles that they
would soon be restored to their country and goods and
that they should go to join Parma to attend the hour
(p. 597); so they also set out for Flanders. Of what was
being done on the English side to meet the attack these
papers have little to tell. Some of those who send
information betray impatience at the apparent tardiness
in preparing for the danger. From France there came
a memorial setting forth what were considered the best
measures to take. Among other things it advocates
the employment of German reiters and landsknechts
(p. 518), a curious recommendation in view of the recent
fiasco in France. There seems to have been no special
attempt to secure allies except a curious appeal
from Harborne, the ambassador at the Porte, to the
Sultan to join in the war against Philip (p. 508),
an appeal which seems to have become known
almost immediately in Europe (pp. 504, 562). That
the English government was on the alert was
shown when the forces of the League under Aumale made
their attempt to seize Boulogne. Outside the port Aumale
found a strong squadron of English ships commanded by
Lord Admiral Howard himself. When the duke enquired
whether he was there as a friend or an enemy Howard
told him roundly that he must forbear from attacking a
town of the king, his master, and that if he did not remove
upon that warning he might, ere long, have cause to regret
it. An unfavourable wind drove Howard away from the
port directly afterwards, but the defenders were able to
save the town without outside assistance. It is obvious
that Boulogne would have afforded a most useful base
for the Armada, when it sailed, and that in the hands of
the League it would have been absolutely at their service.
At the end of his report Howard expresses his satisfaction
with the sailing qualities of the royal ships (p. 613).
III.
Although the English government had concluded a
treaty with Scotland in July, 1586, for the defence of the
reformed religion and providing that neither party
should join a foreign power against the other, France
and Spain both continued to look to Scotland for assistance against England in case of need. The Bishop of
Glasgow, envoy of Queen Mary and afterwards of James,
was busy at Paris intriguing with the papal nuncio and
the Spanish Ambassador Mendoza for the overthrow of
English influence at Edinburgh (p. 94); James even went
so far as to send to France to ask for help in the case of
his mother, in prison and in danger of her life (p. 174).
When the queen's head fell all Scotland united to demand
vengeance, while from France King Henry tried to egg
James on and urged him not to accept any satisfaction
for his mother's death (p. 320). James, however, subordinated any private feelings he might have had to his
obvious interests, for he saw clearly that his best chance
of succeeding quietly to the English throne lay in keeping
on good terms with Elizabeth, and in purchasing the
goodwill of the people, since if war was to ensue between
the two countries, his only hope of becoming king of
England would be by conquest (p. 247). Accordingly
he adhered steadily to the policy of cultivating friendly
relations with Elizabeth since he perceived that nothing
could do him more hurt than a quarrel with England
(p. 277). With regard to the unfortunate affair of his
mother he professed to have no ground of offence with the
queen, whose hand had been forced, or with the people,
but only with the councillors who had signed the death
warrant (p. 259).
The importance of Scotland in any plan for the invasion
of England was too obvious to be overlooked, though
Philip's chances of enlisting any help from James were
seriously prejudiced by Mary's recognition of him as her
heir, to the exclusion of her own son. The Spaniards
were certainly busily intriguing with both king and
people. Spanish partisans in both France and Flanders
freely boasted that there was an arrangement with James
to land the forces for the invasion of England in Scottish
ports (pp. 411, 454), and at the end of 1587 it was reported
that the Spanish fleet had actually sailed for Scotland
(pp. 416, 439). The Spaniards undoubtedly tried hard to
spread the idea that their attack would be made by way of
Scotland, perhaps only as a blind, though from the cross
questioning of Gibbes by Santa Cruz it would seem that
the project had been seriously considered. A report
actually got abroad that hostilities had broken out
between England and Scotland, and obtained so much
credence that the King of Denmark wrote offering his
mediation (p. 486). But as it became clear that Spanish
hopes of Scottish co-operation were doomed to disappointment, Mendoza and the band of English exiles
who frequented his house began to speak ill of the Bishop
of Glasgow and of James, who had grown afraid, they
said, of admitting a large foreign army into his country
lest they should quarter themselves permanently there
(p. 598).
The negotiations for the marriage of James to a Danish
princess seem for some reason, not too obvious, to have
been kept as secret as possible (p. 349), though without
conspicuous success. Elizabeth, while approving of
the alliance resented having been kept in the dark about
it (p. 369). Her humour was to object to all love affairs
(p. 86), if this could be called such, but her objections
in the case in point were somewhat premature since the
alliance did not take place for another two years.
IV.
In the summer of 1585 representatives of the Hanse
Towns came to England to arrange terms for mutual
trade and to try and obtain the restoration of the ancient
privileges of their confederacy. The English government made it clear that they were not prepared to go
beyond a mutual arrangement of give and take, and
after some negotiation an offer was made at Nonsuch
on the 3rd October that if the Hanse would restore the
Merchant Adventurers at Hamburg to all the rights and
privileges from which they had recently been excluded,
the queen would allow the Hanse the same liberty of
traffic as they had enjoyed at any time since the beginning
of her reign (p. 102). An assembly of the Confederacy
held at Lubec to consider this offer, broke up without
any conclusion. The prevalent feeling at this meeting
seems to have been opposed to any agreement with the
English unless all the old Hanse privileges were restored.
The English government had made it clear that it would
only treat on terms of equality, involving mutual concessions on equal terms. This point was insisted upon
in a letter written by the queen to the King of Poland,
who had written to her on behalf of Danzig (pp. 59, 172).
The confederacy hoped by offering a firm front to profit
by the difficulties in which England was involved, and to
recover their former monopoly. But the days had gone
when the Hanse could be certain of acting as one body
and with one voice. The important city of Hamburg,
breaking away from the rest, decided to act independently
and to accept the queen's offer. Accordingly they wrote
asking that an embassy might be sent to discuss and
settle details (p. 75). In England the company of
Merchant Adventurers received these advances favourably. Their efforts to establish marts for the sale of
their wares in the empire had not turned out very well.
At Middelburg trade suffered too much from the war. At
Emden, owing to dangers by sea and land, they had
found their sales very restricted (p. 409), chiefly because
of the opposition of the emperor and German Princes,
so strong that Count Edzard, ruler of East Friesland,
declined to renew the privileges of the Company unless
the queen would promise him protection (p. 7). Under
these circumstances the English Company sent a mission
to Hamburg in the summer of 1587. In the discussions
which followed they found that the Hamburghers were
by no means of one mind about the establishment of
trade and the concessions to be made to secure it.
Agreements made with the principals one day were
revoked when referred to the burghers, or else the terms
were raised. The Hamburgers in particular insisted on
their right to charge tolls for entering the Elbe because
of their charges in keeping the river open and they were
unwilling to concede a residency until the privileges
offered at Nonsuch had been definitely secured. The
merchants, who desired a monopoly for their Company,
and not free trade, found themselves very much hampered
in their negotiations by interlopers from their own
country and especially by a patent to Sir Walter Raleigh,
granting him the faculty to export cloth, because the
existence of such things made the Hamburgers doubt
their competence to fulfil any agreement they might
make. Soon after their arrival at Hamburg the merchants
had sent a deputation to Stade on the other side of the
Elbe to see if any arrangement could be made there.
The men of Stade were perfectly willing to come to an
agreement, but they refused to enter upon any negotiations unless those with Hamburg were first broken off.
Meanwhile the conversations continued at Hamburg,
for although there seemed little prospect of arriving
at a definite settlement they were anxious to make some
temporary arrangement which would allow them to sell
the cargoes which they had brought with them. Even
this was denied them, for after such an arrangement had
been made it was rejected by the burghers. Somewhat
late in the day, and in contradiction to their earlier
procedure, the Hamburgers now began to say that they
could not act independently of the rest of the Hanse, a
change in attitude supposed to have been inspired by
their fear of the King of Denmark. The merchants
fancied that other hostile influences were at work, for
they found the Hamburgers extremely pro Spanish in
their sympathies and they imagined that much of the
stiffness they had met with was due to prompting
received from the Duke of Parma. Consequently after
treating to no purpose for two months, they suddenly
broke off all negotiations and departed to Stade. There
they speedily came to an agreement to last ten years, on
terms much more favourable than any that had been
offered at Hamburg, for Stade claimed the right to
free navigation of the Elbe. This arrangement was
promptly ratified by the Council in England. As soon
as this became known the Hamburgers were much
concerned, and they lost no time in trying to re-open
negotiations on the basis of the Nonsuch offer. In the
same breath they ominously announced their determination to uphold their rights in the Elbe (p. 398). They
received little satisfaction from the English government.
The reply sent told them plainly that for the arrangement
made with Stade they had no one to thank but themselves.
Their traffic with Parma would have justified the breaking
off of all relations, nevertheless the offer made at Nonsuch
would remain open if they were ready to fulfil their part
of the bargain (p. 429). The Hamburgers preferred to
try other means and fitting out a strong war fleet they
prepared to enforce their claims. English and even
Dutch ships were attacked at Stade and compelled to go
to Hamburg to unlade, while a ship of war was stationed
in the channel to prevent any trading with Stade (p.
646). But the English had anticipated some such development and came out in equal if not greater force. They
found seven or eight Hamburg men of war in the river,
but the German admiral, judging the English to be too
strong, spoke them fair and suffered them to discharge
their cargoes unmolested (p. 644). Other forces were
invoked to abate the pretensions of the Hamburgers.
The Bishop of Bremen announced his intention to
maintain and defend his jurisdiction on the Elbe and he
issued orders forbidding the Hamburgers to use violence
(p. 612). An appeal from Stade to the Imperial Chamber
drew from the emperor a decree commanding the
Hamburgers to withdraw their ships of war and to revoke
their newly imposed tolls, restoring what they had unjustly taken away (p. 646).
V.
Matters of minor importance call for a brief reference
here. Both the Spaniards and the French counted with
some confidence on the outbreak of disaffection in
England. The Spaniards also hoped that the way
might be made plain to them by the queen's assassination
(p. 18), though Philip, to his honour, refused to soil his
hands with any such thing (p. 181). The English
refugees in France received pensions from Spain (p.
284). Many plots, real or imaginary, against the queen's
life are referred to. Walsingham expressed the belief
that the execution of the Queen of Scots made the queen
safer as the papists could no longer hope to advance
their religion by her removal (p. 242, 276). The volume
contains a considerable amount of material bearing upon
Stafford's position in Paris. He had his differences with
Walsingham and his troubles with his secret agents, and
a very virulent enemy in the Abbot Del Bene, but the
impression of his integrity and devotion conveyed in
previous volumes is here fully maintained. He professed
himself an admirer of the King of Navarre, but he did
not get on well with that king's ministers, whom he
accuses of trying to embroil the kingdoms of England
and France, contrary to their own best interests.
The execution of the Queen of Scots naturally made a
great stir on the continent. Pictures of the queen,
emanating from Rome were on sale at Venice, with
verses commending her virtues and calling down vengeance
on Elizabeth (p. 455). The reputation won by Drake
by his exploits in the Indies and elsewhere is illustrated
by the rush to see a portrait of him brought to Ferrara
from France (p. 572).
The publication of this volume has been delayed
by the prolonged illness of Mrs. Lomas. She had passed
the whole of the text for press and had compiled part of
the Index; and it was hoped that she would return after
a few months and finish her work. This hope having
been disappointed, it was, with her consent, completed
by Mr. A. B. Hinds, M.A., who has also written the preceding part of the Preface. It is much to be regretted
that Mrs. Lomas with her intimate knowledge of the
period and of the papers she had edited has not been
able to write her own Preface or at least to supply notes
for those cases where she had promised information in the
Introduction. Two of these, at pages 19 and 248, relate
to what appear to be holograph letters of the King of
Navarre, and it would be idle to speculate what comments
the Editor intended to make on them. The third case,
at page 673 relates to the date of the document there
printed, and is a comparatively simple matter. The paper
is a communication from the Prince of Wallachia and
at page 675 it refers to letters of the 28th November
received on the 26th January, which spoke of the death of
Mehemet Bassa. This will be no other than Mehemet
Sokolli, the Grand Vizier of Turkey, murdered on the
11th October, 1579. (fn. 3) In the Foreign Calendar for 1580
there is a letter from France of the 9th April stating that
the Prince of Wallachia is returning to Turkey. (fn. 4) The
date of the paper will, therefore, be some time between
26th January and 9th April, 1580, probably nearer the
former than the latter date.
A further note in the text refers to the Index for the
identification of the names in a list of supporters of the
King of Navarre at pages 516–7. The list presents
considerable difficulties and these were not lessened by a
somewhat faulty transcription. One or two only of the
persons mentioned had been identified by Mrs. Lomas
in the portion of the Index which she prepared. It is
difficult to identify satisfactorily a large proportion of
the names, which are in all cases the names of fiefs
with no further clue beyond the province to which the
nobles belonged and occasionally a governorship which
one or another held. It is probable that a good number
of them were cadets.
Although no attempt has been made to revise Mrs.
Lomas's text, a certain number of errors have come to
light in the compilation of the Index, and these are all
tabulated in the Corrigenda. The most considerable
of these mistakes are the dating of two papers, occuring
at pages 179 and 260. The first is a letter from Dr.
Marta to the English Ambassador, left undated and
conjectured to belong to the beginning of 1587. This
Marta was a Neapolitan Professor at Padua, and a
familiar of Sir Dudley Carleton and afterwards of Sir
Henry Wotton, ambassadors at Venice in the time of
James I. (fn. 5) The letter refers to the Duke of Mantua
amusing himself at Verona, and this gives the necessary
clue for dating it. In 1613 it was proposed that Carleton
should go on a visit of friendship to the Duke of Mantua,
who had only recently assumed the dignity. The duke
made some difficulties and also pleaded illness. But on
the 22nd October of that year he went to Verona, for a
few days only, (fn. 6) apparently in order to meet Carleton on
neutral ground. The "From the casa Dominica" of
the letter should read "From my house, Sunday." It
may then be assumed with some confidence that the
Sunday in question was the one next following the day of
the duke's journey to Verona, which was a Tuesday, and
so the correct date of the letter would be the 27th October,
1613.
The other misdated paper, at page 260, is a letter
from Don Gonzales de Cordova to the Swiss Cantons.
The date is given as 1587 March 29—April 8, without
brackets. The only original date on the paper is April
8, without the year. The date 1587 is in pencil on the
back in a modern hand and presumably the conjecture
of the official who last arranged the file. Gonzales de
Cordova was the Spanish governor of Milan up to August,
1629. In the spring of that year he had been besieging
Casale, from the neighbourhood of which this letter
is dated. The siege had been raised at the end of March.
Oliver Fleming, from whom the copy of the letter was
received, according to the endorsement, was acting as
resident with the Swiss at this time. As Cordova does
not seem to have had a camp near Casale at any other
time, it is fairly safe to date the letter in the year 1629.
The redating of these two papers has necessitated some
rearrangement of the files to which they belong; and so
far as this rearrangement affects the present volume, the
alterations are included among the corrigenda.
These lapses from the habitual care and accuracy of
Mrs. Lomas are to be attributed to the deterioration of
health which has so unhappily brought to a close her
work on this Calendar.