October 1527, 1-20


Institute of Historical Research



Pascual de Gayangos (editor)

Year published





Comment on this article
Double click anywhere on the text to add an annotation in-line

Citation Show another format:

'Spain: October 1527, 1-20', Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 3 Part 2: 1527-1529 (1877), pp. 412-423. URL: Date accessed: 16 April 2014. Add to my bookshelf


(Min 3 characters)

October 1527, 1-20

4 Oct.213. Andrea del Borgo to the Emperor.
S. E. L. 1,553,
f. 175.
On the 29th of September a captain from the German camp at Narni arrived [at Ferrara], and said that his countrymen, the lansquenets, were not disinclined to serve the Emperor, but only stated that they could not live without pay. They would wait until the 25th of September, and if not paid by that time, would march on Rome and ask for their pay. If that remained without settlement, they would employ force. If neither of these expedients met with success, they were determined to ask safe-conducts from the enemy, and return home. Whoever among them should feel inclined to enter the service of the League might be at liberty to do so, without their countrymen having a right to complain.
Thinks the best thing to do under present circumstances is to conclude peace speedily. The Duke of Ferrara (Alfonso d'Este) shares also this opinion.
Lautrec hearing that Leyva was at Milan, raised the siege of that city, and marched on Pavia.
Muster has been passed [at Narni]; there were 7,500 Germans and 18,000 more troops of all nations. They are not the least afraid of the enemy.—Ferrara, 4th October 1527.
Signed: "Andrea del Burgo."
Italian. Holograph. pp. 1½.
7 Oct.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist.
Salazar, A. 41,
f. 248.
214. Alonso Sanchez, Imperial Ambassador in Venice, to the Emperor.
Since his letter of the 25th ult., Lautrech has approached Milan with the intention of laying siege to it. Having, however, intercepted a letter of Leyva [to the Governor of Pavia], he changed his mind, and took the direction of that city, which they say surrendered to him almost immediately, although it had provisions for two months, and a strong garrison of Italians under Count Lodovico Beljoyosso. (Cipher:) The event had been foreseen, for there was reason to fear that Lautrech had intelligences within the city. He (Sanchez) lost no time in informing Leyva of it, but his letter arrived too late, and Pavia was lost in the manner that His Imperial Majesty must already know through Leyva.
Milan will be defended to the utmost, but it is to be feared that Lecco, Trezzo, and other fortresses also in the Duchy may fall into the hands of the enemy, as they are entirely garrisoned by Italians, whom Antonio de Leyva has sent thither in order to bring the Spaniards to the capital, and, as the Emperor will see, soldiers of that nation are not to be trusted under present circumstances.
(Common writing;) Hears that Cardinals Cibo or Cortonna, or one of the two, have gone to Lautrech's camp for the purpose of urging him to go to Rome and deliver the Pope, and that Lautrech promised to do so as soon as he had taken Pavia. We shall see whether, now the city is taken, he will march that way.
There is a report here that the Imperial army was returning to Rome; that there were dissensions between the Germans and Spaniards, and that the former wished to get the Pope into their hands; that the Viceroy (Lannoy) was dangerously ill at Aversa, in the kingdom of Naples.
Hears from a good source that Prothonotary Gambara, who was Papal Nuncio in England, has gone to Rome for the purpose of intimating to the Pope, in the name of the Kings of England and France, that they will never consent to his making agreements detrimental to the Apostolic See, or to its Cardinals. Cibo, Cortona, Ridolfi, and the newly-made Cardinal of Mantua are at Parma, whence they are in correspondence with Lautrech. Cardinal Egidius is at Padua, and Trani here fat Venice]. Though strongly solicited by their colleagues, they have refused attending the meetings at Parma.
It is also reported that the Cardinal of England (Wolsey) has left France to return to his own country, and that King Francis has made him very valuable presents.
Has duly received the Imperial letter of the 17th of August. No answer is needed, as it only acknowledges his despatches of July last.
(Cipher:) Great armaments are being made in Genoa by the enemy, directed, as is publicly announced, against the kingdom of Naples. Is very much afraid, if the news he correct, that great harm may be done there, for if in the last invasion, when Genoa was for us, and the Imperialists prospered in Lombardy, so many towns in Naples were lost, what will happen now that the small army under Leyva is entirely without resources, and almost shut up in Milan?
Andrea Doria took Porto Ercole some time ago. The Siennese are now trying to recover it. That captain, they say, has despatched from Genoa six of his galleys to its relief. —Venice, 7th October 1527.
Signed: "Alonso Sanchez."
Addressed: "Sacræ, Cesareæ, et Catholicæ Majestati."
Indorsed: "To the King. 1527. From Venice. Sanchez 7th October."
Spanish. Original partly in cipher. Contemporary deciphering on separate sheet pp. 2.
9 Oct.215. Andrea del Borgo to the Emperor.
S. E. L. 1,553,
f. 247.
B. M. Add. 28,576,
f. 377.
Was about to seal his despatch of the 4th inst, when a trusty person came, and related to him that the sacking and slaughter at Pavia were really dreadful, and that neither the monasteries of men nor convents of nuns had been spared.
(Cipher:) Notwithstanding the entreaties of the cardinals, Lautrech would not lay siege to Milan, and gave orders to suspend the works for throwing a bridge [over the Pò.] He waits no doubt for instructions from the King, his master, whom both the cardinals within Sanct Angelo and those assembled at Parma are urging to send his armies to the Pope's deliverance. They have written that this is a good opportunity for him (Lautrech) to attack us by land, whilst the French fleet does it by sea. For, they say, whilst the Imperialists are at variance together, and there is no money to pay the troops, anything may be attempted. This is unluckily true to a certain extent, for of the sums provided by the Emperor, nothing remains in the hands of his treasurers, and those promised by the Pope do not seem to be forthcoming, for whenever our people press him to pay, he answers that he has not the means. From Naples no money can be expected, the kingdom being completely exhausted by the expenses of this war. The Viceroy is confined to his bed, so dangerously ill that he is not expected to live. Even if he should recover, he could not do much good that way, especially if the fleet and Lautrech make a combined attack by sea and land. The Imperial army, it is added, cannot, from their private dissensions and want of money, hold together much longer.
(Cipher:) Such is the advice of the cardinals and also that of the Florentines; the rest of the confederates, the Venetians, and Francesco Sforza want Lautrech to go to Milan, but not to undertake the siege until the 6,000 Switzers engaged by the King of France come to reinforce his army, when they expect he will be able to march on Rome and attempt the conquest of Naples. Meanwhile he is waiting for an answer from France, to know whether he is to lay siege to Milan, or go to Rome at once to free the Pope, and afterwards invade Naples.
(Common writing:) The French pretend that their forces amount to 30,000 men, but the general opinion is that they do not exceed 18,000, good, bad, and indifferent.
(Cipher:) His (Borgo's) informer further says that the brother of the English ambassador in Venice went the other day to the French camp, and said many things concerning the King of England, who he said was to do wonders, &c. The said King is considered the principal instigator of the war now raging [in Italy] between the Emperor and the King of France. The Cardinal of York (Wolsey) had taken leave of the latter to return to England, loaded with presents. Upon his arrival in England he was to do many things (facturus multa); war was to be declared against the Emperor, conjointly with France, &c.
Such is the news brought from the French camp by a trustworthy person. Knows well that intelligence of this sort is not much to be relied upon, as everyone speaks according to his wishes; yet considers it his duty to report what he hears.
(Cipher:) The Doge of Venice said the other day in public as he (Borgo) learns from letters of his own countrymen (propriorum) received yesterday, that the Germans had entered Rome [a second time], robbing whatever they could lay their hands upon, and that they intended sacking the city again. Some money, however, had been sent for the pay of the said Germans, but probably not enough to make them abandon Rome.
The Spaniards and Italians were encamped at various places in the neighbourhood. There was a talk of disbanding the Italians, which was not difficult to accomplish, when it would be much easier to provide for the pay of the Germans. (fn. 1)
(Common writing:) Wishes to God the Imperial forces could soon return to Lombardy, for then everything would go on well. This Duke [of Ferrara] certainly wishes for the Emperor s prosperity and good success. If he has not done hitherto all he could and would do, it is chiefly owing to the causes mentioned in former despatches. Not, indeed, that the Duke is in any way disinclined to serve the Emperor to the utmost of his power, but that people misrepresented him, or wishing to forward their own particular ends, chose to accuse him. Has no doubt that the Duke will help when required, and will never break his faith, but, on the contrary, do his duty towards the Emperor. He certainly might wish the Emperor to provide differently than he does for the affairs of Italy, so that a good peace might be concluded between the belligerents. He (Borgo) does what he can in this respect; but the Emperor's ministers and others, with their erroneous views concerning the Duke, will perhaps be the cause of the Emperor's affairs in [Italy] sustaining injury. In this accusation the innocent may suffer for the guilty, but what he (Borgo) says is the plain truth, as he has lately informed the High Chancellor, Mercurino di Gattinara, in one of his letters.
It is very needful that His Imperial Majesty make such provision either through peace or through war, in which latter case the wants of this army must be speedily met, that his affairs may be put on a satisfactory footing. The Emperor has still in Italy many adherents and faithful servants, who wish to see him triumph [over his enemies], but they are afraid that the course now followed will not ensure a complete victory. Certainly reinforcements from Germany and other countries would not be wanting if money were provided for their pay, and if there were besides order and harmony between the Imperial ministers. As, however, this cannot be easily obtained, and as, moreover, it is doubtful whether the Emperor can provide for the emergency as quickly as is required, the best thing to do, in his opinion, is to make peace, which after all is the surest and most advisable course to follow.—Ferrariæ, Nonæ Octobris 1527.
Signed: "Andrea del Borgo."
P.S.—The news from Genoa is that the [enemy's] fleet will not be able to put to sea as early as was anticipated, and that when once the winter season sets in, nothing of importance will be achieved. Neither are they afraid of Mons. de Lautrech, for should he decide to march on Rome, and attack the Imperial army there, and in the kingdom of Naples, it is to be hoped that the Imperialists, once paid their arrears, would go out against him and obtain an easy victory. If for that time it were possible to get a few thousand men more from Germany, and money for the pay of at least 8,000 infantry, all matters might be satisfactorily settled, for there is at Milan a considerable division of the army, against which neither the Venetians nor the partisans of Francesco Sforza. can well make head. The only drawback is that the King of Hungary having to attend to his own dominions, with the coffers of his treasury quite empty, will not be able to give assistance just now. Hopes, however, that some good expedient will be found to avert the danger of the situation. The remedy must be speedy, or else everything will be lost.
Latin. Original partly in cipher. Contemporary deciphering on the margins and between the lines. pp. 4.
12 Oct.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist.
Salazar, A. 41,
f. 253.
216. Alonso Sanchez, Imperial Ambassador in Venice, to the Emperor.
Wrote on the 7th by three different ways advising the loss of Pavia. (Cipher:) The enclosed copy of his letter to the King of Bohemia and Hungary, informing him of the present position of affairs, will duly acquaint the Emperor with everything that has happened since. His Majesty will perceive from the tenour of the said letter that the King, his brother, though he has lately obtained a most signal victory over his enemy, the Vayvod, will not be able to send the promised reinforcements as soon as was expected. Hungary was still so disturbed that it could not possibly be left to its fate. On the 27th ult., Count Salm, who commands the Royal forces, surprised the Vayvod, and defeated him with great loss, most of his men being slain or drowned in a river, close to which the battle was fought. The Vayvod fled, no one knows in what direction.
This letter is directed to the Imperial ambassador at the Court of Bohemia, for him to show to the King, and then forward [to Spain].
Has no doubt that His Highness will do everything in his power to assist us. The Emperor, nevertheless, must not neglect his Italian affairs, which are in so dangerous a state that if help be delayed it may come too late.—Venice 12th of October 1527.
Signed: "Alonso Sanchez."
Addressed: "Sacræ, Cesareæ, et Catholiæ Majestati."
Indorsed: "To the King. 1527. From Venice. Sanchez 12th of October."
Spanish. Original parity in cipher. Contemporary deciphering on separate sheet. pp. 1½.
17 Oct.217. Prothonotary Caracciolo to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist.
Salazar, A. 41,
f. 265.
(Cipher:) The bearer of this letter has just returned from Lautrech's camp. He says that the French army has marched as far as Belzoiosso (Belgioioso), and must by this time be close to Lodi. The avowed intention of the enemy seems to be to attack Rome, and thence go to Naples, which is to be invaded by sea and land. In Lombardy the Venetians and the Duke [of Urbino] still occupy Marignano and other strong potitions, trying to worry and tire us out, knowing, as they do, that we have no money or provisions in store.
The news lately received from Rome is that the Imperial army is very much reduced in numbers, partly by the plague, which has carried away thousands, and partly because many have deserted and gone home. The Germans and Spaniards were still inside the city, insisting upon being paid their arrears out of the Pope's money. The Viceroy was suffering from quartan fever, at a town in the kingdom of Naples called Aversa. By the last advices he was so ill that his life was despaired of. It is doubtful whether the army will ever come to our assistance, or the reinforcements expected from Germany arrive in time to save us,—Milan, 17th October 1527.
Signed: "Prothonotario Caracciolo."
Addressed: "Sacratissinmæ, Cesareæ, et Catholiæ Majestati."
Italian. Original entirely in cipher. Contemporary deciphering on separate sheet pp. 2.
18 Oct.218. Antonio de Leyva to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist.
Salazar, A. 41,
f. 267.
His last, which went by way of Monaco, was dated the 30th ult. Since then Lautrech, after taking Alessandrea, came on here to Milan, and on Thursday, the 26th, encamped at place close by, called San Christoval (San Christoforo) imagining no doubt that we were going to surrender, as the venetians had led him to believe. Perceiving, however, that we intended to offer resistance, Lautrech joined the Venetians under the Duke of Urbino, and both marched upon Pavia, which they at once besieged with a most powerful artillery.
Having planted four batteries, they began to fire with one of them against the castle, whose walls soon crumbled down as if they had been dust. The Emperor may believe me that it was the fiercest artillery combat that ever took place. The Italians inside withstood the enemy's assault with great courage, and Count [Lodovico], who commanded them, did his very utmost. We ourselves [from Milan] helped the besieged as much as was in our power; for on the day, and at the very same hour that the enemy made the above-mentioned attack on the castle, I, with 1,000 Germans, 600 Spaniards, 200 lances, and 300 light horse, came suddenly upon them, and cut to pieces the company of men-at-arms (gendarmes) of the Duke of Albany, mustering 100 men, who happened that day to be on duty. Meanwhile the inhabitants, unable to resist the attack of the enemy, flocked round Count Lodovico, humbly requesting he would send a trumpeter to Lautrech, and offer to capitulate. The Count refused, and defended himself for two more days as well as he could, until at last the citizens took up arms against the garrison to oblige them to capitulate, which the Count prepared to do after obtaining a safe-conduct. I am told that no sooner did the Count arrive at the enemy's camp than Lautrech ordered another assault to be made on the castle, and, in spite of his plighted word, retained near him the person of the Count, for whom he now asks a ransom of 10,000 cr. (escudos). Of course the castle was taken and the city sacked; the Count and Pietro de Birago were sent to Genoa.
After the taking of Pavia, which happened on the 5th inst., the enemy began to brag and say that they would soon come to Milan and take it also from us. They actually encamped before this city, but finding us prepared to receive them, they changed their mind (cipher:) and went away. Lautrech with his bands has now passed the Pó, and is marching in the direction of Rome for three different purposes, as he gives out. The first to prevent the Pope and the Florentines from giving the money they have promised us; the second, to threaten the kingdom of Naples from that vicinity; and the third, to hinder the Imperialists from giving us assistance.
The Venetians, under the Duke of Urbino, remain encamped before this city. I am not afraid of them, but I can assure Your Majesty that the sufferings of this small army, destitute as it is of money and provisions, are very great, and though we still fight, we may in the end all die of starvation. It is now full four months that my several letters representing the miserable condition of the forces under my command have remained unanswered. Nor have I during all that time received help or encouragement from anyone.
The loss of Alessandria was entirely owing to the bad management of Çount Baptista Lodron. That city once lost, Pavia could not be successfully defended, because neither the Germans nor the Spaniards could defend more than one city at a time. At Pavia we were in too large a number, and the city had not provisions for us all. At Milan we are not so numerous as we ought to be. Nevertheless, though all the world is against us, and we have neither money nor provisions we have hitherto kept, and will hereafter keep, Milan, Como', Trezzo, Lecco, Pizziguitone, and Monza, which are the most important cities and passes in this Duchy. The castle of Novara still holds for the Emperor, and the city will soon be recovered. Pavia is in such a state with its crumbling walls that neither the enemy nor ourselves will be able to retain it long. Whoever has Pavia must be also master of the field.
Your Imperial Majesty ought to consider that three great dangers beset us here. Firstly, we are few in number; secondly, we have no money; and thirdly, we are without provisions. All my efforts to lay in a good store of the latter have been fruitless, because just at the harvest time the enemy was scouring the country. Your Majesty may believe me when I say that I have hitherto done wonders for the defence of this city The Germans mutiny almost daily for want of pay; the Milanese desert their homes to avoid having to feed my soldiers, and the countrypeople are completely ruined, and unable to support the burdens of this war.
[Reproduces the paragraph of his letter of the 4th September, and then continues in cipher:] Cannot help again reminding Your Majesty that for four or five months I have received no assistance from anyone, and that Milan cannot be guarded with only 6,000 men, Spaniards and Germans, which is all the force now under my command. Never was this Duchy successfully defended on former occasions, except by 10,000 or 12,000 men at least. Had Count Baptista Lodron not divided his Germans not one fortress in this Estate would have been lost. As it is, let us only have money to pay for what we eat, and provisions will come in abundantly. If a reinforcement of 7,000 or 8,000 Germans arrive, I undertake not only to maintain my positions during this winter, but to recover one by one all the places we have lost in the Duchy.
The news from Rome is anything but satisfactory, for although I myself have received no letters for a very long time, I gather from what the enemy publishes that no help is to be expected from that quarter. To prevent the Imperialists from coming to Lombardy, the Pope delays as long as he can the payment of the 150,000 ducats, so often promised to the army. It is he (the Pope) who insists now upon the French going that way, and is doing Your Majesty all the harm he can, as if he were in complete freedom. May God forgive him who was the cause of the Pope remaining at Rome! He would have been better at Gaeta, and Italy would have been spared the many bad thoughts which no doubt assail its people just now. I can assure Your Majesty that it is the Pope who kindles this fire, and that he is now more evil disposed than ever. (fn. 2) Little trust can be placed in him. I have often informed the Viceroy and the other captains of these sentiments of mine; but to no purpose for I have never received an answer from them, and what is more, I know not what they intend doing.
(Common writing:) The French army is greatly reduced in numbers. It only musters 5,000, with Gascons and Frenchmen. Swiss there are hardly any, as 13 companies of them have lately deserted, and gone home discontented [for want of pay]. Lautrech has besides 2,000 Italians and 1,000 Germans under his banners; his men-at-arms are estimated at 500, though in reality they do not exceed 300. The artillery is both numerous and powerful, the best that was ever seen in these parts, but with all this the least help in men and money will enable me to take the offensive, and make Your Majesty master of the whole world.
The Venetians, under the Duke [of Urbino], amount to 6,000 foot, 500 men-at-arms, and 600 light horse. This force, .they say, is soon to be increased to the number of 15,000 men, for the avowed purpose of besieging us in Milan, cutting off our supplies, &c. (Cipher:) Between Frenchmen and Venetians, however, there is little or no similarity of opinion; they disagree on most points concerning the war, and mistrust each other. If I only had money and a few more men I would soon baffle all their plans of campaign
Encloses a list (fn. 3) of noble citizens, who, regardless of danger and privation, have preferred remaining at Milan with their wives and children, and risking their lives and property in his service. Recommends them all to the Emperor's favour. The office of treasurer to the Imperial forces, vacant by the death of the Abbot of Najera, has been given to Bartolomeo di Magis, who, together with Antonio Rabia, has lately done good service, procuring money, &c. Begs for a confirmation of the appointment, which he was compelled to make, as the army could not well be without a paymaster.
At Parma no less than eight cardinals have lately met, for the purpose, as they say, of electing a lieutenant to the Papacy. An ambassador from the King of England is with them. Mons. de Lautrech is also to assist at the conferences, as well as the Duke [Francesco Sforza], who, though almost powerless, is doing what harm he can to the Imperial cause Cannot say what resolution they will come to. Should he learn anything he will not fail to advise.
A trumpeter, whom I sent some days ago to the enemy's camp, has just returned with a message from Count Guido Rangone, saying that the Viceroy of Naples (Lannoy) is dead.—Milan, 18th October 1527.
Signed: "Anto. De Leyva."
Addressed: "To the most Sacred, Imperial, and Catholic Majesty."
Indorsed: "To His Majesty. From Antonio de Leyva. 18th of October. Answered."
Spanish. Original partly in cipher. Contemporary deciphering on separate sheet. pp. 5.
19 Oct.219. News from Rome.
S. E. L. 1,553,
f. 180.
B. M. Add. 28,576,
f. 395.
The following intelligence has been brought by a servant of Madame de Lannoy (la Viceregina di Napoli). who left Rome on the 11th, under a safe-conduct of Mons. de Lautrec, to proceed to Flanders, and who arrived here (Ferrara) on the 19th of October [1527.]
The Viceroy (Charles de Lannoy) died about 20 days ago. (fn. 4) Don Ugo de Moncada remains in command till new orders [from Spain], It is expected that a very heavy tax will be levied on the kingdom of Naples.
The Imperial army is at Rome, doing no harm whatever to the city, except that for want of fire-wood they take the doors, window sills, and wooden vessels (vaselli) of the houses to warm themselves with and cook their meals.
The Germans had received two months' pay out of the money remitted from Naples, which had considerably helped them in their wants. More money was expected to come, one pay to the Spaniards, and a trifle to the light horse. As to the men-at-arms, they had been paid part of their arrears some days before.
The Imperial army [at Rome] musters 15,000 good infantry, 500 lances, and upwards of 1,000 light horse.
Letters from Rome state that Mons. de Vhere (Veyre), whom the Emperor had sent to treat for the Pope's liberation, had arrived at the beginning of September, bringing powers from the Viceroy, and from the general of the Franciscans (Quiñones), to make arrangements for the Pope's release, provided certain towns were pledged as security for the payment of the sums stipulated.
Had it not been for the Viceroy's demise, the agreement would have been made and signed [much sooner], for he (De Veyre) had a special mandate to conclude what he thought best for the Emperor's service, and the Pope besides seemed disposed to grant anything that was asked of him; but on the death of the Viceroy neither the General (Quiñones) nor Mons. de Vere (Veyre) felt disposed to take the responsibility on themselves, and, therefore, the negotiations were suspended. The master of the post, who accompanied the informer, asserts that the agreement cannot fail to take place as intended, as he was going in the Pope's name to the cardinals assembled at Parma, for the purpose of dissuading them from the meeting, they (the Cardinals) being supposed to be rather in favour of the Emperor.
The steward of the Prince of Orange (el Maestro de Casa), who came from Spain with Mons. de Vhere (Veyre), was taken prisoner between Rome and Sienna by certain horsemen of the League; he is still in confinement.
The informer was also detained two whole days in the enemy's camp, which he describes as in bad order and by no means numerous.
The above is the news from Rome. Mons. de Lautrec had passed the river Pò, and was to be at Piacenza yesterday (the 18th). He intends, the French say, to remain five or six days in the Piacentino and Parmigiano, to give time for 4,000 lansquenets to join him. But if such be his intention, he will have to stay there at least 20 days, for no news has yet come of the lansquenets having passed the mountains.
The King of England wishes the French to go to Rome, otherwise he says he will not give any help in money.
Italian. Original. pp. 2½.


1 "De disolutione Italorum, quod esset facilis ad providendum, si its faciliter possent providere solutioni Germanorum."
2 "Y certifico á V. Mt. que por lo que puedo entender y alcançar no dexa cl Papa dc hazer agora todo el mal que puede, como si estuviesse en su entera libertad. Dios se lo perdone á quien le dexó estar alii, que mejor estaria en Gayetta, y seria causa de evitar muchos malos pensamientos á Italia porque el es el que pone fuego en todo y tiene peor voluntad contra Vña Mt. que nunca, y se deve esperar [de é] poca fiança." "Y certifico á V. Mt. que por lo que puedo entender y alcançar no dexa cl Papa dc hazer agora todo el mal que puede, como si estuviesse en su entera libertad. Dios se lo perdone á quien le dexó estar alii, que mejor estaria en Gayetta, y seria causa de evitar muchos malos pensamientos á Italia porque el es el que pone fuego en todo y tiene peor voluntad contra Vña Mt. que nunca, y se deve esperar [de é] poca fiança."
3 It is appended to the letter, and contains the names of Count Lodovico Belgioioso and his brother Alberico; Count Filipo Torniello; Pietro Botigela (Boticella); Hieronimo di Castione, President of the Senate; Lodovico di Magis (de' Mazii?), chairman of the board of extraordinary magistrates (magistros straordinurios); Antonio Rabia, presidente de las Biauas (della Biada); Bartolomeo di Magis, treasurer; Lodovico Galarom (di Galarata?), collateral [councillor], and commissary "de las Taxas" (delle Tasse?); Marco di Beccaria, and his brother the Provost. See above, p. 371.
4 That is on the 20th of September. A letter of Sanchez says that it took place on the 23rd.