October 1542


Institute of Historical Research



Pascual de Gayangos (editor)

Year published





Comment on this article
Double click anywhere on the text to add an annotation in-line

Citation Show another format:

'Spain: October 1542', Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 6 Part 2: 1542-1543 (1895), pp. 142-159. URL: Date accessed: 19 April 2014. Add to my bookshelf


(Min 3 characters)

October 1542, 1-31

2 Oct.66. Eustace Chapuys to the Queen of Hungary.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233,
f. 114–5.
"Madame,"—I have this very morning received Your Majesty's letter of the 23rd inst., inclosing several more for the Emperor, which I immediately forwarded by express to Bristol, in order that if Fallaix is still in that port, and has not yet sailed for Spain, he may himself be the bearer of them. In case, however, of his having left, which I very much fear he has, I have made arrangements with a Spaniard here, who has almost decided to go home on his own private affairs, to undertake that voyage immediately and be the bearer of the packet of letters, which he has faithfully promised to do in return for a gratuity (moyennant un pot de vin), which I have promised him. This afternoon, after dinner, I called on the King, who told me that very willingly would he have received (accueilli) here the Germans mentioned in Your Majesty's letter [to him] had it not been that, according to reliable information, of which he was in receipt, the Emperor was not likely to want their services for the purpose of having the siege of Perpignan raised, inasmuch as the French, after the great loss they had sustained by the regular and periodical sorties of the garrison, as well as by the artillery fire from the batteries (bellowars) of the town, and another from a hillock commanding the place, had actually raised the siege, and attempted another town in the neighbourhood called Henne (Elne), (fn. 1) the inhabitants of which had also repulsed them; so that they had returned crestfallen to their camp. They had since made another vain attempt upon Colibre and Port Vendres, until perceiving that they were losing their time, and being afraid of the army under the duke of Alba, which amounts to 15,000 or 16,000 men, including the reinforcements shortly expected from Italy, they had retreated to a small town called Elarak (Clairac) (fn. 2) two or three leagues from Perpignan [on the frontier of France]. King Francis has sent for all the best military engineers in his kingdom to ask their advice as to the fortification of the town, near which he is now encamped, so as to reduce Perpignan by famine, or oblige the Emperor's army to come and attack him in his fortified camp, he (king Francis) boasting (bragoit) of being extremely anxious and eager for battle, and saying that he had only one daughter, but he would rather see her become a prostitute than lose his hope of fighting a good battle with the Emperor. And yet, notwithstanding that taunt, this king believes, and so does his resident ambassador in France, that his brother of France is more desirous of peace or truce, whichever it may be, than of a battle with His Imperial Majesty. The King has expressed his wonder to me how the French can possibly think by that means of reducing by famine a place like Perpignan, having at its back the whole of Spain, especially when the Emperor, as they themselves own, is stronger by sea than they are, by which means the garrison, if short of provisions, could at any time be revictualled.
That Your Majesty may better understand what his plans of campaign are, he has given me the enclosed map that you may have it copied and forwarded to the Emperor. He has also told me that having heard by letters from Anvers (Antwerp) that the bishop of Westminster had already taken leave of the Emperor, and is returning in company of certain Spanish personages of the Emperor's court, and that at Dieppe fourteen or fifteen French ships were being hastily armed, he had thought of dispatching the best and fastest vessel in these waters to warn the bishop and the others, and tell them of the danger of the said French ships, and advise them to come by the Irish Channel.
With regard to Scotch affairs, the King has declared to me that the ambassadors of king James have shown of late greater coldness than before in the affairs of the peace, especially since they had received their master's answer. They will not engage that king James shall come beyond York until the Queen has been delivered of a child. This condition the King refuses to accept, and is decided, unless the ambassadors speak differently, to give orders for his army to march into Scotland at once. And upon my surmising that perhaps the Scotch had heard (avoient senti quelque fumée) of the French ships being armed at Dieppe, the King replied to me that there was no fear of that, for his ships at sea kept so good a watch on the coast of Normandy that the Scotch could have no news whatever from France. He believed, however, that the French are trying to do him all the harm possible, and slighting as much as they can his ambassador, whom they purposely keep away both from Camp and Court. Notwithstanding that, the ambassador has managed to send a secret herald (herault) or agent to king Francis' camp in the environs of Perpignan, through whom the King got the information he gave me the other day, (fn. 3) and, what is more, he has ascertained that Mons. d'Orleans was also in that frontier with the King, his father, and that a good portion of the men of Clèves (Clevois) and other lanskennets were going thither.
The Irish lord of the name of Nel (O'Neil), of whom I wrote in my despatch of the 14th, (fn. 4) was yesterday created count (earl), having sworn fealty and obedience to this king in the most ample manner, and what is still more wonderful, the [Irish] bishops who came with him have renounced the titles and dignities they hold from the Pope to receive them again from this king's hands.—London, 2 October 1542.
Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
French. Holograph. pp. 4.
7 Oct.67. The Same to the Same.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233,
ff. 116–8.
"Madame,"—Yesterday, in the afternoon, after dinner, the privy councillors sent me word that the bishop of Vuasmestre (Westminster) had arrived at Plemua (Plymouth), and had been obliged to land in a fishing boat with two of his men and his despatches, owing to the large ship, on board of which he and Mr. de Courrières (fn. 5) came, not being able to enter the port from stress of weather. As to the latter, being rather indisposed on account of the sea voyage and of the wind blowing harder than ever, he would not go into the boat, and preferred remaining on board the ship, which took to the high sea again. It is thought, however, that on the same day that the bishop landed at Plymouth, which was Tuesday, Mr. de Courrières was enabled to land at Falemue (Falmouth), which is seven leagues from the above-mentioned port. I have also received a particular and private message from one of this king's privy councillors to the effect that the Bishop has brought from Spain a very favorable despatch, and that His Imperial Majesty is in very good health, and has decided next year to pay the French a visit, attacking them both in Guyenne and in the Languedoc, in spite of all the sermons and admonitions of the Portuguese Cardinal. (fn. 6)
This king has sent to Falmouth Master Huyet (Wyatt) and certain other courtiers to receive and accompany the said Mr. de Courrières, of whom I have not yet got news. Indeed, I am rather astonished at his not having written to me, or sent on one of his suite or else the courier who comes over with him.
Within the last three days the King has laid an embargo on almost all foreign ships in the ports of England, or at least on their crews, owing to his having had intelligence that at Dieppe the French are fitting out a fleet, and also that some of the men, who had lately served in Picardy, had actually come down to man that fleet. The King, moreover, somewhat suspects that the said fleet and infantry are intended to succour the Scotch in case of war. The negociations with the latter still continue, for their ambassadors here are, as I imagine, delaying as long as they can for the sole purpose of gaining time, and waiting only either for succour from France or for the arrival of winter, which will naturally put a stop to all military operations against their country, and then they will laugh at the company. (fn. 7)
Please God that a good peace be concluded in the meantime between England and Scotland, so as to enable this king to bring all his power to bear against the French. I believe, however, that Your Majesty has already heard from other quarters the news of the French armaments at Dieppe, and taken measures against any attack on that coast.— London, 7 October 1542.
Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
French. Holograph. pp. 2.
7 Oct. 67. The Same to the Same.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233,
f. 116–8.
"Madame,"—The day before yesterday, after dinner, these privy councillors sent me word that the bishop of Westminster (fn. 8) had arrived at Plemua (Plymouth). The Bishop had been compelled, owing to the boisterous sea, and to the fact that the large ship (navire) in which he was with Mr. de Courrières could not approach the land, to throw himself into a fisherman's boat with his despatches and two men of his suite. As Mr. de Courrières, who was rather sick and fatigued from his voyage, saw that the wind was increasing and that the waves were getting higher and higher, he dared not land at Plemua, but was obliged to put to sea again. It is, however, calculated that on Tuesday, the very same day on which the Bishop landed, he (Mr. de Courrières) must have arrived at Falemue (Falmouth), a port seven leagues from the said Plymouth. (fn. 9) By a private message received from one of the privy councillors I am informed that the Bishop brings very good news from Spain, declaring that His Imperial Majesty was in good health (God be thanked for it), and has determined to pay the French a visit, invading their country both on the side of Guyenne and on that of Languedoc, all in spite of the sermons preached by the Portuguese Cardinal!!
This king has sent Master Huyet (Wyatt) and certain others to meet on the road and accompany to this city the said Mr. de Courrières, of whom I have had no news yet. Indeed, I am really astonished at his not having already written to me or informed me of his arrival by one of his men or by the courier who comes with him.
For the last three days the greater part of the merchant vessels in the ports of England are being sequestered by this king's order, that he may avail himself of them, or at least of their crews, in case of need. This has been done, exclusively of other reasons, in consequence of intelligence received from Dieppe that considerable naval armaments are making ready in that port, and that some of the men-at-arms, whom king Francis has in Picardy, have also gone thither to man the fleet. The King, moreover, has reason to suspect that those French armaments are intended in favor and for the assistance of the Scotch, with whom negociations for a peace are still being carried on here, though in my opinion they are purposely delaying them as long as they can, in order to gain time and give the French time to prepare a fleet for their defence, or else that by winter setting in, all appearance of war may pass away for the present, after which they will laugh at the English. May it please God that a good and lasting peace be concluded with the Scotch, for then this king will be able to make greater efforts against the French! I have no doubt that Your Majesty knows already of the reported French armaments at Dieppe, and has by this time taken precautionary measures against them should they be destined against the coasts of the Low Countries.—London, 7 October 1542.
Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
French. Holograph. pp. 2.
10 Oct. 68. The Same to the Same.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233,
f. 119.
"Madame,"—I write in favor and commendation of Guillaume d'Amizelle, sent by the king of England for the purpose of purchasing in the Low Countries and exporting therefrom one thousand "bois de sappin" to make shafts for spears.—London, 10 October 1542.
Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
French. Holograph. p. 1.
18 Oct. 69. The Same and Mr. de Courrières to the Same. (fn. 10)
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233.
"Madame,"—The day before yesterday, the 16th inst., Mr. de Courrières and I (Chapuys) went to the King, who, after our declaring to him in virtue of our joint credentials the Emperor's reciprocal good-will and intention to treat of closer friendship and intelligence, said to us that it was not his fault that the alliance had not been sooner established. He was astonished (said the King) at the delay there had been in the matter, and, above all, at the difficulties and scruples raised by His Imperial Majesty, who ought not (he added) to have been stopped by trifles, thereby preventing the accomplishment of a work of such importance. Neither the article about the rebels, nor the clause specifying the ecclesiastical dignitaries to be included in the defensive league, were worthy of the scrupulous and minute examination bestowed on them, in doing which so much time had been lost. For since we came to treat in the Emperor's name of renewing and strengthening that intimacy and alliance which already existed between the two friends, the treaty confirming that alliance must be so worded, and its clauses so specifically and closely bound together, that there should remain no possibility for misinterpretation and calumny, through which hereafter greater inconveniences than before might ensue. (fn. 11) Upon which Mr. de Courrières and I (Chapuys) summarily explained to him the Emperor's legitimate reasons and excuses for delaying his final answer, without, however, entering into many details, or trying to discuss the matter with him. This process seemed to us more convenient and less likely to over-irritate the King, reserving all our best arguments and excuses for our next conference with the privy councillors; the more so, that I (Chapuys) had three days before discussed the matter at length with the King himself, (fn. 12) who had sent for me on some excuse or other, but in reality to lament himself and complain to me (as a friend, he was pleased to say, (fn. 13) not as Imperial ambassador) of the difficulties and obstacles in the way of the treaty.
At last, after inquiring about the Emperor's health, congratulating us on his successes in the duchy of Juliers, and speaking of various things and affairs—of which, as well as of the honorable reception made to me on my arrival in this country, I (Courrières) intend informing Your Majesty verbally on my return—this king said that in order to put an end to this matter of the treaty, he would appoint two deputies and commissioners to debate about it with us. So did the King, for, yesterday, the bishops of Winchester and Westminster (fn. 14) and secretary Vristley (Wriothesley), named for that express purpose, came to dine with me. The dinner over, we at once proceeded to business. First of all we examined the doubts and difficulties, which had been started by the Emperor's ministers in Spain to this King's ambassadors. Having repeated the very same arguments, of which the Emperor's ministers had made use in Spain, and added such others as then and there came to our mind, we perceived at once that we could not persuade the deputies to agree with us on that point; for scarcely had we ended our speech, when one of the councillors rose and said he was afraid that the King, his master, would not accept the proposed terms, and that the whole structure would fall to pieces in consequence. This notwithstanding, we went on with the discussion of the points until we perceived, or at least imagined, that the deputies laid less stress on the article concerning the Pope than on those of the resort (hantise) and of the rebels. True is it the deputies did not expatiate at any length on those subjects, for fear, as I presume, of their not knowing then how to meet our arguments, or else of their wanting to know first what their master's final resolution would be concerning the said articles, with which resolution, as it appears, we are to be apprized this very day, though we very much doubt, to judge from the deputies' countenance and words, of the resolution being a favorable one, and are afraid that the whole business will be retarded rather than quickened by it. That is why we should wish, above all things, that the discussion of these matters took place there in the Low Countries, and in Your Majesty's presence, rather than here, in England, though we are afraid that this king and his ministers, for the sake of etiquette (reputation) and other motives, when asked will not consent to it. In this state of things, and our joint charge being entirely dependent on or strictly founded upon the advice, the will, and the commands of Your Majesty, we very humbly beg you to instruct us as soon as possible as to how we are to act respecting other articles of the treaty not expressly reserved by the Emperor, and whether Your Majesty agrees or not to our proposal of remitting the discussion of the whole [to Brussels], and temporizing with this King's deputies so as to gain time, &c.
We cannot pass over in silence the very singular fact that this king, who at other times was almost continually talking to us in favor of the duke of Clèves, and even suggesting a reconciliation between the Emperor and him, has not said lately one word to us about that, but, on the contrary, has shown satisfaction and pleasure at hearing of the success of the Imperial army against him. (fn. 15)
Of other news we have none of importance to advise, not even as regards Scotch affairs, save saying that the Lord Privy Seal died the other day of the plague in the North, (fn. 16) It is a very great pity, for he was a prudent and wise personage, and as much inclined and devoted to the Emperor's service as could be imagined.—London, 18th of October 1542.
Signed: "Eustace Chapuys"="De Montmorency."
French. Holograph. pp. 3.
18 Oct.70. The Same to the Same.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233,
ff. 221–2.
"Madame,"—Since our joint letter (fn. 17) of this morning, the King has sent us a message to excuse his deputies for their being unable to attend the conference fixed for to-morrow morning, in consequence of important business likely to occupy them for some hours. At the same time he has forwarded to us a summary of the news received from his ambassador at the court of France, with the prayer not to reveal them to anyone, or say that they came from him. The French had deliberately raised the siege of Perpignan, and retreated altogether from the county of Roussillon, after fortifying a few places of little or no importance at all in it. It appears that some time before their retreat, the duke of Alba (fn. 18) had reinforced the garrison of Perpignan with 3,000 men, and king Francis, guessing what the Duke's intentions were, had detached a considerable force to stop him on the road thither. The French, however, had not dared to attack the Spaniards, and the consequence was that the Duke had succeeded in altogether relieving the place.
King Francis intended to remain some time at Narbonne, to see whether the Emperor would or would not march his army into Languedoc, and, if he did, resist as best he could. In case of the Emperor attempting to proceed to Italy, king Francis intends going to Lyons. If, on the contrary, the Emperor's army invades France on the side of Navarre, king Francis will march straight thither, and afterwards to Sanctonga (Sainctonges), and lastly to Britanny, where he will collect his fleet, sail for Picardy, and attack the Low Countries by sea and land next spring. He (king Francis) is very much annoyed and displeased at his not having disposed once for all his forces in that direction, and made the most of it. The Swiss had quitted his camp, not over satisfied with him or he with them, inasmuch as when recruited they had been given to understand that their services were intended for a defence of French territory, not for foreign countries, and principally for an invasion of the Emperor's dominions.
Johan Paule Ursin (Giovan Paolo Orsino), and various other Italian captains, have left for their own country, with a view to raise levies for next year, and do all the mischief they possibly can. King Francis, moreover, is treating with Pope Paul, to whom he has offered the kingdom of Naples. The former already looks upon the duke of Ferrara (fn. 19) as his friend and ally, since the latter has actually sent—or, at least, promised to send—artillery and ammunition to Maran. (fn. 20) The Venetian ambassador, whom king Francis had for some time back refused to receive, has of late been very much caressed by him, and held frequent conferences with the Admiral (Brion-Chabot) and others of Francis' ministers, whilst that king himself has sent to Germany agents to make levies of men for next year's campaign. He has also despatched to the kings of Sweden and Denmark a secretary of his to solicit their co-operation, and beg them to be prepared for next spring's campaign, and given the bishopric of Mâcon to cardinal Sadolet. (fn. 21)
The English ambassador in France also writes that the marquis del Gasto is master of the field (dominoit la campagne) in Piedmont, and that his men have gone as far as Suza, and even passed close to Grenoble.
Besides the above news, the King's messenger tells us that the duke of Norfolk has written to say that he has lately heard that a number of Frenchmen had landed at a port near Scotland (près d'Escosse); but that, if the report be true, he would soon nail them down (fn. 22) so that they could not do any mischief.—London, 18 October 1542.
Signed: "Eustace Chapuys" ="De Montmorency."
French. Holograph. pp. 2.
28 Oct.71. The Same to the Same.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233,
ff. 125–7.
"Madame,"—Though this king's deputies at our second conference with them, on the 21st inst., promised to let us have a prompt answer, and inform us of their master's final resolution on pending matters; though we have almost daily solicited them to procure the same for us, yet up to this hour no message has come from them, and we clearly perceive that they are getting colder and colder on the subject. Nor has there been a question of our again meeting until the day before yesterday, when De Montmorency and I (Chapuys) were cited for the bishop of Winchester's house, lying half way between mine and the town of Greenwich. The first thing the deputies told us was that the King, their master, thought it very strange indeed that we should object to the spiritual state being mentioned in the treaty, (fn. 23) alleging, among other reasons brought forward by the King himself, that it seemed as if no great regard was paid to his Royal person, and as if his own rank, will, and power were not taken into account, for otherwise (they said) there would have been no question of preferring the Pope's friendship to his own for innumerable considerations, and especially that of his own succession and posterity being continuous and certain, whereas the Pope's was not; besides which it ought to be considered that the present Pope is very weak (fort caduque), and may die to-morrow, and be succeeded by another Pope belonging to the French party, and consequently hostile to the Emperor. As to the Venetians, added the privy councillors, our master enjoys so much credit with the Signory that he will have no difficulty in inducing them to form a league with him for the defence of Italy. "Indeed (said the privy councillors to us) it would be a great loss of reputation and folly for our king to spend his money in carrying on war with a people and country where his friendship and alliance are sought even with advantageous and profitable offers. God has endowed him with sufficient prudence and discretion to prevent his attaching faith to those who advise and solicit him to declare himself and make war on the French merely on the expectation of the Emperor's good-will and affection, which in the present case he finds rather cold and meagre. In short, unless the articles, as conceived and worded, are agreed to in such terms as to include both the spiritual and ecclesiastical state—or at least without any reference to the spiritual—the King, our master, does not intend going on with the negociation; (fn. 24) as otherwise it is to be apprehended that the whole will come to an end."
Hearing this, Mr. de Courrières and I made such an answer, and placed so urgently before them the convenience of yielding to our joint representations, that they knew not what to answer. There was no question then of debating the other articles, inasmuch as both De Montmorency (Courrières) and I (Chapuys) supposed that once the article about the Pope being disposed of, one way or other, the deputies would become more tractable and more conformable to reason. Yet, whatever their countenance and words on the occasion, we are both of opinion that there is no reason to despair altogether, and that the game is not yet entirely lost. Until the affair comes to extremity, we will not think of proposing that it be submitted to Your Majesty's arbitration; it will be enough for me (Montmorency) to make the offer when I take leave of the King to return home, which will be tomorrow, if I can first obtain audience from the King. Chapuys and I counted upon having it to-day, as the deputies had promised, but the King and they have no doubt put it off in order to reconsider the case. When we again go to the King we shall resume the debate as temperately as it will be in our power to do, and follow altogether the advice and prayers of secretary Wristle.
The duke of Norfolk writes, on the 22nd inst., to the King that he has actually entered Scotland. He would have done so two days sooner but for the breaking down of a bridge, which had caused the loss of some of his men, either wounded or precipitated into the river and drowned. He hopes soon, by means of certain war ships that had arrived there, on the coast, to be able to make some successful enterprize against the Scotch, of whom not one had yet appeared in arms in front of him.—London, 28th October 1542.
Signed: "Eustace Chapuys" ="De Montmorency."
French. Holograph, partly in cipher. pp. 3.
31 Oct.72. The Queen of Hungary to the Imperial Ambassadors in England.
Wien Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233.
"Messieurs les ambassadeurs,"—We were about to answer your joint despatches of the 18th of this month, when We received that of the 22nd, which came to hand in such good time that it will render Our answer easier. We sincerely hope that since the king of that country and his ministers begin to be more amenable to reason, they will offer no opposition to the proposed amendment of the remaining articles of the treaty. For, certainly, after a close examination of those which they themselves propose, and after maturely weighing all that has passed between them and you with regard to the closer friendship and alliance, We always feared that it would be very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to come to an agreement, and, if so, that We might incur the King's displeasure instead of gaining his friendship.
As in your despatch of the 18th you ask Our advice, and wish to know whether it would not be expedient under the circumstances, and in case there is a chance, to propose that the present negociation be carried on here, and, if so, try and see whether that king will send someone here to conduct it, We cannot fail to tell you what Our intention and wishes are on that particular, requesting you in the first place to weigh and consider the state of the Emperor's affairs, public and private, at this present moment, especially in the countries that We are now governing in his name. We do not think it at all convenient (convenable) that the negociation for a treaty of closer friendship and alliance be carried on in this country, for, as you yourselves wrote, and the English allege, the proposal will not he accepted by the latter for the sake of his reputation. (fn. 25) Even if they desired it, you are to excuse yourselves, and decline as graciously as you can for many reasons, even if you saw that a rupture was imminent (which may God avert); for certainly We should prefer that it came without Our intervention in the affair, so as not to engender any ill-will in that king's mind against Us. However this may be, We request you, should you not come to an agreement, to try and persuade that king that, notwithstanding, neither His imperial Majesty nor We Ourselves will cease to profess and entertain perfect friendship for him, according to the old alliances existing between his kingdom and these Low Countries.
With regard to the second point, on which you and your colleague wish also to have Our advice, We have no doubt—judging from the Emperor's letters to you (Chapuys), (fn. 26) of which We have copies by Us—that you have perfectly understood his orders as to that, and must, therefore, know how and in what manner you are referred to Us for advice; for he (the Emperor) wrote to you expressly: "that with regard to the Pope, the rebels, and the resort (hantise) of the Emperor's subjects to England for trade purposes, nothing is to be said in the articles of the treaty likely to lead to the imputation of Our having acted against God or the World. With this sole limitation, I leave it entirely to you to continue the negociations and conclude the treaty." To the above words, as communicated to Us by the Emperor, Our brother and lord, you should pay attention, for, as reason demands, We would not in the least contravene his commands so expressly and precisely set down, nor can We allow you to refer in any way to Us concerning the said limitation. Even should that king's ministers still insist on the articles concerning the Pope and the rebels remaining as proposed by them, and not according to the Emperor's amendment, We could make no alteration whatever in them. It is, therefore, incumbent upon you to obey implicitly the Emperor's commands with regard to the one as well as to the other article, though with reference to the period of time during which the rebels may be withdrawn (retires), rather than become a cause for rupture, it seems to Us that it could be shortened instead of lengthened, provided this alteration were the means of the Royal deputies passing the article concerning the rebels as it was couched in the treaty of Cambray.
Respecting the third restriction and limitation proposed, namely, that of the resort (hantise) of the Emperor's subjects to England, it seems to Us as if it embodied and comprised two points, that is to say, those touched in the second and eighteenth of the said treaty of Cambray. And if so, We cannot go beyond the limit marked in the Emperor's letter to you, and We fancy that if you can persuade that king's deputies to have the second article of the new treaty altered, and to put aside the restrictive clause about the resort (hantise)—that is to say, from the words et mercatores mercimonii exercendi causa till aut principali diplomate fuerit indultum—the difficulty might easily be avoided. Otherwise, the article would indicate that the contracting parties do not treat for a closer friendship, but, on the contrary, desire to restrain and curtail ancient friendships and past treaties, and thus the residence in, and frequentation of, England by the Emperor's subjects—which was formerly free, not only for merchants, but also for people of all classes, crafts, or professions indifferently—would be seriously interfered with. If this point can be carried out without mentioning in the amended clause any laws or statutes made in England, let it be done, for, after all, the English cannot pretend to be the winners by that arrangement, it being a notorious fact that whoever wishes to reside in a foreign country must needs accommodate himself, and be subjected to the laws and usages of such country in which he chooses to fix his residence, without that being considered a derogation of this treaty, or the preceding ones, by which the said residence and frequentation are absolutely free.
With respect to the intercourse of trade, for which the English ask the confirmation of the commercial treaty of 1520, that is a point which has always been found extremely difficult to settle, and one which, if granted, will be the cause of Our merchants never getting a reasonable intercourse with England, besides which the English do not observe the treaties as to the payment of "tollieux" (fn. 27) and Royal duties, which constitutes the principal grievance of the merchants of these Low Countries, inasmuch as by the treaty of 1520 it is stipulated that with regard to the payment of "tollieux," the contracting parties shall take as a rule the treaties of the years 1400, 1420, and 1500, wherein it is expressly said that the subjects of the Low Countries are not to pay more duties in England than those which they themselves were accustomed to pay fifty years ago, that is to say, before the year 1445, when no higher "tollieux" were due in England than those which the Easterlings do now pay. (fn. 28) If the English consent to clear up this point, it will be easy to come to an understanding respecting the remaining items of the intercourse of trade. That will at once show that king's good intentions and desire of closer friendship with His Imperial Majesty and his subjects. But if the Royal deputies will not accept the article as put down and worded in the treaty of Cambray, or otherwise agree to leave it out entirely, without mixing up with it the affair of the intercourse of trade—which, after all, concerns chiefly merchants—with that of the closer friendship and affiance touching only princes, We really do not know how the Emperor can allow the article to pass as it is. For it has been observed in almost all Our treaties with England until that of Cambray that the English deputies and commissioners have invariably tried to insert the article of the intercourse such as it is now worded, imagining that by doing so they would succeed in making the treaty of the year 1520 perpetual. We leave it entirely to your discretion to address to the King's deputies any remonstrances and raise any objections that you may think proper and convenient on this matter of the "tollieux," or else to have the article left out altogether, as you may think best for the perfect conclusion of the treaty.
Article "the seventh," touching the number of men which each prince ought to send to the other's assistance when required in case of invasion from the enemy, is so unequal as to be almost unbearable for these Low Countries; for it would be entirely out of Our power to assemble, in the course of forty days, 3,000 horse with such pay as that specified in the article. Indeed, it ought to he considered that the English have cause to rate soldiers very low, knowing, as they do know, that on this side of the Channel We should ask for assistance in money rather than in men, who are, generally speaking, untrained for war, (fn. 29) whilst they themselves will most likely apply for men instead of money, in doing which the people of these Low Countries will necessarily have to sustain double damages; for, if called upon to furnish men, We shall be obliged to give them higher pay than that stipulated in the article, as it would be impossible for Us to recruit men at that rate, without counting officers and those entitled to double pay. On the other hand, should We want assistance from the English, and were they to send Us a contingent of troops, We certainly could not support them at the rate specified in the article, (fn. 30) so that instead of the 7,500 infantry to be furnished by them, We could scarcely support 5,000 with the money allotted for that service, in addition to which it is to be feared that if the English ask for men, they will want 3,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.
Likewise in case of the invasion of English territory on this side of the Channel by the enemy, we find that the Emperor would be obliged to help with a force of 3,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, the expense of which armament by no means corresponds to that of the 7,500 foot that the king of England is himself obliged to furnish. Indeed, it seems to Us that the Emperor might just as well ask for 3,000 foot and 2,000 horse, which number it will be more difficult to furnish since the king of France is likely to make a greater effort on other frontiers of these Low Countries, (fn. 31) which cannot be defended except with large masses of men. That is why you, his ambassadors [in England], are to take care not to make promises or take engagements, which, if unfulfilled, might over-irritate or offend that king.
Besides which, there is another argument to bring forward, which is that for the defence of the lands on this side of the Channel no such amount of cavalry is requisite as that which would be indispensable for a joint invasion of France by Picardy. These are the objections which you are to raise respecting the assistance to be given by the contracting parties in men or money; and yet if you, the ambassadors, can have the rest of the article settled according to the Emperor's views in that respect, you are authorized to yield to the demands of the Royal deputies rather than come to a rupture with them.
As to the interpretation of the treaty itself, in case of supposed or pretended contravention by one of the contracting parties, the articles seem to Us so couched as to indicate not so much a closer friendship between the two princes to be preserved for ever, as rather one which may be broken whenever it may be convenient for either one of the parties, which is by no means the Emperor's intention, nor, as We hope, that king's either; and, therefore, you, the ambassadors, are to make no difficulty about having the heading of each article of the intended treaty reformed, as is customary between princes, so as to indicate that the two contracting parties have perfect confidence in each other, that is to say, that whatever contravention there may be, the treaty shall not be considered as broken and violated on account of that, but is to be faithfully observed in future, notwithstanding the said contravention, which ought to be repaired by the customary clause of "rato manente pacto." To that end We send you the clause of the treaty of… (fn. 32) in which the condition is specifically stated, that you may act accordingly.
With regard to the duration of the defensive war in all cases, as well as to the offensive one, We have to observe that were His Imperial Majesty to look out for his own advantage only, no difficulty ought to be made on Our part, provided it was stipulated that after that the king of England would furnish the contingent of men or money which would seem to him sufficient for his own co-operation in the enterprize, as the French are in the habit of doing in similar cases; but in order not to make promises which cannot be afterwards fulfilled, the English might and ought, in Our opinion, so to moderate their demands on this point that they may be complied with, as the Emperor has very wisely recommended in his last letter to you (Chapuys). To that letter and instructions you shall both adhere without any further advice on Our part.
Respecting the dukes of Clèves and Holstein, it is for you to follow closely the Emperor's prescriptions in the matter, and endeavour to have them declared enemies of the allies, since both are at present at war with His Imperial Majesty. If you cannot obtain that, you must ask for time to consult Us, rather than have the negociation broken on that account. For if the English object to both these dukes being declared in the treaty enemies of the Emperor, they cannot do so to the latter treating with them whenever he considers it proper or convenient—as generally speaking they (the English) seem to desire—without the King's will and intervention. The article, moreover, is couched in terms too general as far as the Emperor's dominions and these Low Countries under Our government are concerned, for to say that no treaty with princes and electors of the German Empire or neighbours of these Low Countries can be valid without being approved or ratified by the king of England, is too vague a stipulation to be accepted as the article is worded. That is why it is important for the Emperor to do away with that vagueness, which might in the end be injurious to one or the other of the contracting parties, or in some way derogatory of this present treaty, as His Imperial Majesty has pointed out in his letters to you (Chapuys). However, should you both find that in trying to have that article amended there is danger of the negociation being suspended or altogether broken off, you may, after assuring the King of the Emperor's constant wish to maintain friendship and alliance with him and his subjects, seize the first opportunity at hand to have the three above-mentioned points cleared up and elucidated for the better interpretation and execution of the treaty now being negociated, and, above all, that one referring to the prohibition of treating with foreign princes, which points and articles We do not hesitate to say the Emperor in nowise could grant without injury and serious damage to himself. That is why We advise you not to subscribe the said articles as they are worded, but follow to the letter the Emperor's orders and prescriptions as contained in his last letter to you (Chapuys).—Brussels, on the last day of October 1542.
French. Original minute. Pp. 3½.
n. d.73. The Queen of Hungary to Eustace Chapuys.
Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., Fasc. C. 233.
"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—Your letters of the 13th, 24th, and 27th of September, and 2nd inst. have come to hand. (fn. 33) I thank you for your diligent care in advising Us of events in that country. As that King has told you that the Germans whom We were about to send to England, there to embark for Spain, would be well received and treated, I now request and order you to look out for an early opportunity of going to the King and thanking him for his good-will, telling him at the same time that hearing from every quarter that the French have already retreated from Perpignan, and considering also that the season is so far advanced that the Germans could not arrive in Roussillon in time to do efficient service this year, We have changed Our opinion and sent them towards the Lutzenburg (Luxemburg), which the French have again invaded in great force.
Some days ago We received, through a merchant of this country, a letter of your's asking permission to export to England certain pieces of armour (armures) out of this country. That permission We have refused to grant, owing to the great difficulty there is nowadays, even for us, of procuring any harness or armour in these Low Countries; the consequence being that such articles have risen in price more than one-third. We, therefore, request you in future, whenever you are called upon to support such petitions, not to yield so lightly to solicitations of that kind for the reason abovementioned, unless the request comes directly from the King himself, for We find that at various times English merchants and private persons have made similar applications, and taken out of this country large quantities of armour.
Addressed: "To the Ambassador in England."
French. Original draft. p. 1.


1 "Et apres ont tasté, silz pourroient mordre à la cite de Henne, mais ceulx du dedans leur sortirent au devant et les chasserent."
2 "Ylz se sont retirez dans une petite villette à deux ou trois lieus de dict Perpignan, que sapelle Elarak, et a envoye le roy de France pour tous les engeniers, &c."
3 See above, p. 143.
4 See above, No. 61, p. 134.
5 That is Philippe de Montmorency, seigneur de Courrières, who in March of this year had been employed in a former mission to king Henry. See Vol. V., Part II., pp. 480–1, 483, and 500. Bradford (p. 533) calls him Corieres, and captain in the rear-guard forces, which is a mistake. He was captain of the Imperial body-guard in Flanders.
6 Miguel de Silva, bishop of Viseu, about whom see above, pp. 141–2.
7 "Que la saison de menner guerre soit passee par la survenance de lyber (l'hiver) que inste, et aprez ce (se) gaudiront ilz de la compagnie."
8 The original has distinctly the bishop of London (levesque de Londres); but it is an oversight of Chapuys himself, or a mistake of his secretary. In like manner the bishop of Winchester (Gardiner) is occasionally confounded with the bishop of Westminster (Thomas Thirlby).
9 The original, which, as may be seen, is mostly a duplicate of the preceding, reads: "quest à sept lieues du dict Porsemue," evidently a mistake of Chapuys himself, or of his clerk, for the letter is not in his own hand.
10 The same De Courrières elsewhere alluded to, that is, Philippe de Montmorency, sieur de Courrières.
11 "Yl convenoit de le faire de sorte, tant plainement et punctuellement quil ny peust rester aucune scintille ne occasion on sinderesse, par ou Ion voulsist mal interpreter et calumpnier le traicte."
12 "Joinct que moy, Chapuys, en avoye desia trois jours paravant estrifve avec le dit sr roy bien longuement."
13 See above, p. 139.
14 Stephen Gardiner and Thomas Thirlby.
15 "Ne nous en aie dict la moindre parolle du monde, ains monstroit avoir plaisir du bon succez des affaires de vostre maieste contre le dit duc."
16 Sir William Fitz-William, earl of Southampton. He had been admiral of England, Wales, Ireland, Normandy, Gascony, and Aquitaine in 1536, and appointed Lord Privy Seal in 1539. He was, as captain of the war-ship Forward, engaged in the expedition against Scotland in 1542, but died, as it is said, on board his ship on his way to Newcastle.
17 That is the preceding of the same date.
18 D. Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, third duke of Alba, son of D. Garcia, who was killed at Los Gelves (Gerba), in Eastern Africa, in 1510, before he came to the title.
19 Hercole II. d'Este, son of Alphonso I., third duke of Ferrara of the Este family. He had in 1527 married Renée of France, daughter of Louis XII. and of Anne de Bretagne.
20 Marano in the Friuli. See Vol. VI., Part I., p. 460.
21 Cardinal Giacopo or Jacopo, who died in 1547.
22 The word used is lez enclourroit, which most likely is meant for "lez encloueroit."
23 "Que celluy sieur roy trouvoit marveilleusement extrange que nous voullions [nous] arrester à non exprimer lestat spirituel en cas de defension."
24 "Et que sans luy accorder lez articlez ainsy quil lez a faict coucher en cas de deffension, ou du moings une qualite sans expression de lestat spirituel et ecclesiastique, yl ne pouvoit ne entendoit proceder au parfaict du traicte."
25 "Ores comme escripves, ceulx de par de la pour la reputacion, ne le vouldroient consentir."
26 "Quant au second poinct, pour le quel desirez avoir mon advis sur les pointz demourez en difficulte, amplement reprins et debattus en lettres de sa Mate à vous Chappuys" (sic).
27 "Avec ce que par dela ils nobservent le dit entrecours quant au payement des tollieux" (sic).
28 "Que lors on ne payoit autre tollieu en Engleterre que cellui que presentement payent les Osterlinges."
29 "Et doibt estre prins bon regart que ceulx de par dela non sans cause mettent petite soldre pour les gens de guerre, à cause quilz sçavent que de ce coste on demandera plustot argent que davoir leurs gens, que ne sont trop aguerroies."
30 "Car on ne pourroit les recouvrer à si petitz gaiges, et dan le cas par raison, en requerant assistance deulx non ne sçaueroons (nous ne sçaurions) entretenir le nombre de gens convenu."
31 "Et nous semble que lempereur feroit grant avantaige pour icellui sieur roy accorder IIIm pietons et IIm chevaulx, lesquelz en cas bien facillement seront plus difficiles de furnir (sic), en tant que lon indubitablement le roy de France fera (sic) quelque grant effort sur lea aultres frontieres de par deça."
32 A blank in the minute, which, I presume, must be filled by the word Windsor.
33 "Voz lettres du xiii., xxiiii., et xxvii. dicelluy mois, et du second du present" are the words in the original, from which I conclude that this must have been written in the second week of October, when the ambassador's despatch of the 2nd (No. 66) had already been received. For that reason the letter itself, which is an undated draft, has been placed within the month of October.