January 1545, 1-10


Institute of Historical Research



Martin A. S. Hume (editor)

Year published





Comment on this article
Double click anywhere on the text to add an annotation in-line

Citation Show another format:

'Spain: January 1545, 1-10', Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 8: 1545-1546 (1904), pp. 1-22. URL: Date accessed: 18 April 2014. Add to my bookshelf


(Min 3 characters)

January 1545, 1–10

1545. 1 Jan. Vienna Imp. Arch.1. Mary of Scotland to the Emperor.
Sends David Paniter, (fn. 1) her Councillor, to congratulate the Emperor on the conclusion of the peace with France; and begs him to remain friendly with Scotland. Stirling; Kalends of January, 1545. Signed Jacobus Arranis Comes.
3 Jan. Vienna Imp. Arch.2. Chapuys and Van der Delft (fn. 2) to the Emperor.
We travelled hither with all possible speed, and arrived very late the day before Christmas-eve. The next morning we advised the Council of our arrival, whereat they appeared pleased; and took in good part our message, to the effect that, owing to the holidays, we would not importune the King for an audience; but would leave it entirely to the convenience and pleasure of his Majesty. On the following day, which was Christmas Day, the King sent the Secretary of the Council to visit and welcome us, and to offer to provide anything in the way of lodging or otherwise that we might require. His Majesty, moreover, sent word to say that, whenever we chose to go to Court we should be heartily welcomed. On the day after Christmas Day, we requested an audience, which was granted for the next day (i.e., Saturday) or Sunday. As we saw that Sunday would be the more convenient day for the King, we agreed to go on that day after dinner; but on Saturday evening the Bishop of Winchester and Mr. Bartlett (fn. 3) (Bertellet) came to say that the King would greatly prefer that we should go in the morning, and that they were instructed to conduct us. We readily agreed to this, considering that doubtless the King not only desired that we should witness the festivities at Court, but even more that the people should see us; for the reasons already conveyed to your Majesty. We met the King just as he came out to go to Mass, and after saluting him, and conveying to him your Majesty's good wishes I, Van der Delft, handed to him your Majesty's letters, which he took but forgot to make the usual enquiries as to your Majesty's health and well-being. We thought this arose rather from his anxiety to greet us personally, and from his haste to go in to Mass, than from any other reason; although he also forgot the enquiries after dinner, perhaps through his attention being taken up in answering and refuting us.
When the King had entered his oratory we were conducted, without the slightest hint of a desire on our part, to the oratory of the Queen, who shortly afterwards herself entered. We conveyed to her your Majesty's greeting, and thanks for the good offices which she had always exercised towards the preservation of friendship between your Majesty and the King; and also thanked her for the favour she showed to the Lady Mary. The Queen answered very graciously that she did not deserve so much courtesy from your Majesty; and what she did for Lady Mary was less than she would like to do, and was only her duty in every respect. With regard to the maintenance of friendship, she said she had done, and would do, nothing to prevent its growing still firmer: and she hoped that God would avert even the slightest dissension, as the friendship was so necessary and both sovereigns were so good. We afterwards saluted Lady Mary, and gave her your Majesty's greetings; for which she was humbly thankful. We were then conducted to the King's oratory; and on the conclusion of the Mass, when his Majesty came out from his pew he addressed us very heartily, saying that I (Chapuys) did not look so well as when I was at the camp at Boulogne, where he said I was better in health than he had ever seen me. He also, he said, was ten times better there than he had been since. There is no need for him to insist greatly upon this point, for he is evidently much broken since his return. He then added, speaking very loudly, that those people—meaning the French—had been well whipped both by land and sea, and had paid their scot lately; by reason of the great quantity of wine seized by his (Henry's) ships of war, besides over fifty French ships having been captured by his subjects on the west coast. The men of Rye, also, had not been backward in damaging the enemy. The French, he said, raised a great outcry at first, when they heard that he had ordered his ships to return, to port to refresh: but when they learnt that they were putting to sea again, the Frenchmen soon retired in a great fright; for if they had only waited a couple of days longer they would have been destroyed.
After we had dined with the Councillors we took the opportunity of praying them, in the name of the Queen Dowager of Hungary, to use their influence with the King to have certain Frenchmen sent to Flanders. These Frenchmen had been captured off Dunkirk by an English ship of war at the instance of your Majesty, in order that they might be capitally punished for having attacked a Zealand ship off the coast of Zealand, which ship they would have sunk or captured if assistance had not arrived. The Councillors answered that they would speak to the King on the subject and let us know his decision. We also remonstrated with them on the loss and damage inflicted on your Majesty's subjects by the embargo at Dover of eighteen or twenty vessels loaded with merchandise destined for France. The Councillors replied that some of the ships were loaded with herrings, the exportation of which could not be permitted, in view of your Majesty's prohibition of the conveyance of victuals to France. They, the Councillors, believed that most of the remaining merchandise in the vessels was the property of Frenchmen, under cover of the names of some of your Majesty's subjects; and it was only just that the ships should be detained here until it was ascertained whether the said merchandise belonged to French subjects or not. We were able to assure them that the bills of lading and the merchants' marks testified to whom the merchandise belonged, and said that it was unjust to detain the goods in the absence of certain proof to the contrary. It was, we added, “Corinthian law” to sentence first and enquire afterwards; and, as for the herrings, if there was any violation of your Majesty's orders it was for you, and not for the English, to punish it, both on the persons and the property of your subjects. But, withal, we could get no reply but that it was necessary to hold the matter over for the present. We suspect, from the look of the Chancellor, when he whispered something to the Earl of Hertford, that there is but small appearance of the releasing of these vessels until a decisive answer is received from your Majesty with regard to the demands made by the Earl of Hertford and the Bishop of Winchester. (fn. 4) Besides the above mentioned vessels, they have embargoed here ten or twelve of the ships that have brought goods from Antwerp, though we imagine that their object is to make use of the crews. During our conversation with the Council we were summoned to see the King, who received us very graciously, and was courteous enough to insist that I (Chapuys) should be seated before he was. Before he took his seat again he repeated to us the contents of your Majesty's letter to him, and said that he was ready to hear our credentials. As your Majesty will see further on he made me (Chapuys) pay dearly for this piece of politeness on his part.
In accordance with the arrangement which we (i.e., the two ambassadors) had made together I, Chapuys, addressed the King; commencing by saying that your Majesty had been much surprised that the Earl of Hertford and the Bishop of Winchester were not satisfied with the answers given to them by your Majesty respecting the subject of their mission, notwithstanding all the arguments that your ministers had used to convince them. Your Majesty, I said, believed, nevertheless, that he (the King), thanks to his virtue and prudence, would consider the reply reasonable, sufficient and to the point; but if he still remained dissatisfied with it your Majesty had instructed us to repeat to him the arguments already brought forward, and others which have subsequently occurred to your Majesty. The King replied that he willingly believed what we said, but had no doubt that he could so convincingly answer our arguments that we should not have a word more to say. I (Chapuys) then set forth carefully the three points of your Majesty's reply, beginning by saying that even if the greater part of the statements made by the said ambassadors (i.e., Seymour and Gardiner) had been correct, there was still no cause for dissatisfaction with the reply, for the reasons stated to his ministers; which reasons I repeated briefly to him. It appeared to us, moreover, that the demand itself was confused and general, the English ambassadors basing it upon various clauses of the treaty, which did little to support their case; and the letter which the King had recently written to your Majesty saying that the demand was well-founded, and setting forth the details of his claim was equally uncertain and general. To tell the truth, I could not make out exactly what declaration he really demanded. It could not be a question of defensive action (against the French) for the reasons set forth to his ambassadors; and that, all hostility having ceased, I could not understand how, even if your Majesty was inclined to declare yourself, he, the King, would consent to it; as such a thing would redound greatly to your Majesty's discredit, whilst he, the King, would not profit by it in the least. The treaty of peace (with the French) had, moreover, been so recently concluded, the French having done nothing since to violate it nor given your Majesty any reason for a hostile declaration, that it would be impossible to close people's mouths if such a course as that requested were taken. The object aimed at by the King as the result of such a declaration was, I said, not that which was professed, but was really the prohibition of trade between the subjects of your Majesty and the French, the effect of which would be in every way to make war rather upon the former than the latter. He, the King, I said, had seen that even during the heat of the war between your Majesty and France, trade was allowed to be carried on by means of safe-conducts, of which the King had not complained. It is true that inconvenience arose out of this system to the poorer sort of people, who could not afford to obtain the safe-conducts; and consequently that the profit was made by the rich and by those who needed it least.
I then proceeded to say that, as the peace between your Majesty and France had been made by his, the King's, consent, there was but slight ground for his urging your Majesty to make this declaration, since it was obvious that his consent to the conclusion of peace must be understood to extend to the subsidiary points, without which the peace could not be concluded at all. On hearing this the King, who had changed colour several times during my speech, now did so more markedly than before; and speaking angrily and excitedly, said that it was not true that he had ever given his consent, except on condition that he was satisfied, in the form laid down and sent by him to his ambassador with your Majesty. He dared any man to tell him that this was not true. There were other witnesses besides Messieurs Arras, Courrières and myself; (fn. 5) namely the Dukes of Alburquerque and Suffolk; (fn. 6) and none of us three had any credence from him to convey such a report to your Majesty. His own ambassador was properly accredited and should be better believed. Our reply was that no letter of credence was needed, since there were a sufficient number of witnesses present and we were satisfied to have learnt his decision. I also reminded him minutely of his words to M. d'Arras, in order to convince him that we were right; but he continually interrupted me angrily; saying that he should like to know if any body would dare to assert that he had distinctly declared his willingness that your Majesty should treat with France, even though he (the King) was not satisfied on his side. I replied that, since he insisted that his consent was conditional upon his claims being satisfied, I would not contradict him; but unless I was asleep or out of my mind at the time, I clearly heard him use the expressions which Messieurs d'Arras and de Courrières had reported to your Majesty, and I had written to the Queen (Dowager of Hungary). As to his assertion that he had not expressed his willingness that your Majesty should treat unless he was satisfied, I could positively affirm that he did not limit his consent by any such reservation. If it had been otherwise it is obvious, I said, that he would have complained at once after he had received news that peace was concluded (fn. 7) just as readily as he made other complaints to M. de Courrières and me. During the whole time that he remained at Boulogne he had not contradicted what he had said to M. d'Arras; nor had he referred to the matter in any way whatever. Whilst I was thus setting forth my arguments and points to prove his free and unconditional consent to the negotiations, he endeavoured constantly to confuse the issue, saying that I was dwelling upon several things that had nothing to do with the matter and bidding me keep to the main point. I continued, however, to state the case as I thought best; and amongst other things I said that, not only had he declared his wishes to M. d'Arras in the matter, but at the request of Cardinal du Bellay and his colleagues he had despatched a courier, who went with Secretary L'Aubespine, to inform your Majesty that you might proceed with the treaty of peace with the King of France as he (the King of England) had good hope of being able to obtain the conditions which he was demanding of the French. The King was intensely annoyed and irritated at this, and told me quite openly that it was a great lie; but he did not attempt to refute the main assertion, confining himself to a dispute as to the time when the occurrence I mentioned took place. He tried to make me believe that I had said that the courier had been despatched before M. d'Arras; and he then began to recount the comings and goings both of the Cardinal (du Bellay) and M. d'Arras, until, either through his anger or forgetfulness, he got into a complete confusion, and no one could set him right. He could not, however, deny what had taken place between the Cardinal (du Bellay) and the Council in the presence of Courrières and myself. I replied to his arguments without fear or surprise; saying that, not for all the possessions of your Majesty and himself, would I tell an untruth; as he from long experience of me should know. If he found otherwise, I said, I would renounce my ambassadorial privilege, and would willingly undergo punishment. It might, I said, have been expected of him, to judge from his actions hitherto, that he would have taken it in good part, and even considered it a great service to him, that I should speak thus frankly to him in so important a matter as this; but if he desired it I would abstain from proceeding further; though I should be much disappointed at the result of the voyage, which I had undertaken solely in the hope of doing him service. He softened somewhat at this, and I led him on to repeat what he alleged that he had said to M. d'Arras. According to his account, after blaming those who had advised your Majesty to advance so far into France and place yourself in so difficult a position, he said that he was willing that your Majesty should negotiate with France, and that he would convey his views more fully to your Majesty through his ambassador; but his consent was only meant, he said, after the conditions which he had forwarded to his ambassador had been accepted (i.e., by the French). I pointed out to him that nothing could have been concluded on his side in this way, since neither your Majesty nor his ambassador was empowered for the purpose; but he denied the latter point, saying that his ambassador was empowered. I questioned this, and told him that, even if it were so, your Majesty was fully justified; because the ambassador had never exhibited or mentioned such powers. The King replied that there was no occasion for him to do so; as probably before M. d'Arras left on his mission, or soon afterwards the treaty was concluded between your Majesty and the King of France. (fn. 8) Though I tried to convince him to the contrary, and pointed out to him that your Majesty had subsequently captured Soissons, the King would not alter his opinion, and distinctly contradicted me with regard to Soissons.
With regard to my point that he had not complained at Boulogne (i.e., of the conclusion of a separate peace) the King made no reply at the time; but he subsequently referred to it, and said that the reason why he had made no complaint was that I had given him to understand from letters I had received from the Queen (Dowager of Hungary) that your Majesty was negotiating for him as well as for yourself. I replied that the Queen wrote that she did not know the particulars of the treaty; but he would not be convinced, until I reminded him that an hour or two after Courrières and I had been with him, the Bishop of Winchester and the General of the Forces (fn. 9) had come to our lodgings to inform us that as soon as we had left the King's presence Cardinal du Bellay had visited him and informed him of the conclusion of the peace, and of the submission of the King of France to arbitration with regard to the pensions and overdue payments to England; asking us whether we had received any such advice, to which we had replied that we had not. I had on that occasion disputed with the Bishop of Winchester, saying that, even without the said submission by France to the arbitration of your Majesty of the question of the payments due to the King of England, your Majesty was justified in concluding peace. The altercation had lasted some time, as Courrières and the General could testify. This I said was very different from what the King asserted I had given him to understand; and I also reminded him that when I received letters from your Majesty telling me of the treaty and of the submission to your arbitration of the question of the payments, I sent and informed him of it. At that time he made no objection whatever, nor had he done so at the time of his departure from Boulogne, when de Courrières and I had conversed with him at length on these matters. In the face of so many facts, the King could not hold out, and said that even if all this was the case, as I said, the truth remained unchanged. Seeing that he could find no more arguments to convince us, as he had boasted at first that he could do, he changed his tack, and said that all this wrangling was waste of time, as affairs were dressed up afterwards to suit our purpose. When we wanted to negotiate with him in future it would be better to put everything in writing, and he would reply in the same way, otherwise he would not negotiate with us at all. As we said that we were not authorised to do this, he would despatch to your Majesty a special mission. He tried to persuade me that he had never negotiated State affairs, except in writing; although I told him that during the fifteen years and a half that I had been here, I had never written to him a single word of any negotiation I had conducted. I said that this affair, moreover, needed no writing, as it consisted simply of the three points which I had laid before him; but if it was the intention to have adopted this procedure, his ambassadors should have commenced it, they being the initiators; to which he replied that it was not their place. After explaining the three points, I said that it appeared to me that he, the King, had better reason to be pleased at the conclusion of the treaty of peace than your Majesty; since (as he said) having formerly surrendered some of his claims for the sake of peace, he now returned to his original demands. And yet your Majesty had in your own treaty with the King of France stipulated for the points which had influenced him (the King of England) in favour of the treaty with France, namely that the King of France should withdraw his friendship from the Turk, which was provided for in your Majesty's treaty: secondly the submission to arbitration of the question of the pensions; and, thirdly, the abstention of the King of France from joint action with the Scots against him, which point could doubtless be arranged without difficulty, an agreement on other points being arrived at. The King did not attempt to answer these arguments, but turned the matter aside: but finally he let fall a confession that he had made certain that the French would have accepted his conditions. I did not neglect to remark thereupon, that this fact, together with other reasons, had moved him to consent so frankly and freely to your Majesty's negotiating with the King of France. He replied that there would not have been the slightest objection to that, if your Majesty had been a little stiffer (eust tenu ung peu bon). He said, also, that he must remind me that the first time I spoke to him at the Camp at Boulogne, when he repeated to me the offers brought to him by Framoiselles, I had said that it would not do to go to sleep or depend much upon the Frenchmen's talk; and that a lasting and honourable peace could only be made sword in hand. I admitted that I had said this, and had added that it was necessary to follow up the enemy actively. If, I had said, it was to be a question of making peace, your Majesty and he could entrust the negotiations to the Queen Dowager of Hungary, who was in a good position to' communicate with both, and had means for conducting the negotiations successfully, Warlike operations were so dangerous and sudden: he and your Majesty were too far apart for rapid communication, and it was important for your Majesty to learn his decision early, for your guidance; since you were (not) in a position to retire easily, as he could, who was near his own territory. To this the King had replied that it was much the best way for those directly interested to manage their own affairs, instead of referring them to a third party. He admitted that he had said this, and I then continued that what I had said about following up the enemy actively was for the purpose of inciting him to pursue the voyage to Paris. He said that I had not expressed anything of the sort, and had even praised his action before Boulogne; but this I flatly denied, saying that no one would testify that I had done so. I said it would have been most unfortunate for me to have taken such a course, for I knew that the siege of Boulogne was hopelessly against the agreement made by treaty, and prejudiced the main object aimed at. I had, I said, complained. to his ministers that the terms of the treaty were not being complied with. He retorted that he was quite sure that none of his ministers would testify to this, and ended by saying that your Majesty should bear in mind that in many countries, nay, nearly all over the world, people were murmuring that your Majesty had made peace without him; and that if this action was not redressed in the way he had requested, it looked as if no trust could ever be placed in treaties between princes.
No power in the world could prevent people from talking. To escape from us he seized upon our proposal that, if he wished for our points in writing we would repeat them and others to the Council, who could take them down; and he accordingly referred us to the Councillors, asking us very graciously when we should be at leisure to confer with them. In the meanwhile, he thought that as it would be inconvenient for us to return from Greenwich at night, it would be better that we should meet the Council next morning.
The Council duly awaited us as arranged, but we thought better to send an excuse that we were both indisposed, whereupon the Councillors, taking it in good part, offered to be ready to receive us whenever we liked to go. To say the truth, it seemed best to us thus to show a little resentment of the rudeness of the previous day, although we clearly perceived by various indications that the King himself was sorry, to have used us as he did. Although he stormed (brave) at first, it was easy to guess that he was not altogether displeased at the delay proposed in your Majesty's name, with regard to the declaration, (fn. 10) for the reasons set forth: the main point with him being his anxiety as to the intentions of your Majesty after the delay had expired, which he calculated would be in eight or ten days, counting from the time that the answer was given to his ambasssadors.
We thought well to remind the King of what he had said with regard to the terms which M. d'Arras had conveyed to him from your Majesty, namely that-they would have been hard and inacceptable even if their object was to release your Majesty from prison: whereupon he began very passionately and vehemently to declaim about the two marriages, (fn. 11) He said it was a most unwise condition, and the more he thought of it, the more astonished he was that your Majesty should ever have condescended to such a thing.
Since writing the above, yesterday, we sent to the Council to say that for various reasons we had been unable on Sunday to explain fully the points of our mission, and that as the matter was important we were sorry that our indisposition had prevented us from waiting upon them. We therefore requested them to move the King to send to us some of his Councillors versed in the matter, with whom we could confer, and who could report to him. They conveyed this message to the King and he immediately instructed the Earl of Hertford, the Bishop of Winchester, and Secretary Paget to wait upon us this morning. We thought best to take this course, in order to confirm the excuse we had sent; and to avoid having to discuss before such a turmoil of Councillors.
The said deputies came this morning, and, as we had agreed, I, Chapuys, discoursed with them. I began by regretting our indisposition, both on account of the trouble we had given them to come, and also because we were so desirous of discussing with the Councillors the affairs in hand; which appeared to us to be of unprecedented importance, both to your Majesty and the King, and might entail, unless well understood, results of the highest consequence, and matters difficult to stomach. It therefore seemed to my colleague and myself that our discourse should not only be listened to by the Councillors, but that, so to speak, it should be heard by the nation at large for your Majesty's justification, if what several of them said was true: namely that it was common talk in the realm that your Majesty had failed in your obligations towards the King. We did not believe that the King himself, or they, would allow such talk; which, moreover, did not redound to the King's own honour; and the public would be pleased to know that he was on good terms with your Majesty. This would be greatly prejudiced if the people were persuaded to the contrary, and I had thought well to mention this matter to them in the interests of the honour of both princes, and in order that they might take what steps were necessary. When we had produced to them your Majesty's answer we protested that it was not our intention to say anything inconsistent with that; and we had supported it by several arguments addressed to the King. Finding, however, that he was somewhat excited we had been unable to conclude our address or to ascertain the King's decision with regard to your Majesty's reply. Certain unpleasant passages had occurred between the King and us, which they (the Councillors) probably heard, and I thanked God that it had not happened to any other of your Majesty's ministers instead of to me, for I was not sure that any other would have put up with it. But I, who knew the King's humour so well, and so ardently desired the continuance of his friendship with my master, would avoid reporting, if possible, any event which could injure the good feeling. I ascribed what had passed to the familiarity with which the King had always treated me, and I would, I said, condone everything he .said to me in consideration of the honour with which he had formerly treated me. He might confidently believe that no subject or servant of his own was more anxious for his welfare or more desirous of serving him than I. I repeated that the matter at issue was most important, and it was consequently necessary that it should be considered maturely and without passion. Saving the King's acquiescence, the matter mainly depended upon two points. The first was whether, in view of the King's consent to your Majesty's making peace with France, it was incumbent on your Majesty to make the declaration demanded by the Earl of Hertford and the Bishop of Winchester on behalf of the King. For the reasons given to the Earl and the Bishop when they were with your Majesty, and subsequently sent to the King, we thought not, and we besought the Councillors, as good and virtuous ministers, to consider deeply the points already brought forward, and those we should add thereto. The second point was one that we were extremely loath to approach, since it was the very unpleasant assertion of the violation of the treaty (i.e., by the King of England), and we were convinced that your Majesty would not renounce the rights which the said violation gave you, nor would any of your Councillors advise you to do so.
I then repeated in substance the discussion that had taken place between the King and us, and the Councillors had no reply to make. With regard, however, to the King's consent (to the peace) given to M. d'Arras, and reported by the latter, the Councillors wished to make out that before the return of M. d'Arras the whole of the conditions of peace between your Majesty and the King of France were agreed upon— or practically so— the signature only being wanting. They said that there was already some softening of the war in the matter of burning; and the Admiral of France was with your Majesty. This had been reported by the English Ambassador, and had not been denied by M. de Granvelle. I replied to this in the terms which your Majesty wrote to M. de Courrières and myself from Soissons, and they had no more to say. (fn. 12) The Bishop of Winchester also dwelt somewhat upon the letter of the Queen (Dowager of Hungary) mentioned in your Majesty's despatches; but after I had reminded him of what had taken place at Boulogne he dropped the subject. He maintained that even if the King had done no more than reserve the maintenance of existing treaties; which reservation indeed, was provided for in the treaty of peace between your Majesty and France; it would be sufficient to oblige your Majesty to declare against France, since at a period subsequent to the said treaty of peace, the King of France had violated the reservation by invading English territory. The king of France, he said, was informed by the preamble of the arbitration clause that your Majesty could not conclude peace unless the King of England's claims were satisfied; and by binding himself to the observance of the treaty with this reservation he (Francis) tacitly bound himself also to satisfy the King of England. I replied that, even if this were so, no right would accrue to their master under a treaty which he had refused to acknowledge; and they themselves (i.e., Hertford and Gardiner) had refused even to see. The preamble to the arbitration clause, which they had refused to accept, was, moreover, limited by the presumption that it would become operative by the consent of their master (Henry); and this must be understood to apply not only to the principal point but also to the subsidiary articles, such as are usually inserted in all treaties. One of these ran, “ Friend of the friends, and enemy of the enemies.” The King had expressly consented to your Majesty becoming the friend of the King of France, who was then his (Henry's) open enemy, and had so continued to be. The invasion of English territory had not made him (Francis) more of an enemy than he was before, and the fact of the continuance of the same enmity that existed when the King of England gave his consent to the peace, was no reason why your Majesty should again declare yourself against France. With regard to the so-called invasion in the neighbourhood of Guisnes: it ought not to be so considered, since legists held that the principal intention, and not the incidental or occasional acts, should be regarded. If, I added, they would examine closely the treaty of friendship (i.e., between Henry and Charles) they would find that the mutual defence clause, where it said that on the retirement of the enemy the assistance might be withdrawn, did not mean that the prince whose territories were invaded could renew a claim for aid for the purpose of following the enemy into their own territory again, and so prevent a repetition of the invasion. It might be said that the French had come principally for the purpose of raising the siege of Montreuil and recovering Boulogne; and with this object t might be desirable for them to drive the English as far away as possible, which they had done by following them to Calais, and other places belonging to England. Finding themselves between Calais and Ardres the famished and desperate (French) soldiers had done some damage, and had endeavoured to recover some victuals. said that it would be necessary to clear up articles 6 and 13 of the said treaty of friendship; since it appeared that in their opinion, in case of invasion, and aid being rendered to them, the invader was to be held as a common enemy until peace was made by common consent; even though the invasion itself might have ceased. I said that, in my opinion, the clauses in question were intended to refer only to the period during which the invasion lasted. I gave several legal reasons for this; and said that otherwise such absurdities would follow as I felt sure your Majesty would never admit. Up to the present, in your desire to please the King to the utmost, you had accepted their interpretations; but it was not reasonable to expect your Majesty to continue your attitude of hostility against Scotland; since there was no appearance of an arrangement between their master (Henry) and the Scots; and it would not be right to deprive your Majesty and your subjects, for this reason, of trade with Scotland to their great injury. It would be unjust, also, that they (i.e., the Netherlanders) should be expected to forego the herring fishery of the Scottish coasts, or to be bound to burden themselves by equipping war ships. The deputies replied that the clause in question meant the aid to be sent before the invasion, in order that the dignity of the allied princes might be safeguarded. An invasion might be sprung upon them, in which case it would be easier to prevent than to remedy when it had taken place. I said that their argument was a very thin (maigre) one. The text to the treaty only mentioned the aid being given after the invasion; and if it were necessary for it to be known that your Majesty and the King were making common cause, and that any invader of either territory would have to deal with both sovereigns, some means of making this understood could be found during the invasion. With regard to the declaration (against France), for which they had pressed your Majesty, I said that such a demand could hardly have been made with full knowledge: because, in addition to the proofs which had recently been shown to the King of how little he would profit, and how much your Majesty and your subjects would lose by such a declaration, it must be remembered that it would throw all Christendom into turmoil. The war would recommence between your Majesty and France; the door would be opened for the Turk to work his will on the frontiers of Hungary and Germany; and even if strictly your Majesty were bound to make such a declaration, it seemed that you would fulfil all that could be fairly expected of you, if you continued, as heretofore, to divert victuals from the French, and weakened them to the extent of their 600 men-at-arms and 10,000 infantry, which by your treaty with France you have at your disposal against the Turk. I added that they (the English) were powerful enough to resist the French for the whole of next year if necessary, as it was impossible for the French to encamp in the Boulognais for want of forage and other victuals; and, therefore, the English ought not to ask, or even allow, your Majesty to make the declaration, seeing the injury it would cause you. They (the deputies) replied that, whatever appearance of reasonableness there might be in our contentions, it was not strong enough to justify the breaking of the formal alliance with them, and leaving them in the lurch. In any case, the world would not think well of such a proceeding.
The deputies subsequently endeavoured to justify the King, their master, in respect to the non-fulfilment of the treaty, (fn. 13) by saying that in laying seige to Montreuil and Boulogne, he had only followed the example set by your Majesty in besieging St. Disier. It looked as if your Majesty was desirous of coming to terms with France, and had deliberately placed yourself in a difficult position. If, they said, the King their Master had wished to make peace with France, he might easily have played a trick whilst your Majesty was before St. Disier; such, for instance, as to lead his army across the Somme, and to send someone to your Majesty, as you sent M. d'Arras to him, to give you notice that unless you raised the siege, and at once marched to his aid, he would be obliged to make peace. The object of the deputies in saying this was to lead us to conclude that this was the interpretation which the people ad placed on your Majesty's action. We gave them, however, such a reply that we think they were sorry for having broached this suggestion. I reminded them that, even before the King left England, I had on two occasions urged him in the presence of the Council to pursue the main intention of advancing on Paris, and I had found him very cool about the enterprise, raising all manner of difficulties, most of which must have existed when the Viceroy of Sicily was here. (fn. 14) I had also found the same lukewarmness existing in the Council; and the last conference I had had with the members on the subject had been peremptorily closed by one more subtle than the rest, in order that your Majesty should not learn that the King had no intention of carrying out the main part of the plan. That this was the case has since been made obvious by events, and the King himself had not concealed it, for he had declared repeatedly that he would a hundred times rather capture Boulogne than Park It had, moreover, been clearly proved since, and pointed out to them by your Majesty's ministers, that the capture of Boulogne and Montreuil was not necessary for the purpose of advancing into France. They (the English) might have marched on your Majesty's frontier as easily as on their own soil, being abundantly furnished with supplies from your territories, if they had appointed commissaries in time, as recommended by the Viceroy (Gonzaga), and had arranged for the proper treatment of the contractors. It was quite otherwise with your Majesty, who had to depend upon Lorraine for your supplies, which was the same as depending upon France itself, and it was positively impossible for you to obtain victuals, unless you captured St. Disier. To tell them the plain truth, I said, even if the siege of Boulogne and Montreuil had been allowed by the arrangement, it would not have excused them from fulfilling the main plan; for the slackness and bad management were such as to make the sieges simply a farce, more especially that of Montreuil. As they themselves had always said, they were fighting at Montreuil without a chance of winning; for they could not surround the place, and it suited them to leave one of the gates free. Their bombardment had never been worth a cabbage (ung choux) and they had made no effort to carry the place. In fact, the siege was nothing but a sham, for the purpose of gaining time and serving their own ends without going too far away from their head quarters at Boulogne. At the latter place also, they seem to have purposely wasted time, to avoid having to advance further; for after the first short bombardment, the breach effected was, in the opinion of soldiers, as nice and easy of assault as ever was seen. If the King had even ordered an assault and tried his luck, as your Majesty did at St. Disier, it would have been some excuse. If the sole object of the campaign had been Boulogne, and there was no obligation to advance on Paris, the king might well have temporised to avoid losing his men; but, seeing that he was bound by the arrangement with your Majesty, he should have acted otherwise. The councillors could find no fit answer for this, but the Bishop of Winchester said that when the Council conferred with M d'Arras in the presence of M. de Courrières and myself, he (the Bishop of Winchester), speaking for his colleagues, had asked M. d'Arras whether he was instructed to complain of the non-fulfilment of the treaty by the King; to which question a negative reply had been given, and consequently that he (the Bishop of Winchester) had concluded that your Majesty was satisfied in this respect. I easily upset this contention: and pointed out, unofficially and under reserve, that if your Majesty had known that the King did not intend to fulfil the arrangement, as agreed upon, it would have been enormously to your advantage, and worth a vast sum of money to you, that the King should have remained neutral. Your Majesty, without having to wait for anyone else, might then have pushed forward on the main enterprise, choosing a much more convenient route to Paris than that by Champagne, which route you had adopted at the urgent request of the King, though it was the worst and most difficult that you could have chosen. The object of this was to leave to him the choice of all other routes, with the Netherlands as his base of supply. Besides this, your Majesty had taken into your service the forces, both horse and foot, which had been raised for the King, and had incurred the cost of the2,000 men you kept at sea, entirely in the interests of the King, for during other wars your Majesty had never maintained such a force. It is certain that in such case your Majesty would have been able to carry all before you, and would have brought the King of France to reason. Besides this, your Majesty would have been the richer by the 200,000 crowns which the Netherlanders would willingly have paid to exempt themselves from furnishing ships, and, above all, from supplying waggons for the English forces. Indeed it would have been to the advantage of the Netherlanders to have paid double as much for exemption, for they have lost a great deal more. Not only would this money not have been lost, as it has been, but it would have been an enormous help to your Majesty in the enterprise. The Netherlands also had suffered very serious injury from being unable to send their merchandise to France; and especially herrings, which will not keep good whilst a safe-conduct is being obtained. Even when safe-conducts had been granted by your Majesty and the Queen Dowager, the English had plundered the ships. It could be proved positively that, since the declaration of war with France, the English had captured from subjects of your Majesty, principally Spaniards, property worth 150,000 ducats; whilst even shortly before the declaration of war 40,000 crowns worth belonging to certain merchants of Burgos was seized at the port of Southampton. Not only had these merchants failed to obtain restitution, but they had been unable to get even an enquiry into their claims. The deputies boasted a great deal of the greatness of their armies, but they had been of no use or service whatever to your Majesty; for as the King himself had said several times to M. de Courrières and myself, in spite of the English armies, all the French soldiers on the frontiers, except the garrisons, had gone to fight your Majesty's forces, the garrisons themselves only being prevented from moving because of the (imperial) troops which remained behind (i.e., on the Flemish frontier) under the command of the Duke of Arschot and he Count de Roeulx.
We begged 'the deputies to consider well and lay before the King all we had said, as they were far better able to do than we.
Thereupon the Bishop of Winchester repeated what he said to your Majesty's ministers at Brussels; namely that the friendship and aid of- his master had greatly promoted your Majesty's interests. I immediately replied that he was too fond of repeating such things; and he forced me against my will to say what otherwise I should not say: namely that his constant repetition of this point took the form of a reproach. If the friendship of the King had been advantageous to your Majesty, that of your Majesty had been no less fortunate for the King. It was true that God had granted success to your Majesty during the alliance, but His divine goodness had not deserted you when you were the King's enemy, but had even granted you one of your greatest victories, namely, when M de Lautrec was defeated. (fn. 15) If it was needful, I said, to go back further still, they (the English) might recollect that before the alliance with the house of Spain this country (England) had been in terrible combustion and revolt, not only on account of the Scots, but by Peterkin Warbeck, the Marshal of the West and others, but since the alliance everything had been peaceful. As for the capture of the King of France (i.e., at Pavia) the English had no reason to boast in that matter, for after Master Russell no one knew better than I what became of the broad-angels which the King (Henry) was then sending (i.e., to Italy). One portion of the money at the time was at Genoa, another portion at Rome, and a small sum was handed to M. de Bourbon for his expedition in Provence (fn. 16) . We were astonished also that they (the English) should assert that the troops they had sent to Landrecis were the cause of the submission of the Duke of Cleves to your Majesty. I doubted very much whether the Duke or the Gheldres-men even knew of the coming of the English; but even if they did and the English had been ten times as numerous, the Gheldres-men would have taken no notice of them. It (i.e., the submission of the Duke of Cleves) must be ascribed to the goodness of God and the battle of Daren, where no Englishmen were present. All three of the deputies interrupted me here, and appeared vexed that they had opened up this matter; and finally confessed that, as I said, the alliance had been to the advantage of both parties. With regard to the excuse for not supplying waggons, when I had repeated all that had passed in the matter, and had stated the efforts made by the Queen (Dowager) they had nothing more to say; and especially when I pointed out to them the discourtesy shown, not only on the part of private persons, but also by the King's agents in exporting all the best mares from the Netherlands, under the pretext of using them for the enterprise, instead which they sent them to England for breeding. The King himself had sent over 200 besides those exported by private persons clandestinely from Holland and elsewhere with the carts that were sent for the English army transport. (fn. 17)
Up to the present we see no signs that the King is carrying on any negotiations with France. Far from it, his mind seems quite taken up with plans for the fortification of Boulogne and the furnishing of victuals and stores, of which great quantities have already been sent. Every day fresh pioneers and other troops are being sent to Boulogne; and the King has recently retained in his service M. Loys de l'Arme, a Bolognese, and the Count Bernard de St.Boniface, a Veronese, as well as another man named Philip Prince of Bucharest. They have been sent to Venice to look out for Italian soldiers, but they are not yet authorised to engage any, until the Queen's secretary joins them with instructions to pay the necessary money. This secretary is to go first to the Diet of Worms, and, in accordance with what he hears there, will, we believe, either go on to Italy, or else look for troops in Germany. The king has decided to send someone to the King of Denmark. We knew this some days ago, but as Secretary Paget has now informed us of it we communicate it to your Majesty.
Our interview (with the deputies) was brought to an end with a request on our part that they would consider all we had said; and together with their colleagues, use their influence with the King that he might be satisfied with the explanations in justification of your Majesty. They replied, that they would do so willingly; and the Earl of Hertford and the Bishop of Winchester, especially, rose and approached me with the assurance they would do their very best, if only in return for the treatment accorded to them when they went to your Majesty. They seemed convinced that your Majesty would raise no difficulty in making the declaration (against France) after the expiration of the ten weeks; but I extricated myself by saying that I had no knowledge of your Majesty's intentions on the subject, beyond what I had said; only that I was sure that your Majesty would not fail on that, or any other point, to do what was proper and incumbent upon you. They promised, as they departed, to convey to us as soon as possible the King's decision; but they previously besought us very earnestly to tell them if we bore any other fresh message on the matter, as the King thought we did, in view of what your Majesty had said in the conference with Hertford and Winchester. This was to the effect that your Majesty would send hither ambassadors to satisfy the King: but they said that they had not hitherto seen any justification or satisfaction whatever, beyond, what had already been given to them (i.e., to Hertford and Winchester on their embassy to the Emperor). We replied to this that, even though they (the deputies) might not be authorised to accept the justification as satisfactory, the King would do so.
London, 3 January, 1545.
4 Jan. Vienna Imp. Arch.3 Chapuys to the Emperor.
Since the enclosed letters jointly from my colleague and myself were written, the Earl of Hertford, the Bishop of Winchester and Secretary Paget sent word to me that, as they had to come to town (i.e., from Greenwich) to-day, they would not fail to come and chat with me privately and without witnesses. They came immediately after dinner; and began at once to apologise for the behaviour of the King towards me on Sunday last. They assured me of the great affection that the King bore me, using many expressions which it would be tedious to repeat. They then went on to say that neither the King nor they could believe that, considering my ill-health, I had come to England unless on some more important mission than that which I and my colleague had disclosed. Otherwise, they said, surely it was not necessary for me to come, simply to repeat the same statements that had been already fully debated at Brussels. I replied that I had no private mission whatever. The mission upon Which I had come was important enough to justify the coming of a more able person than myself, as they would admit if they considered the contentions laid before them the day before yesterday. It was true that the matter had been fully discussed at Brussels; and if they (Hertford and Winchester) had thoroughly mastered and understood it, my coming might to some extent have been unnecessary. I then laid before them certain letters which the Queen Dowager of Hungary had written to my colleague and myself complaining of the excesses of the English troops not long ago near Arras; and also of the insults, pillage and illtreatment, by them of the people of Dunkirk, Nieuport and Ostend and others. I said that this was a fresh proof, in addition to those already set forth, of the truth of my contention, that the neutrality of the King would have been greatly to the advantage of your Majesty's subjects; (fn. 18) and I expected they would shortly hear of numberless complaints of the same sort. A Spaniard only this morning told me that he would furnish me with a written statement of the losses that had been inflicted on Spaniards, which exceeded the amount I had mentioned the day before yesterday. They (the English Councillors) blankly looked at each other, but had not a word to say in reply to this.
I then asked them if they had reported to the King what had passed at our conference, and what he thought of it all. They answered that they had reported summarily, but I ought to know the character of the King sufficiently well to be sure that he was always anxious to reciprocate; nay even to exceed, any friendly approaches made to him and that any one who knew how to manage him might do almost as they liked with him, if he could be satisfied that his friendship would be returned. They (the Councillors) thought that if your Majesty were pleased to write a few amiable words to the King, they would have more influence than anything else in appeasing and settling matters. I asked them what sort of words they meant. They said that your Majesty might assure the King of your perfect, sincere, and inviolable amity, and of your absolute intention to observe all engagements and promises. They did not venture to proceed any further; and I pointed out to them that what they suggested had already been emphatically declared to them by your Majesty, and subsequently by my colleague and myself to the King They insisted a little, however, saying that the King would like it better if it were written to him; and after they had dwelt upon this for a time, they came to the real matter which touches them. They haggled a good deal over saying it; I am not quite sure whether in consequence of their being half ashamed of it, or from their anxiety to wrap it up nicely: but when it did come out, it was that, in addition to the two professions above-mentioned, the letter should contain a third clause, saying that your Majesty was perfectly satisfied with all the King had done in the enterprise, and that it was your intention to fulfil punctually the terms of the treaty. I laughed when I heard this, and said I was surprised that they did not add a demand that your Majesty should ask the King's pardon. For my part, I said, I would never advise the Emperor to concede the last clauses they mentioned, for to say the plain truth, my own opinion was that the King had broken the treaty. Since, as they said, all the world was talking in a manner unfavourable to your Majesty in the matter of this peace with France, and they themselves, against all reason, raised doubt about the consent (given by the King to the peace between Charles and Francis) conveyed by M. d'Arras to your Majesty, it would be necessary for us to let the world know what really had happened. I made clear, as I had done the day before yesterday, that what I said was quite unofficial; as I knew no more of your Majesty's intentions than what I had told them. I then proceeded to ask them what the King would do, if your Majesty consented to write as they wished: to which they replied that the King would consent to the delay that your Majesty had taken. (fn. 19) I replied that, though, frankly, I had no idea how far your Majesty might consider that a favour from them, I thought that, even though the delay was conceded, and it was three times as long as it was, your Majesty would not be under the slightest obligation to them for it; bearing in mind what had passed in the matter of the declaration against Cleves and Denmark which the King had been requested to make, but which they (the English) would never admit that they promised, until they learnt that your Majesty had made friends with the Duke of Holstein. (fn. 20)
After some more talk, I repeated that, whatever they might say, I did not believe that the King was so bad a friend to your Majesty as to ask you to do a thing derogatory to your honour, and to lay yourself open to the blame of the whole world, besides, as I had already said, throwing all Christendom into turmoil and danger, without any benefit to the King, and even to his disadvantage. So long as your Majesty remained at peace with France the strength of the latter would be reduced by the French contingent against the Turk. There was, moreover, another point to be considered. The Netherlander had spent immense sums over this war, and the only benefit they had derived from the peace was the opening of trade, upon which riches of their country depended. If, I said, alter all their sacrifices, they saw themselves deprived of the benefit in order to serve the interests of others, and with no advantage either to your Majesty or to themselves, they would at once cry murder; for they are very free of speech: and your Majesty would in future be unable to obtain any aid from them. If they (the English) imagined that the King of France would care very much for the declaration they requested, they were making a great mistake; for he did not care a cabbage for it. (fn. 21) I begged them to point this out to the King, and to direct his attention to the various considerations I had set forth. I said, if they would reflect well on the whole matter—admitting the King's consent to the negotiations with France—there was, in my opinion, not the slightest question that their demand that your Majesty should make the declaration was unwarranted. They wanted to dispute this, but after a short time they departed, promising to lay the contentions before the King more fully than heretofore. Seeing the complexity, as well as the importance, of the affair, I thought well to give them a hint, if they needed it, which might lead to a settlement; by saying that, in my opinion, they had acted, and were acting, unwisely in pressing your Majesty to make the declaration. Even if your Majesty did not avail yourself of the King's own non-fulfilment of the treaty, which was as clear as the sun at noon, your Majesty was not in the slightest degree bound. There were, I said, other, and more legitimate, means for obtaining the object they sought. They begged me eagerly to tell them what these means were; and after a show of hesitation, and a protest that I was speaking in confidence; hoping that your Majesty would not be informed of what I said, I told them that they must be aware, as I had recently declared to the King, that your Majesty had not obtained and accepted the arbitration (i.e., of Henry's claims against France) from any desire of your own to adjudicate on the question, but with the objects already explained to the King. Your Majesty had, I said, considered that, however advantageous it was to adjudicate between two enemies; and so to gain the friendship, at all events, of one of them, it was a thankless office to adjudicate between two friends, and thus turn one into an enemy. It nevertheless seemed to me that the best means of arriving at a settlement would be for the King to endeavour to have the arbitration carried through: and I pointed out to them fully the advantages which they might derive from it, besides avoiding the difficulties I had mentioned. They ruminated for some time on it, and said much which need not be repeated, but they finally approved of the suggestion. I do not know whether I was overbold in bringing it forward; but in such case I crave your Majesty's pardon, and beg that my fault may be attributed to my desire to serve your Majesty.
London, 4th January, 1545.
5 Jan. Vienna Imp. Arch.4. Minute of Letters Patent.
Charles, etc. Whereas complaints have been made to us that certain subjects of the King of England have for some time past been arresting vessels loaded with merchandise of great value belonging to our subjects, both Spaniards and Netherlanders. In order that due steps may be taken for the indemnification of our subjects we have informed the English ambassador resident in our Court of the matter; (fn. 22) but, pending the reply and redress for the injury inflicted, we have, at the request of our subjects, decided to arrest the persons, property and ships of the King's subjects here. In order that this decree may be executed with the gentleness and moderation due to our friendship with the King, we have decided to entrust the task to a person faithful to us; and one in whose diligence, tact, loyalty and virtue we have full confidence. We have therefore appointed you; our well-beloved and trusty councillor and Master of Requests, M. Charles Boissot, doctor of laws, who are hereby instructed to proceed to our cities of Antwerp and Bergen, and there to seize and place at our disposal all the persons, ships, merchandise and other property, belonging to the subjects of the King of England; which persons and property will be safely guarded and remain absolutely intact, until our further orders: and this shall be your full warrant therefor. All our officers and subjects are hereby ordered to obey, assist and forward the fulfilment of this warrant and to give such aid thereto as the holder may request.
Ghent, 5th February, 1545.
5 Jan. Brussels Neg. Aug. B.M. Add. 28,594.5.Instructions from the Emperor to his Gentleman of the Mouth, Mde. Torquen, (fn. 23) for his mission to England.
You will proceed with what diligence you may to England, addressing yourself in the first place to our ambassadors, Eustace Chapuys and François Van der Delft, to whom you will deliver your letters and show them this instruction. You will explain your mission to .them, and obtain and follow their advice as to your bearing towards the King and his Council. You will then, acting under their direction, present to the King our letters of credence, with our very affectionate greeting, and tell him that we have been several times informed that his people have captured a number of ships, some loaded with goods, provisions, etc., of great value, and others in ballast, belonging to our subjects both Flemish and Spanish. The pretext given for these seizures is that the ships were about to load or discharge in France, and the men on board have been detained. Our subjects have grievously complained of this; and in accordance with our duty to protect them, and provide redress for the injuries done to them, we have on several occasions remonstrated against the damage thus inflicted since the treaty of friendship was signed. No redress has hitherto been forthcoming, although quite recently we informed the King's ambassador here of the great complaints we were constantly receiving from our subjects, of the losses that were daily being inflicted upon them by Englishmen. These losses already reach a large amount, and we laid the claims before the ambassador, in order that some effort might be put forth on the King's part to make restitution of the property seized. The complaints however, continue and increase every day; and being unable to refuse protection to our subjects, we have acceded to their prayers, and have ordered the seizure of all English subjects, ships and merchandise here. This has been done as moderately, and quietly, as possible; and the persons interested have been given to understand that the sequestration has only been ordered for the reason set forth above, and pending a reply from the King, on receipt of which we will act in accordance therewith. We trust his reply will be such as is demanded by the close friendship between us: and we now despatch you to him for the purpose of making this statement to him, and to beg him to conform to the treaty of alliance, and release the property seized, whilst allowing our subjects in future to pass by sea without molestation. If the contrary be the case, we shall not be able to avoid treating his subjects as he treats ours, though this would cause us great regret, and we would fain avoid it if possible. We have despatched our councillor Charles Boissot to inform the English merchants of the cause of the arrests, and the course we propose to take, in order that they may not think that more harshness than is necessary accompanies the measures, but that our object is solely to provide for the indemnification of our subjects.
You will set this forth to the King, with all possible modesty, and in kind words, such as you may see will induce him to consent to the release of the seizures. You will act throughout in conformity with the advice of our ambasssadors, and go and return from your mission with all possible speed.—Ghent, 5 January, 1545.
P. S.—It is possible that the King may seek to explain the seizures by saying that the ships were loaded with victuals, etc., for for conveyance to France, and consequently that they were good prizes. If this line be taken, you will say that, even if that were the case, it was not for him to arrest our subjects, but that he should have informed us of the matter, and we would have taken such steps as were necessary. To proceed thus forcibly against these subjects of ours was in direct violation of the treaty of alliance, and you will therefore persist in demanding the release; using the gentlest words possible, but at the same time letting the King know that, failing the release of the property seized in England, we shall be obliged to seek the redress and indemnification of our subjects by other means.


1 David Paniter was Arran's Secretary. He was prior of St. Mary Isle, Abbot of Cambuskenneth, and subsequently, until his death in 1558, Bishop of Ross. During the year 1545 he not only went on this embassy to the Emperor, but also proceeded on a mission to the King of France.
2 For the instructions of Chapuys and Van der Delft sec p. 447 of the previous vou me of this Calendar.
3 This was doubtless “Mr. Bartlett of the King's Chamber.”
4 For particulars of Seymour and Gardiner's mission to the Emperor in order to claim his aid against France by virtue of the treaty of alliance with England, see the preceding volume of this Calendar.
5 An account of the interview mentioned here, and the King's alleged speech to the Bishop of Arras consenting to the peace, will be found in the preceding volume of this Calendar.
6 The participation of the Duke of Alburquerque in the campaign before Boulogne will be found fully detailed and explained in the Spanish Chronicle of Henry VIII., edited by the present writer. The original author of the Chronicle is believed to have been Antonio de Guaras, a Spanish merchant living in London, who appears to have accompanied Alburquerque to Boulogne as interpreter. His account of the fateful interview with Arras, in which Henry rashly gave away his case, agrees with that given by the other subjects of the Emperor present. It will be seen that during the whole of the subsequent negotiations Henry was fruitlessly struggling to free himself from the consequences of his thoughtless speech, of which the youthful Bishop of Arras, the future Cardinal de Granvelle, saw the importance as soon as it was pronounced.
7 By reference to page 364 of Vol. 7 of this Calendar it will be seen that Henry did complain to Chapuys through Gardiner when he learnt of the conclusion of peace.
8 That this was practically the case, though the document was probably not signed until after Arras' return to the Emperor, is shown in the Introduction to the preceding volume of this Calendar.
9 It is not quite clear who is the person referred to here as le general des guerres. In Chapuys' account of the event, written at the time to the Queen Dowager, he calls the person who accompanied Gardiner on the occasion le tesorier dee guerres; and Senor Gayangos assumes that Sir Thomas Cheyne was meant. Page 363, Vol. 7, of this Calendar.
10 This was a delay of ten weeks taken by the Emperor in which to give his decided answer to Henry's requisition that he should furnish the armed contingent stipulated by the treaty of alliance in case of the invasion of English territory. It will be seen later that Charles declined to recognise the “invasion” by the French of the County of Boulogne, as this territory did not belong to England at the time that the treaty was signed and was not comprised in it.
11 This refers to the terms actually agreed upon by Charles and Francis (see Vol. VII.); the two marriages in question being that of the Duke of Orleans with the daughter or the niece of Charles.
12 This letter is not now to be found, but the point referred to, namely the vigorous prosecution of the war whilst the peace negotiations with France were pending, is fully dealt with in Arras' instructions written at the same time. See Vol. VII., p. 328.
13 As one of the strings to their diplomatic bow it was considered advisable to retort to Henry's demand for armed aid under the treaty, that he had himself failed to fulfil the obligations he had undertaken in the treaty arranged with Gonzaga in London (see Vol. V, part 2) for the conduct of the war. It will be recollected that instead of joining the Emperor on the Somme, as agreed, and advancing with him on Paris, Henry had tarried before Boulogne and Montreuil. Henry pointed out that neither had Charles fulfilled his part of the bargain by staying to besiege St. Disier. These wearisome tu quoques continued throughout the whole subsequent negotiation.
14 The plan for a junction of the English and Imperial armies and a joint advance on Paris had been agreed upon by Henry and Gonzaga, Viceroy of Sicily, as the Emperor's representative. See Vol. VII.
15 That is to say the campaign of Lombardy in 1521—the year after Henry's meeting with Francis on the “Field of the Cloth of Gold”—when the Milanese was lost to France.
16 A most minute and curious account of the disposal of the money-subvention paid by England to the Emperor is given in a letter from the Bishop of Bath (John Clerk) Henry's ambassador in Rome, to Wolsey, dated 6 April, 1525, shortly after the battle of Pavia (MS. Cotton Vit. B. 7 and printed in Ellis). If Clerk's accounts be trustworthy Chapuys would appear to have had no other cause of complaint than that the money was paid after the victory instead of before it, and that Clerk in Rome and Sir John Russell in Milan spent or retained a comparatively small sum for expenses. The imperialists however were to be paid 45,000 Suncrowns instead of 50,000, and Clerk says that “they be ryght well contented to take this iu this manner and gevithe the Kynges Highnes harty thanks therefor.” In the same volume are letters from Sir John Russell to Wolsey respecting the subsidy, particularly with regard to Constable Bourbon's demands.
17 All these petty points of contention are dwelt upon fully in Vol. VII. They were deliberately kept alive by both parties as sets-off one against the other.
18 That is to say that it would have been more advantageous for the Emperor and his subjects, if England had stood aloof from the war altogether, than to have entered into it and then to have conducted it independently for her own ends.
19 i.e., the period of 10 weeks that Charles had taken in which to reply finally to the demand for aid.
20 By reference to the correspondence contained in the preceding volume of this Calendar it will be seen that the allies had in the previous year persistently endeavoured to gain advantage over each other, England by foroing the Emperor to declare war against Scotland and the Emperor by extorting from Henry a similar declaration against the usurping King of Denmark and the Duke of Cleves, the brother of the divorced Queen of England. The declarations in both cases were delayed until circumstances had rendered them of little service.
21 That is to say that the stoppage of commercial intercourse, which would be the main outcome of the declaration requested, would only slightly injure the French, whilst it would ruin the Flemings, &c.
22 On the 3rd January Dr. Wotton (the English Ambassador with the Emperor) wrote to Henry VIII., that M. d'Arras (Antoine de Perrenot) and Dr. Boissot had called upon him to complain bitterly of the seizure of Flemish ships in England (especially on the West Coast, Fowey, Dartmouth, etc.), and threatened that unless these ships were instantly released and the owners indemnified the Emperor would decree the seizure of all English subjects and property in his dominions. State Papers R.O. Vol. X.
23 The name of this envoy is spelt in an extraordinary variety of ways, Turcoin. Torquain, Tourcaigne, Torquayne, Torquen. Turkuin, Tourcoigne, etc. He had been sent on a temporary mission in the previous year, 1544. His real name was Baudoin de Lanoy, Sieur de Tourcoing, and he was descended from the famous Charles de Lanoy, Prince of Sulmona and Viceroy of Naples.