Spain: November 1524, 16-30 | British History Online

Calendar of State Papers, Spain: Further Supplement To Volumes 1 and 2, Documents From Archives in Vienna. Originally published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1947.

'Spain: November 1524, 16-30', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain: Further Supplement To Volumes 1 and 2, Documents From Archives in Vienna, (London, 1947) pp. 408-419. British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/spain/further-supp/vols1-2/pp408-419 [accessed 19 April 2024]

November 1524, 16-30



Nov. 16. H. H. u. St. A. England, f. 1.	Louis De Praet to Margaret Of Savoy. From my other letters you may see the gist of Wolsey's reply to yours of November 5th. For your further information I am enclosing herewith copies of my last two letters to the emperor. London, 16 Nov. Signed, Loys de Praet. French.
Nov. 17. H. H. u. St. A. Belgien DD Abt. B. f. 8.	Louis De Praet to Charles V. I wrote last by Fusil, enclosing news of Italy. Yesterday evening I received letters from Madame enclosing a copy of a letter from Chasteau to the audiencer. I went this afternoon to communicate this news to Wolsey, both to learn his intentions and to find out what he had heard from Pace. Having read Chasteau's letter, Wolsey told me Pace's news, written from Mantua October 27th. It was substantially the same as Chasteau's, except that it added that having garrisoned and provided Lodi and the citadel of Milan, Bourbon, Pescara and Lannoy had garrisoned Pavia, and then retired toward Cremona where the duke of Milan is, hoping they had provided all three places so well that King Francis could not take them. In fact, nothing is to be feared except lack of money. Bourbon has retired to Cremona, not daring to trust himself in any other place in Italy, not even at Mantua, although the marquis is his near relative. He fears the great hate which King Francis bears him, and suspects the marquis, who is captain general of the church. The insinuation is that Bourbon and the other captains doubt the pope's good faith, since he had a large number of troops at Parma and Piacenza, but commanded them to go no farther. This was very unfortunate, for the Venetians, seeing the papal troops inactive, ordered their troops not to advance beyond their boundaries. All the Italian princes are watching each other, and especially the pope, to see what to do next. Wolsey expressed himself as very astonished at this news, though he ended by saying he was sure the pope would never forsake your majesty, or leave the French in Milan. He thought Clement would rather declare himself against them, for if they took Milan and marched on Naples, Florence and Rome would be in great danger, and consequently the prestige of the papacy. As for the proposals made by Bourbon to Pace, Wolsey said he had communicated them to the king, but they seemed unreasonable. It would be impossible for an English army to enter France this year, and highly unreasonable to expect Henry to give Bourbon 200,000 crowns to equip an army to invade Burgundy. He said it was doubtful whether Bourbon would be able to do anything there, and he did not believe Bourbon had any large party in France. He asked me to write you that, in his opinion, your majesties ought by no means to abandon Bourbon, but it did not seem sensible to risk any large amount of money on the hope of any understanding he might have with French subjects. From now on, Wolsey said, you should rely on your own powers, and make yourselves strong enough to combat the enemy without such aid, counting any assistance from Bourbon's friends as extra profit. I then said the precautions taken by Bourbon and the viceroy seemed to me admirable, and I hoped the pope, also, would help in the defence of Italy, particularly if he saw that the king of England would join in that cause. I took this line because it seemed to me that Bourbon's proposals would be long and uncertain in their execution, and after all I had no instructions to further them. I asked Wolsey at least to permit the 50,000 at Viterbo to be employed for the defence of Italy, not all at once, but twenty-five or thirty thousand crowns a month. I pointed out that such a contribution would encourage all the Italian powers, and place your majesty under a great obligation. It might be the cause of preventing the French advance, and, perhaps, if King Francis saw all the towns well garrisoned against him, he would be obliged to retire and agree to a truce. In spite of these arguments, Wolsey would not agree to do anything. He said he had involved the king, his master, in so much useless expense for the sake of your majesty, and the Italian princes had shown themselves so ungrateful and given so little assistance to Bourbon's last campaign, that Henry would not hear of making any further contributions for the defence of Milan. Wolsey added that Henry was very surprised that in forwarding this news, which seemed to presage the loss not only of Milan but of Naples, and after that of the Low Countries, Madame had said nothing about any contribution she was sending to the viceroy, and that, it seemed to him, if they understood the danger, the estates of the Low Countries would certainly grant a considerable sum of money, and if they did not do so, the nobles of those realms, whom your majesty and your predecessors had so much enriched, ought to go down to the very bottom of their purses, and, as a loan, send at once to Milan some 150,000 or 200,000 crowns, thus showing themselves good servants. Wolsey said he had done more than that for his master, for he had not merely loaned him money, but given him all he could raise, and sold his plate to provide for the war. I replied that I did not doubt Madame would do all she could, and more, for the advancement of your affairs, but it was unlikely the Low Countries would contribute any great sum, not from lack of good-will, but because they had not even enough money for their own defence. I said I did not doubt that your lords would voluntarily contribute whatever they could, but many of them were not as rich as people thought. But I could get no more favourable answer from Wolsey, and he requested me to write Madame what he had said in order to find out what she was going to do. Meanwhile he said he would talk to Henry, for whatever happened he would not have you defeated. He advised a truce until May, 1526, unless you were able to execute the "Great Enterprise" next year, according to the treaty of Windsor, or, at least, place such an army in the field as you could honourably lead in person. This, he said, he did not think you could do, for he was informed that your finances were in a very bad state, and you often had not enough money for living expenses. Also, even if you had money enough, he thought the Spanish frontier a disadvantageous one from which to make such an invasion, both because provisions were scarce and the roads were bad, and because your subjects in those kingdoms, particularly the grandees, gave you but scanty obedience. Wolsey certainly spoke like a man who had your interests at heart. At the end of our interview he asked me to beg your majesty from him, above all, not to promise Henry anything you would not be able to accomplish, for Henry would not abandon you for anything in the world. I hope your majesty may be able to profit from this attitude, though I think Wolsey's words came in part from a fear that your majesty would impute the failure in Italy to him and the king, his master, and make some agreement with the enemy without them. Also, they now see their negotiations with the French about to fail, and have no hope of any recompense for their indemnity in money or territory, unless they can take it by force, and this they are not strong enough to do alone. I am thoroughly satisfied that King Francis will not cut up his kingdom to give a piece to the English, and increase their footing on the continent, but I am afraid that they may agree with the French in order to recover their indemnity, and conspire with them against your Low Countries. This would certainly be the ruin of the Netherlands, though it would do the English no good in the end, for if King Francis ever became the lord, I do not say of the whole of the Netherlands, but just of the county of Flanders, this kingdom would be brought very low, and no merchant or other person in it could leave it by land or sea without the permission of the king of France. I think Wolsey understands this well enough. I wrote Madame, at once, of my conversations with Wolsey, but I am afraid her good-will is greater than her power. I doubt whether she can satisfy these lords here, and I think there is little hope of your getting much assistance from them for Milan. They will make delays to see how things are coming out, and whether or not a truce can be arranged, this being the course to which Wolsey has been most inclined for some time. I shall keep your majesty advised. On the whole, these English have been the principal cause of your present difficulties, first by entertaining Jockin here so long, so that King Francis was as well informed of the state of English preparations as I am myself, and second by Wolsey's refusal of a truce at a time when, had it been obtained, we should have avoided the recent reverses. Nevertheless, it seems to me that your majesty should dissimulate, and seek to retain the friendship of these lords. To do this you must find some means of paying the pensions ; this is the only means of winning them and keeping them. Meanwhile you should diligently seek to extricate yourself from this war, and accept whatever honourable truce you can obtain. Madame asked me to find out what the present relations of this kingdom with Scotland were, and whether commercial intercourse had been resumed. Wolsey said it had not, and that the armistice would soon be over, and there was no news of the coming of any ambassadors. I am enclosing a packet addressed to Dr. Sampson which has come to me through Lord Mountjoy from the queen. I would have communicated more frequently with the queen but I have been warned by some of her friends that it would not be discreet, and indeed I have often noticed that the cardinal was very restless whenever I talked to her, and often interrupted our conversation. I hope your majesty will comply with her requests in favour of her confessor and her physician ; the physician, in particular, is a worthy and discreet man, who can be of great service to your majesty, as indeed he has already been. London, 15 November, 1524. While I was writing, I received letters from Madame, dated November 9th, a copy enclosed, containing news from Rome, the accuracy of which seems to me doubtful. I went at once to Wolsey and showed him the letters. He said it was true that, so far, no certain news had come from Rome of the fall of Milan, but that the last letters he had had from the pope had been dated October 22nd, while Jockin's letters were dated October 24th and he thought they were reliable. Wolsey still will do nothing about contributing to the defence of Italy. He says that, when he knows what Madame is doing, he may be able to approach Henry on the subject more successfully, but, even if Henry consents to contribute, it will be a considerable time before English money can reach Italy, since the 50,000 crowns have been transferred by letters of exchange, to Antwerp. Wolsey said he was not surprised to hear that French forces were being gathered near Saint-Quentin, as Madame wrote, for the French would undoubtedly do their best to attack your majesty's subjects in all your lands. He said it would be impossible, however, for Henry to send an army to the continent this season, and that Jerningham had already been recalled. I have informed Lannoy of Wolsey's reply. It seems possible that Pace has secret orders from Henry and Wolsey to lend the 50,000 crowns either to the pope or to the duke of Milan, rather than let Italian affairs go completely to ruin. It is worth while, therefore, to bring pressure to bear on the English ambassadors in Italy to induce them to part with this money, even though nothing may come of it. If Henry would only contribute to the defence of Italy, as he is able to do, I think King Francis would soon regret his invasion. There is one piece of bad news. Wolsey told me he had learned from Jockin that Queen Louise had sent her treasurer to King Francis with 400,000 crowns in ready money, beseeching him not to use this money except at his greatest need. It is, Jockin says, a sum which Queen Louise was reserving for other purposes, and drains the very bottom of her purse, but it is unfortunate if she has sent it. Wolsey then began to speak to me of the general course of present affairs, which he said were going very badly. Your majesty, and, through his persuasion, the king, his master, had spent an enormous amount of money in the last two years without any good result. Had you stood on the defensive until last May, the time agreed on for the "Great Enterprise," and had Bourbon kept quiet until then, and had you then attacked King Francis, all at once, you would have had him at your mercy. Wolsey said he hoped you and the king, his master, would profit by experience, and behave more wisely in the future. If no truce is concluded, Wolsey feels certain that the first post from Spain will bring me powers and instructions to persuade Henry to invade France next year, and that you will write, in order to reinforce my arguments, that you are well provided with money and with everything necessary to keep your promises. He thinks you will do all this simply to draw the French from Milan, and he says that, if you do so, and if Henry takes the field and leaves his realm, relying on your promises, and if you then fail to fulfil what you have promised, matters will take a turn so bad they will ruin all your affairs. He asked me to give you this advice from him at once, and to say that, unless you were certain of having enough money to keep your promises, it would be better for you to accept any truce you could get. I replied that I was sure your majesty would never urge Henry into dangerous courses, and that complete frankness was the best means of preserving the alliance. Your majesty will see that Wolsey's real aims are to persuade you to a truce, so as to avoid executing the "Great Enterprise," with honour to his master. In my opinion, it would be well to let him know that you would prefer at least to postpone the "Great Enterprise," so they cannot accuse you of breaking with them, for, in spite of what Wolsey has said to me, I am credibly informed that Henry, in all his conversations, shows great eagerness to cross the sea next year, in accordance with the treaties. Consequently this matter should be handled very tactfully. The pope has ordered his ambassador here to ask Wolsey to send powers to Rome for the conclusion of a truce, and to contribute for the defence of Milan at least the 50,000 crowns now available, and to assure Wolsey that His Holiness is secretly doing everything in his power for the defence of Italy. Wolsey replied to the ambassador in the same terms that I have described above. Wolsey tells me that matters are going very badly in Scotland. I do not think this king will dare to cross the sea until that country is pacified. All the difficulties in Scotland arise from French intrigues, as Wolsey knows very well; nevertheless he continues to entertain Jehan Jockin here, which is very strange conduct, and would be even more surprising to one who did not know Wolsey's character. 17 November. Copy. French. pp. 15.
Nov. 17. H. H. u. St. A. England, f. 1.	Louis De Praet to Margaret Of Savoy. After I had written you by one of the couriers of Baptiste de Taxis, your master of the posts, I received yours of November 7th, enclosing a copy of Chasteau's letter to the audiencer. I went at once to lay the proposals in Chasteau's letter before Wolsey, feeling sure that Pace had already informed him of them. He absolutely refused either to consider an English invasion of France this season or to help Bourbon to form an army with which to invade Burgundy. Seeing there was no hope of obtaining either of these points, I again urged him to make some contribution to the defence of Milan, and again received a refusal. He said the danger to Milan concerned you more than it did anyone except the emperor, and that, in this emergency, you should assemble the estates of the Low Countries and so present the matter to them that they would grant a considerable sum of money, and that the wealthy lords of the Low Countries ought to show their loyalty by lending money to the emperor, which they could easily do without serious inconvenience. If help was thus forthcoming for the emperor from his own realms, Wolsey said he might be able to persuade Henry to do something. It seemed best to write you what he says, although I know that you are doing everything in your power. London, 15 November, 1524. P.S.—Since writing this, I have received yours of November 9th, which I communicated to Wolsey. I fear, however, that our news is fresher than yours. Wolsey will give me no more favourable answer about contributing to the defence of Milan than to say that if a considerable contribution is raised in Flanders. Henry might be willing to do something. Even this, I fear, is not sincere, for a good friend of mine has informed me that the money is already being sent back to Antwerp, which would indicate that Wolsey does not intend to spend anything. When I told Wolsey of the concentration of French troops around St. Quentin, he merely remarked that he had no doubt the French would now attack you on all sides. I do not think he has any intention of sending English troops across the Channel, for Jerningham is coming back. Yours of the 12th has just come, with the enclosed packet from the viceroy. Money seems to be what is chiefly needed, but I have little hope of obtaining any here, although I shall speak to Wolsey at once, and to Henry next Sunday. Meanwhile, however, I think you should advise Lannoy not to rely on English help, and to make a truce if possible. The English powers for such a negotiation were sent, according to Wolsey, six days ago. 17 November. Signed, Loys de Praet. French. pp. 3.
Nov. 22. H. H. f. St. A. Belgien Abt. B. f. 8.	Louis De Praet to Charles V. I wrote last on Thursday. Next day I received letters from the viceroy, with a copy of a letter he had written to you. Since the principal point in the viceroy's letter was his lack of money, I decided, while waiting for the coming of M. de Roeulx, to go at once to Wolsey and afterwards to the king, and, despite their former refusals, to ask them again for some contribution, alleging four reasons. First, they had been asked to do so by the pope, by your majesty, by Madame, by the duke of Milan, and by other princes, all of whom they would place under an eternal obligation by making this contribution, which was much smaller that what they had formerly given to Pope Julius and the Emperor Maximilian, who were not nearly such close allies. Second, if this argument did not move Wolsey, he ought to consider the great opportunity for an exploit which would redound principally to the benefit of the king, his master, since Francis had come in person to Italy and without doubt our people would give battle to him if money were provided, and King Francis might be conquered. Third, by making a contribution for the defence of Milan, the king of England would help preserve Naples, and it would be better for him to do this early and with small expense than to wait until the danger was greater and he was obliged to do so according to the treaties. Fourth, according to the accounts sent me by Lannoy, Henry had disbursed, in ready money and in remainders due the troops, at least fifty thousand crowns less than had your majesty, and it was reasonable that Henry should pay what he owed. In reply to these arguments Wolsey raised several difficulties, but he finally promised me to discuss the matter with Henry and give me a decision. When he saw I wished to go to Henry myself, he said he would advise against it and that he could manage matters better alone than in my presence. I obeyed in order not to irritate him, although I would have found this manner of doing business very strange indeed, had Wolsey not done the same thing to me several times before, and also to Badajoz, and in general to all ambassadors. When I saw Wolsey to learn the king's decision, he said that Henry would willingly aid the army at Milan so far as the fifty thousand crowns which he had in Italy would go, provided he first saw proof that your majesty, the pope. Madame, the Venetians, and the other Italian princes whom this affair touched more nearly than he, had done likewise. Otherwise he said it did not seem reasonable to press him. Or if we preferred, Wolsey said, Henry would lend the money to Madame for six or eight months, on reasonable security. As for the first three arguments I had alleged, Wolsey replied that Henry had acquitted himself only too well toward his allies, and at need was prepared to fulfil all his promises. As for the fourth reason, he said he had no intention that his master should accept any further responsibility for the payment of the troops who had been in the invasion of Provence, and, if I wished to argue this point further. I could place my reasons in writing, and he would give me a reply. He said if it proved that your majesty had spent more than the king, his master, Henry would reimburse you, but that he believed you had not, and had figures to support his belief. I replied that the reasons he advanced ought not to make him hesitate to contribute, for it was notorious that your majesty supported the chief burden of the war, and had recently sent at least a hundred thousand crowns to Italy ; similarly the pope was doing his best, as the papal ambassador would tell him, and the Venetians had already begun to show their good-will. Wolsey replied that, in this case, Henry would not hold back, and would authorize his agents in Italy to add his money to the common defence fund. This was Wolsey's final answer, but he is so variable, particularly in this affair, saying one thing and doing another, that I do not know what to believe. I have informed Madame and the viceroy, and hope they may be able to profit by the information. I did not argue the matter further with Wolsey because, having no instructions, I preferred to wait for M. de Roeulx. Wolsey then began to talk to me about Henry's intention to execute the "Great Enterprise" next year. He spoke quite sharply, saying that Henry should begin his preparations at once and you should do the same. I replied that I would be glad to write what he said to your majesty, but I felt a little ashamed at having written you so many contradictory stories, since in my last dispatch I had said that in case you did not feel strong enough to execute the "Enterprise" you should say so frankly, so that you and Henry might take council of other means. Wolsey replied that it was true he had said something of the sort, and he still wished you to do so, so that his master might regulate his conduct accordingly, but he did not intend, by his words, to release you from your treaty obligations, but only to provide an opportunity for Henry to decide whether or not the "Enterprise" should be delayed at your request. I made no answer to this, for it seems to me that Wolsey is pursuing this course only to secure a confession of your majesty's weakness in order to advance the prestige of his master. I should advise your majesty to be careful, in replying to the English ambassador, not to say anything from which the English could infer any derogation of the treaties. For whatever they may say, unless they are quite out of their minds, or unless they have a secret understanding with the French, and mean, when they have landed their army in France, to attack the Low Countries, I cannot believe that they will make preparations for the "Great Enterprise" unless they are sure that your majesty is well prepared to execute it, otherwise they would be going to great expense with little hope of profit. If they insist on the "Enterprise," however, it will be more than ever necessary for you to arrange a truce. When I returned from seeing Wolsey, Brian Tuke sent me a letter from Madame containing news of the siege of Pavia and other matters. Wolsey had given me this very news without disclosing its source and Tuke had certainly detained my letters all day and perhaps longer. I do not regard this sort of behaviour as honest, but it is quite the custom here, and one from which all the ambassadors suffer. Not to show any suspicion, I went again to Wolsey to-day to tell him the contents of these letters, and to say that since, as he could see, all the other allies were doing their duty in resisting the enemy, he ought not to fail, according to the promise he had given me yesterday. It was no use. Wolsey denied having given the promise in the terms I have written above, and said that if Henry saw that all the rest of the allies were doing their duty, this would perhaps incline him to do something, but he would neither promise nor refuse, since he was bound by no treaty to defend Milan. He said his ambassadors in Italy would be instructed what the king's pleasure was and how to conduct themselves. Indeed I am ashamed to write your majesty so many contradictory reports, but Wolsey leaves me no choice. Wolsey's news from Rome is about the same as Madame's, except that, he tells me, the pope greatly fears that Pavia may be taken, and consequently the whole of the Milanese be lost. The pope did not know of the twelve hundred wagon loads of provisions destroyed by the garrison of Alexandria, nor of the plague in the French camp. Wolsey said your delay in giving the duke of Milan the investiture of his duchy had greatly injured the common cause and you should consider that persons who want everything for themselves and refuse to share with others often lose what they have gained. If Madame's reports are true, and if the money holds out, it looks as though the enemy will be sorry to have gone so far at this season. For if Pavia is as strong as they say, and if there is no lack of provisions, and if all the Germans are within it, King Francis will scarcely take it except by famine, which will be a long task. I am inclined to hope for the best, for Jehan Jockin has had no fresh news from France, and if the pope's information were correct and if the French had breached the walls of Pavia in two places, they should have won or lost by this time, and would no doubt have informed Jockin at once. Wolsey appeared to be very angry that the Datary (fn. 1) had been sent to King Francis. He said the Datary was too young a man and too little a friend of your majesty's. Also he was informed that the viceroy had offered King Francis terms of truce, which he said he ought not to have done without the king of England's consent. My reply seemed to soothe him, and he ended by saying that since the archbishop of Capua was still in France, he was sure things would be conducted wisely there. I have written you Wolsey's opinions at length, though I suppose Dr. Sampson will tell you of them. It is now more than ever necessary to dissimulate with these people, and to work for a truce before the time of the "Great Enterprise," lest the English adopt one of the courses I warned you of above. I do not say that Wolsey will be wicked enough to do so ; I am not wise enough to judge. Nevertheless, now that he is asked by all the allied princes to make some contribution to the defence of Italy, and now the opportunity for a good stroke against the enemy is so clear, his coldness and trepidation and ambiguity make me think that he is not acting in good faith. Either he has secretly encouraged the enemy to attack Milan, or he hopes that you and the king of France will go on fighting until you are exhausted, so that his master may be esteemed the most powerful of Christian princes. The papal ambassador here has had letters from Rome, dated November 2nd, and from Vienna, dated November 4th. In those from Rome the pope orders him to solicit Henry and Wolsey for a contribution for the defence of Milan and also for the sending of their powers for a truce. He is to point out to them the apparent dangers and the pope's activity in forestalling them, with many other words favourable to your majesty, and to give the cardinal to understand that, if Henry will not do his part, the pope will have to seek elsewhere to insure his safety. The ambassador is to say the pope has been informed that Wolsey has some understanding with the French, and he has sent the Datary to King Francis to discover the truth, and to replace Capua, whom Francis brought with him to Milan. Capua is instructed to go at once to your majesty, and then to England. If he has been permitted to do so, he should now be with you, and can inform you of the true state of affairs better than anyone else, but I doubt whether King Francis will allow him to take this information to you. The letters from Austria say that your brother, the archduke, having learned of the capture of Milan, is preparing in great haste to join your army in person, bringing with him ten thousand German infantry, five thousand of which will be at Morano by the tenth of this month, and the rest at Innsbruck on the same day. The archduke was to leave Vienna on November 6th. The same letter reports that the Turks have overrun a considerable part of Hungary, and it is feared that they will lay siege to Buda, or else overrun Transylvania. Such news should lead all Christian princes to desire peace among themselves. Wolsey replied to the papal ambassador that by this time the powers and instructions for a truce were at Rome. As to a contribution, however, he said it should not be counted on, for Henry was not obliged to it by treaty. If, however, Henry saw that the powers more nearly concerned were doing their part, he might be willing later on to contribute some money. The papal ambassador was very dissatisfied at having to communicate so cold an answer to the pope. I asked him to commend your majesty's affairs to His Holiness, and he promised to do so, saying the pope would never abandon you, as indeed I believe he will not. I hope that by your joint efforts peace may come, or if not, Italian affairs may be so arranged that Milan may be defended without relying on English help. As long as you depend on these lords for that assistance, you will never be sure of anything ; they have not the matter at heart, and Wolsey has often said to me that for the sake of a general peace the king, his master, ought to abandon his claims on France, and you your claims on Milan, and that in that case the alliance between your two majesties remaining firm, you could hold King Francis in fear of you, and your subjects at peace. London, 22 November, 1524. P.S—I suppose the English ambassador has told you that Wolsey has been informed by his spies in France that the marquis of Pescara has conspired with King Francis to betray Bourbon to him. This is incredible news, as I pointed out to Wolsey ; nevertheless he told me the whole thing before several members of the council. It seems to me very unwise to make such charges against such persons. Loys de Praet. French. pp. 13.
Nov. 23. H. H. u. St. A. England, f. 1.	Louis De Praet to Margaret Of Savoy. As I have already written you, I have several times tried to persuade Wolsey to a contribution, using the arguments contained in your letter of November 16th, and in the viceroy's which you enclosed. The news is good, if true, but it is not fully verified by letters which Wolsey has had from Rome. Wolsey says that, if it appears that the pope, the emperor, you, Madame, and the Italian princes are doing your share to defend Italy, he may be able to persuade Henry to do something. Or, if you will give sufficient security, perhaps a loan of the fifty thousand crowns now at Viterbo can be arranged. He says that, by this time, the instructions for a truce should be in the hands of the English ambassador at Rome. Wolsey made bitter complaints to me of the rise of exchange rates in Flanders, particularly on the angel and the rose noble. He said all the English were coming to complain of it to him, and were determined to cease trading in the Low Countries rather than to suffer such losses. He says he is sending two commissioners to you to see if the matter can be settled without bitterness, for this rise cannot possibly profit the emperor or you, and indeed injures all recipients of revenue in the Netherlands, lay and ecclesiastical. London, 23 November, 1524. Signed, Loys de Praet. French. pp. 2.
Nov. 23. H. H. u. St. A. England, f. 1.	Louis De Praet to Margaret Of Savoy. I have already written you briefly of occurrences here since my last dispatch, but, for your further information, I am sending herewith a copy of my last letter to the emperor, which relates everything which has occurred since the departure of Fusil. I beg you to communicate its contents to very few persons. I have recently perceived that Wolsey is informed of certain things which I have written to no one except to you and to the emperor, and it seems to me unnecessary that he should know everything that a servant writes to his master, especially since, in obedience to the emperor's commands, I have pretended not to notice some things that are going on here. One must ignore them for the present, but if they go on longer they may prove the emperor's ruin unless his majesty can make a safe treaty with the French, which, as you know better than I, is not easy. Wolsey has recently complained of you on two counts. First, he says you have not been ready to carry out the treaty by which you are to furnish three thousand horse and a thousand foot in aid of the English army, although, he says, knowing that it was not feasible for the English to cross this season, you have always told him and his ambassadors that you were ready to furnish these troops. This, he says, was not done like a friend, and it would have been better had you confessed your inability, instead of taking advantage of theirs. I can see that Wolsey blames me for this, since I have always written you the truth about the English preparations. He also says that he has recently been informed that you have come into possession of certain facts which gravely concern the good and honour of the king, his master, about which you have not so far advised him. To the first of his complaints I replied that I was sure you had not promised anything you were unable to perform. I would have been glad to get to the bottom of his second grievance, but he would only speak of it in general terms. It seems to me that this suspicion must have been insinuated either by Jehan Jockin, who has told him some lie to sow ill-will between you, or by Dr. Knight, who may have written that you concealed from him the recent capture of the Scottish ship, carrying letters. I did not speak of this to Wolsey because you wrote me that the news was not known in Flanders, and that the letters captured were partly in cipher, and that when they were deciphered you would communicate their contents to Dr. Knight. So that you may see that this is what you wrote, I am sending a copy of that part of the letter in question. I shall be glad to know your pleasure on this point. London, 23 November. Signed, Loys de Praet. French. pp. 3.