Simancas: December 1586, 21-31

Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 3, 1580-1586. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1896.

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'Simancas: December 1586, 21-31', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 3, 1580-1586, ed. Martin A S Hume( London, 1896), British History Online https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol3/pp679-691 [accessed 4 November 2024].

'Simancas: December 1586, 21-31', in Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 3, 1580-1586. Edited by Martin A S Hume( London, 1896), British History Online, accessed November 4, 2024, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol3/pp679-691.

"Simancas: December 1586, 21-31". Calendar of State Papers, Spain (Simancas), Volume 3, 1580-1586. Ed. Martin A S Hume(London, 1896), , British History Online. Web. 4 November 2024. https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol3/pp679-691.

December 1586, 21-31

24 Dec.
Paris Archives, K. 1564. 246.
529. Bernardino De Mendoza to the King.
Since my last letters I have learnt by letters from England, dated 17th, that the earl of Leicester returned to England in the ship that carried Drake over. At the time of his embarkation an order arrived from the Queen and all the Council that he was to stay in Zeeland, but he replied that he was now ready to embark, and it was necessary that he should verbally communicate certain matters to the Queen which he did not wish to be known by any other person. He arrived at Richmond on the 4th, and the Queen received him well, as it was a private understanding between them that he should come over with a secret license, notwithstanding other orders reaching him. It was said that he would return to Zeeland, but this is disbelieved by many people. He left Count Maurice (fn. 1) as head of the rebels and Colonel Norris in command of the English, a brother of Philip Sidney (fn. 2) being at Flushing.
M. de Believre (fn. 3) had his first audience on the 7th instant, when nothing but compliments passed, and in the second interview he addressed the Queen on the matter of the queen of Scotland, but with gentleness, saying how much the king of France would be obliged if she proceeded kindly with her. The queen of England was very haughty and told him that although subjects, of course, had to obey their sovereigns, she was nevertheless much surprised that he, Belièvre, who occupied so distinguished a position, and was so much considered, should not have declined such a mission as this, which had only been brought about by her enemies and those of the King, for the purpose of defending this homicidal woman. She added what she usually says about the queen of Scotland, and that Mary must die in order that Elizabeth may live, as they could not both of them live. She told him to tell his King this, and gave him twelve days, beyond which, she said, she would not defer the execution. When the Scots ambassador asked her not to behead the Queen until the arrival of ambassadors who would be sent as soon as a passport was given by her, she gave him the same answer, namely, granting a delay of twelve days.
Belièvre signified his intention of leaving, but the Queen sent two Councillors to him, with the result that he will stay.
On the same day that she gave audience to Belièvre the Queen caused Parliament to pronounce the death sentence, and bonfires were lit for joy all over London, and one was placed purposely before the door of the French ambassador.
The queen of Scotland remained in the same place, her room had been hung with black, and she had no canopy and is only addressed as Mary. But, as I have said to your Majesty, it is all artifice, for if she (Elizabeth) had wanted to put an end to her she has had plenty of opportunity and time for doing so, without waiting to do it in the very face of the ambassador who was sent to prevent it by the king of France. (fn. 4)
Leicester and Walsingham were greatly opposed to the queen of Scotland, and Walsingham writes to the English ambassador here that the bombastic threats sent to the Queen by the king of Scotland were not left unanswered.
The queen of England had imprisoned in the county of York and the north of England over 300 gentlemen, who, although they attended the Protestant churches, were thought to be Catholic at heart.
Lord Buckhurst is now in charge of the queen of Scotland as Paulet has come to London, (fn. 5) and Buckhurst was accompanied by a minister who was sent to the queen of Scotland to give her spiritual aid. She treated him with the bravery which was due from a Christian and a Queen, saying that he was bold indeed to presume to appear before her, knowing as he did that she had been baptised as a Catholic, in which faith she would live and die. She cared nothing for her life, but the queen of England could not deprive her of it, although she was now in her power, for she (the queen of Scotland) was a sovereign. If she dealt with her differently from what her condition demanded, she desired no vengeance against the Queen or her Council, nor against the Parliament which persecuted her, but she would have them know that there was no lack of Catholic Princes who for their own sakes would take upon themselves the task of avenging her.
Drake had requested license from the Council to put to sea, but it had not been granted up to the 17th, although it was said that he would be accompanied by a number of ships which the rebels of Holland and Zeeland offered the Queen.—Paris, 24th December 1586.
24 Dec.
Paris Archives, K. 1564. 247.
530. Bernardino De Mendoza to the King.
When the despatch from the duke of Parma, in reply to mine about Scotland, was received, Colonel Stuart, captain of the King's guard, sent word to me that he had arrived in Paris, and wished to see me secretly, in order to communicate to me a mission with which he was entrusted by certain Scottish catholic nobles, and I consequently delayed writing to your Majesty until I had heard what he had to say. The substance of it was that the earls of Huntley, Morton, and Montrose, catholics, seeing the oppression in which they lived in matters of conscience and other points, in consequence of the English faction having seized the person of the King, desired, in the first place, to set him at liberty, and so to have freedom of conscience for themselves, with the object of opening a door thereby for the subsequent conversion of the whole country to our holy Catholic faith, and causing their King to make every effort for the release of his mother. This project they were ready to carry into execution, if your Majesty would assist them with some money, and they had asked Muzio (i.e., the duke of Guise) to act as their intercessor in the matter towards your Majesty and myself. They requested him to point out how advantageous the matter would be to your Majesty's interests, as the queen of England had broken peace with you, and they offer in return for the aid they crave, the use of their forces and those of Scotland to offend the queen of England, in the way your Majesty might consider most convenient. He (Stuart) dwelt at length to this effect. I replied, pointing out the objections which could be found to the offer, in general terms, but highly approving of their purpose, and said that when I learnt how Muzio had received the proposal I would communicate it to your Majesty, and would, for my own part, do all I could to forward it, so far as an ambassador might, although we ambassadors could only depend upon the will of the Sovereign. I did not indicate that I was in communication with Muzio, except to express general sympathy with him as a brave and a Catholic person. I dealt with Stuart in this way because I know he is connected with the Scottish Catholics, and is a Catholic himself, although a politician (fn. 6). It is evident that they have not opened out very much to him, but they have made it clear that they are discontented and desire aid from your Majesty, as he is a man of influence and a soldier to whom the King is much attached. I was obliged therefore not to make him despair, but sent him away satisfied and pleased at my sympathy. I also gave him letters to the duke of Parma, to whom I told him to give an account of his mission. I have privately informed the Duke of the parts of this Colonel Stuart, and of my reply to him, in order that the Duke may continue with him accordingly. I have also told Muzio how I replied, with a similar object.
When Robert Bruce returned from Spain I asked him some questions which I set forth in my letter to the duke of Parma. Muzio informs me by him, that to elucidate these points he had written to Don Juan de Idiaquez that the 6,000 soldiers should be foreigners, of whatever nation, and led by the commander your Majesty might choose ; and they would land at the port your Majesty judged most convenient, according as they might be sent from Spain or Flanders. The sum they ask, 150,000 crowns, might be sent at the same time, and they would take up arms when your Majesty might order, either before or after the arrival of the contingent, liberating the King, massacring the English faction, and the ministers, unless they could with perfect safety imprison them, in which case they would at once have them executed by process of law. They would then take possession of the fortresses, which are old castles, and the three Catholic Earls will be the leaders of the troops to be raised for that purpose. They have the secret consent of the King for them to set him at liberty by any means. These are the points I said to the duke of Parma should be cleared up before the affair was settled. The Duke writes to me the letter of which I enclose a copy, telling me that he could not decide to answer Muzio, without hearing again from your Majesty, and that I was to keep the matter open by asking Muzio for answers on these points. If I did so now that the questions are all cleared up, Muzio and the Scotsmen would take it as a negative, and consequently I had to find some other expedient. I answered him, saying that the need in which the elector of Cologne was, had forced the duke of Parma to concentrate all his forces at Gueldres, and the results were the actions with which he, Muzio, was acquainted. I said that 6,000 men had to be left at the siege of Bergen, which had quite transformed the condition of affairs there, and the duke of Parma consequently was unable to decide about Scotland without fresh advices from your Majesty. This is quite a sufficient excuse for delay, without giving them any reason for complaint. The Scots ambassador and this gentleman are so fully satisfied with this excuse, that I am sure Muzio will be so Robert Bruce having now gone to him with your Majesty's letter on the subject. I will duly report his reply.
The ambassador and Robert Bruce have letters from the Catholic lords, dated the 20th ultimo, saying that, as the queen of England sees that they and their party do not rise to the various baits she has presented to them, she was now beginning to stir old enmities and feuds in the country, which they say makes them the more anxious to know the result of their mission to your Majesty. When they are assured of receiving aid, they will hold back as long as they are able ; but if they were unable to obtain help they had decided to throw in their lot with the Englishwoman on security being given to them for their lives, for they could do more.
The king of Scotland was about to send an ambassador to the queen of England to know from her whether she intended to nominate him heir to the Crown, as in the contrary case he would seek friends elsewhere. The King now not only secretly favoured the Catholics, but was pleased for them to speak to him about religion, which he was not formerly. He told those of the English faction who urged him to marry, that the time for it had not yet come, and that he wished to seek a bride outside his realm, as his grandfather had done. These things indicate some secret views and dissatisfaction with his present condition, thus confirming the statement that he has secretly given his consent to the Catholics to release him by any means. This smoothes away the first difficulty raised by the duke of Parma, about keeping the King in durance. His other point that the heretics in Scotland are so numerous that the Catholics could not sustain themselves against them and the English, is confessed by the Catholics, who say that, unless your Majesty assists them with men, as they ask, to join their forces, and so enable them to outnumber the heretics and the English, they must give way.
With regard to the Duke's argument that, in the event of your Majesty intending to undertake a great national enterprise, it might be injurious to urge these affairs on prematurely and so cause precautions to be taken, it must be borne in mind that the queen of England, for years past, has strained every nerve to be prepared for such a blow, and has played her last card in taking your Majesty's rebellious subjects under her protection, with the sole object, as is clear from the earl of Leicester's proceedings, of letting the blow fall first upon the Netherlands, and so divert it from her. This obliges your Majesty to hasten matters and wound her in the quick, and this will not be, as the duke of Parma says, urging matters prematurely when she sees 6,000 men landed in Scotland at her own doors. It is of advantage to the English that they should rather be attacked by a force which needs great sea fleets for its transport and maintenance ; both on account of the immense sums of money which must be spent on such an expedition and the great quantity of material and time necessary, as well as the many opportunities which occur during the delay and preparation for impeding the progress of such armaments. They are also subject to much greater disasters than are land armies, for in most cases the mere death of the leader is sufficient to frustrate their design, (fn. 7) as happened in the case of your Majesty's fleet under Pero Melendez, which was raised in Biscay for Flanders. It is true that it was not very large, but, in the event of the loss of a great fleet, the owner sees himself bereft at one blow of forces, ships, and guns, for they are things hard to replace except after much delay. It is especially important to your Majesty to keep your naval force intact to protect and relieve dominions so far spreading as yours, and this design of the Englishwoman should now be evident. It is, as is seen in this pretended desire for an agreement, only to gain time and maintain her reputation, whilst keeping the discontent of her subjects in check by this means in face of their lost commerce, and the Dutch still at war with your Majesty, believing that, whenever she pleases, you will be willing to embrace terms of peace. It is on all grounds, therefore, advisable to make haste to offend her in such a way as shall not force your Majesty to stake the whole of your strength for the sake of a part, and by the preparation of a great fleet, which cannot be kept a secret, cause her (the queen of England) to anticipate you, and by raising even 3,000 reiters in the spring, hamper the duke of Parma all the summer, whilst at the same season she may send out, with the greatest ease, twenty or thirty armed merchantmen to meet the Indian flotillas and keep your Majesty's fleet fully occupied in meeting and protecting them. The earl of Leicester, now he has returned, will certainly set about this, and will offer the ships to be contributed by the rebels to join the English in encountering the flotillas, or in aiding Don Antonio to invade some of the Portuguese islands.
The French, moreover, are so intimate with the Queen that, although they can send no forces from here, they may, and will, do their best to obstruct your Majesty and prevent you from punishing your enemies. This they are trying to do by arranging for thirty or forty Turkish galleys to come to Algiers, which would force your Majesty not to leave Spain unprotected on the coast. All these difficulties will be avoided if you anticipate the Englishwoman by helping the Scots, whose goodwill (putting aside for the moment the prospect of bringing the country to the Catholic faith, which is a matter of great import and worthy of your Majesty) cannot for State reasons be rejected when they offer frankly a friendship which for so long the French have laboured to maintain with them as a counterbalance to the friendship of your Majesty with England, which country has now proved to be your mortal enemy. If your Majesty agrees to this you might send the 6,000 men in the ships which were fitted out in Biscay last summer, the infantry regiments being sent to various places to divert suspicion. It is impossible to get so many troops ready in Flanders, where you only have one port, that of Dunkirk, without its getting wind, and it would at once be concluded that the intention was to send them to Scotland or England. This would force the Queen to take measures to frustrate it, whereas if the men come from Spain the number of ships will not be large enough to attract attention in France or England, where they will think, as they did when the fleet left Biscay, that they are only for the defence of the coast and the Indian flotillas. The worst they would think is that the design may be to invade Ireland, as they will never believe it possible that the Scots would consent to receive so many foreign troops. The ships might arrive without any opposition at Kircudbright (quercubi), which is the port offered by the earl of Morton, or at another port if that be not suitable.
When this force shall have landed in Scotland, the queen of England will necessarily have to turn all her forces on to the Border, and will cease to annoy your Majesty elsewhere when she finds herself in danger. She will have to make Westmoreland, Northumberland, and Cumberland her principal recruiting grounds and places of arms, and nearly all the people of those counties are Catholics, whilst the lords of the soil are personages who upon every opportunity have offered to take up arms for the faith. Upon the arrival of aid to the Scots Catholics, the Englishmen of the same religion will certainly raise head. As affairs may demand your Majesty might send reinforcements in the months of June, July, and August, until the end of September, which is the best season for the coming of a great armada, and the latter might invest another part of England with as powerful a force as the demonstration of the Catholics might render necessary. It may be that the Catholics will rise in such strength that no more than the 6,000 men may be wanted, or that the mere sending of three or four thousand Germans from Flanders to Petty Leith to join the others and the Scots may be sufficient to bring the whole country to submission. By this means you will avoid the enormous expense which will be necessary whenever your Majesty decides to send a great armada to England. As France would certainly try to impede such an armada, at least 20,000 or 25,000 infantry would be needed, and some cavalry, which will cost such a large sum of money as may be judged from the expense of the Portuguese affair, where I am told the wood for the barrels alone cost your Majesty 1,500,000 crowns. (fn. 8) When his Holiness, moreover, sees these soldiers in Scotland summoned by the Catholics for the conversion of their country, he will fail in his duty to his throne if he does not support them with a money subsidy.
In opposition to this may be urged the duke of Parma's contention, that the present plan may turn out as all similar affairs have in England, and that it would be injurious to your Majesty's prestige, and particularly in the Netherlands, if these men were to be crushed by the Englishwoman's invading Scotland to meet them, and she were to obtain help from other princes whose forces placed in England might make the invasion of the country by your Majesty more difficult.
The Duke also contends that, if your Majesty is determined to invade England, the sending of these 6,000 men beforehand would be dividing your forces and would dismember your armada, which would then be less powerful to encounter that which the Queen will bring against it, and that with this number of men it would be easy to occupy Ireland.
Against these arguments it may be urged that with regard to all past English attempts, that of Ireland was managed by priests, and the rest have not failed for want of aid but from the fault of the English themselves, who, for lack of courage, did not carry out what they promised to bring things to a point when your Majesty's help would be serviceable. It must be borne in mind that the English Catholics have to stand up against the Queen, who has such great forces and so many heretics behind her ; whereas the king of Scotland is anxious for his liberty and for revenge against his subjects who have him in durance, and that the lords who are seeking aid are those who want to help the King, and are infinitely more powerful than those who hold the King, unless the latter be assisted by the queen of England. It was by her help whilst the rest were scattered, that they were able to seize the King and Government. The majority of the nobility has always been able to force the sovereign in Scotland, although the rest of the nobles might be on the monarch's side. A meeting of nobles made the Queen marry Bothwell, and another forced her to leave the country, and chose the Regent ; and the same influence has brought about the various events which have befallen this King, who has on his side the Catholic nobles who wish to release him, as you will see by the enclosed statement of the whole of the nobility of Scotland which has been drawn up by Colonel Stuart at my request.
To the objection that the queen of England would at once enter Scotland with all her force and go to encounter the troops who land, I will remark that, even if she had not so large a portion of it pledged with the rebels in Holland, it is not likely from a tactical point of view that she could do so ; above all, if she hears that the majority of those who head her party in Scotland have been put to the sword. She will be content to protect her own country, but even if she did enter Scotland our men could hold their own, if there were but 2,000 of them ; but with 6,000 Spaniards, mostly veterans, well led and with good regimental officers, not only could the fortresses and passes be held with the assistance of the Scots, if the English entered, but I venture to say that our 6,000 men alone would be able to hold lines in the open country. 2,000 Frenchmen in 1564 were able to hold out for a long time at Petty Leith, against a besieging force of 16,000 Scots and 12,000 English ; and at last leave on honourable terms, when pressed by famine and despairing of relief from France, in consequence of your Majesty's threat to aid the English if they were not withdrawn. This proves that the armies in Scotland and England do not consist of trained soldiers, and are unable to besiege a place with the strength of a powerful sovereign, so that how potent 6,000 disciplined men would be for offence or defence need not be urged. Even if the Englishwoman be content to guard her own house, and tries to obtain foreign help, it will be no small advantage to your Majesty that the game should be played out on the English table, just as she (the Queen) has tried to make Flanders and France the arena.
It may be true that your Majesty's forces would be divided, if this aid were sent beforehand, but those of England will not be united if they have to guard the Scottish Border, and send a fleet out to meet that of your Majesty as well. If they go into Spanish waters, the passage from Flanders to England will be open, whereas if they keep their ships in the English Channel and on the west coast, the route round Ireland to Scotland will be free for the coming or going of your Majesty's forces. It is important that the ships should thus be able to return to Spain in time to join the main body of the fleet, as your Majesty will need ships more than anything else.
The last objection I have to meet is, that with the same expenditure Ireland might be occupied. Granted that this is so, the occupation of Ireland will not cut the spring which feeds the war in the Netherlands, and it will require as many ships to bring our men from Ireland to England as to bring them from Spain to Ireland.
All the points I have dwelt upon might be illustrated by many examples to clench my arguments ; but it will be sufficient to point out how essential it is for your Majesty to have the safe port and fortresses in the island, which are now offered by the Scottish lords, as the English Catholics are powerless to make such an offer, they being so much oppressed and without leaders. In order that your Majesty may ensure the friendship of the Scots, if you intend to invade England with a great armada, it will of course be necessary to provide them with a round sum of money beforehand, for which no security whatever will exist ; whereas if you accept their present offer the security is perfect, as soon as the troops arrive in their houses, and it will be unnecessary to give them (the Scots) more money than the monthly sum needful to pay the armed Scotsmen it is considered well to maintain, this being the purpose for which they request the money. When I see France, too, in her present position, I cannot help urging your Majesty to seize the opportunity offered by the Scots, for if it is let slip it can hardly come again, you will be obliged to attack the queen of England, for she invites it in every way and it should only be done with the care befitting a prudent captain, who when a fight is forced upon him, avoids engaging all his troops at the first encounter, for fear that, even if he win, he may not have strength to follow up his victory, and he only therefore employs the squadrons needful to ensure success. The smaller the number of men employed to punish an enemy the greater the effect produced.
I have been led thus to give your Majesty my opinion in consequence of your orders that I should send a copy of what I wrote to the duke of Parma, and of his reply, and I humbly pray that my zeal in your service may be my excuse for having written at such a great length. The diffuseness of the discourse may enable it to contain some precious grains to make up for the errors and stupidity it may enclose.
I understand the English (catholics in Flanders) have signified to the duke of Parma that if, when the English enterprise be effected, he does not cast his eyes upon the queen of Scotland, Arabella (Stuart) the grand-daughter of the countess of Shrewsbury, who is 11 years old might marry his son ; as she, in defect of the king of Scotland is the heiress to the throne, being second cousin of the queen of Scotland, whose grandmother married as her second husband the earl of Angus, by whom she had a daughter who married the earl of Lennox and their eldest son married the queen of Scotland and was killed, whilst the second son married the daughter of the countess of Shrewsbury as will be seen clearly by the genealogical tree of Scotland. If the king of Scotland be a heretic, the duke of Parma, with your Majesty's consent, might marry his son to Arabella and support her claim, offering to the Pope in return for his help the duchies of Parma and Plasencia to be restored to the apostolic see. The idea has its drawbacks, but I have thought well to give your Majesty an account of it.—Paris, 24th December 1586.
531. Statement of the Scottish Nobility.
Friendly earls and nobles :—The duke of Lennox, Lord Claude Hamilton, Earls Marischal, Huntly, Orkney, Morton, Arran, Crawford, Rothes, Montrose, Murray, Caithness, Sutherland, Glencairn. The aforegoing are earls, those who follow are viscounts and barons : Ogilvie, Fleming, Carrington, Seton, Hume, Herries, Lovat, Invermeith, Don and Ochiltree.
The inimical earls and nobles :—Lords Hamilton, Angus, Mar, Linsay, Boyd, and the guardian of the earl of Cassilis.
The Earls and nobles who are indifferent :—Argyll, Bothwell, Athol, Vaughan, Marischal, Cassilis, Eglinton, Monteith, Saltoun, Forbes, Gray, Methuen, Drummond, Elphinston, Sinclair, Somerville, Semple, Rose, Cathcart, Sanquhar, Chester, Borthwick, Torphichen, Glamys (his guardian is an enemy). The number of professed friends is 24 upon whom the Catholic earls say they can depend. The number of enemies is seven and those they call indiffernt amount to 22.
Of the seven enemies, the four leaders are the earls of Hamilton, Angus, Mar, and Boyd. Hamilton is the first person in Scotland, but is a fool, and the influence of his name and family is wielded by Lord Claude Hamilton, whom I know for a man of understanding and worth, and he is considered also a good soldier. Angus the head of the English faction is thought much of, and has considerable influence. Mar has none at all and is very unpopular. Boyd has little following, but he is a clever man of understanding, which enables him to rule the others. Both Robert Bruce and Colonel Stuart assure me that if these four are killed, the business will be over and the nobility won, as most of those who are put down as indifferent are mere youths.
The pay of Scotch infantry soldiers is 2¼ sun-crowns a month, the captains and officers being paid in proportion. The pay of a light horseman is 8 crowns a month.
24 Dec.
Paris Archives, K. 1564. 249.
532. Bernardino De Mendoza to the King.
[Extract.]
Uncertainty of peace with the Huguenots. The King is still trying to draw closer to the queen of England, which is the principal object of Belièvre's mission. Such is the confusion of the court, the vacillation of the King, and the jealousy, hatred, and suspicion of the courtiers, that decisions are adopted and abrogated at random, and even Villeroy who holds the helm, says that such is the state of the King that it is impossible to predict whether it will be peace or war. The Queen-mother sacrifices every interest in order to keep control and maintain her hold over her son. I advised the duke of Parma that Colonel Stanley (fn. 9) who had come over with the Irish troops, and was in garrison at Deventer, should be warned that the queen of England had learned from the confessions of the Catholics who were executed what his (Stanley's) intentions were ; and he should be asked whether he thought it would be prudent for him to return to his own country again, or trust the earl of Leicester, as both he and the Queen were aware for a long time past that Stanley was a Catholic at heart. These words will set him thinking as he was certainly the accomplice of the Catholics, which the latter made clear to me, and fear for his life may cause him to surrender the place on payment. If he does so, the whole of the towns of the Oberisel will at once surrender.
Anthony Pointz has arrived here unwell, and with my connivance wrote to Secretary Walsingham some generalities about what he had seen in Spain. He was answered that the Queen was very well satisfied with his conduct and services, and wished him to return to England at once, in order that she might employ him in a more important task. He was asked by a relative of his whether he would accept a company of horse, and he came to me to know whether he should go over to England before he had seen the duke of Parma. I told him on no account to miss the opportunity of getting the Queen to employ him in Holland, and when he arrived there he could communicate with the duke of Parma by some signs which I would give him, and ask the Duke to send a trustworthy man to discuss with him the service he might render. I have sent the signs to the Duke and have caused Pointz to leave for England.—Paris, 24th December 1586.
27 Dec.
Paris Archives, K. 1566. 1. Original Latin.
533. James VI. Of Scotland to Philip II.
It has come to his knowledge that one of his subjects is in prison in Spain for some offence against the law. He appeals to the King's clemency and good brotherhood to favour him by surrendering the prisoner to him.—Holyrood, 26th December 1586.
(Signed)
Jacobus, R.
Note.—Reference is made to this letter by Mendoza in his despatch to the King, dated 18th February 1587. The name of the offender is not mentioned in the above letter, but Mendoza gives it as Gilbert Lomb, a Catholic, and former servant of the archbishop of Glasgow, Mary Stuart's ambassador in France, who was interesting himself in the case.
Dec.
Paris Archives, K. 1556. 5.
534. Account of the Money owing to Englishmen for their allowance up to the end of the year 1586.
Lord Paget, Baron Beaudesert, from the 24th March 1586 to the end of December— 100 crowns a month 925 46 9
Charles Paget, 8 months and 8 days, at 50 crowns a month 412 52 4
Charles Arundel, 8 months and 23 days at 80 crowns a month 699 23 7
Thomas Throgmorton, 8 months and 8 days at 40 crowns a month 442 28 8
Thomas Morgan, 1 month at 40 crowns a month 40 0 0
Earl of Westmoreland, 26 days at 100 crowns a month 83 50 7
Charles Arundel has also to receive as a grant-in aid from His Majesty 500 0 0
Crowns 3,154 21 11
Three thousand one hundred and fifty-four broad pistole-crowns, twenty-one sueldos, and eleven dineros.—December 1586.
Dec.
Paris Archives, K. 1566. 19. French.
535. Address of M. De Belièvre, Special Ambassador from the king of France to Queen Elizabeth, on behalf of the Queen Of Scotland.
Bespeaks her kindly consideration for the Queen, as all those who boast of being her (Elizabeth's) best servants exhaust the resources of violence and animosity in attacking the queen of Scotland. Her (Elizabeth's) natural goodness and clemency give him hopes. Points out how the king of France has considered her enemies his enemies also, and trusts that his intercession may be effectual in saving the life of the queen of Scotland. Speaks of the sacredness of the royal dignity and its inviolability, and although he acknowledges that a foreigner who takes refuge in a country must be bound by the laws of his asylum, still the mercy he sees imprinted and shining in the sweetness and beauty of her (Elizabeth's) face convinces him that she will, with her great prudence, never allow history to record that the great Queen Elizabeth of England allowed her fair fame to be sullied by the stain of so great an innovation as the sacrifice of an anointed monarch, her nearest relative.
Cites a great number of instances from sacred, ancient and modern history, to prove that monarchs have in all times been merciful to one another. Prisoners of war are not punished by ordinary process of law for trying to escape, and the queen of Scotland's position is worse than theirs. He appeals to the sacred claims of hospitality, speaks of the misfortune and treachery of which the queen of Scotland has been a victim. It is a common saying in England that both Queens cannot live, but Belièvre thinks that people who say it forget that God and not men may best be judge of which of His creatures shall exist.
He says that one of the king of Spain's ambassadors in a neighbouring court has been heard to say that if the queen of Scotland is killed, he is certain that the English Catholics will range themselves on the side of his master. In the name of his master (and at great length) he begs her, for their friendship's sake, to exercise moderation and gentleness in this trouble that has befallen his sister-in-law. By doing so and dealing tenderly with all her Catholic subjects, her reputation will be greatly enhanced. He adds to the prayer of the King that of his mother, that she will save them from such a calamity as seeing their near relative, a crowned Queen, put to death, and all the realm of France joins in their prayer.
Note.—The draft summarised above has been annotated by the writer with many comments and remarks of an uncomplimentary and satirical nature towards the queen of England. It will be observed that no attempt is made to deny Mary's guilt and that the appeal is simply ad miserecordium and for her life alone.

Footnotes

  • 1. In the King's hand : "I think this is the son of Orange."
  • 2. The decipherer had made a mistake in the spelling of the name Sidney—not an uncommon error, for hardly an English name in the whole mass of the correspondence is rightly spelt—but the King has carefully underscored it, and has written the name correctly, "Sidney." The person referred to is Robert Sidney.
  • 3. In the King's hand : "I suspect this man has gone for something more than they say."
  • 4. In the King's hand : "God grant that this may really be the object of his going."
  • 5. In the King's hand : "She is in so much want of bad men to hear her causes."
  • 6. The term was usually applied to the moderate and conciliatory party of Catholics, who after St. Bartholomew acted under the leadership of Alençon, with Montmorency, Damville, de Cossé, and others.
  • 7. In the King's hand: "It is very advisable to provide against this in time, which can well be done." This is a curious forecast of the disaster to the armada, which was certainly in a large measure due to the death of the marquis of Santa Cruz and the appointment of an incompetent successor.
  • 8. In the King's hand: "150,000 he means. He says a million five hundred thousand, which is a great mistake."
  • 9. It will be seen by reference to the letters from Mendoza to the King respecting the Bahington plot that Sir William Stanley had arranged to rise with his troops in favour of the Catholics simultaneously with the assassination of the Queen. In accordance with the hint in the present letter he betrayed the town of Deventer to the Spaniards, and subsequently became one of Philip's principal instruments against England.