Spain: 1512

Pages 61-85

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 2, 1509-1525. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1866.

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1512. 3 Jan.
S. E. Var. L. 1551.
62. King Ferdinand the Catholic to King Henry VIII.
His ambassador in England, Luis Caroz, has informed him of the state of the negotiations in England. Is very well satisfied with what he hears. The world shall know that the King of England and he will not permit any one to trample the Church under foot.
His ambassador will communicate to him his observations more fully.—Burgos, the 3rd of January 1512. (fn. 1)
Indorsed : "To the King of England."
Latin. Draft, written by Miguel Perez Almazan. p. 1.
9 Feb.
S. E. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 6. f. 2.
63. King Henry VIII. to all Persons.
Ratifies the treaty between himself and King Ferdinand the Catholic concluded on the 17th November 1511.—Westminster, the 9th of February, 3rd Henry VIII.
Latin. Autograph. On one sheet of parchment.
9 Feb.
S. E. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 6. f. 3.
64. King Henry VIII. to All Persons.
Ratifies the treaty of alliance between himself and King Ferdinand of Spain concluded on the 17th November 1511.— Westminster, the 9th of February, 3rd Henry VIII.
Indorsed : "Ratification by King Henry of England of the league and confederacy concluded with the Catholic King Ferdinand and Queen Juana. 1511.
Latin. Autograph. On one sheet of parchment.
16 March.
S. E. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 6. f. 5.
65. Additional Treaty between King Henry VIII. and King Ferdinand The Catholic.
Thomas, Earl of Surrey, and George, Earl of Shrewsbury, in their quality of commissioners of the King of England, on the one part, and Don Luis Caroz, in his quality of ambassador of King Ferdinand, on the other part, have stipulated, in the treaty concluded on the 17th of November 1511, that King Ferdinand the Catholic and King Henry of England shall bind themselves to assist one another in the defence of the Holy Church against France, and to aid the common attempts to be made to recover those provinces which by right belong to the crown of England, but are occupied by the King of France. To effect this purpose the King of England is to send, in the course of April next, to the duchy of Aquitaine, or into its immediate neighbourhood, an army consisting of 6,000 soldiers, commanded by a good general, and provided with all the necessary engines of war. The object for which this army is to be sent is the conquest of the duchy of Aquitaine. King Ferdinand, on his part, is likewise to send into Aquitaine or its neighbourhood an army consisting of 500 heavy and 1,500 light horse, together with 4,000 infantry. This army is likewise to be commanded by a good general, and to be provided with all the engines and other requisites of war ; and its destination is to defend the Holy Church and to aid the King of England to conquer his duchy of Aquitaine. Each party is bound to pay the expenses of the equipment and the sustenance of his army.
But the power of the King of France is great and daily increasing. Taking this circumstance into consideration, the contracting parties intend to increase their forces. It is therefore concluded and convened by the above-mentioned ambassadors and commissioners that the English army shall be increased by 500 soldiers, so that the whole number of the English forces shall consist of 6,500 men. King Ferdinand, on the other hand, binds himself to increase his heavy cavalry by 1,500, and his light cavalry by the same number of horse. The total number of Spanish cavalry is, consequently, to consist of 2,000 heavy and 3,000 light horse. The number of Spanish infantry is to remain as stipulated in the last treaty. The King of England, however, is to pay the expenses of one half of the cavalry by which the Spanish army is to be increased, that is to say, 750 heavy and 750 light horse.
This copy, signed and sealed, is to remain in the possession of King Ferdinand.—London, the 16th of March 1512. (fn. 2)
[No signature. No seal.]
Indorsed : "Declaratory clause of King Henry VIII. of England, concerning the number of soldiers whom he and the Catholic King are bound to send to the assistance of one another, for the purpose of carrying out the stipulations of their league of 1511."
Latin. Draft. pp. 4.
20 July.
S. E. Leg. Suelt. L. 2.
66. King Ferdinand The Catholic to Luis Caroz De Villaragut, his Ambassador in England.
After the battle at Ravenna, which exhausted the resources of the King of France, the French were driven out of Italy. They threaten, however, to return once more to Italy, and to conquer the states of the Church.
Empowers him to conclude, with the ambassadors or nuncios of Pope Julius II., the Emperor Maximilian, King Henry of England, and the Doge of Venice, a treaty of alliance, the principal object of which is to defend the Holy Church.— Burgos, the 20th of July 1512.
Latin. Draft. pp. 3.
21 July.
S. E. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 6. f. 25.
67. Pope Julius II. to All Persons.
When our Father in Heaven, after his incarnation and death on the cross, returned to heaven, He left on earth a vicar, whose principal duty it is to preserve the flock confided to him in the true religion, and to expel such sheep from the flock as are infected and refuse to be cured. Being himself this Vicar of God, he has warned all those whom "the Devil has ensnared" not to fall a prey to his diabolical wiles, and he is bound to exclude from intercourse with the faithful all such as despise his patriarchal admonitions.
When Louis, King of France, aided Alphonso, late Duke of Ferrara, who had been excommunicated, and who had been deprived of his states as a rebel, he went, in spite of old age and infirmities, to the camp of the Papal troops, in order to animate them and to defend the rights of the Holy Church. Went to Bologna. The King of France, however, not satisfied with the states of the Duke of Ferrara, invaded the territories of that city with a great army, and advanced even to its very gates. Went from Bologna to Ravenna. The French took Bologna, and forged false title deeds, pretending that the city belonged to them. But this was not all, for they threatened to conquer other territories of the Church.
The King of France persuaded Bernard de Carbajal, (fn. 3) Guillaume de Brissonet, (fn. 4) Renatus de Prie, (fn. 5) and Federigo de San Severino, (fn. 6) late cardinals of the Roman Church, to renounce their obedience to the Papal See, and to convene a schismatical mock council, cutting in pieces thereby the tunic of our Lord, and dishonouring his bride, the Roman Catholic Church. Exhorted them to desist from their impious designs, and all the other Christian princes did the same. It was in vain. They grew worse than before.
Concluded, therefore, with his most beloved son, King Ferdinand the Catholic, and with the Doge and Signory of Venice, a treaty, according to which his allies were to assist him and the Catholic Church against all aggressors and evil-doers. His beloved son, King Henry of England, quickly consented to this treaty, and promised to aid him with all his power in any war in which he might be involved. Reconquered, with the help of his allies, Bologna. Alphonso, late Duke of Ferrara, confessing his errors, prostrated himself before him, and entreated pardon ; but Louis, King of France, occupied other territories of the Church, took his legate a latere prisoner, and received Bernard de Carbajal, Guillaume de Brissonet, Renatus de Prie, and Federigo de San Severino, who had been deprived of their dignity as cardinals, in his states, and treated them as though they still were cardinals.
The King of France seduced the Biscayans and Cantabrians, and other peoples of that neighbourhood, by false doctrines and money, to become enemies of the Church of which they had from time immemorial been most obedient sons.
Is, therefore, bound to pronounce the Greater Excommunication against the Biscayans, the Cantabrians, and all their favourers and abettors, who shall not within three days after the publication of the present bull return to the obedience of the Church of Rome. They cannot be absolved, except in articulis mortis. The like punishment is pronounced against all who assist the King of France against the Apostolic See or its confederates, or who take service in his army, although they may have bound themselves to do so by a solemn oath.
Curses, anathematizes, and vows to eternal damnation all those who will not obey this bull, &c., &c.—Rome, in the palace near St. Peter, the 12th of the calends of August, the 9th of his Pontificate.
Balthazar Tuerdus.
A copy of this bull is to be sent to the Emperor, the King of England, &c., &c.
Authenticated by Alphons Herera, secretary of Johannes Ruffo, Archbishop of Cosenza, and Papal Nuncio.
Latin. Authenticated copy. pp. 14.
Oct. (?)
S. E. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 5. f. 141.
68. King Ferdinand The Catholic to Martin De Muxica, his Paymaster and Envoy Extraordinry to the King Of England, and to Luis Caroz De Villaragut, his Ambassador in England.
Sent first Martin Dampies, and afterwards Juan Sepulveda, to give the King of England very detailed accounts of all that has happened from the moment that the English army landed in Spain until the day on which Sepulveda left. Incloses for their information a copy of the instructions to Sepulveda. After the departure of Sepulveda, the paymaster of the English army and another English gentleman, sent by the commander-in-chief of the English army, together with John Stile, came to speak with him in the name of the said commander-in-chief. Gave them a written answer, a copy of which is enclosed. Sent, however, at the same time, another copy of his answer to the Bishop of Siguenza, who was staying with the English commander-in-chief, in order that he might show it to him and persuade him not to permit the opportunity of a certain victory to pass by without availing himself of it. When the commander-in-chief had read that paper he wrote a letter in answer to it, stating that he would break up his camp, and join the Spanish forces on Monday next, with his army, in order to undertake the conquest of Guienne. At the same time he begged that he (King Ferdinand) would send him the carts and animals which were necessary for the transport of his army, together with the horsemen who were to serve as his guides. Encloses the letter of the commander-in-chief. Rejoiced much when he read this letter. According to news he had received from France, the French army was greatly weakened and disorganised. The combined Spanish and English forces might have conquered as much of Guienne as the rate of their marches would have permitted them to occupy. The French were even intending at the approach of the combined armies to evacuate the whole duchy, with the exception of Bayonne and Bordeaux. Even Bayonne would have surrendered within three months without being regularly besieged, if the combined Spanish and English armies had occupied all the country around. The places which would have come into their possession would have afforded excellent garrisons for the army during the winter, and the French would not possibly have been able to succour Bayonne or to provide it with provisions. Besides, the French forces would have been obliged to occupy places so far distant from one another, that the combined army would have had excellent opportunities of routing them every day, and of weakening them thereby. The siege of Bordeaux might have been continued during the winter. If the French had offered resistance to the combined armies, there is no doubt they would have been entirely defeated, and the way to Paris would have remained undefended ; so greatly superior were the forces of England and Spain to those of the French.
Was very glad to hear that the English were ready at last to march into Guienne, especially as the months of September and October are a very good season for carrying on warlike operations in the south of France. As soon, therefore, as he received the letter from the Marquis, he gave orders that he should be provided with the necessary animals and carts, and sent him the horsemen who were to serve him as guides. The Spanish army and artillery had marched to San Juan, on the other side of the Pyrenees some days previously, in order to form the van guard of the army, and to render the passage of the mountains safe for the English troops. The Duke of Alba had left San Juan and gone to meet the English army, and he (King Ferdinand) had made preparations for taking the field in person. It was his intention to cover the rear of the Spanish and English armies. When affairs were in this prosperous state, he received a letter from the Marquis of Dorset, accompanied by credentials from the Bishop of Siguenza, by which he learnt that the English had determined not to remain longer than five-and-twenty days in the field, and, that time having elapsed, to return immediately to England. All remonstrances were useless. They persevered in their determination, although he promised that the Spanish troops should remain with them and assist them to garrison the conquered places. At last, the English declared that if he did not procure the necessary shipping for them, and pay the fleet in which they were to return, they would go by land through France.
Was very much astonished and offended at seeing such an exhibition of fickleness. The English had changed all their plans within a few days. The first letter, in which the Marquis said he was ready to march with his army into Guienne, was dated the [blank (fn. 7) ] September, and the other, in which he said that he was about to return to England, was dated the [blank] of the month of [blank (fn. 8) ]. Bearn, which is a part of Guienne, and the town of Ax, (fn. 9) and all the other places round Bayonne, might have been occupied without the least resistance on the side of the French. The town of Ax being in their power, Bayonne would have been isolated, and next spring they might have conquered all they had wished to conquer in France, without meeting with any serious obstacle.
As, however, in spite of the almost certain opportunity of gaining an easy and brilliant conquest, the Marquis had determined to return with his army to England, and as all his efforts to persuade him to undertake the conquest of Guienne had been ineffectual, he could do nothing but signify to the Marquis how much he deplored his determination, and then let him go. To retain him against his will would have been of no advantage, and would possibly have been attended with disagreeable consequences. Nor was it possible during the five-and-twenty days, during which the English had promised to remain, to undertake the conquest of Guienne. The time would barely have sufficed to march the armies into Guienne and back to the port where the English were to embark, and thus no time for warlike operations would have been left. To begin so great an enterprise as the conquest of the duchy of Guienne, and to abandon it almost as soon as it was begun, to conquer towns, and, as soon almost as they were conquered, to give them up, would not have increased the reputation of the King of England, or his own, and would have been little in accordance with their sense of honour. Such conduct would have been interpreted as springing either from want of resources, or from lack of energy. Either interpretation would have been very prejudicial to them in their future enterprises against France. Influenced by all these considerations, he wished the English a happy return to their own country, and gave orders to provide them with shipping and with whatever else they were in want of for their voyage.
They (Martin Muxica and Luis Caroz) are to tell the King of England that his commander-in-chief is doubtless a very distinguished nobleman, but that it is to his behaviour from the first day he landed in Spain that is owing the failure of the splendid enterprise they had planned. He has never from the beginning agreed with his (King Ferdinand's) views of the manner in which the undertaking might best be carried into effect. The King of England may be certain that, if his commander-in-chief had not always opposed his plans, and if the two armies had entered Guienne without delay by way of Pamplona, the whole, or at least one-half of the duchy, would already be conquered. If they had profited by the consternation of the French after their first victory, they might, perhaps, have carried out much greater things than the conquest of Guienne.
Many Spaniards have their suspicions, or firmly believe, that some of the persons who served in the (English) army entertained a secret understanding with the French. Was and is still unwilling to give credit to such assertions. Has however, ordered enquiries to be made respecting the cause which had determined the English to return to their own, country. The result of them is as follows. It is said that as the English had come with the intention of conquering Guienne, they could not be persuaded that they ought to do anything but straightway march to Bayonne, and lay a regular siege to that town, not heeding the great inconveniences of such an inconsiderate manner of conducting the war. They obstinately refused to acknowledge that the war must begin with any other operation than the siege of Bayonne. However that may be, he cannot pass over in silence another circumstance. The English had scarcely arrived, when the commander-in-chief spoke to the Bishop of Siguenza, who was staying as Spanish commissioner at the English head quarters, of a marriage which he intended to conclude with one of the daughters of the then King of Navarra. He said that this marriage would facilitate the conquest, and that this was the reason why he was inclined to conclude it. Messengers of the late King of Navarra went frequently to the English commander-in-chief, and negotiated with him, not omitting to render him suspicious of the Spanish, and to recommend such measures to him as were most detrimental to the enterprise. Cannot tell whether this advice did, or did not determine, the English commander-in-chief to reject his proposals to invade Guienne with the allied armies by way of Navarra and Bearn, but it is a fact that they would have encountered no obstacles if they had done so. The whole of the period during which the English remained in Spain had been employed in debating the question how they were to march into Guienne, and the result of the protracted debate has been the utter failure of the enterprise.
Has inquired whether all the English captains shared the opinion of the commander-in-chief, and has been informed that the second officer in command and many other generals were fully persuaded that his (King Ferdinand's) plans were the best. On the whole, very different opinions prevailed in the English camp about the manner in which the war was to be carried on, but as the commander-in-chief had to decide on such questions, nothing could be done.
The English army has returned to England. Nothing can be done in Guienne during the winter. Don Luis Caroz, his ambassador in England, has, moreover, written to him that the English are placed in difficulties by the Scots and by the French fleet. The King of England has, therefore, asked him to send the Spanish fleet without delay to his assistance. Under such circumstances he has thought it best to conclude, in his name and in the name of the King of England, a truce of six months with the French. Relieves thereby the King of England from all danger. The French have offered him this truce, which, however, relates only to England, Spain, Scotland, and the high seas. It has no effect in the Mediterranean Sea and in Italy. A truce with respect to that part of Europe could not be concluded without the consent of the Pope and the Venetians, who would thereby be prevented from conquering those fortresses in the duchy of Milan which the King of France still holds. Is, according to this truce, at liberty to continue hostilities against the French in Italy, and to aid the Pope and the Venetians. The King of England is at liberty to do the same.
The best use he and his son, the King of England, can make of the truce is to prepare another expedition against Guienne and Normandy for next summer. Hopes that disputes among the captains will not again prevent a happy result of the enterprise, and that the conquest will, with the help of God, be easily accomplished.
They (the ambassadors) are to make, in his name, the following observations to the King concerning the English army. Judging from the English soldiers who had come to Spain, the English are strong, stout-hearted, stand firm in battle, and never think of taking flight. A long time having however elapsed during which England has had no wars, the English do not know how to behave in a campaign. But they are very excellent men, and only want experience. Unaccustomed as they are to warfare, they show a marked dislike to perform such labours as are inevitably entailed on soldiers. They are inclined to self-indulgence and to idleness. But their greatest fault is that in a combined action they will never assist the troops, or act in concert with a commander of another nation. More time is spent in concerting any measure with them than the whole execution of it requires.
In order to remedy the first-mentioned deficiency of the English army, it would be well to practice a portion of the men in the evolutions of regular warfare. After being thoroughly drilled, and having acquired experience, the English troops would excel those of any other nation, make England honoured, prove a great security to the country, and be an effectual instrument with which to conquer and defend such countries as by right belong to the crown of England. A larger number of pikemen in the English army would give it greater efficiency in battle than it at present possesses.
With respect to the second deficiency of the English army, he is of opinion it would be best that he (King Ferdinand) should undertake the conquest of Guienne next summer alone, employing only Spanish troops. At all events, no English troops ought to be sent to him. Is ready to undertake the conquest of Guienne on the two following conditions. In the first place, the King of England, whose enterprise the conquest of Guienne is, must pay him one half his expenses, or, if he prefers it, the sum of money he would spend if he were to send an English contingent. The expenses can be calculated on the cost of the last English expedition. He would not ask for any money if he were as rich as the King of England. Thinks he will be doing much if he pays the other half of the expenses of the army, those of the artillery, and other things necessary for the war, and in addition exposes himself to all the risk of a war with France. Would certainly not do it were it not from love of his dear son.
The second condition is, that at the same time that he invades Guienne an army of the King of England, sufficiently strong to take the field with success, should march from Calais into Normandy. Promises that the Spanish army shall be sufficiently strong to effect the conquest of Guienne. Thus, separated from one another, both armies will fight much better than they would if they were commanded by one commander-in-chief. The French would be obliged to divide their forces, and the troops which they could send against either of the invading armies would be inferior to them in numbers. Is of opinion that the invasion of France ought to begin next May. If the King of England wishes to reduce the conditions of the enterprise to a formal treaty, the treaty must be concluded without loss of time. His army is ready to invade France, and no preparations are necessary, except that the King of England must send the money destined to pay one half of the Spanish troops. The King of England must also send a power for the commander-in-chief, whom he (King Ferdinand) will nominate, authorizing him to conquer in his (the King of England's) name, the cities, towns, and fortresses of the duchy of Guienne, to take their oaths of fidelity, to confirm their privileges, and, in a word, to make all the arrangements which may be necessary. Is ready to give the King of England whatever security he may desire that he will deliver up to him, or to whatever person he may designate for that purpose, all such conquests as may be made by him in Guienae.
It is very desirable that the Emperor should at the same time attack France in Burgundy or in Picardy. Is persuaded that, if all this were done, the King of France would not be able to refuse them anything they asked. But in case the Emperor cannot be persuaded to make common cause with them, the forces of Spain and England alone would suffice for the enterprise of Guienne and Normandy.
Begs the King of England to do all in his power to preserve the friendship of the Emperor for the future, and promises on his side to neglect no means by which that object may be attained.
The King of England may rest perfectly sure that he never will make peace with France without the express consent of England. Would not have concluded even this short truce if the King of England had carried on hostilities against France either in Guienne or from the side of Calais. There was, moreover, another reason which induced him to conclude this truce with France, namely, that it was his intention to induce the Pope to abandon the crooked manner in which he behaved towards the Emperor and the King of England. It is the fault of the Pope that the King of France has not yet lost the fortresses which he holds in Italy, nor has it been possible to induce the Pope to pronounce the King of France to be deprived of Normandy and Guienne. As the King of France, in consequence of the truce, will not be occupied during winter with the affairs of Guienne and Normandy, he will be at liberty to carry on the affairs of Italy with more vigour. The Pope will thereby be placed in a dangerous position, and be obliged to seek the friendship of the Emperor and the King of England. In this manner it will be easy to induce him to conduct himself towards the Emperor and the King of England as he ought to behave in the interest and for the welfare of Christendom.
Indorsed : "Instructions concerning what the Paymaster Martin Muxica and Don Luis Caroz are to tell the King of England with respect to the army which has returned to England, the war with France, and other subjects."
Spanish. Draft. pp. 15.
22 Oct.
S. E. Cor. d. Cas. L. 1. 2° f. 403.
69. The Knight Commander Juan De Lanuza, Ambassador of King Ferdinand The Catholic.
Juan de Lanuza was sent as ambassador to Flanders and England, and left Logroño on the 22nd October 1512. His salary was 5 gold ducats a day, and 500 gold ducats a year for the expenses of his household.
The entries of the payment of his salary continue until the 26th September 1515.
Spanish. Original accounts of salaries. pp. 5.
22 Oct. (?)
S. E. Pat. Re. Cap. c. 1. Cas. d. A. L. 2. f. 35.
70. King Ferdinand The Catholic to Juan De Lanuza, his Ambassador in Flanders and Envoy to England.
In virtue of the credentials he takes with him, he is to speak to the Emperor, to the Prince (Charles), and to the Princess, Madame Margaret, as follows.
Knows how much they desire that Don Juan de Aragon, his nephew, should take service at the court of the Prince (Charles). Sends, therefore, Don Juan de Aragon to Flanders.
He is to inform the Emperor and Madame Margaret that he is henceforth to reside as ambassador at the court of the Prince.
He is to tell the Emperor that the tyranny of the house of France is happily at an end, as the other Princes of Christendom are united together and are resolved to put it down. No other Prince is dangerous to their states or to the interests of their houses. If it were possible to deprive France of all the countries she has taken from her neighbours, and to reduce her to her former position, the succession of the Prince (Charles) would not only be secured, but he would be the first prince of Christendom. Thinks it is highly desirable that during his and the Emperor's lifetime Burgundy and the towns in Picardy, of which France has deprived Prince Charles, should be reconquered. For this purpose it is indispensable that he (King Ferdinand), the Emperor, and the King of England should remain always united in intimate friendship.
The alliance between him (King Ferdinand), the Emperor, and the King of England has forced the French to abandon the Duchy of Milan, with the exception of the fortresses, which they still retain. As soon, however, as the French began to retreat, the Pope, forgetting the services which the Emperor, the King of England, and he had rendered to him, and perhaps moved by still less honourable motives, discontinued to fulfil his duties as a member of the league. He went so far as to attempt to break up the Spanish army, from fear that it would conquer Milan and deliver it up to the Emperor, as is stipulated in the league. It is the intention of the Pope to drive the Spaniards and the Imperialists out of Italy. The worst is to be expected from such a Pope. As, however, it is impossible for them to rely on France, they must try to preserve the friendship of the Pope.
Two measures are of the greatest importance ; the first is that, with the consent of the Pope and the Venetians, the duchy of Milan should be given to the Emperor. If that cannot be effected in any other manner, the possession of Milan must be obtained in the name of Maximilian, the son of the late Duke Lodovico. The Emperor, having the real government of the duchy, would have it in his power to employ its resources against France, and to obtain better conditions with respect to his other claims If the Emperor does not wish to give back the duchy of Milan to Maximilian, he must at all events not betray his real intentions to the Pope, the Venetians, and the Swiss, who are bent on reinstating Maximilian as Duke of Milan. Should, however, the Emperor wish to give back Milan to Maximilian, he would do well to declare his intention at once, and to give him the investiture. The Duke of Milan would then be obliged to marry one of their grand-daughters. But even if the investiture should not be given at once, the fortresses held by the French must without delay be got possession of and placed at the disposal of the Emperor. Their principal aim must always be to annihilate the power of France in Italy.
The second measure of great importance which ought at once to be adopted is that the Emperor should make peace with the Venetians. Has ordered his Viceroy and his ambassador to give all the aid in their power to bring about this affair. Should nothing beyond the claims of the Emperor and of the Venetians on Vicenza be the subject of dispute, the Emperor would act wisely to content himself with a large sum of money and the tribute the Venetians are ready to pay him ; but, at all events, it is his intention to stand by the Emperor.
He is to give the Emperor a very full account of what has happened since the arrival of the English in Spain. When the English troops were in Spain it was impossible for them to march to Bayonne before Navarra was conquered, for King John and Queen Katharine had concluded an alliance with France, and had done all in their power to oppose the English as well as the Spaniards. He is especially to enter into very minute details respecting Navarra, according to the instructions which he has given him. He is to dwell at great length on the reasons which justify the conquest of that kingdom, on the danger with which France has threatened Spain from Navarra and Bearn, &c. Bearn and Navarra are the keys of the mountains which divide Spain from France. Had they been left in the hands of the King of France the French might have easily entered Spain, and not only have cut off the English and Spanish armies, but also have created serious difficulties in his own kingdoms.
At first the English understood perfectly well that it was necessary to make sure of Navarra and Bearn before beginning the conquest of Guienne. It was settled with them that the Spanish and English armies should march together, first to Navarra, next to Bearn, and from Bearn, which belongs to Guienne, to Bayonne. If the English had followed this plan, there is no doubt the greater portion of Guienne would have been conquered by this time. It was, however, utterly impossible for him to prevail with the English to carry out this measure. They had been made to believe before coming to Spain that they had nothing else to do but to march straight to Bayonne, and could not understand that the war ought to begin in any other way. At last they began partly to comprehend that his plan was the only reasonable one, and the King of England sent them orders to do what he (King Ferdinand) should bid them. Accordingly the commander-in-chief of the English troops wrote to him that he would consent to march to Bearn, and from Bearn to Guienne, fixing the day when the English would be ready to march. Believed him. Made in great haste all the necessary preparations for the crossing of the mountains. The Spanish troops and artillery had already crossed to the other side of the Pyrenees some days previously, in order to cover the movements of the English and to form the vanguard of the army. Promised the commander-in-chief that the Spanish troops should not steal a march upon him, and garrison all the conquered places. Was ready to start and to take the field in person in order to cover the march of the invading armies. The English commander-in-chief having written to him and told him that he was quite prepared to start on the day which had been fixed, the Spanish captain-general sent him the horsemen who were to serve the English as guides until the junction of the two armies had been effected. When all that had been done, the English commander-in-chief sent him a letter, and told him that the English had decided not to remain any longer in Spain, or in Guienne, than at the utmost five-and-twenty days, even if some portions of Guienne should then have been conquered. He likewise asked him to keep the vessels for the return of the English troops to England in readiness.
Was very sorry when he heard this news. The victory would have been so easy. Had the combined armies invaded Guienne, they would have found no resistance. Could not imagine any other reason for the inconstancy of the English, excepting that being unaccustomed to warlike enterprises for so long a time, they were afraid of the hardships of war, and wanted to return and seek rest in their own country. France is not a country that can be conquered in five-and-twenty days. Besides, the movements of the English army are so slow that five-and-twenty days would scarcely have sufficed for them to march to Guienne and afterwards to return to the port where they were to take shipping.
It is clear that it would have reflected dishonour on him, had he undertaken so great an enterprise as the conquest of Guienne, and directly afterwards abandoned it. Answered the Marquis, therefore, that the ships for his passage should be in readiness. Thus the English returned to their own country.
Thinks the English army is incapable of acting in common with the army of any other nation. The only use which can be made of an English alliance is for the English troops to carry on their warlike operations separately in one province, whilst their allies attack the common enemy in another province. If their warlike operations were to be combined with those of any other army, negotiations between the commanders of the two armies would require more time than the execution of the whole enterprise if resolutely begun. Has told the King of England that, if he intends to conquer Guienne and Normandy, it would be best that Normandy should be invaded by none but English troops, and Guienne be conquered by the Spaniards alone ; but as the war would be an exclusively English war, it would only be just and equitable that the King of England should pay one half of the expenses for the Spanish army. If both attacks on France were executed at the same time, success would be almost sure.
He is to beg the Emperor to undertake the conquest of Burgundy at the same time that he and the King of England invade France. Promises to persuade the Italians to assist the Emperor with money. If, on the one hand, France were deprived of Guienne, Normandy, and Burgundy, and, if on the other hand, the Emperor, the King of England, and he (King Ferdinand) remained friends and allies, France would be forced henceforth to obey them, and the succession of Prince Charles would be safe.
In common with the English made war upon France in the interest of the Holy Church. The English afterwards forsook him. Did not like to continue the war by himself, and it may be that the English, from the same reason, wish likewise to conclude peace with France. As winter is near at hand and will soon render warlike operations impossible, he has thought it best to conclude for himself and for England a truce with France, which is to last six months. This truce, however, concerns only France, Spain, England, and the high seas. On the Mediterranean Sea and in Italy the war is to continue. Will try to conquer during the winter the fortresses which France still holds in Italy.
Hopes while the truce lasts to decide in conference with the Emperor and the King of England upon a plan for conquering Guienne, Normandy, and Burgundy, and to make all the necessary preparations for carrying out the enterprise. Flatters himself that he shall gain over to their cause the Pope and the Venetians. Will say to the Italians that the war in Guienne has been interrupted, because the Venetians did not make peace with the Emperor, and will thereby induce them to offer better conditions to him.
It is well known that the French are always trying to sow suspicion and discord between the princes of Christendom. They may, therefore, perhaps have attempted to persuade the Emperor that he (King Ferdinand) is willing to conclude a separate peace with them. Declares solemnly that he never will make peace with France, except with the knowledge and consent of the Emperor and the King of England. If he were to do so he would commit a great political error ; for as soon as his alliance with the Emperor and England should have ceased to exist, the French would no longer fulfil their obligations towards him. Will always keep his promises to the end of his life, and begs the Emperor to do the same.
Wishes immediately to know the opinions of the Emperor.
Longs to see Prince Charles in Spain. It would be of great advantage to Prince Charles if he were known in Spain, and knew the Spaniards and the ways of the Spanish government.
If the Emperor is in Flanders, he is to deliver his message to him in person. Should, however, the Emperor be absent, he is to communicate in secret his commission to Madame Margaret. In case the Emperor should not be far from Flanders, he is to go to the Emperor after having conferred with Madame Margaret. But should the Emperor be staying at a great distance, he is to send Luis Gilaberte to him, who, after having delivered his message, must return to Spain at once.
He must write directly.
Given [blank].
"Two thousand men as succour in Gueldres."
Indorsed : "Instructions for Mosen Juan de Lanuza."
Spanish. Draft. pp. 19.
10 Nov.
S. E. Pat. Re. T.c. I. L. 1.
71. King Henry VIII. to Thomas, Earl Of Surrey, and George, Earl Of Shrewsbury.
Empowers them to conclude a treaty of alliance with the ambassador of King Ferdinand the Catholic, in defence ot the Holy Church against any aggression of France.—Westminster, the 10th of November.
Latin. Autograph. On parchment. p. 1.
19 Nov.
S. E. Cor. de Cast. L. I.20 f. 144.
72. Martin De Muxica (?) to King Ferdinand The Catholic.
Has written twice from Bermio to Almazan, and told him that he had put to sea. Wrote a third time from Guetaria, as he could not return to Bermio. Wrote likewise from the last-mentioned place to the Bishop of Siguenza, asking him whether anything had happened there. The Bishop answered that Martin Dampies had arrived in the English camp, and had brought letters from the King of England. The English army was to sail on the night of the same day. The Bishop sent his physician to tell him not to trust the English, and to keep clear of them.
Put to sea next day, which was Sunday, in company with the English. His vessel sailed among the ships of the English. Did not salute any of them, and always kept at a certain distance from the admiral's ship. Arrived on Thursday, together with the fleet of the English, off Falmouth. Intended to enter port the same evening, but was driven from one side to the other. As the weather continued bad, the next day he landed in a little boat between a mountain and the cape of England. Went to a place near Falmouth, and took horses there. Met Lord Felis (fn. 10) on the road, but parted with him, and went by another road, as quickly as he could, to London, where he arrived on the 6th of November. The ambassador not being in town, he sent a messenger to him to Southampton, where he had gone to see the Spanish fleet. The Queen lived at a place about half a league from London. Wrote to her, and told her that he had arrived with letters from him (King Ferdinand) to her and to the King of England. Went thither in order to deliver the letters. The King sent to tell him that, as he was about to go out hunting, he would see him next day ; and the Queen let him know that she did not consider it proper to receive him before he had seen the King. Thought it was sufficient that the King and his advisers should know that letters and a messenger had arrived from Spain, who was able to answer those who would tell falsehoods. Determined, therefore, to wait until the ambassador had arrived, as he wished to consult him about the manner in which he must behave. Besides, the Queen sent to him and advised him to wait, letting him know that the King was already informed how shamefully the English had behaved, and that he was very angry with them.
Nine days afterwards the ambassador arrived. Went in his company to the palace, kissed the hands of the King and the Queen, and delivered his letters. Spoke some time with the King and the Queen on various subjects. Afterwards explained to the councillors what the paymaster had said to him (King Ferdinand), and what answer he had given to him (the English paymaster of the army) and to John Stile. Said to the councillors that he (King Ferdinand) had immediately sent a courier to the Marquis, and showed them the letters of the Marquis of the 7th and of the 11th of September. (fn. 11) Delivered the letters in a Latin translation, which was read in his presence and in the presence of the ambassador. The councillors declared that they considered the answer he (King Ferdinand) had given to be very good, and the behaviour of the English to have been very bad. Did not deliver the other papers, as there had not been time enough to translate them into Latin. Will have next day, Friday, the 19th of November, another conversation with the councillors, and on that occasion will deliver the other papers, or such parts of them as seem fit for communication. Should even the negotiations last till winter, all shall be discussed chapter by chapter, according "to the inspiration of God."
Went on Friday to the palace, accompanied by the ambassador. Were first conducted into a chapel, and then into a large room, where they found the King and the privy councillors, together with a great number of learned men and members of Parliament which had just assembled. The captains of the army which had been in Spain were introduced. Among them were Lord Herbert, Lord Huyloby, (fn. 12) Lord Feliz(?), a brother of the Marquis, many other captains, and the paymaster. They were asked in English what reasons they had for returning to England when they had been ordered to remain in Spain and to begin the war. The captains were at a distance from the others, kneeling, the councillors were standing, and the King sitting on a bench, which was united to a chair, (fn. 13) covered with brocade, and placed under a canopy. An archbishop, standing near him, delivered the speech. That done, the captains answered. The King communicated their answer to the ambassador in Latin. The ambassador, however, asked some privy councillors afterwards in Latin, and he asked five privy councillors in French, what the captains had answered. All the privy councillors gave him the same explanation which the King had given, namely, that the captains had alleged three reasons. The first was that they had no provisions ; the second that the soldiers had mutinied and demanded to return home ; and thirdly they threw all the blame on the Marquis, saying that he had been the cause of all that had happened. They were interrogated three or four times more. At last they begged that, if they had committed an error, and had merited punishment, they might at least be permitted to stand up whilst their conduct was being investigated. The King ordered answer to be made them, that he had sent for the Marquis and for others, and that he wanted to know the truth, in order to punish those who deserved punishment. All the captains who were present were ordered to remain at court.
Had brought his instructions with him. Read such portions of them as seemed to be fit for communication. Did not communicate the paragraph which speaks of the one-half and of the other affair which was added. (fn. 14) The ambassador will write more fully on this subject. The Privy Council saw very clearly that the English were in the wrong, and especially the Marquis. They read the passage which speaks of the marriage of the Marquis with the daughter of the late King of Navarra two or three times, and all of them condemned it. They read likewise the letter of the Marquis of the 7th of September, and the Privy Council said that the letter of the 11th of September, was not written by the Marquis but by the Bishop (of Siguenza), adding that the Marquis had told them so. They wished to see that letter. Said he had not thought it necessary to communicate it, as the portions given had spoken clearly enough, but as they wished to see it they might read it. Gave them the letter. They retired to hold a council, which was attended by a great many persons of rank, among whom was the Duke of Buckingham. When the councillors had informed themselves of what had passed in Spain, all of them were persuaded that the English captains had done wrong, and had compromised their honour as well as the honour of their country. They asked him and the ambassador what they thought ought to be done. He and the ambassador answered that they had explained all that had happened, and that they were glad that so many had been present and had heard the truth, because there are some persons who try to give quite a different version.
A long conversation followed. The English said he (King Ferdinand) was the true father of the King of England, and that they wished to be informed what was to be done in future. The King, they added, had the greatest possible desire to obey him (King Ferdinand). Answered that he (King Ferdinand) looked upon the King of England as his true son, and wished to gratify him in all things. The wishes of the King of England would already have been fulfilled, if his (the King of England's) servants had willed it. The conclusion was that the English councillors promised to inform the King of this conversation, and said that the King should speak with them (Muxica and Don Luis Caroz) afterwards. Has formed a very good opinion of the discretion of the ambassador.
Went afterwards to the Queen. She said to him and to the ambassador that she had told the King and some of the councillors that they ought to give money to him (King Ferdinand) with which to carry on the war in Guienne, if they wished to conquer that duchy. Is resolved to observe his instructions strictly, even if the negotiations should last a long time. The ambassador told the English the news from Italy, in order to facilitate the negotiations. They said they knew it already. It would be well to write what the tidings are from Navarra. It is known in England that the French and the late King of Navarra entered the valley of Ronceval, but it is not known what happened afterwards.
Fears the Spanish fleet will sail without waiting for this letter.—London, 19th November 1512.
[Postcript in a different hand, apparently that of Muxica.]
Has sent another letter from Cartanum (?) by a servant of the ambassador, and another letter on the 13th from Plymouth.—No signature. (fn. 15)
Indorsed in the same hand in which the postscript is written : "The letter which I wrote from England."
Spanish. An incorrectly written copy. pp. 4.
19 Nov. (?)
S. E. Pat. Re. Cap. c. Pont. L. 2. f. 13.
73. Treaty concluded between the Pope Julius II., in his name and in the name of his confederates, King Ferdinand The Catholic, and Henry, King Of England, on the one part ; and the Cardinal Of Gurk, in the name of the Emperor Maximilian and of the Duke Of Milan, on the other part. (fn. 16)
When Maximilian, Emperor elect, declared that he was willing to enter the league, and to send an army to Italy, the following articles were concluded between the Pope and the Cardinal of Gurk, ambassador of the Emperor elect :—
1. All the stipulations contained in the treaty of alliance concluded the year before for the defence of the Pope and his states, and for the purpose of reconquering the cities and towns which have been wrested by force from the Holy Father, are to remain in full force, except such articles as are expressly abrogated or interpreted by this treaty. The Pope and his allies, namely King Ferdinand the Catholic, the King of England, &c., on the one part, and the Emperor elect and Duke of Milan, on the other part, bind themselves strictly to fulfil the said treaty of last year.
2. This treaty is to last during the joint lives of the confederates. If one of them dies, the other members of the league are to continue it, and the heir of the deceased member has a right to enter it. All the allies are bound to assist with all their forces, and at their own expense, any member of the league whose Italian possessions are invaded by an enemy. If non-Italian dominions of an ally are attacked, the other members of the league are likewise bound to assist him, but he who receives assistance must pay all the expenses.
3. If one member of the league attacks another member of it, without being authorized to do so by the whole confederacy, he is ipso facto excluded from the league, all the members of which are bound to combine and to punish him. Should an ally believe that he has just reason to complain of another ally, the whole league is to decide their quarrel.
4. The French oppressed the Holy Father and occupied almost the whole of Romagnola. Although they were soon afterwards expelled from Italy, they are still persisting in their iniquitous designs. They are, besides, schismatics. They are the authors of the schism, have received the schismatic prelates in France, and continue the mock-council (fn. 17) in the "synagogue of Satan." In order to put a stop to this scandal, and give security to the possessions of the allies in Italy, the Emperor is to discontinue the war with Venice and Ferrara, and the allies are to send their combined armies to make war against France. Raymond de Cardona, Viceroy of Naples, is to be the captain-general of the allied forces. The monthly payments for the sustenance of the army which were agreed upon in the treaty of last year are, however, not to be continued, except the allied armies should carry on the war in order to wrest from the enemy any cities, towns, &c., belonging to Holy Church. In all other cases each ally is bound to pay the expenses of the troops of his contingent.
The contingent of the Pope is to consist of 500 horse and 1,000 foot, that of King Ferdinand of 800 lances, 400 light horse, and 4,000 foot, that of the Duke of Milan of 300 lances and 3,000 foot. The army formed by these contingents will invade France by way of Dauphiné or of Savoy, in order to assist the Emperor elect in his enterprise against Burgundy and Picardy, or to defend him if he is attacked by the French. The allied army is to subsist on whatever is to be found in France, and to do the schismatical French as much harm as possible. The war against France is to last until the Emperor elect has conquered Burgundy and Picardy, and the league the provinces of Dauphiné and Provence. King Ferdinand and the King of England are likewise bound, at the request of the captain-general to attack France, if they have not already conquered Guienne, Normandy, and Languedoc.
Provence is to be disposed of by the Pope. If the Duke of Lorraine enters the league and makes war on France, the Pope promises to give him Provence ; if on the other hand, the Duke of Lorraine does not enter the league, the Pope is to keep Provence for himself, as his portion in the division of France.
Dauphiné and Lyons are to be divided between the Pope and the Emperor elect. The Pope is to have that portion of Dauphiné which is nearest Avignon. The Duke of Milan is to have such portions of Dauphiné as it may please the Pope and the Emperor elect to give him. They will then persuade the Duke of Savoy to accept these portions of Dauphiné, and to give to the Duke of Milan the equivalent of them in townships and villages of Savoy situated near the frontier of Milan.
5. All the members of the league are at liberty to continue at war with France until they have destroyed or conquered her entirely, no matter however long the war may last.
6. The allies are to engage at least 5,000 Swiss, in order that the Swiss Confederacy may be favourable to them.
7. The Duke of Savoy, whose states are subject to the empire, is not to permit the French to cross the Alps in Savoy or Piedmont.
8. The Emperor elect has a right to ask assistance against the French from all the princes and imperial cities in Italy.
9. If the Emperor elect undertakes to go to war with France before the wars with Venice and Ferrara are concluded, then the Pope binds himself to pay him a subsidy of 8,000 ducats, King Ferdinand 10,000 ducats, the King of England 10,000 ducats, and the Duke of Milan 6,000 ducats.
10. The Pope binds himself to excommunicate the King of France and all Frenchmen.
11. Many reasons can easily be found which will fully justify this league. Foremost amongst them is the fact that the King of France will not obey the repeated exhortations and behests of the Pope. The Holy Father will write to the Emperor elect, and request him, in his quality of protector of the Church, to make war on the schismatic French, and to enter the league.
12. If a member of the league dies during the war with France, his successor becomes ipso facto a member of the confederacy.
13. In case the King of France enters into an alliance with the Turks, or if the Turks attack any member of the league without being the allies of France, all the members of this most Holy League will, with their united forces, make war on the Infidels ; and they will at the same time carry on the war with France.
14. As soon as France is entirely annihilated, or the war with her concluded in some other way, all the members of the league will begin a common war against the "dirty" Infidels, the Turks, and wrest from them all their possessions. Maximilian is to be the Captain-general and "Imperator" of the whole Christian army. He is to have, as his portion of the conquest, Constantinople, the whole of Greece, and the title of Emperor of the Occident and Orient. The rights and privileges of the Roman Church are, however, to remain intact.
15. If any member of the league should raise obstacles to the expedition against the Turks, or should try to delay it, he will be forced by the other allies to do his duty, and he will even be declared unworthy of the name of a Christian.
16. The Pope will order a crusade to be preached in all Christian countries.
17. No member of the league is allowed to permit rebels of another member of the league to stay in his dominions.
18. The members of the league are to ratify this treaty within three months.
19. All Christian princes can become members of the league.
20. The conservators of this most Holy League are the College of Cardinals, the Kings of Hungary, Poland, and Portugal, and the Princes Electors of the Empire.
21. This treaty is to be published when the members of it may think fit.—No date.
Indorsed : "Articles of the League and Confederacy between the Pope, the Emperor Maximilian, the Catholic King, the King of England, and the Duke of Milan."
Latin. Draft or contemporary copy. pp. 10.
19 Nov. (?)
S. E. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 1.
74. Treaty between the Pope Julius II., in his name and in the name of his allies, viz., King Ferdinand The Catholic and King Henry VIII. Of England, on the one part, and the Emperor Elect, Maximilian, and the Duke Of Milan, on the other part.
This document is a contemporary copy or duplicate of the preceding one.
S. E. Pat. Re. Cap. c. Pont. L. 2. f. 20. 75. Pope Julius II. Articles concluded between the Pope and the Cardinal Of Gurk.
This document is a Spanish translation of the preceding one.
19 Nov.
S. E. Pat. Re. Cap. c. Pont. L. 2. f. 12.
76. Treaty between Pope Julius II. and the Emperor Elect.
Pope Julius II. and the Emperor elect conclude the following treaty :—
1. The contracting princes bind themselves to remain friends and allies for all time to come.
2. They bind themselves to assist one another in defending their persons and states against any aggressor, without exception, and to undertake a common war against the Turks.
3. The Emperor binds himself to defend all such Italian states as belong by right to the Church, no matter whether they are at present in the possession of the Church or not.
4. The Emperor binds himself to show no favour to the enemies of the Church.
5. The Emperor binds himself to recall his prelates from the Council at Pisa.
6. The Venetians have obstinately refused to conclude peace with the Emperor ; and when King Ferdinand the Catholic, in this present year, succeeded in persuading them to conclude peace with the Emperor, they broke it directly. They are, therefore, excluded from this alliance, and are to be regarded as enemies of the allies.
7. The Pope binds himself to excommunicate Venice.
8-18. Stipulations concerning Gueldres, Ferrara, and other Italian states.
19. The College of Cardinals, King Ferdinand the Catholic, the King of England, the King of Hungary, the King of Poland, the King of Portugal, the Princes Electors, &c., are the conservators of this treaty of friendship and alliance.
20. The Pope promises, on his word as Pope, to observe all the stipulations of this treaty. Mathaeus, Cardinal of Gurk, promises in the name of the Emperor that this treaty will be strictly observed by him.—Rome, at the Palace of the Pope, the 19th of November, 4 o'clock at night, 1512.
Latin. Contemporary copy. pp. 4.
20 Dec.
S. E. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 1.
77. King Henry VIII. to Edward Poynings, Doctor John Yonge, Thomas Boleyn, and Richard Wingfield.
Power to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Archduchess Margaret in the name of the Emperor and King Ferdinand, in defence of the Church.—Westminster, 20th December.
Latin. Copy. pp. 3.
1512 (?)
towards the end of Dec. (?) S. E. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 5. f. 86.
78. Henry VIII. to Johannes Descane.
Considers King Ferdinand the Catholic as his father, and, like a good son, rejoices with all his heart whenever he hears that the King of Spain is successful in his enterprises.
Confides without reserve in King Ferdinand his father, and thanks him for all his good services, and especially for the fleet he has sent him.
Begs the King of Spain to send, at the beginning of the month of March next, a new fleet, well armed and well provided with all the engines of war, to Plymouth, Yarmouth, or Falmouth, where the English fleet will be kept in readiness.
Wishes the Spanish fleet to consist of ten galleys, six of which are to be swift vessels, and four heavy ones.
Begs King Ferdinand that not less than 5,000 well armed soldiers may be on board.
Has expressed in a letter to King Ferdinand his wish that he (Descane) might be made commander of the fleet, and at the same time that he might be permitted to act as English envoy in Spain. Confides in him (Descane), and hopes he will carefully superintend the armament, and arrive early in March with the fleet in England. The soldiers must be equipped in such a way that they may disembark and fight on land.
Should galleys be more expensive than vessels of another class, he will content himself with other ships.—No date.
Henry Rex.
Indorsed : "Instruction of the King of England."
Latin. Autograph. pp. 2.
1512 (?)
End of Dec. (?) S. Pat. Re. T. c. I. L. 6. f. 7.
79. Project Of A Treaty between King Henry VIII. and King Ferdinand The Catholic.
On the 17th of November 1511 a treaty was concluded between England and Spain against the King of France, by which it was stipulated that a common war should be carried on in Aquitaine. The principal object of the war was to chastise King Louis, the oppressor of the Holy Church, and to reconquer Aquitaine, stolen in defiance of all right by the King of France from the King of England. The war was in fact begun last summer ; but when winter approached the English army returned to England, and the King of France became more "malicious" and "nefarious" than ever. It is, therefore, necessary to punish him. As the King of France has a large army, this can be done only by combined efforts. King Ferdinand the Catholic and the King of England consequently conclude the following articles :—
1. The dominions of King Ferdinand being so near the duchy of Aquitaine, and the King having had such great experience in the war against France, he is better calculated than any other prince to conquer Aquitaine. He is therefore requested by the King of England to undertake the conquest of that duchy. As King Ferdinand loves the King of England with the love of a true father, he binds himself to undertake the war in the duchy of Aquitaine at his own expense in the beginning of the month of June, or at the latest before the end of June next, if the King of England will at the same time take the field in person against the King of France in Picardy or in Normandy.
2. As, however, the war in Aquitaine will entail great expense on King Ferdinand, the King of England binds himself to pay him 100,000 crowns, or 20,000l. sterling, viz., 50,000 crowns on the 1st of the month of [blank], and the remaining 50,000 crowns in the month next following. King Ferdinand is not entitled to claim a higher sum, though his share of the expenses may amount to more.
3. The King of England promises to send to King Ferdinand, or to the Spanish general in command of the army in Aquitaine, a power to take possession of the conquered cities, towns, fortresses, and provinces in the name of the King of England.
4. Both contracting princes bind themselves to arm a fleet against the King of France. Each of these fleets is to contain at least 5,000 armed soldiers. The fleets must put to sea before the end of March, and continue at sea at least six months.
5. Both contracting princes will show favour to the council assembled in the Lateran, and will oppose with all their might the schismatic council of the King of France.
6. Neither of the contracting parties is allowed to conclude peace, truce, &c., with the King of France, except with the express consent of the other contracting party.
7. All former treaties between England and Spain remain in full force.
8. Both contracting parties bind themselves to ratify this treaty within [blank] months.—No date. No signatures.
Indorsed : "1511. Copy of the articles of a treaty which the most Serene King of England sent to Spain in the year 1511, respecting a confederacy and league against France." (fn. 18)
Latin. Draft. pp. 22.


  • 1. This letter is printed in Rymer, but erroneously placed amongst the papers of 1513. Although the English were accustomed to begin the year on the 25th of March, the Spaniards were not.
  • 2. As the war which forms the principal subject of this treaty is the war in Guienne, or rather in Navarre, of the year 1512, it is clear that this document is not dated according to the old Florentine or English style, but according to the modern computation, by which the year begins with the 1st of January.
  • 3. Cardinal of Santa Croce.
  • 4. Cardinal of St. Pudentian.
  • 5. Cardinal of Santa Lucia.
  • 6. Cardinal of St. Theodor.
  • 7. 7th September.
  • 8. 11th September.
  • 9. Sic. Dax (?)
  • 10. Sic.
  • 11. The letters mentioned in the preceding instructions to Martin Muxica and Don Luis Caroz.
  • 12. Willoughby?
  • 13. "En un banco junto con una sylla."
  • 14. " ... y hera sacandolo por venir asi dela meytad como dela otra cosa que venia inserida." The passage is very far from being clear. The "meytad," or one-half, seems to relate to that portion of the instructions in which King Ferdinand asks the King of England to pay one-half of the expenses of the intended invasion of Guienne in the following year.
  • 15. Although this copy is not signed, the contents of the letter show that the writer was most probably Martin Muxica.
  • 16. It is impossible for me to state positively the date of this treaty, which, by the way, was not ratified, either by the King of England or by King Ferdinand. Guicciardini does not mention it. Peter Martyr speaks of it, in his letter No. 514, which is dated Valladolid, 7th of January 1513, as having been lately concluded. John Stile mentions, in his letter to King Henry, dated Valladolid, 14th of January 1513, that a treaty between the Pope and the Emperor against the Venetians had been concluded on the Feast of St. Barbara, that is to say, on the 4th of December. (Brewer. Letters and Papers, I. p. 474.) As he, however, evidently speaks of the separate treaty which is dated the 19th of November, it is clear that he was not accurately informed. Finally, the Cardinal of Gurk informed the Archduchess Margaret, in his letter, dated Rome, 23rd of November 1512, that the treaties in question had been concluded, but he does not state the day on which they had been signed. (Le Glay ; Négociations Diplomatiques entre la France et l'Autriche, I. p. 513.) Thus, I am unable to give the positive date. As, however, King Ferdinand censures both treaties, this one and the separate treaty between the Pope and the Emperor elect, which is dated the 19th of November 1512, in the same letters, and even in the same sentences, it is probable that they were concluded on the same day. At all events, not many days can have elapsed between the conclusion of the one and the other treaty.
  • 17. Conciliabulum.
  • 18. This indorsement is evidently false. The war with France, mentioned in this document as having been undertaken in the preceding summer, is the war of 1512. It is, therefore, impossible that this treaty can have been projected in the year 1511.