Spain: January 1530, 1-15

Pages 395-430

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 4 Part 1, Henry VIII, 1529-1530. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1879.

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January 1530, 1-15

2 Jan. 242. New Deed of Investiture of the Duchy of Milan in favour of Francesco Sforza.
f. 22.
B.M. Add. 28,579,
f. 283..
Bologna, 2nd of January 1530.
Latin, pp. 1½.
243. Investiture of Francesco Sforza as duke of Milan.
S. Pat. Re. Milan,
L. l,f. 22.
Bologna, 2nd January 1530.
B. M. Add. 28,579,
f. 283 vo.
Latin. Copy. pp. 3.
—Jan. 244. The Empress Isabella to Francisco de los Covos.
S. Pat. Re. Cap.
y Prat. c. Pont.,
L. 2, f. 63.
B.M.Add. 28,579,
f. 351.
Our letter to His Imperial Majesty, and a paragraph of the instructions which Don Antonio de Mendoça took with him, will inform you of what has been done here since the arrival of the Bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo (fn. n1) with the Emperor's com mands. The Royal Council of Castille and the Council of State were immediately assembled under the presidency of the bishop of Çamora, when the point was put under discussion how and where the money required for the Emperor's immediate wants could be procured.
As the Bishop's instructions intimated that the sum was to be raised on the articles comprised under the denomination of "Sisa General," most of the councillors were of opinion that such a tax could not well be imposed without calling together the Cortes or General States of these kingdoms. Such a convocation would be at this present moment inconvenient not to say dangerous, as the deputies from the cities and towns would never consent to the nobility, gentry, friars, nuns(religiosos de ambos sexos), and ecclesiastics in general being taxed. If the Emperor still insists upon the Cortes being summoned for that special purpose, it would be advisable to extend the measure to all the towns and villages belonging to the Crown, (fn. n2) as well as to all ecclesiastical and lay lords without yielding to the representations of the nobles, who will naturally ask to be exempted therefrom as at other times. The excise (sisa) to be paid only by ratepayers (pecheros), trades people, and others, who cannot allege exemption. This opinion, however, was far from being unanimous, the majority of the councillors having voted that on no consideration could this be the moment to demand the excise (sisa) from any kind of people in Castille, or to con-voke the Cortes. Besides, were the "sisa" unpopular, as it is to be levied on the ratepayers (pecheros), its yieldings would be scanty, and the collection (recaudacion) too slow to be of much use.
Has had these details omitted in Mendoza's instructions because, though he is much to be trusted, yet it would not do for such things to be divulged and get abroad, &c.—Madrid, January 1530. (fn. n3)
Spanish. Original draft, pp. 3.
11 Jan. 245. The Emperor to his Brother King Ferdinand.
Lanz. Corresp. des
Kaysers, vol. I.,
p. 360.
I have duly received your two last letters, but was unable from press of business to write at the time, so that Loys, the courier, had to go away without my answer. Would have been unable then, bad cipherer (mauvais chiffreur) as I am, to explain my views, and besides things were so uncertain and doubtful then that I could not venture to fix any time for my journey. Now that matters seem more clearly defined I will enter into further details respecting them.
And first of all, I have to thank you for your congratulations on the birth of my second son, ‡ of which you were duly informed by Madame Margaret, as well as by Martin de Salinas, your ambassador at this our court.
Respecting Mr. de Praët's departure [for France], your wishes have been complied with, for he has already left. The instructions for his mission have been forwarded to Cardinal Saltzburg according to your desire. As to the Bishop of Gurce, I was not aware that he ever solicited the charge of ambassador, if he did he shall not get it after what you have written to me.
I shall now reply to your second letter, which is of much greater importance. You will hear hereafter the little inclination or power which the Christian princes have of helping you in this present difficulty. I apprehend that our being brothers and loving each other as we do, and my taking such interest in your prosperity and welfare, are the principal causes why no trust is to be placed in their assistance. Our mutual forces, therefore, are the only ones to be relied upon in the present emergency, and I must add that I do not consider them sufficiently great to withstand so formidable a power as the Turk's, unless you decide to accept the truce you speak of; inasmuch as your ordinary expenses, already very considerable, would be so increased by war, that you could no longer pay your men, and although in such an emergency as a Turkish invasion I should not hesitate to help you with all my resources, I might myself run the same risk as you; besides which it might well happen that my assistance, for want of money, would be scanty or come too late, and consequently be useless, as the last nearly was. These are the reasons why, in my opinion, you ought not to refuse the truce proposed. Yet, if you accept it, all those who are ill-disposed towards us and the Empire are sure to say that they would otherwise have done wonders, and that since you, who are the nearest to the enemy and can do him most harm, sign a truce, it is not for them to interfere. And, moreover, as they know very well that you never take such resolutions without previously consulting me, they will say hereafter that I, who instigated them against the Turk, who threatens the frontiers of my own dominions, both by sea and land, had been the first, though Emperor, to advise a suspension of arms. They might also say that since the Turk has retreated to his own country, more through sheer necessity than from fear of any succour in men coming to your camp; and since there is no probability of his returning this year, or if he does return at all, of his invading Hungary for three years to come, how is it, they will ask, that you make truce? for in so doing, they will argue, you give him to understand that your difficulties are quite as great as his. This might, besides, afford occasion for the enemy to imagine that had he stayed longer in Europe he might easily have got all he wanted, and also that once free and disengaged in those parts, he could look out for some other Christian country to invade, and I need scarcely say that the calamity would hardly fall on any other prince but myself. Nevertheless, I would not for any personal consideration of mine, prevent you from attending to your own interests, for as you would not willingly act in prejudice of any other Christian prince, I am sure that you would not, either in this instance, act in mine and that if the smallest of them were in need you would immediately march to his assistance, much more to mine, who am your brother. Would to God every Christian prince would behave towards you as I have no doubt you would behave towards them in a similar case, and that they may not cool down and excuse themselves from action with this retreat of the Turk, which ought, on the contrary, to encourage them to wage war upon and destroy the Infidel, that he may never again return [to Europe], or if he does, that he may not find a place to set his foot upon. But the said princes, knowing that this would be a great boon for us two, will, I apprehend, forsake God's service and that of Christianity, and leave us to fight single handed against our powerful adversary. Considering, therefore, the little regard the said Christian princes seem to have for these sacred objects, and the political reasons above specified, the former being more weighty and solid than the latter, besides others which I will explain hereafter; seeing, moreover, their want of good-will and inclination to aid us, and the state of affairs in Germany, whence your chief and principal succour ought to come; seeing also that at the present moment the affairs of the Queen of England, our aunt, are being seriously discussed, and might become in time the cause for new wars, unless things take a very different turn; I think that you ought, on the whole, to abstain from war.
All and every one of the above considerations induce me to believe that you would do well in accepting the truce as proposed, or, if not, in procuring one yourself. However, as the Pope has now called together the ambassadors of the Christian powers, in order to propose to them a crusade against the Turk, and it is to be believed they will take their time to acquaint their respective masters thereof, that will give you time to wait, for although the answer of the ambassadors will be anything but favourable or appropriate to the circumstances, and they are sure to say that whilst on one side we ask for aid against the Turk, we are, on the other hand, negociating a truce with him, you can easily wait (if it does not put you to too much inconvenience or expense) until this peace, which cannot be delayed beyond the beginning, or, at the most, the end of March, is fairly settled, and the German affairs are less embroiled, and you might in the meantime decide whether I ought to go to you soon, or delay my journey. My opinion is, as I said before, that you ought, if you can afford it, to wait until the answer of these princes here assembled be known. If unfavourable, and they refuse their aid. you have a good excuse for accepting the truce. The cause of the delay has been that no one here saw a chance of success in the convocation of the assembly, and if the meeting took place at last it was entirely through His Holiness' exertions and my own, for no other purpose than to prevent their saying afterwards that had they been invited to it they would have done wonders, although, to tell you the truth, I do not believe a single word of what they may say in this respect, but, on the contrary, am persuaded that, if left to themselves, they would move in the opposite direction.
In order not to lose time, and lest the Turk should imagine that it is difficult for you to obtain the aid you are now asking for, and consequently take courage; lest people should think that you yourself had applied for a truce instead of waiting for the offer of it, I would advise and recommend that you should send the Infidel an ambassador with the following secret message: You might tell him that you have delayed answering his letter from want of a man in your dominions who could interpret the Turkish language. That you were besides unwilling to reply, for fear it should be thought that your anxiety to make a truce had its origin in fear, which ought in nowise to exist in treaties of this sort, among parties equally free and disembarrassed. For which reason, and perceiving that at the present hour each of you was in his own territory, without any particular reason to fear each other, nor do acts which might appear compulsory, you now wrote to him, inquiring whether he still persists in his avowed determination of making truce, and, if so, that, provided he does not demand from you anything to the prejudice of Christendom and its princes, you will prove to him that you desire peace and his friendship, voluntarily, not by force, and that you wait for an answer. You may alter or suppress any sentence you like; if too harsh, you may soften it; if too humble, you may modify or strike it out entirely. In sending a secret message of this sort I see no harm whatever; the only thing is the time lost and the expense of waiting for an answer. Such is my advice. It is for you to consider whether you can or cannot conveniently follow it. I have no doubt that you have used all diligence in getting the Turk's letter translated into German, and that the fault was not yours. Had you procured a translation sooner, the remedy would have been more at hand; but what has not been may still be done.
I have so far answered the contents of your two letters; it now remains for me to say something respecting my journey to Germany, which you naturally desire to take place as quickly as possible. But as the assistance to be got against the Turk, if any, is sure to be of very small amount, I wish to have your advice on three things. Am I to be crowned as soon as possible on this side of Rome, so as to be able, immediately after my coronation, to go to Germany; or am I to take my three crowns at Rome and delay my journey till May or June? Or again, should the state of affairs in Germany and the settlement of the present peace allow it, ought I to visit first my kingdom of Naples (which is sadly in want of my presence), leave the German journey for a later season and then return to Spain by way of Flanders, without having to come back to Italy and Naples, which last place, as I said before, I must needs visit once, and, if possible, this time before or after my journey to Germany?
That you may the better answer these questions, and give me the advice I require, I will explain to you, firstly, the causes which prompted my departure from Spain; secondly, the events that have taken place since, why and for what reason, sure as I am that most people will and do judge of the case differently. Having told you already, on another occasion, what my ideas were in quitting Spain and coming over to Italy, against the advice of many of my councillors, and not so well provided with money and troops as I ought to have been, I will only tell you that my firm conviction is this: that had I remained in Spain the peace would never have been made, and war would have gone on for ever. My forces were getting exhausted, and my means began to fail. By coming to Italy I felt sure that peace would be soon made either through the exhaustion of one of the belligerents or by one of the two getting the better of the other.
The other is the great heresies with which Germany was and is still troubled, and which increase every day. If there was a remedy it lay in my coming over, or at least in crossing the sea. It was greatly to be feared that disobedience and want of respect might spread there, and even that some of the elector princes would attempt to nominate another king of the Romans, and as I wish you to be that king, and that could not be accomplished without my being crowned as emperor first, that is the second reason that decided me to come to these parts.
The third reason was to visit my kingdom of Naples, which, as I said before, is completely exhausted and destroyed by the late wars. If I could not go thither on my arrival, or at least send a man of authority and repute, or otherwise visit the capital on my return to Spain, its ruin was certain. By coming to Italy there was a chance of peace being soon made, for, in the first place, all the Italian princes could not possibly combine against me, and, on the other hand, I could make profitable alliances. Had it been left to my choice I would willingly have begun by pacifying Italy, and afterwards making war on France, or if not have begun by France, the better to make peace in Italy, for I do not see either the reason for, or the means of conquering the whole of the latter country. Indeed, had I succeeded in subduing part of Italy, this would have been a standing cause for war, besides which I then desired, and still desire, the Pope's friendship, whoever he may be, and that could hardly be attained if I wished to become supreme ruler in Italy.
Besides the above three reasons there was another also of great weight, which was that, believing the Turk's invasion to have been earlier than it really was, I fancied that I might meet him on the field. I know very well that I did not come to Italy sufficiently provided with men and money to undertake such mighty things, but I know also that some work will in the end be done, and that if the game is to be lost it is much better that the blow should come after our crossing the sea than through staying at home, for then our common disappointment would be greater and more dishonourable.
This was my first and principal reason for leaving Spain, as I have told you. As to the second and third, I have often conversed with your ambassadors, 'and doubt not but that they have duly informed you there of; and yet, that you may understand better my position and views, I will now recapitulate them in my own handwriting. The second point is, that in consequence of the majority of my councillors being of opinion that the journey ought not to take place, the fleet was not ready for the time I had fixed, and two months' pay to the troops and mariners was thus thrown away, as it were, and likewise much of the favourable season for navigating. The unwillingness shewn by my Spanish subjects that I should be absent; the money to come from the settlement of the Molucco Islands not being forthcoming, owing to the dilatory ways of the king of Portugal; the corn harvest, from which I intended getting a good sum of money, being everywhere bad or indifferent; all these causes combined delayed my departure, and made me come late and not so amply provided as I should have wished. On the road the first news of the peace with France was received, of which, however, I was not officially informed until 20 days after my disembarkation at Savona, during which time, as the season was very backward, and the men from Malaga had been two months at sea, and were besides very much fatigued, I was obliged to give them some rest. It Was then that I heard certain news of this peace, which cannot be but good if it lasts, and which naturally made me change all my plans. Some days previous to this I had had a letter from you, stating your belief that the Turk would not come, and this intelligence, coupled with the other about the peace, induced me to take a different route. This gave me more leisure to attend to the affairs of Italy, besides which I found here some parties who wished me very much to carry on war, and advised me to that effect. I believed in them as in people well acquainted with the country and its inhabitants. I waged war; but in so doing I lost much time without achieving anything of importance. I, therefore found myself much further from you than I should otherwise have been, had I at the beginning invaded the Venetian territory, for then I would have been nearer to you, and in a better position to hasten to your aid and share your dangers, with a greater chance perhaps of the Signory coming to terms, as she has since done, and consequently of a more advantageous settlement of the Milan question.
When a fault is committed at the beginning of an affair it takes much time and trouble to correct it. Then came your messengers, one after the other, representing in warm terms your necessity and the increasing prosperity of the Turkish arms. Hearing which, and perceiving the shortness of the term allowed (though longer than I should otherwise have wished); fearing on the one hand to arrive too late, and on the other that something might happen to mar the enterprize, I actually set out on this journey with less than the necessary provision, and instead of holding one language was obliged by circumstances to speak a very different one, shewing much inclination to peace, which in fact I have always had. And, although it is an ascertained fact that the greater the desire a man shews for a thing, the more difficult it is for him to obtain it, I might have followed another course, far more profitable. However this may be, I was already on the road, when the news arrived of the retreat of the Turk. The Pope was here [at Bologna] at my request, owing to which, and to the season being already much advanced (without any indications that the winter would be as mild as it has been), I found myself in a fix; I could not advance, nor recede, nor change my plan, especially having already proclaimed my adhesion to peace. With matters in this state the undertaking against Florence was decided upon and actually commenced. At first it was thought that 15 or 20 days would be sufficient to prepare for the enterprize; that there was no other affair in hand, and that the Pope was to be satisfied on this point. Then it was asserted that the provisions collected were insufficient; that more material of war was, wanted, in preparing which several months elapsed, and even now I do not think that all is ready, though I hope that towards the end of this present month we shall hear of the siege of Florence having begun. For this reason it is my intention to quit Genoa in about 10 or 12 days and go somewhere else; for the Spaniards here with me are wanted for that undertaking, and I could not possibly remain behind without an army. If I find that it is better to go on, I shall be in a situation to do so, shall proceed to Bologna, where His Holiness will also be, take my several crowns much sooner than I intended, and then start for Germany. I hope, however, before starting on my journey to receive such news from you, as will be the means of strengthening me further in this my resolution. Cannot say how the Florentine business will end, whether by capitulation or by force; but I have engaged my word to the Pope, and my promise must be fulfilled. I would not for the world put myself in the wrong with him. He has spent money, and partly paid the besieging forces; it would be dishonourable were I now to leave him in the lurch It is, therefore, to my long stay here [at Bologna]—during which, however, peace has been concluded with the Signory of Venice and with the duke of Milan, to whom the estate has finally been restored—that the delay in my journey must be exclusively ascribed. You may believe me when I say that, had I been differently situated, and known how to render you the needful aid, I should not have hesitated one moment.
But if I am, brother, to tell you the real truth I must confess to you that on the occasion of this war to be made against the Turk, and in order to ensure the co-operation of the Christian princes, I had spoken so warmly and so frequently about peace that I should have considered it dishonourable not to promote it with all my power. I could not without this persuade the Signory to accept my terms; I say more, I think that the Venetians themselves, and some of the princes with whom I was at peace already, would have been glad to recommence war, and others would not have tolerated that you or I, or any one prince professing to be our friend and ally, should remain therein. The duke of Milan, moreover, still held some very strong places, and although 1 might have given the rest of the Duchy to another that would have been a sufficient motive for the Venetians not to give up what strong places they held in Lombardy. This might have led to everlasting wars in Italy, because, being already on my route and far from their territory, I should have been obliged to go to Milan and carry on war on the frontiers of Venice. If to this be added that the Germans were coming down, that the Spaniards having already been three months in Italy had almost consumed my resources; that I was disappointed in Flanders of 100,000 ducats, which have been since received; that bankers and merchants, not receiving news from Spain, were chary in advancing money (though the news since received from that country is more favourable), you will easily understand that I was at one time reduced to great extremities.
The above reasons have moved me to act as I have done. Some people will argue that since all my embarrassments proceeded from want of money, I might have demanded a larger sum from France, but my answer is that the utmost that country can pay has been asked as a ransom for the King's sons. Besides I was not sure then, nor am I now, that the French would keep the peace long, and, therefore, it was important for me to look for friends and allies elsewhere, and let Italy enjoy peace and liberty. And, moreover, though the Venetians had duly surrendered to me Barletta, in the kingdom of Naples, they still held four or five seaport towns of some importance on that coast, which, in that case, as some think, I could not have obtained except in exchange for Milan, Novara, Pavia, and other less important fortresses in the Duchy, keeping only for myself the castle of Milan and city of Como. In this manner, not otherwise, could I regain possession of the towns and ports held by Venice, whereas, now, by making peace with that Signory and re-investing the duke Sforza, I can keep the whole of Naples. This arrangement will enable me to withdraw all my army from that kingdom, which would otherwise have been completely destroyed without my getting one single farthing out of it, whereas, now it is to be hoped that it will be of some help to me, and, moreover, before the Venetians came to a rupture, I was sure, if they were in the least favourably inclined, to get from them 150,000 or 200,000 ducats. In addition to this the king of England is now on the point of divorcing his queen, our aunt, against all right and justice and against the Pope's will and consent. If he does he will lay a great responsibility at our door, and perhaps also he and the king of France, seeing me at peace in Italy, will adopt measures and attempt things likely to renew the war. But even if this comes to pass, and all of them combine against me, I maintain that my position now is better than when I left Spain, for besides having the kingdom of Naples all to myself, I have here in Italy 12,000 Spaniards and 9,000 Germans, whom I can support till the middle and perhaps the end of May. I dare say some assistance in money will he procured elsewhere, for if Florence capitulate some is sure to come from them. Again, the duke of Ferrara has not yet made terms with the Pope concerning Reggio and Modena. When he does, and I hear they are now treating about those towns, some more money will be forthcoming. In short, it will be a great boon to us both, now that peace has been concluded, that it should be consolidated all round, and leave no sparks behind likely to kindle a new fire. You must know, moreover, that the thing my Spanish subjects hate most is to see all their substance spent in foreign countries and especially in Italy. As to the Germans, though their constitution be that of an empire, and the measures adopted might be profitable to them, you know as well as I do how they are likely to take them and how they will probably act when called upon to bear part of the expenses of war. One thing, however, is certain, that peace has been made, and if that with France lasts, I shall have more means at my command to obtain money from them. This, in my opinion, will be the surest way of promoting your election as king of the Romans.
Having thus far explained to you my reasons for coming to Italy, and the changes in politics which have since occurred, I will now discuss the present state of affairs, that you may in turn give me your advice. And, first of all, I wish to know your opinion about the Pope. You know very well that I have made a treaty with him and engaged to reduce Florence under his sway. Now supposing that this could not he effected, I ask you what ought to be done to satisfy the Pope and keep him contented? For I wish above all things to preserve his friendship, and not lose it again, or at least, if he is not to be my friend, not to have him as my enemy. At present he is treating me well and shews me great affection, though some people are of opinion that all this is a feint, and that he has intelligences and plots elsewhere, which might under certain circumstances turn to our disadvantage. Yet you may well imagine that His Holiness would not willingly begin his old game again unless for such reasons as would ensure success. With the king of France I am likewise at peace. He has hitherto fulfilled all the conditions of the treaty [of Cambray]; not only has he surrendered all the towns and villages he still held in the kingdom of Naples, but also Hast (Asti) and Hesdin, and although the restitution did not actually take place on the appointed day it was effected shortly after. It is said, however, that he is now busy intriguing secretly (qu'il a grandes pratiques), and I doubt not but that he is after no good, and that he may at the present moment be secretly helping the Florentines; but these are matters which are not easily verified, and I am inclined to think that what he is now doing, if he is indeed doing anything, is not an act of his own free will, but a yielding to the natural desire of recovering his sons sooner and on better terms, and that for that single object he is still intriguing though he has solemnly promised not to mix himself up with the politics of this country. Should he attempt anything that way I fancy that he will undertake either Genoa (on the pretext that that Community is not named in the treaty of Cambray), or the marquis de Saluzzo, or the Florentines or the duke of Ferrara. Nevertheless, I believe that when he sees that the present peace is equally beneficial to all parties, and likely to last, the king of France will adhere to it. If he does not, and succeeds in making some agreement with the Italian powers, they will no doubt inflict on me all the harm they can; of that I am sure. Some believe that the moment the King has collected the money required for the ransom of his children he will break out; others that he will regain possession of his sons first and then declare war; most, however, hope that he will not stir anyhow.
Respecting the king of England, it is said that he already considers his mistress as his wife, and threatens to marry her whether the Pope will give his consent or not. For he says he cares not a straw for the Pope, whom he calls almost a heretic, (fn. n4) intimating that he might on that account be degraded. The Pope, on the one hand, would not easily consent to this new marriage owing to the affair being by far too scandalous, but on the other he would not like to see the King lose all sense of submission to, and reverence for him. I cannot tell yet how this affair will end, but of this I am quite certain, namely, that the King will commit this folly, and with or without the Pope's consent marry the Lady [Anne], which I need not point out to you will be a great evil and a sufficient cause for new wars. I really believe that the French king will help and do his utmost to set us both at war on that score, and compel each of us to apply to the Venetians, to the duke of Milan and Ferrara, to the Florentines, and to other Italian powers for help and alliance respectively.
This is as much as I can say on these questions. Doria's term of service is up in May or June. It is, however, my intention to renew it and I hope to retain the services of that captain, though if there be, as I say, any conspiracy in the wind, the first thing my enemies will try to do is to gain him over to their cause.
I have told you all this that you may understand the possibility of any of the above contingencies taking place, and that at the present moment my enemies are probably dissembling in order to let me consume and waste my resources, though I do not believe they will succeed. (fn. n5) But this case happening, I want you to tell me where and how I had better retaliate and harm those who would assail me? If away from Italy to return at the head of my forces, or here in this country prepare myself equally for defensive or offensive warfare? If this last course be decided upon I will ask you which point is to be attacked first, for if I am to defend myself and fight the enemy I am pretty sure that it must be in Italy. For this reason it would be advisable that you should have a number of men always ready in case of need to come over, thus enabling me with their assistance to break the force of the enemy, as I have done at other times. I have now in Italy 21,000 men, Spaniards and Germans. True they are far apart and decreasing daily in number, so that should the enemy pounce suddenly upon me I might find myself in difficulties. That is why I recommend you always to keep a number of men in readiness, no matter from what nation, whether Swiss or Germans. Should I in the meantime hear anything about the plans and intentions of our enemies I will let you know.
I do really believe after all that all these rumours and presentiments of war are circulated by people here who would like to see me as soon as possible out of their country; but I also believe, that being so well attended as I am, and at the head of such an army, they could not do me much harm if they tried. The soldiers of my armies are generally speaking good and effective, but terribly unruly. It will be necessary for me to keep them in arms until we see whether the king of France fulfils the conditions of the treaty or not. I say keep them, because they will not cost me more money, I being with them, than if I were absent.
You may believe me when I say that it is not for fear of these Italians that (fn. n6) I am here; I would much prefer being anywhere else where my pleasure or my duty called me, since I have, nothing to do for the present. It was at first considered expedient, in order to stop people's mouths, that my coronation should take place at Rome, especially as the ceremony will not cost more there than here, at Bologna. I have, however, given the preference to this plan, because it is to be presumed that the Turk will not come down this year. If, however, the affairs of Germany required my presence, I should abandon everything to go thither, for it is my duty as Emperor to attend to the affairs of that country. I would then take my crowns on this side of Rome, whatever gossiping there might be about it, (fn. n7) which, I am sure, will not be wanting, for common people seem to think that my coronation will not be valid unless performed at Rome. They are, however, decidedly mistaken, and their opinion (which is generally not that of politicians and lawyers) will not make me change my determination. True it is that in this case, you will have to look out for the means of stopping the heresies of that country, and also see how you can promote your own election as king of the Romans. I will send you for this very purpose and by the first courier the usual letters of convocation for a Diet to be held on the 1st of May, and another letter in blank, to be filled up with the date of May or June according as it may be, that is, if I decide to be crowned at Rome, and the state of things in Germany permits.
The two above mentioned means might suffice in both cases, whether the present peace lasts or not. Respecting the third, which is the peace itself, I need scarcely say that were that peace to be good and firm, and you happened to see the affairs of Germany in a doubtful state —both in regard to the new heresies and your own election—or if you saw that there was time to gain the German princes over by mild persuasion and fair means, and the promise of a General Council (and I say general, because I do not consider a provincial one good enough for the purpose, and because the Pope will most likely attend the General at all times, and especially during the peace, whilst he will not the Provincial), also to avoid war between the king of England and myself, in the event of his acting unjustly towards the Queen, our aunt, and holding the Pope as suspect for not attending to his wishes, and should the Queen agree to challenging the Legate, then in that case I would immediately start for Germany. (fn. n8) And if it were necessary that the Council should take cognizance of this affair, it would take some time to do it and convoke the same, and see if the general peace was likely to last. And if in consequence of the ill-will of the Germans, or of our not having sufficient money in hand for the expenses of your election, as likewise for the other business of mine, you found that you could wait, and that I could also delay my journey until the end of the winter, I wish to know if your advice is, that there being time for it, I should first visit my kingdom of Naples? For I can assure you that it needs my presence greatly, and that if I am to go thither at all, I must stay some months, otherwise my visit will rather do harm than good, and if the affairs of Germany, as I say, allowed it, it would be a great boon for that kingdom. Then after visiting Naples I might go to Germany, finish my work there, and return to Spain by way of Flanders. This plan, of course, to be abandoned, unless the state of things in Germany allows of it entirely; for otherwise, everything must be left as it were to chance. Then it must be considered whether I am to return to Spain without visiting Naples, or whether I am to come back to Italy for that purpose, and then go to Spain. This last plan, of course, to be adopted only in time of peace, and in case of the affairs of Germany and the Turk permitting its execution, for in time of war there is no thinking of it; even so I can assure you, that it will be a rather difficult undertaking, for the obstacles are many, and the risks very great. If I am forced into a war, I shall do my best and risk everything. I have no doubt that much harm will be done on both sides through it; but at any rate, I shall not be deemed the cause thereof, I who have so strenuously and in all ways worked for peace. Should, however, this misfortune befall us I will send you letters of convocation for a new Diet, that we may hear the advice and know the will of the electors, princes, and Imperial cities, all or part of them, as you may think proper or convenient, assuring them and you that I shall never cross the sea to Spain without first visiting that country and having made you king of the Romans. I beg you, therefore, to let me know your advice on these several matters that I may shape my movements accordingly; and when you have answered all and every one of my questions, and told me what you expect me to do in Germany, now or later as it may be, and how and at what time I am to go, and what kind of I remedy is to be applied to the evils of that country, then I will inform you of the day of my departure and of the route I intend taking. I forgot to say that some people here advise me, in case of my journey being postponed, to delay also the ceremony of my coronation until I myself am ready to start, for fear of the Germans electing in the meantime another king of the Romans but you. I cannot say whether their advice be good or bad, but you will think of it and let me know your opinion.
This letter is long and full of repetitions (redittes) and blunders (faultes), and yet I will not take the trouble of copying it again. Long as it is, it does not contain many things whereof I intend speaking to you when we meet next. You need not answer all its points, only those which relate to the present state of affairs, and on which I have asked your advice. The rest to be discussed at our leisure, at our next meeting. But it is absolutely necessary that all the contents of this letter should be kept a secret from everyone. Keep it carefully by you, not on account of the writing itself, which is bad, but that it may be a sort of memorandum book when we next refer to it together.—Bologna, 11th January 1530.
French. Holograph. pp. 11.
11 Jan. 246. The Marquis of Denia (fn. n9) to the Empress Isabella.
S.E.L. 518, f.343.
B. M. Add. 28,579,
f. 357.
The Queen (Joanna) inquires after the Empress' health, and wishes to know how she is after her confinement. (fn. n10) Wants also to know how the Emperor's affairs in Italy are getting on. — Tordesillas, 11th January 1530.
Signed; "El Marques de Denia."
Spanish. Original, p. 1.
12 Jan. 247. Eustace Chapuys to the Emperor.
K. u. K. Haus-
c. 226, No. 2.
According to my last advices, I went to Court on the Festival of the Kings. Shortly before my arrival there Mr. de Bayonne and his brother, the two ambassadors of France, had come to the spot, and were waiting at the first gate of the Palace. Met in the King's anti-chamber Messieurs de Norfolk and Rochfort. (fn. n11) the former of whom took me on one side, whilst the latter with the French ambassador went to the other, and we began conversing together until the Bang should come out of his chamber, which he did shortly after. The conversation chiefly turned upon the Duke's great regard for Your Majesty, and his desire to be useful, as I will explain hereafter.
The King coming out of his apartments, I made my reverence, and was graciously received by him; after which he turned towards the other ambassadors and said a few words to them. He then came up to me and said aloud before the whole company that I was most welcome to his Court, though he reproached me for having come so seldom during the recent festivities, remarking that in the present state of affairs between him and Your Majesty I was not to play the stranger, but come at all hours on a friendly footing, since at no time, he said, should I be otherwise than most welcome. Excused myself on the ground that neither my predecessors in office, nor other foreign ambassadors, as I had been informed, had ever appeared at Court without a previous invitation, and that I feared lest my presence might be otherwise than agreeable. He replied as above, and then asked me if there was any fresh news from Your Majesty, and hearing that I had none to communicate, said that he would after dinner acquaint me with some of his own. I then took leave to withdraw, and the ambassadors of France came forward to speak to him; but although the brother of Mr. de Bayonne (fn. n12) had not seen the King since his arrival [in England], the audience was very short, hardly half a dozen words being exchanged between the two, for it was already time to go to mass.
After dinner the French ambassadors and myself again had audience, when the King suddenly made me a sign to approach, which I did, and we conversed for a good while, to the great annoyance of the French, who saw night coming on, and had to return to London. The King spoke at length of the news he had received, and especially of the gracious reception given to his ambassadors [at Bologna]. Replied that Your Imperial Majesty wished to make it generally known everywhere that he valued his (the Bang's) friendship as much, and even more than that of any other prince in Christendom, and that the demonstration made on the occasion, as well as the good treatment of his ambassadors, was but a slight proof of your deep regard for him. To which the King readily assented, observing that it was only through such public ceremonies and observances that the people at large, who cannot judge the motives of princes, or follow the course of affairs, could see evidences of mutual friendship and good-will. Replied that he must have had plenty of opportunities to know that Your Majesty Desires nothing so much as his friendship, and that respecting the, affair of the Queen, which had been made a ground for complaint against you, he ought not to take Your Majesty's interference in bad part, inasmuch as it was dictated not only by a feeling of conscience and honour, as well as a wish for the prosperity and welfare of England, but likewise by a sense of duty towards the Queen, your aunt. The King's reply was that he had not until then been made aware of Your Majesty's sentiments; (fn. n13) all he knew about them was what you yourself had said and proposed to his ambassadors [at Bologna]. Nevertheless, Your Majesty had acted well [and he had no complaint to make]. He was about to forward such information as should convince you first, and the whole world afterwards, that he had not moved in this matter until after long and mature deliberation, and that he was not prompted by uncontrolled passion or illegitimate affections which at his age, and in a matter of so great an importance, would be wholly unwarranted.
I spoke also about the "fleur de lis," giving him to understand that I had received letters from Your Imperial Majesty informing me that the French ambassadors residing at your Court had more than once tried to obtain an acknowledgment that the jewel had been delivered to me, alleging that in accordance with the treaty of Cambray it was to be taken to the place appointed for the delivery of the sons of France, and then and there handed over to the Imperial commissioners, who on the receipt of it would tender the required acknowledgment. Upon which the King observed that in this matter he only required one word from me. Would I have the "fleur de lis" delivered to me, or should it be sent to Mr. de Bayonne for him to present it to his master? It was for me to decide, and my wishes would be complied with. Replied as on a former occasion that I had no instructions about the matter, and therefore did not know how to act, but I fancied all difficulties might be surmounted by the mere fact of committing the jewel to the care of some trusty person to take it to the spot fixed for its delivery. To this the King objected, for fear of some accident on the road, but I met his objection by saying that Mr. de Bayonne had promised to ensure the "fleur de lis" for a sum of 200,000 crs. Upon which the King begged me to write to Your Majesty for express instructions respecting this matter, at the same time offering to forward my letters by the courier he is now about to dispatch. Willingly agreed to the proposal.—London, 12th January 1530.
Signed; "Eustace Chapuys."
Addressed: "To the Emperor."
Indorsed: "From the ambassador in England, Jan. 12."
French. Original partly in cipher. Contemporary deciphering on the margins, pp.4.
12 Jan. 248. The King of England's Answer to the Proposals brought by the Sieur de Mingoval.
K. u. K. Hans-
c. 226, No. 3.
The King of England's answer to the proposal made to him by the Sieur de Mingoval on the part of the Emperor, to aid and assist in the enterprize against the Turk.
To the statement made by the Sieur de Mingoval, that the Turk, not contented with having conquered the kingdom of Hungary, has with still greater forces passed into Austria, and is now closely investing the city of Vienna, intending, after he has wintered his army in Hungary, to proceed immediately on the approach of spring with large reinforcements of infidels to attack and, if possible, subdue the whole of Germany. And therefore that for the resistance to, and repulsion of such an aggression—the danger being imminent, and not private and special, but common and general—His Imperial Majesty prays His most Serene Majesty the king of England to come to his help, and, if he cannot send troops, at least to furnish him (the Emperor) with money for the pay of a certain number of men with whom he may withstand the attacks of the Infidel and drive back his hosts. The answer is:—
That His Royal Majesty cannot but feel great sorrow at heart, seeing that the Turk, once so glad and thankful if he could barely defend himself against the Christians and escape from them by flight, should now have so gained ground that, taking advantage of the dissensions and intestine wars by which Christian kings and princes are trying to oppress and subdue one another, he actually ventures to provoke and attack them in their own country. Perceiving, therefore, that if Turkish aggression is to be checked effectively all princes must lend united aid, His Royal Majesty will doubtless greatly rejoice to hear through the Sieur de Mingoval that His Imperial Majesty, setting aside all personal concerns, has determined, in fulfilment of His Imperial calling, to advance to the defence of threatened Christendom, resolved to free her from danger, and revenge her on her cruel and wicked enemy, the Turk.
His Royal Majesty would have much preferred, and, indeed, thinks it would have been much better for all parties, that the most illustrious king of Hungary, Ferdinand, had made terms with the Vayvod (Zapolsky), even at the loss of some personal right, rather than have come to this pass. It would have been far more advisable to have avoided war, and temporized with the Italian powers, and that the money spent and the blood shed by the Christians in trying to destroy one another should have been employed in war against the Infidel. But alas! the past is irrevocable, and regret for what has happened is of no avail for the future.
His Royal Majesty is well aware of the danger being great and imminent; he knows the power of the Turk to be so great that no Christian prince could cope with him single handed. He also knows how nearly the danger concerns not only the other Christian princes, but also himself, though far removed from the scene of action. He is, in short, convinced of the necessity there is for at once crushing the Turks before their courage (consequent on their success) should be so far increased as to kindle an inextinguishable flame throughout Christendom.
Accordingly, His Royal Majesty has already sent special instructions to his ambassadors—recently sent to His Imperial Majesty for the ratification of the peace of Cambray—to say that, as soon as a general peace is concluded, and the Christian princes, by common consent, and each according to his power and means, engage to furnish men, money, horses, and war material for the said enterprize, they shall also on his part and in his name promise such aid as may be required from him.
But whereas the Sieur de Mingoval has requested His Royal Majesty in the Emperor's name to contribute yearly for this purpose, both money and horses (chevaulx), His Royal Majesty must here state the particular objections he has for acceding at once to such a request.
First of all, His Majesty sees that everyone in this affair looks far more to his own private interest than to the public weal.
That peace is not yet universally or firmly concluded on the Continent (de par de là), and that the Turkish power is so great that it cannot be effectually crushed without large supplies of money and men, and lastly, that, owing to the great sufferings of the Christian community [during these recent wars], there will be great difficulty in raising a sufficient force. All which considerations put together are strong enough to deter His Royal Majesty from spending his substance rashly and on mere impulse, without securing first real and effectual good to the common cause.
His Royal Majesty is indeed deeply affected and grieved at the miseries of poor Christendom, desiring, as he always has done, her prosperity and welfare before all things; but, judging from the present state of affairs, he is decidedly of opinion that the wisest course to be pursued is to husband all resources, and not to undertake anything against the Turk until it can be done with ample and sufficient means. For, to attack the enemy without a sufficiently strong army would be to encourage, not to check, his advance.
His Royal Majesty is the more moved to express such an opinion at the present time, in view of the representations of the Parliament of his kingdom, now assembled, whose members complain that out of the large sums of money collected by the Pope from vacant ecclesiastical benefices and other sources throughout Christendom in general, and this kingdom in particular, under the pretence of assisting in a Crusade against the Turk, and helping the common cause of Christianity, nothing has come; the said members asserting that, as the Emperor is so much bent upon carrying on war in Italy, and shedding Christian blood, they are afraid of voting the supplies demanded, lest under cover of crushing the Turk the money should be actually spent in bringing misery and bloodshed among the Christian people.
Although His Royal Majesty would not think otherwise than honourably and respectfully of the Emperor on this occasion, yet, considering that in past times the Pope has not, as he should have done, faithfully reserved all the produce of vacant ecclesiastical benefices strictly for the end and purpose for which the money was collected, and for the present emergency, it will be better for him not to part in future with such resources, than have to make fruitless inquiries afterwards concerning the appropriation of the funds.
His Royal Majesty, therefore, earnestly and affectionately entreats the Emperor to hasten and press, as he has already done, the conclusion of this universal peace among the Christian princes, that each may in proportion to his resources and means assist in the said enterprize against the Turk in which all are equally interested. Though the accomplishment of this may occasion delay, it is still absolutely necessary; for in so mighty an undertaking there must be no rashness; far preferable it is at all times to draw back a little, the better to leap (reculer pour mieulx sauter), and first collect a powerful army, sufficient for the destruction of the Turk, than endanger the cause by some foolhardiness at the outset. This is, in His Royal Majesty's opinion, the point to which the attention of the Christian princes must be principally directed.
His Royal Majesty has therefore come to the conclusion, and is decidedly of opinion, that for the present the wisest course for him to pursue is to collect what treasure and horses (chevaulx) he can, and may seem to him most expedient for the defence and common weal of threatened Christendom, and, when the other Christian princes shall have agreed and united to assist in the enterprize against the Turk, His Royal Majesty will no longer delay his contingent, but will at once furnish all reasonable aid.
French. Original, pp. 3.
12 Jan. 249. Eustace Chappuys to the Emperor.
K. u. K. Haus-
c. 226, No. 3 bis.
To-day's despatch (fn. n14) having been forwarded through the King's people (par le moyen des gens du Roy), I could not write so openly on all points as I should have wished; I therefore add this by way of supplement.
In the course of conversation the King observed to me that he did not yet consider peace to be firmly established in Italy, nor, as the report went, was there much likelihood of its being so as soon as people imagined, and besides that Your Majesty must be sadly in want of funds just now. My answer to the former remark was that judging from the rumours now current of a settlement with the Venetians, and considering the great kindness, clemency, and generosity shewn by you in restoring the estate of Milan to the duke Francesco [Sforza], which had been the one great ground for alarm in Italy, it might well be believed that the rest would soon follow. As to the state of Your Majesty's finances, I could not say that it was very flourishing at present. Indeed, it was the point on which many people had hitherto founded their hopes, and which had determined them to arm against you, and yet, I added, "Nothing that I know of has been left undone through want of means. The Emperor has now as great, even greater, facilities for raising money than he ever had." "Indeed," replied the King, "I understand the Emperor has found money at 30 o/o interest, which shews he has not much credit [among bankers]!" As regards Milan, he said he objected to the arrangement as much as to other points, and we went on in this way debating these questions for some time.
Respecting the Queen's business, the King said to me that he had now in his favour the opinions of all the learned doctors of this kingdom, (fn. n15) even of those who at the beginning had taken her part, and who had since acknowledged their mistake. My reply was that I knew of many among the most learned of this country who maintained their first opinion as strongly as ever, and that even if the whole of his subjects, as he said, agreed entirely with him, the matter, nevertheless, was of such importance that the opinion of his own doctors was insufficient for the decision of the case, inasmuch as from their being natives of this country they might and ought to be considered suspect. The opinion of the first universities in Christendom ought to be taken, and that before attempting a divorce between two persons of such exalted rank, whose union has lasted so long, and from whom there is issue. Indeed before entering upon a question with which the power and authority of the Holy Apostolic See are so closely connected, it seemed advisable to convoke a small council (ung petit concile).
To this the King replied that there were in his kingdom plenty of honest men (gens de bien), whose persuasions and writings, besides what he himself, who is well acquainted with such matters, had read in books, had had the effect of quieting his conscience, and that he had no doubt Your Majesty would be of the same opinion when you saw the allegation (information), which was shortly to be forwarded to you. (fn. n16) That although his own conscience was perfectly at ease on that point, he had thought it well to consult the Paris doctors, 16 of whom, the principal amongst them, had sided with him. And upon my replying that the number of his partizans (fauteurs) was wonderfully small when compared with the innumerable host of doctors in Paris, he said that those who had voted the conclusion in his favour were the most distinguished men in that university, and that a greater number might have been found, had not two doctors, one a Spaniard the other a Fleming, at the instigation of the Imperial ambassadors in France, hindered and thwarted in every possible way the labours of the person sent by him for the management of this business; a most unfair proceeding, he observed, which he could in no wise assign to Your Majesty, as emanating from your own free will, since for whatever you had done or ordered to be done in the affair the Imperial ambassadors had lately apologized in so solemn a manner that there was nothing more to say (qu'il n'y avoit que mordre). Besides which, Your Majesty had spoken to his ambassadors in terms so humane and generous, more perhaps than the affair deserved, that he hoped Your Majesty would, in accordance with his innate goodness, his justice and integrity, only advise and recommend a course of action strictly legal. (fn. n17)
The duke of Norfolk, nowadays the most powerful man in England, and, if I am not mistaken, he who desires most to do service, told me the other day, among other things, as I have already (fn. n18) informed Your Majesty, that he very much regretted my not having been at Court during these last festivals. He had been vexed to see the French ambassador dining at the King's table on the third day after Christmas (Noel), and that I had not been invited; not that this could be considered a privilege in the French ambassador's favour, since there were four more guests besides, namely, the Grand Chancellor, the two dukes, and one marquis; yet whether it was privilege or familiarity, he did not care which, he very much disliked others being invited where I did not attend. Had I come at the time by myself, without the ambassadors of France being present, he would certainly have secured an invitation for me. This he begged me to keep to myself and not to mention to the French ambassadors, as he would rather lose 1,000 crs. than that they should hear of it. (fn. n19) He said more: "It would have been proper and just for the King, after the gracious reception of his ambassadors [at Bologna] to have invited you to his table, but; it was forgotten, I cannot exactly say how, and I myself have been afraid of shewing too much interest in the matter, from fear of arousing suspicion." (fn. n20)
The Duke then went on to say that he thanked God for the firm purpose and mutual agreement which, to judge from the reception of the English ambassadors by Your Majesty he perceived to exist between you and the King, his master, for the maintenance of peace and perfect friendship. Then, after a few minutes' reflection, he exclaimed with a deep sigh: "Alas! there remains still one step for the removal of all scruples and the confirmation of that very friendship and alliance which might indeed become quite indissoluble, and lay the King, my master, and his kingdom under such obligation to the Emperor that money or anything else required could be easily obtained, and this step is no other than His Imperial Majesty's consent to this marriage." (fn. n21) "The King," continued the Duke, "is so much bent upon it that I do not think anyone but God could turn him aside, for he believes it to be imperative for the welfare and tranquillity of his kingdom that he should marry again for the sake of having male succession; besides which, from the books he has read on the subject, and the discussions he has instituted throughout his kingdom, he feels quite convinced that his union with the Queen was from the beginning illegitimate."
The Duke, as I informed Your Majesty by my despatch of the 9th of December, had already told me all these things on a previous occasion, though with great and ceremonious reserve, and under protest that I was to keep the matter secret. Now it seemed to me as if in repeating the same statement he wanted me in reality to mention the subject more openly. He sighed frequently during his speech and said repeatedly he would willingly have given all he possessed in this world for the King or himself to have one hour's interview with Your Majesty. He called God to witness that in what he said he was nowise influenced by motives of personal affection towards the Lady, who is his niece, but merely by his desire for the welfare of the kingdom, the King's service and your own. I replied that his reputation stood so high with Your Majesty as of a man incapable, from motives of duty or affection, of swerving from the path of honour and integrity; that had this been a merely individual question in which Your Majesty's interests alone were concerned, you would willingly have made him judge in this matter. I then repeated to him in substance all that I had said to the King on a former occasion, and concluded by acquainting him with the common report of this town, that he (the Duke) would greatly rejoice in the accomplishment of the said marriage. I told him plainly that I was of a different opinion, I thought such an alliance more detrimental to him than to anyone else; for it was generally reported that the King wished to marry the princess to his eldest son, (fn. n22) who would then for want of male issue become the heir to the throne. The Duke replied that these reports were a pure invention; such a thought had never entered his mind and he would much prefer to see his son drowned than to have him in such a position. He also told me that he knew very well what Your Majesty had said to the English ambassadors [at Bologna] respecting the Queen's business, but that he must appear as if he knew nothing about it.
At this stage of the conversation the King came into the room, and no more was said on the subject; but after mass the Duke again approached me and said that the London merchants had received letters from their correspondents abroad stating that Your Majesty was in great want of money. My answer was the same as the one I made to the King as above, taking care to specify in detail the many ways Your Majesty had at present of procuring money whenever it was wanted.
After leaving the Duke, Mr. de Rochefort (Rocheford), now earl of Vulchier (Wiltshire) and Vulmot (Wilmot), came up to me proffering his services, and expressing a wish to visit me at my lodgings, saying also how much gratified the King was at Your Majesty's evident desire to maintain friendly relations with him, as appeared from the gracious reception made to his ambassadors [at Bologna]. The Earl went on to say how particularly pleased the King was to see me in England, feeling sure that I should not be one of those who by evil reports sent home would try to disturb the said friendly relations, "although," he added, "there being still a few points of dispute between the Emperor and the King, my master, your letters perhaps are not without their rough edges, " (fn. n23) My reply was that from the manner in which the English ambassadors had been received [at Bologna], it was quite evident that my account of the true state of things in England had been somewhat modified, for I had not yet lost all hope in the wisdom, goodness, and magnanimity of him whom the affair principally concerned, meaning the King, who, I thought, would sooner or later perceive the true nature of the affairs (fn. n24) under discussion. The Earl's reply was: "I cannot persuade myself that the Emperor wishes to hinder a plan which would be so beneficial to this kingdom. I would willingly have given all I possess for the King, my master, to have been able to converse with the Emperor for a little while on this subject." He then asked me whether I wrote to Your Majesty often, and how my despatches were forwarded, to which I purposedly made no direct answer, feigning not to have understood the nature of the inquiry.
The French ambassadors were at first considerably annoyed at my not consenting to ask the King for the "fleur de lis," as mentioned in a former despatch. I again told them that I had no instructions to do so, but that I would willingly request the King, who was sole arbiter in the matter, to consign it into the hands of Your Majesty's commissaries at the time of the delivery of the princes, for according to the letter of the treaty [of Cambray] the English were bound to send the "fleur de lis " back to you, and it was for them (the ambassadors) to see that it was sent. (fn. n25) The ambassadors replied that all that might be very well, but nevertheless they knew their master's intentions in the matter, and could not help forwarding them with all their might. I have not heard from them since they had their audience; but I hear from Brian Tuke that this king is again to write to Your Majesty about it, as it is presumed that his first letter on the subject has not reached its destination.
In consequence of a message sent me by the Queen I asked the King's permission to wait upon her. I went thither accompanied by the earl of Vulchier (Wiltshire), who tried to persuade me that she was absent from home and had gone to hear a sermon. Found her, however, sitting in her room. She asked for tidings of Your Majesty, inquired what I had to say and what I thought of her affair; if I had any hope, and thought the people [at Rome] were acting well, &c. Replied in the most encouraging terms possible, which seemed to give her much satisfaction and relief.
(Cipher:) Her physician says that the letter in cipher, which I once received [from him], to be forwarded to Spain with my despatches, was actually written from the Queen's own dictation, but that no doubt it had been previously communicated to her as a Gospel truth. (fn. n26)
Whilst writing the above the French ambassador has called on me to take leave, I mean Mr. de Bayonne (Jean du Bellay) for his brother (Guillaume) is to remain here a few more days, at least until the arrival of Jean Jocquin, who is shortly expected. Mr. de Bayonne said to me that as he was on his way to Court to take leave of the King he intended making one more attempt about the "fleur de lis." He asked me whether I had received any further instructions about it. In case I had not, would I again recommend, as I had promised to do, that it should be delivered into the hands of some trusty person of this court to be the bearer, when he or his brother went away, he (Mr. de Bayonne) offering to give sufficient security. Replied that as I was the first to propose that expedient, and it had met with their approbation, I could not but do everything in my power to have his wish accomplished.
I then asked him if he knew who the Germans were who had lately arrived at Court. His answer was that he had no information whatever about them; he had occasionally heard of Germans coming to reside at this court, but as he took no interest whatever in the affairs of that country he had neglected to inquire who they were and what they came about. His manner, however, was such when he said this that it aroused rather than calmed my suspicions.
Of the Germans above alluded to, the one whose arrival after Christmas I have already mentioned to Your Majesty happens to be, as I am told, an agent of Mr. de Mayance. (fn. n27) Another one who, they say, comes from the Cardinal de Guise (fn. n28) has arrived since, followed by two or three attendants. They have been here three days, I have not yet been able to ascertain what they are about; will make every possible inquiry, and transmit whatever information I may obtain respecting them.—London, 12th January 1530.
Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
French. Holograph cipher.
13 Jan. 250. The Same to the Same.
K. u. K. Haus-
c. 226, No. 4.
Yesterday, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Your Majesty's letters of 14th December were duly received. I immediately informed the King, who sent word to my secretary (mon homme) by M. de Nolphocq (Norfolk) that I was to go to him this morning between 9 and 10 o'clock. Went accordingly, and entered the Audience-hall, but the King not being yet ready, there came the duke of Sufforcq (Suffolk), the earl of Vulchier (Wiltshire), the Treasurer of the Household, the First Secretary, and Brian Turk (Tuke) to tell me thereof, and to entertain me in the meantime. After a few sentences had been interchanged, the Duke began to speak of the goodwill which the King, his master, and all those who surrounded him (pointing to the courtiers), bore to Your Majesty, and how there was no one throughout the whole kingdom, as well as in the King's Council, who did not feel that the friendship of Your Majesty and of your people was not only advantageous but absolutely necessary for this king and kingdom, for an old friendship renewed was to be valued much more than one of a new date, and the Duke went on saying many pretty things to the same purpose.
To this complimentary effusion I answered but little, and for many reasons; first of all because, as is well known, the Duke [of Suffolk] has vast possessions in France, and I suspected that he was only trying to get information." Besides, not having yet seen either the King or the duke of Norfolk, I thought it was better not to acquaint him (Suffolk) with any particulars. I, therefore, contented myself with thanking him in Your Majesty's name, and declaring that I had particular orders from Your Majesty to request that he would employ himself in cementing that very union and friendship between the King and Your Majesty, of which he had spoken, adding that you relied most implicitly on him, and hoped he would continue his efforts in that direction.
The King having entered the Audience-hall, the Duke gave me his arm, and introduced me to the Royal presence. After the usual commendations, I exhibited Your Majesty's letter, and presented it to the King, who, on reading the superscription, began to say: "This letter could not be more welcome than it is, for I perceive it is in the Emperor's hand." He then inquired kindly after your health, observing "that is the first and principal thing; if that goes on well the rest will follow." Then hearing of Your Majesty's good health, he said two or three times running "I am delighted to hear it; that is really good news." He then read the letter through more than once, apparently with great satisfaction; said he had known for some time that tidings would soon come; that he had told me so when I saw him on the Festival of the Kings, and that from the letters which he had received from his own ambassadors, dated only one day earlier than this, he concluded that there could be no other news than those which he himself had communicated to me on that occasion. He knew by the reports of his ambassadors [at Bologna] how great Your Majesty's kindness and inestimable affection for him were, and added that he and his Council had been ever since considering how they could sufficiently show their deep sense of it. In order to do which, and also to give Your Majesty full satisfaction respecting the Queen's case, he and his Council had resolved to send to the Imperial Court one of its members, some one of weight and authority, and that at first he had thought of sending thither M. de Norfolk himself; but that on account of his indifferent health, and because his knowledge of French and Latin was inferior to that of the earl of Wiltshire, the latter had been chosen. He would be accompanied by Dr. Stocler (Stokesley), just presented to the see of London on the promotion of the former bishop to the see of Durham, a much more valuable bishopric, on condition, however, of his giving up in favour of the said earl of Wiltshire the office of Lord Privy Seal, which he formerly held. (fn. n29) To these two Dr. Lee, recently ambassador to Your Majesty in Spain, was to be joined. The two former go for the exclusive object of debating the Queen's case, and the King firmly believes that their equals in pleading and argumentation are not to be found, so that nobody will be able to refute their allegations. The King also said to me that he was glad the choice had fallen upon the said earl, as he knew more of his (the King's) secret intentions than any other man in the kingdom, and because, not being able to go himself, he was the fittest man to represent him, besides which (he added) Your Majesty was already acquainted with him. Had Your Majesty (he said) been in Flanders at the present time, he (the King) would have sought a personal interview, which he should greatly have valued. He then spoke of the great satisfaction which my appointment had given him; how entirely he trusted in me, and how he had spoken and would continue to speak to me with perfect openness. He then desired me to enter into the subject of my evidence, which I had had no opportunity or leisure to do before. All this being said with great warmth and energy, which I took good care not to check, as it was proper and courteous for me to do.
I then repeated to the King how very great Your Majesty's regard for him was, and that the proof given in the welcome reception of his ambassadors [at Bologna] was but a slight manifestation of your own sentiments towards him. After which I proceeded, as instructed, to introduce the subject of the Queen, urging him with all due deference, but most earnestly, to decide upon her case.
The King replied that the embassy now going to Your Majesty would give full satisfaction on this point; that the Earl would acquaint you with his (the King's) true motives and intentions in all that had been done, whilst the others, his colleagues in the embassy, would state the reason, right, and equity of the whole proceeding in a manner that could not be gainsaid. In fact, he had no doubt that when Your Majesty had heard his ambassadors thus clearly setting forth the good or the evil likely to ensue—should what has been begun not be accomplished—you could not fail to be perfectly satisfied with what had been done in the matter; that being exactly the thing which he (the King) desired most in the world, for to retain and ensure for ever the friendship and grace of so noble and virtuous a prince, was his most earnest wish, (fn. n30) especially remembering, as I had just told him, the kindness and friendship you had shewn him on many occasions. "Indeed (he added) the Emperor's daily increasing greatness is a sufficient proof to me that God, who always rewards virtue and goodness [in princes], has favoured him with so many victories and such great success. You may, therefore, be sure that I will do everything in my power, and will consider it a duty on my part to maintain and strengthen that very friendship, so as to shew to the World that I desire nothing else." Replied that I could confidently say the same of Your Majesty; I felt sure that not only would you answer for yourself, but that to judge from the great trust you placed in him (the King), I did not hesitate to say that your affection for him, and your desire for his friendship, were quite reciprocal The King said he quite believed that, and besides that, to say the real truth, the old friendship which had existed between Your Majesty and himself, and which, after all, was to be valued most on account of the intercourse of trade between your respective dominions, was absolutely necessary, so much so that one could not do without the other. To which I added, by way of confirmation, that all this was the work of nature, in order to shew you both the path to mutual friendship, and that it would indeed be a most unnatural thing if enmity should arise between two such princes, and that in all that had passed before, as I had already stated on another occasion, Your Majesty had never thought that his (the King's) heart was at fault. "At that time (said the King) those who had the reins of government in their hands deceived me; many things were done without my knowledge, but such proceedings will be stopped in future. I am marvellously pleased at being relieved from the very close alliance with the French, into which the Cardinal had dragged me, for the purpose of obtaining the recovery of the children of Francis, and one of my chief motives for so urgently pressing the conclusion of this peace was that I might be freed from such binding obligations. Now that the treaty is concluded and ratified I am released from all bonds." My reply was, that there was still one by which, for the good of Christendom, he should still be bound, and that was if any infraction of the treaty of Cambray were to take place, in which case I had no doubt he would declare against those who failed to observe the same. The King said that he should be mightily displeased if any objection was made (reditte) to the said treaty; and would do all he could for its full accomplishment. As to any other stringent bonds, he cared for none, except that of living in peace and good relationship with you two, Your Majesty and the king of France, and that from their conduct towards himself and the tokens of affection shewn, he should know to which of the two parties he owed the deepest obligation. This the King said smiling, as it were, in passing (en passant), and without putting much stress upon it, as if he considered it sufficient that the fact should be recorded for me to hear and report. Said that if he (the King) intended to balance the affection of the two I considered the game as fairly won for Your Majesty, to which the King assented by saying that he was of the same opinion. He then declared to me that from the very beginning of the contest between the Queen and himself, before taking any steps in the affair, he had resolved to send to Your Majesty such an embassy as the one which is now leaving, for the purpose of acquainting you with all the circumstances of the case; but war had prevented this. Now it seemed to him this was the fit moment to carry such a plan into execution. I then begged him not to forget giving his ambassadors full and special instructions on all and every point which I had brought forward respecting the Queen's case. The King said nothing should be forgotten relating to that affair. I then told him how I had written to Your Majesty, that the English ambassadors had also full powers to attend the meeting at Bolougnie (Bologna), and then and there treat of this war to be made against the Turk; but that in your last letters no mention whatever had been made of any application being addressed, except that bearing on the ratification of peace and congratulation on your journey to Italy; and that ample powers should also have been given for them to discuss the point and take part in the resolutions. To which the King replied that his ambassadors now with Your Majesty had been fully empowered to treat of that and other matters, but that he did not wish them to make use of their powers in that respect until other princes had sent similar embassies; and, moreover, that the one he was now sending would be furnished with all that was needful. He then asked me where his ambassadors were likely to find Your Majesty, and whether there was any news of your going soon to Rome or elsewhere, and whether the Pope was still at Bolougnie (Bologna). Replied that I had no positive news yet of Your Majesty having left Bolougnie (Bologna), but that there was a report that you would go first to Rome, and thence to Germany. The King said he thought most probably his ambassadors would find Your Majesty still at Bolougnie (Bologna), and that he should be glad of it, as they would the sooner meet you and discharge their mission. He then asked me several times in succession what I thought of the personages he was now sending [to Italy], and whether he had, or had not, made a good choice; to which questions I took good care to offer no objection, although I confess I should have much preferred that the duke of Norfolk had been sent instead of the earl of Wiltshire.
After this question, and many more which I omit for brevity's sake, I ventured to address the King and say that I supposed him to be well informed of the affairs of Hungary, and on his replying in the negative, took out an extract from a letter written by the King [Ferdinand] to Madame [Margaret], dated Lintz, December 12th; saying that but for the want of money he could easily reconquer the whole of his kingdom. To which the King said: "That would be of no great advantage to him; for should the Turks renew their attack no place could hold out against them, for they formerly completely ravaged and laid waste the whole country; other measures would be necessary." Rejoined that this was quite true; it would require the united help of all Christian princes to put down so great a power as that of the Turk; but that, as I had formerly represented to him, he (the King) had it in his power to give very considerable help, and could also urge his friends to do the same. The King, after some talking, agreed to this conclusion of mine, and promised to do his best. After this he asked me what had been settled about the "fleur de lis," and what was he to do with it? He had declined surrendering it to the French ambassadors for reasons already stated, and then, at my own suggestion, on the Festival of the Kings, he had determined to give it in charge to one of his own gentlemen, for him to take it over, when M. de Bayonne's brother, the Sieur de Langey (Langeais) should return [to France]. This, he said, was his plan, provided I approved of it. Replied that this seemed to me a satisfactory arrangement, and that I saw no objection to it, provided the said Sieur de Bayonne, as he had already offered to do, gave full security in the name of the King, his master, from whom he is said to have full powers. That, for even greater security, I myself, with his permission, would go and examine the "fleur de lis," which should then be so packed up and sealed that nothing could possibly be changed in it. The King then said, "Since such is your advice it shall be done as you suggest. It now remains for M. de Bayonne to procure for his brother, Monsieur de Langeais, more ample powers than those he has at present for signing the obligation, which has not been considered sufficient here, having been drawn out, according to the practice of the French Chancery, in rather ambiguous terms. The King then added that the gentleman to whom he thought of entrusting the ring is the same now going as his ambassador to the court of France. He was not yet of his Chamber, but would be appointed almost immediately, and had been designated to replace at the French court the son (fn. n31) of M. de Vulchier (Wiltshire), now recalled.
In the hope of drawing some more explicit declaration from him, I went on to say that it was reported that, besides the reasons already given for his objecting to surrender the "fleur de lis " to the French, there was yet one other, viz., that he perhaps entertained some doubts as to whether the treaty [of Cambray] would be finally carried out or not. The King said that he had no doubt of the money being paid by the French, but as to the other conditions of the treaty he had not yet been clearly informed of them. Replied that Your Majesty fully believed that the most Christian King had duly acquainted him with all the details of the treaty, otherwise he would have done so himself. Upon which the King observed that there must have been some promise to keep the whole matter secret up to a certain time, for otherwise, had the affair been communicated to him and submitted to his arbitration, perhaps no harm would have come of it. Replied that I knew nothing about that, but was pretty sure that, not only with regard to this treaty, but in all other concerns of Your Majesty, he (the King) had as much right of arbitration as if they were his own, and he must well remember that on each previous occasion, whenever there had been question of peace, Your Majesty had always insisted on the King being made arbiter, and, moreover, that he should openly and by letters patent declare himself against whomsoever should infringe the said peace. To this the King quite assented, but said that of this last peace he had had no information whatsoever in writing, excepting what he had gained from the French ambassadors themselves.
The King went on to say that in accordance with his promise he would now speak without reserve, though under oath of most profound secrecy. He had heard, not from the principal parties themselves, but from another quarter, that the article requiring the ratification of the Estates would never be carried out, on the plea that they (the French) could not summon the said Estates for fear of giving offence (bastonnade) to Madame the Regent; but that in reality it was that the children might afterwards oppose the said article, and that a ratification made after that fashion would consequently be of no avail.
I met this statement of the King's by saying that possibly whoever had raised doubts about the accomplishment of this treaty, had done so in consequence of the delay in restoring Esdin (Hesdin); but this did not really affect the case, as from what I could learn from Madame herself the fault of the delay might have been principally with Your Majesty's people, not with the French. The King said that was also his impression. As to himself, had he seen anything, either on the part of the Emperor or of the king of France, that did not tend to the immediate accomplishment of the said peace in all its parts, he should have stated it at once. Replied that I believed all would go well now; but that if the King in the meantime should perceive anything wrong he would be acting the part of a good and wise prince if he made it known at once, while there was yet time to avoid any complication, and if he would besides employ himself in redressing all that was wrong he would indeed realize the saying, long prevalent at the Imperial court, that from England had always come the antidote (tyriaqua) for all the evils by which the House of Burgundy had been beset. Upon which the King said that he would once more repeat what he had told me on former occasions: "it rested with the Emperor alone to make their friendship firmer and closer than it had ever been before."
The King then said that his ambassador to Madame [Margaret] had written of the pleasure she had experienced at the gracious reception made here to M. de Rosymboz and Maistre Jehan de Lesaulx (Le Sauch), her ambassadors, and that she was about to write to me, enclosing some sort of message for him (the King). He wished, therefore, to know whether such letter had been received. I replied that since the departure of M. de Rosymboz and Maistre Jehan de Lesaulx (Le Sauch) no news had come from Madame. He then said that as soon as they did I was to communicate with him; he invited me to dinner on the same day, and told me to reflect whether I had anything further to tell or ask him; he was about sending a post to notify the departure of the new ambassadors, and to recall the former ones, and that if I had any despatches to send he would forward them.
Saying this, the King left the room. As I was also preparing to go, the duke of Norfolk came in. Having told him that I had a letter from Your Majesty to him, which I intended delivering at his house in town, he insisted so strongly upon having it at once that, although the duke of Suffolk and others [of the Privy Council] were quite close by, I gave it him as desired. The Duke received the Imperial letter with the greatest show of veneration and respect; he kissed it, read its contents with great pleasure, and after listening to a few remarks which I made upon it began to express his deep gratitude for Your Majesty's kind remembrance of him, and the great honour conferred upon his person by your writing; all the time praying that God might give Your Majesty as much power as he himself had desire to serve you. He then added: "I have known the times when the Emperor had little opportunity or occasion to address letters of this sort to men in office; those were times of trouble, and his letters would have been scarcely attended to. Nowadays things have changed, and from the highest to the lowest in this country all Englishmen are so favourably disposed towards him [the Emperor] that it seems almost incredible." "This is especially the case " (he continued) "with the members of the Privy Council, such as Monsieur de Suffolk and the others and therefore I strongly recommend that letters similar to the one I have just read should also be addressed to each of the said councillors. This would undoubtedly promote the Emperor's interests in England, and at the same time remove part of the suspicion that might hang on me."
I then spoke to him of the letters of recommendation given to Dr. Sampson, which most surely the Duke himself had procured. He said that the Doctor was a person in whom he greatly trusted both on account of his prudence and discretion, as also from his having been partly brought up in his father's house. On such grounds, and from his being besides known as very partial to Your Majesty, the Doctor had been chosen for that special mission. He (the Duke) had certainly taken the trouble of recommending him to Your Majesty, and had also made similar commendations to the King, his master, so that the Doctor was sure, on his return, to be made bishop of the place where he (the Duke) was born; (fn. n32) and that although the Grand Equerry had married his own niece, and was one of his adherents, yet, considering the Dean better qualified for the post on account of his age, learning, and experience, he had been chosen to form part of the embassy.
I strongly suspect that there is another reason for this preference of Dr. Sampson, which the Duke did not disclose to me. The Grand Equerry has been many times in France [as ambassador], and has had many presents every time he has been there, besides his usual salary.
The Duke told me besides that within the last few days he had again written to the Dean to make the most affectionate commendations to Your Majesty. And since the Duke trusts the Dean so much, it appears to me that some overtures might be made through him, for as I have already written to Your Majesty, the duke of Norfolk is of all the noblemen of this kingdom he who has most the power and the will to serve Your Majesty.
He also said that he was very much out of health and that but for meeting me he should hardly have come to Court that day. He understood that I had had a conversation with the King on the subject of the "fleur de lis." The Duke said that the French ambassadors (fn. n33) had been importuning them on this subject again yesterday; they had dined at Court, and there had been some warm debate between the King and them, but he (the Duke) had interfered and put matters straight between them. It was quite true that for some time he had been under suspicion, but he was now thoroughly trusted and not without reason, as he desired only to keep up a good understanding with everyone. (fn. n34) He said nothing more explicit on this head. Did not venture to ask as to the debate he spoke of, and what it was about, nor what had led to it. (fn. n35) He then announced to me, as the King had done, that the ambassadors would start in eight or ten days; their route would lay through France. Should the king [of that country] be anywhere within ten leagues of their road, they would certainly go and see him, not otherwise.
In accordance with Your Majesty's orders I have spoken privately to all those to whom I considered it necessary; all are, as aforesaid, well disposed. As regards the French ambassadors I have not been able to learn anything further than what I have already written to Your Majesty, but judging from what I have heard this king say, I do not think there is any probability of his (the king of France) withdrawing from his engagements, though I fancy he has more strength than good-will. (fn. n36) With respect to the Cardinal, I said above what I knew of his doings; he has during these recent festivities received some money from the King, with which he has paid several of his retainers and then dismissed them. The King has at once taken more than 30 of his guard into his service. (fn. n37)
Of the commission entrusted by Madame [Margaret] to Mons. de Rosymboz, (fn. n38) namely, to gain over people in this country to Your Majesty's service, nothing has been done yet, that diplomatist having neither the leasure nor the means for carrying out those plans for which something more substantial than mere words is required. I have no doubt that Madame will not fail to inform Your Majesty of all what the said Seigneur de Rosymboz has done in this country, and therefore need say no more on the subject.
I have not been able to ascertain anything further about the gentlemen from the duke of Saxony. I had no opportunity the last time I was at Grinuys (Greenwich) of making private inquiries from Monsieur de Londres (the bishop of London) as he had charge of the French ambassador at Court, whilst the young Marquis introduced me. (fn. n39)
The Queen still remains at Greenwich; the King has been here [in London] for the last five days, probably to attend without interruption to the business of the said embassy, and assist in the deliberations [of the Privy Council]. (fn. n40)
The French ambassadors were a long time at Court yesterday, especially to take leave of the Lady on the occasion of the departure of one of them, Mons. de Bayonne [for France], There was much dancing, and the Lady entertained them splendidly here; nothing could have given the King greater satisfaction than to see the French ambassadors thus take leave of the Lady, and pay their respects to her. (fn. n41)
Having lately written to Your Majesty of the Queen's affairs, I need not say any more now.
I forgot to mention that when I was at dinner with the two dukes, as above, he of Suffolk pressed me hard to take charge of the "fleur de lis," upon which the duke of Norfolk observed that I knew very well what had been decided about it. I replied that I knew nothing more than that it had been repolished and cleaned. Upon which the Duke said: " You must know as well as I do that the King, my master, in his youth borrowed some of the stones, diamonds as well as pearls, and that both have since been replaced with larger and finer ones." "Besides," he added, "between the King and the Emperor, a matter of 300 or 400 ducats, more or less, is not worthy of consideration." The King had said nothing of this to me, though I had mentioned to him (the King) that I had in my possession the inventory of the stones, and description of the jewels.—London, 13th January 1530.
Signed. "Eustace Chapuys."
Addressed: "To the Emperor."
French. Holograph partly in cipher. pp. 9.


  • n1. His name was Maldonado. See No. 229, p. 863.
  • n2. The Empress Isabella (as stated elsewhere, vol. iv., part 2, p. 898), was left by Charles in charge of the Government, assisted by Cardinal Tavera, archbishop of Toledo, and others.
  • n3. The Emperor's second son, Ferdinand, was born in November 1529, but died a few days after. See Florez' Reynas Catolicas de España, vol.i, p. 856.
  • n4. "Du roy Dangleterre lon dict que desja il tient quasi samye pour sa femme. Et luy mesme dist que si le Pape y consent, qu'il le fera, et si non, que aussi fera il. Car il nen a que faire, et appele quasi le Pape heretique, et dit que pour ce lon le pourroit degrader. Dun couste le Pape ne vouldroit consentir pour estre la cause trop scandaleuse, de l'autre il ne vouldroit aussi que luy perdist lobeissance et la honte. Je ne sçay encoires que sen sera, mais je croy que de fait il fera quelque folye. Et soit du consentement du Pape ou non si sera ce ung grand mal et cause souffisante dune nouvelle guerre."
  • n5. " Je vous ay dit ce que dessus afin que sachiez qu'il pourroit estre que quel-que chose de çeci fust, et qu'a ceste heure ils dissimulent pour me laisser consommer, combien que je croy que non."
  • n6. " Vous devez croire que non point pour craincte que jaye deulx, mais pour mon devoir et plaisir j'aymerois mieux estre hors d' yçi, puisque n'y fais autre chose, mais aussi si est trouve meilleur que je me coronne a Rome pour ce que l'on en pourroit dire."
  • n7. "Et prendrois mes coronnes deça Rome, quoy que l' on Sçeut dire que sçay sera assez."
  • n8. "S'il vouloit faire tout de fait et non de justice a la Royne, nostre tante, et qu'il voulsist alleguer le Pape pour suspect, non accordant à son mauvais desir, ou y accordant la Royne le Legat pour suspect."
  • n9. Don Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas, grandfather of Don Francisco, duke of Lerma, the favourite minister of Philip III. He was still in guard of Charles' mother at Tordesillas.
  • n10. Eighteen months before, that is on the 21st of June 1528, the Empress was confined of a daughter (Doña Maria), who in 1548 married her first cousin, Maximilian II., king of Hungary and Bohemia, who became emperor of Germany in 1564. The inquiry, therefore, must have had another cause. According to Florcs' Memorias de las Reynas Catolicas, vol. ii., p. 857, shortly after the Emperor took leave of her in March 1529 the Empress Isabella was struck by fever and ague, which placed her within the brink of death, and obliged her to make her will; "but," he adds, "she recovered her health, notwithstanding a miscarriage she had, and was thus enabled in 1530 to carry out the delivery of the French princes, the Dauphin, and duke of Orleans." The paragraph is evidently copied from Sandoval, Historia del Emperador Carlos V., lib. xvii., p. 26, but if the date of the Marquis of Denia's letter is correctly given, the Empress' miscarriage must have taken place in the last months of 1529.
  • n11. As usual written Nolpholk et Rochefort.
  • n12. Jean du Bellay, bishop of Bayonne; his brother Guillaume is generally called" le sieur de Langeai."
  • n13. "Qu'il ne s'en estoit apperçu et l'avoyt mesçeu usques maintenant."
  • n14. See above, No. 246.
  • n15. "En l'affere de la Royne yl me dit avoer en sa faveur l'opinion de tous les docteurs de ce royaume, voyre de ceux que au commancement avoint tenu pour la royne que ont dempuys cogneu leur erreur."
  • n16. "Le dit seignieur roy me respondit que a ce que yl avoit de gens de bien en son royaume, et que tant a leur persuasion que a ce que luy mesmes, que [sçait] ce que telles choses veuillent dire, avoit vehu sur ses livres qu'il tenoit sa conscience pour satisfayte, et le mesme pensoit de celle de votre maiesté quant icelle auroit vehu 'information," &c.
  • n17. "Et que sur le tout votre dite maiesté avoit tenu propos a ses dits ambassadeurs de plus grande humanite et benignite qu'il ne lui appartenoit, que le faisoyt csperer que votre maiesté ayant vehu les dites informations, usant de sa vertu, justice, et conscience ne voudra luy suader ne dissuader chose illicite."
  • n18. See his despatch of the 31st December, No. 239, p. 393.
  • n19. Toutesfoys ou prerogative ou familiarité que fust, yl ne vouldrait que les autres heussent riens d'avantage, et que si a l'heure fusse venu seul, sans que les dits ambassadeurs de France y fussent, qu'il heust procuré de me fere convier à la dite table du Roy, me priant n'en vouloer riens desclayre[r] aus dits deurs, et qu'il aymcroit plus chier perdre mille escus qu'il [s]| sçeussent le susdit."
  • n20. "Mais que cella s'oublia, yl ne sçait comment, et luy ne l'ousoit remantoner pour non se rendre aucunement suspects."
  • n21. "Ce dit yl commça (commença) ung peu a penser, puys en suspirant yl retourna á dire qu'il restoit encoures une chose pur (pour) haster (oster ?) tous scrupules et confirmer la dite amitie indissolublemant, et que par ce moyen votre maieste feroitdu Roy et de son royaume ce qu'il playroit a icelle, fust a luy baillier argent ou autre chose. Et estoit le dit moyen que votre maiesté voulust consentir en ce marriage. Ainsy estoit ce chose tant resoulue en la desliberation du Roy qu'a son advis outre que Dieu ne I'en sçauroit destourner, cart yl voyoit que pour le bien et repos du royaume estoit necessayre qu'il se marriast pour avoer lignee masculine. D'aillieurs qu'il avoit vehu par les livres et fayt disputer par tout son royaume qu'il ne pouvoit licitement estre marie avec la Royne."
  • n22. "Et apres luy ayant tenu les propos en substance qu'ai sus escrit d'avoer tenu au Roy, je lui dis que penses an bruyt qui courroit par içy qu'il se gaudist desirant l'accomplissement de çe marriage, que luy seroit autant preiudiciable que à nul autre; cart le bruyt estoyt commung que le Roy vouloit marrier la princesse à son aisné."
  • n23. "Toutesfoys quil estoit bien difficille estant aucunes choses encoures en branle quil ny heust quelque scabrosite en mes lettres. Je luy dis quil sestoint bien peu appercevoer a la chiere que votre maieste avoit fayt aux dits ambassadeurs."
  • n24. "Que n'aves escript le vray discours des afferes de par de ça, ce que naves voulu fere, esperant tosjours de la prudence, bonte et magnanimite de celluy a oui principallement le cas attouchoit."
  • n25. "Je leur dis que navoes charge expresse de ce fere, que j'insteres bien vers le dit sieur Roy que la dite ' Fleur de Lis' fust portee pour la consigne du temps de la restitution des princes dans les mains de deputes de votre maieste par qui cella estoit en larbitrage."
  • n26. "Suyvant ce que la Royne m'avoit envoye dire, je recquis licence au Roy pour laller visiter. Le dit conte de Vulchier fust ma guyde, que me volust bien fere encroyre qu'elle estoit alle au sermon. Toutesfoys je la trouvey a sa chambre. Elle me demanda des nouvelles de votre maieste, et quil me sembloit de son affere, et quelle esperance j'en avoes, et si je m'apperçevoes des pratiques de ses gens. Je luy dis les meilleurs parolles que peu, dont elle se trouva fort consolee. [Son medecin me dit que] la lettre quil m'envoya, que va en chiffres dans les miennes dernieres, fust escripte a la relation [de la Royne], may, que sans faulte luy avoit este rapporte pour evangille."
  • n27. That is the archbishop of Maintz.
  • n28. "Le Cardinal de Guisse," says the copy; but it is evidently a mistake lor Gurce. Mathew Lang was at this time bishop of Gurk in Carinthia (episcopus Gurcensis); he became later archbishop of Salzburg. Julius II. had made him a cardinal S. Angeli in foro Piscium at his sixth creation, in 1511.
  • n29. "Mays pour ce quil estoit subietz a maladie,et quil n'avoit (ne sçavoit?) si bien la langue latine ou françoyse que Monsieur le conte de Vulchier, que celluy la estoit choysy, et auroit de compagnie le Docteur Stocleur, presente maintenant evesques de Londres par la promotion de oelluy qui premierement l'estoit a l'eueschez de Duran, la quelle est beaucoupt mellieur, mays aussy sus icelles pactes yl a renunce au dit conte Vulchier l'office du seel priue que de long temps yl avoit heu."
  • n30. "Et ne faysoit doubte que votre Maieste entendant les susdites choses, et le bien ou le mal que s'en suyvroit sans acchever ce qu'est commence, ne se tint en ce endroit pour bien contente, ce quil desiroit le plus du monde, cart yl ny a chose quil souette plus que d' estre accointe en amitie perdurable avec ung si vertueuz prince que votre Maieste."
  • n31. George Boleyn.
  • n32. "Je luy parlay des recommandations du Docteur Sanson, desquelles certainement luy avoit donne charge, comme a la personne quil se fie autant, tant pour sa prudence et discretion que ausy pour ce qu'il a este nourry en partie en la mayson [de] son pere, et oultre ce luy voulust bien donne [r] ceste particuliere charge, pour ce qu'il [l]a tosjours cogneu partial pour votre maiesté. Et qu'il avoit bien peu prendre ceste poyne pour luy de fere ses recommandations à votre maieste, cart yl en avoit fayt dautrcs de par deça envers le Roy, de sorte qua son retourd yl estoit asseure davoer une evesche du lieu de la nativité du dit Due."
  • n33. "Il me dit que les ambassadeurs de France les en avoint importuné encoures hier, et qu'il [s] avoint disné ceans a la court, et qu'il y avoit eu de la façon de faire entre le Roy et eulx, mais qu'il avoit tout rabillé."
  • n34. Qu'il estoit vray qu' autreffoys yl avoit esté tenu pour suspectz mays que maintenant yl avoint de la confidence en luy et, non sans cause cart yl ne voudroit entretenir les maystres que en bonne amytié.
  • n35. "Je ne le ousey interrouguer de la dicte façon de fayre ne sur quoy elle estoit procedé."
  • n36. Quant aux ambassadeurs de France je n'ai peu apperçepuoyr autre que se (ce) quen ay escrit cy dessus, ou yl me semble joinct ce que d'aillieurs ay entendu, c'est a sçavoer [du Roy], qu'il n'y a apparence qu'il veuillie ne puysse [regipper] combien que pense qu'il a plus de force que bonne voulenté.
  • n37. "Yl a ses (sic) festes heu de l'argent du Roy, de quoy yl a contenté plusieurs de see serviteurs, et leur a donne congié, et le Roy pour un coupt a pris plus de trente de sa garde."
  • n38. "De la charge que Madame avoit donné a Monseigneur de Rosymboz d'entendre a practiquer gens au service de votre majesté il n'a pas heu grand loysir ni moyen de demesler telz affaires; cart yl y va autre que parolles, et pour ce quc suys seur que ma dite dame ne faudra d'adverty votre maiesté du besongnié du dit Seigneur de Rosymboz, je n'en direy autre."
  • n39. "Estant dernierement á Grinnuys je ne puys parler à Monseigneur de Londres à part pour m'en enquerir, cart yl conduysoit l'ambassadeur de France, et le jeune marquis eust charge de moy."
  • n40. "Je cuyde pour conclurre plus à son souet (sic for souhait) sans interpollation la desliberation de la dite ambassade."
  • n41. "L'on dança à force, et leur fist la dame tres bonne chiere et à ce qu' entend yl ne ponvoint fere plus gros playsir au Roy que d' aller prendre congié delle."