Spain: July 1544, 6-10

Pages 232-245

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 7, 1544. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1899.

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July 1544, 6–10

6 July. 146. Fragment of a Letter from the Emperor to Secretary Juan Vasquez De Molina.
S.E.L., 640, f.80. Our vanguard has worked so well, that after recovering Lucenburque (Luxenburg)—as you know, a very important place of arms—it has gone and taken a castle further on, which was very convenient and necessary for the supply of provisions. Lini (Ligny)—a strongly fortified town, where the French had made greater preparations for defence than anywhere else, for the garrison consisted of nearly 1,500 men, including 500 Italians, and twenty-six pieces of heavy brass artillery, and forty more of lighter calibre, brass and cast-iron, besides a great quantity of powder, ammunition, provisions, and so forth—was next taken; and whilst We are writing this, Landisihies (Landrecis), which is a town of great importance, is being besieged, and We confidently hope that, with God's help, it will shortly fall into Our hands.
The king of England has ordered the vanguard and rearguard of his army to advance, and both are already inside France. He himself will cross over to Calais with the main body (batalle) so as to join the rest of his forces, and march, as agreed, on Paris, so that, to judge from this beginning and the state of affairs in France, as reported, there is reason to believe that the undertaking will be successful. Indeed, until now no resistance has been offered; no one knows of the King having an army under his command, or the means to raise one as soon as it is required, (fn. 1) and We hope that, with God's help, his service will be done, because the district where We now are is very apropos for an invasion, being fertile and rich, and having very few or no castles at all.
Should this advantageous state of things cease through Our being unable to support Our army till the middle of September at least, you may well imagine the confusion in which I might be placed, (fn. 2) for not only would Our reputation suffer immensely through it, but all monies hitherto spent would be as good as thrown away. The loss of military reputation We would feel above all things; and if this army of Ours, hitherto so prosperous, had to retreat and be disbanded for want of money, there is no saying what Our subjects would feel, when after so much expenditure to insure their comfort and welfare, and oblige or induce king Francis to sue for peace—which is after all the sole and exclusive aim of Our armaments—they found that they were not secure from French attacks. That is the reason why We ask you as urgently as We can to procure Us the greatest sum of money possible.—Metz, 6 July 1544.
Signed: “Yo El Rey.”
Countersigned: “Idiaquez.”
Addressed: “To Juan Vasquez de Molina, Our Secretary.” (fn. 3)
Spanish. Original. 11/2 pp.
7 July. 147. Eustace Chapuys to the Emperor.
Wien, Imp. Arch. “Sire,”—Your Imperial Majesty's letter of the 28th ult., as well as the copy of the note presented by this King's ambassador, in answer to Mons. de Courrière's mission, came to hand yesterday, the 6th. To-day, after dinner, I, myself, waited on the King, to whom, after the usual courteous compliments and thanks for the interest he shows for your Majesty's health and personal concerns, I spoke in the following terms:—With regard to the proposed division or parcelling of the Royal army, that (I said) ought not to take place in the manner stated in the English ambassador's memorandum, but in conformity with the agreement previously entered into with secretary Paget. (fn. 4) I gave him to understand that Your Majesty's advice was, that in case of the whole of the English army not being ready to take the field at the appointed time, at any rate the 30,000 men proposed by that secretary should at once penetrate into the enemy's territory. The rest of the Royal army, the secretary had declared would, doubtless, be employed wherever it could do most harm to the common enemy according to the stipulations of the treaty. That formal declaration secretary Paget had made in Your Imperial Majesty's presence, promising that the above-said 30,000 men would take the field on the 10th of June.
To this statement of facts the King replied that his men had actually been within French territory at the specified period of time, and that a large division of his army had made an advance into the enemy's territory, whilst Your Majesty's own had not yet marched into it. So much did the King reply to my statement, without, however, alluding to secretary Paget's restrictions or choosing to admit, notwithstanding, my efforts were to persuade him, that Commercy and Ligny (taken by your Imperial Majesty's men) were really and truly within French territory.
If his men (the King continued) had not pushed on further into France (or rather did not hasten to do so) he, himself, was not to be blamed for it, the fault laid with the people of the Low Countries, who had not furnished the transport ships and other necessaries, such as waggons, and covered carts (et aultres car); without victuals (he said) it was quite impossible for an army to march. There was no hope of getting assistance from the Low Countries in that way, for since, at the very frontier, men had actually died of hunger and thirst, and the greater part had been three or four days without drinking anything but water; a sort of privation which military men seldom endure without falling into despair.
The King ended by telling me confidentially, and as a secret, that in order to obviate the above inconvenience and keep the road open for the victualling of his army, he had made up his mind to try and see whether Montreuil could not be taken. He was expecting from hour to hour the report of his generals thereupon, and also to hear from the duke of Suffolk that everything was ready for that undertaking; the very moment the required information reached him he would embark, and cross over to Calais, and place himself at the head of his forces.
My reply was that if the undertaking could be carried out immediately with prompt success, it would, without doubt, prove advantageous to the invading armies; otherwise it might turn out injurious to the military reputation of both princes, and contrary to the letter of the treaty, wherein it is expressly said, that on no account are the invading armies to stop on the way unless it be by sheer force, or the exigences of warfare, and that as to the want of provisions of which he complained, the fault lay with his own ministers, who had been warned in due time to send to Flanders, and the Low Countries, commissaries and agents to purchase and make stores of them during the season. The King's ministers were also recommended, in union with those whom the Queen Regent would appoint for the purpose, to see that the country-people (paysans) supplied daily the English camp with provisions. The want of which the Royal commissioners complain (said I) is in a great measure to be attributed to the poverty of the country-people, caused by the damage done to them in these times of war by enemies as well as by friends, and the consequent scarcity of victuals, as his (the King's ministers) had been informed beforehand. Besides which, as I had reason to think, the evil partly originated in the fact that the English and the foreign soldiers in the King's service refused to pay for the provisions taken to their camp by the country-people a higher price than the one which their King sold his at Calais, and, still more, the peasants and sutlers were obliged to take in payment the new coin at a higher value than that of the old one, which is worth nearly two “liards” more than the new one of this country.
As to the waggons (chariotz), of which the King spoke, I maintained that the number he had asked for, had been supplied and rightly handed over to his own commissaries, who being quite inexperienced in such matters, fancied that only two men (for there were no more) could conduct (conduire) such a large number of them, with their respective teams of horses, and that if the drivers had gone away the fault laid with his ministers and commissaries, and not in any way to the Queen Regent or the people of the Low Countries.
On this last point the King replied that there was no appearance whatever of the carriers refusing to serve, and lead their horses, especially when they were paid the price stipulated for their services; if they had left and would not earn money, he (the King) suspected that there must have been some contradictory orders from the Queen Regent.
Thus spoke the King, and yet he seemed very much surprised when I read to him the paragraph of a letter from the Queen to me, of the 3rd instant, (fn. 5) in which it is expressly stated that the inhabitants of the Low Countries would willingly pay a very large sum of money as contribution to the expenses of this present war rather than be obliged to furnish waggons and horses (charrettes et chevaulx), and that those of Flanders, especially, have made an offer of 100,000 crowns, to be exempted from it. To that statement the King had nothing to reply.
Respecting the expedition to Paris I have formally declared to the King, as graciously and adroitly as it was in my power, and in conformity with the instructions and letters received, what Your Imperial Majesty's intentions are. The King made no remark whatever on this subject. Nor can I omit to say that when I mentioned to him “en passant” the fact that the want of application to the Swiss, which Your Imperial Majesty did once suggest might prove a great fault, and that if he (the King) would help in that quarter there might be still a chance of destroying the hope which the French have on that nation, he (the King), persisted, as on former occasions, in his idea, saying that even in case of the Swiss granting king Francis the 12,000 men who are being enlisted, as the rumour is, he cared not for it (il ne 8'en souceyoit), for on the contrary he thought that would bring on the ruin of king Francis, who trusting in them might be induced to fight a pitched battle and be vanquished, which was all that Your Majesty and he ought to desire most. I observed to him that if the Swiss came the inconvenience alluded to in his ambassador's note might rise, for the French would then be able to dispatch a large force to some point of their own territory, whence they could easily stop the passes and the carriage of victuals, whereas on the contrary if the Swiss or other foreign troops did not come, king Francis would probably be in such perplexity that he would be compelled to come to reason and make a lasting peace, to the advantage of Your Imperial Majesty and of him, which was, in my humble opinion, the aim to be attained.
Hearing this the King remained some time thoughtful, and then replied, that whoever would pay attention to that would be in the right, and all such practices directed towards a desirable termination of the present war; and that there could be no doubt that king Francis was placed in extreme perplexity and at his wit's end, especially at this present moment, when the news of the signal victory gained by Your Imperial arms in Lombardy must have astounded and discomfited him—such a victory (added the King), that at the present juncture and season nothing better could be desired.
With regard to Landenberg's (fn. 6) band, the King said the same to me as on previous occasions, adding that he would show to me how his commissaries bad paid for the damage done to that captain's men in two or three places; and on my remonstrating with him that Landenberg and his men pretended that he had offered to pay them the very same stipend that Your Imperial Majesty had last year given to other German soldier.” To which remark of mine the King replied that if he had made such an offer it was entirely out of regard for Your Imperial Majesty, as he said now he would not pay the Germans the high wages they asked for, or in any way attend to their claims, for fear of those whom Your Majesty has now in your service following the example of the others, and demanding an increase of pay. He could grant them an honest and gracious license to quit by giving them one month's pay, and one half more for their return home, thus avoiding the inconveniences above alleged. I told him, as the Queen Regent wrote once to me, that all the fault laid entirely with his own commissaries, who ignored completely the manners and customs of Upper Germany in military matters, and had never visited that country for the purpose of engaging or recruiting soldiers. If they had, they had made no formal payment in specie, and had contented themselves with handing over to the captains certain sums of money on account. The King replied that he had, as above stated, paid part of the damage caused by the soldiery. He was not bound by contract to pay the men themselves, but to deliver the money into the hands of the captains for them to distribute it. As to what His Majesty was pleased to write to you, intimating that had Landenberg in any way failed in his duty towards him (the King) you would have had him punished, the King replied that there was no necessity for Your Majesty to take so much trouble about it, for upon one occasion Landenberg, happening to be at his Royal camp, he should have punished him well had he been at all insolent, which words from the King's mouth differ much from those he uttered to me the other day, when he positively said to me that God had granted him the immense favour of perceiving and becoming aware in time of all the malice and ill-will of the said Landenberg before he came to the camp, for otherwise that captain might have committed irreparable follies. (fn. 7)
The King also resents bitterly enough the Queen Regent's refusal to allow certain mares (jumens) that he has caused to be bought in Flanders to be exported out of that country, owing to his ministers or agents not having first applied for a license. For want of such permission, and on several other grounds, the Queen's refusal was both just and reasonable. Since then the Queen, at my request, has ordered that passports should be issued for the passage and export of the said mares. As the King was not aware of this fact, he began to complain to me of the ministers of Your Majesty, who (he said) had often assured him that nothing he would wish for or want 'from Flanders and the Low Countries would be refused to him, and yet (said he), “Here I am with my money, and having paid for the article I am prevented taking it from the country. It seems to me as if the Imperialists of Flanders were annoyed at my preparations to push forward [and invade France], and that they would much prefer my guarding only the frontiers of the Low Countries.” (fn. 8)
Hearing this, I could not help telling him that he knew very well. that Your Imperial Majesty had entered into a treaty of alliance with him, the principal object of which was the invasion of France and the march on Paris. He was aware of Your Majesty's constant solicitations for the prompt execution of that plan of campaign, and that Your intention was to march straight upon the capital of France, without stopping to lay siege to fortified towns on the way. As to his saying that the frontiers of Flanders and the Low Countries might, without his help and favour, have been lost or seriously compromised, I would not dispute it. I would only observe that about two years ago, as he (the King) could remember, when those countries were completely unprovided for and not thinking of war, owing to king Francis' dissimulation and cunning arts, and were invaded on every side by those powerful French armies—namely, that commanded by the duke of Orleans, that of Vendôme, and that of Van Rossen—so stout was the defence made by the inhabitants, without the least assistance from foreign powers, that the enemy, after a long campaign, was repulsed and obliged to return home; besides which, it is not likely that, now that king Francis will have plenty to think of at home, he can meditate an attack upon Flanders.
To the above remarks of mine the King knew not what to reply, and after a few minutes' silence he touched on another point. He said that he had heard from the Queen Regent that at Utrecht certain horsemen (gens de cheval) coming (as they said) from Seelande (Zeeland) for his services, had made, and were still making, great extortions on the country-people, and that the Queen Regent was very much astonished and surprised at not having heard from his commissaries of the arrival of such cavalry. Having thus asked him what he knew about it, he answered that he had really given orders for 400 or 500 horse to be levied in the district of Utrecht, and promised to take them into his service provided they were at Calais on a fixed day; but as they have not fulfilled their engagement he is now having an equal number raised by Mr. de Buren, so that if they come he does not intend to take them into his service, and it will be necessary to punish them if they do damage to the Emperor's subjects. The King could not tell me the name of the German, the commission of raising the men having been given by his ministers; but I have since ascertained that his name was Lylkmach, a merchant, once the agent of the Stillars in this city, but who, after the failure (banqueroutte) of those bankers mixed himself up with war affairs.
The King has shown more pleasure at the news of the counts of Ligny and Rossy (fn. 9) having been taken prisoners than at the taking of Ligny itself, which he does not consider of much importance.
He has also taken in very good part the announcement of the offer made by the Cardinal of Lorraine to Your Majesty, as well as his having already received through the English ambassador and through me, a summary of the answer prepared for the Cardinal by Your Majesty.
While writing this dispatch the King has sent me word that immediately after my departure from his presence he had received a letter from the commander-in-chief of his army (in France) announcing the arrival of Lytemach at the English camp, making many excuses for his delay. In consequence of which, as the cavalry raised by him was so far advanced, he (the King) had determined not to dismiss the men, but keep them in his service, notwithstanding what he had said to me the day before. He has begged me to write on the subject to the Queen Regent, and express his regret that he was not apprised sooner of their arrival; furthermore he would have sent commissaries to take charge of them, and conduct them to the place of their destination, and take care that they should not inflict injury or do damage to the inhabitants of the places where they halted. He hoped in short that now that the men had received money they would no longer be disorderly and exacting, but would pay in cash for what they had in the shape of food for themselves and fodder for their horses.—London, 7 July 1544.
Signed: “Eustace Chapuys.''
Addressed: “To the Emperor.”
Indorsed: “From the ambassadors in England, 7th of July. Received at the camp before St. Desir on the 21st of the said month of July 1544.”
French. Original. 4 pp.
8 July. 148. The Queen Regent's Privy Council to the Imperial Ambassador In England.
Wien, Imp. Arch. The Queen having heard the representations verbally made to her and afterwards reproduced in writing by the accredited agent of the duke of Suffolk, cannot do less than answer as follows:—Since April last the Queen has frequently ordered her ministers to communicate with the English ambassador who then resided at her Court, (fn. 10) and tell him how much she wished to know beforehand, what amount of provisions, and what number of carts and waggons, as well as of draft-horses the king of England wanted for his army. The ambassador replied that eleven thousand five hundred draft-horses and 2,200 waggons of four horses each would be required, (fn. 11) which number seemed at once excessive, and not to be procured in these countries, considering that at least an equal, if not, a larger number of carts and horses would have to be provided for the Imperial army now marching into France. The Queen then, on the 1st of April, wrote to the Emperor's ambassador in London, requesting him to remonstrate with the King's privy councillors as to the excessive number of horses and carts asked for, but to say that all efforts would be made to collect as many as could be found.
An inventory was then made throughout Flanders and the Low Countries of all horses fit for the service required, and it was found that without putting a stop altogether to agricultural labour in the fields or to carriage of merchandise it would be materially impossible for the peasants to furnish upwards of 10,000 horses, part of which, as above stated, will be required for the Emperor's army, and another part for the baggage and provisions of the infantry and cavalry which count de Buren has already raised. A requisition was then made, and the men ordered to be ready with their carts and horses.
In compliance with Madame (the Queen's) orders as large a number of carts and horses as the English commissaries asked for, has ever since the 20th of May been kept in readiness, and yet until the beginning of June no one came [from Calais] to take the men and horses to the place of their destination, at which the disappointed drivers complained bitterly, saying that they had been detained several days for the service of the English, without being allowed to return to their agricultural and other pursuits, through which they had suffered great damage and loss.
At the beginning of June, as above stated, one single English commissary made his appearance here, saying that he had orders to raise 11,000 draft-horses and 500 waggons (chariotz), which he said were to be at Calais within six days' time. The English commissary was told in the Queen's name that it was impossible for one single man to levy in so short a space of time 11,000 horses, and make 1,000 or 1,200 carriers (chartons) reach their destination. He (the Royal commissary) was moreover asked whether he had or had not with him any assistants to help him in the discharge of his duties, and if he had none, whether he wished for any assistance from this country. The commissary's answer was that he had no one to assist him, nor had he instructions to apply for aid, his orders were only to make the requisition of so many draft-horses, and so many carts or waggons, and pay for them in cash. (fn. 12) This, however, he could never have done had not the Queen set diligently about it. Indeed such was the activity displayed by her own officers deputed for the purpose that soon after the day fixed by the English commissary, the waggons and draft-horses required were at Calais, the Queen having taken the precaution of ordering those nearest to that town to go thither first, sending besides a message to the King's commissaries at Calais, that if they wanted more draft-horses and carts they must let the Queen know much sooner, in order that the King's service should not be retarded, inasmuch as the horses and so forth would have to come from places and districts far more distant from Calais.
Again at the solicitation and request of François Van Halle, man-at-arms of the King, the Queen did furnish at one time 300 waggons, and at a second time . . . (fn. 13) besides 1,360 draft-horses, of which a part is still on the road [to Calais]. François Van Halle was perfectly satisfied and said he wanted no more, so that according to the above account the Queen has furnished 2,460 draft-horses, and 1,800 waggons, making all together 9,660, so that out of the inventory and requisition once made, nothing has been deducted for the Emperor's army which will have to be provided for elsewhere.
If, however, all the waggons and horses have not yet joined, it is no fault of the Queen's, who was not informed in time of the King's wishes in that respect, considering that the greater part has to come from behind the Meuse, and from Namur. No want of diligence can be imputed to the Queen, for immediately after the arrival of the English commissaries, she gave orders that they should be attended to and helped in the execution of their charge, sending couriers and special messengers to the provinces and territories under her government to urge the requisition.
If delay has been experienced in the delivery, that was certainly not the Queen's fault, but to that of the English commissaries who came insufficiently instructed as to the duty they had to perform, and also without assistants nor clerks to help them, for if for every 100 or 200 foot, or pioneers to be raised, one adjutant-commissary is required to take charge of the men, and if each battalion (enseigne) of 300 or 400 men has a captain, and several officers under him it stands to reason that one single commissary could not possibly collect, and conduct to the place of their destination the 500 or 1,000 waggons required, with at least 700 or 1,400 carmen (chartons) to drive them. (fn. 14)
The Queen, therefore, expects that her diligence in this matter will be fully acknowledged, and no blame cast upon her if there has been any fault or delay in complying with the King's wishes. She has acted towards the English army as she would have done towards the Emperor's.
However that may be, if 1,000 more waggons and the proportionate number of draft-horses are still wanted, it is, quite evident from the leasons above alleged that the Queen cannot furnish them now, for the number is really excessive, besides which the demand previously made has already been complied with, or nearly so, with the exception of 400 waggons and 40 draft-horses, which, as above-stated, the Queen can in no wise furnish without unduly oppressing the Emperor's subjects in these parts, who have been, and are still, loudly complaining, and would more willingly grant a large sum of money to his Imperial Majesty towards the expenses of the present war, than be obliged to contribute with so large a number of waggons and horses as has been asked of them—a sort of compulsory service, from which, as they say, they suffer much more than from all their losses during the last wars.
As to provisions for the English camp [before Boulogne] the Queen has taken, ever since April last, every measure to have the English army well supplied with them. No lack of diligence can be imputed to her in this respect, for not only did she immediately order that a report should be drawn up of the quantity and quality of the provisions likely to be required for the English army, but she recommended the appointment of an English commissary-general, with sufficient funds to purchase articles of food and other necessaries of life wherever they could be obtained. Had the said commissary been appointed, and had he come to these Low Countries, the Queen would willingly have afforded him all the aid required for the fulfilment of his charge, and the English camp would have been amply supplied. But either the appointment of a commissary-general never took place, or else the Englishman appointed, if there was one, never made his appearance. For although the king of England sent word through his ambassador here [at Brussels] that an officer would be duly appointed to attend to that service, the fact is that up to this day no one has made his appearance, and yet the Queen has done her duty towards the King, by issuing proclamations, and having bills posted authorising sutlers and all sorts of provision merchants to carry victuals to the English camp—neither more nor less than has been done for the Emperor, who, in order to provide food for his men, has a commissary of his own and clerks, who buy food and provide for the camp in the event of the ordinary supplies failing altogether. (fn. 15)
As to the duke of Norfolk and his letter to the Queen stating that he much feared that the division of the English army which he commands [before Montreuil] would soon be in want of food, no sooner did the Queen hear of it than she dispatched towards him one of her commissaries—the same one, who last year provided in part for the English camp [before Landresis]—to declare and explain to him the causes of the delay, and say that up to the present hour no English commissary had come [from England], nor even announced his approaching arrival [at Calais], much less written to say what sort of provisions he wanted, and so forth, where they are to be sent at the King's expense, or, finally, whether the provisions are to be stored at the risk of not being used, and spoiling, which is a thing the Queen cannot possibly overlook.
Thus, if the English camp [before Montreuil] happens to be in want of provisions, it will certainly not be the fault of the Queen, who has not failed to give all possible attention to the matter, making the usual requisitions, and issuing proclamations for people to go to the English camp with provisions for sale. In fact, the Queen has hitherto acted in this affair in such a manner that the English ought to be perfectly satisfied.
Nor has it been the Queen's or her minister's fault if the van-guard and rear-guard of the English army have stayed so long on the road; the fault, if any, must be ascribed to the above causes. Indeed, the Queen would be very sorry if any one should attempt to inculpate her, or her ministers, on that score, of deficiencies and faults, which are not theirs, and she cannot do less than declare on this present occasion that unless better provision be made for the future, it is to be feared the English may feel still greater wants than those they now complain of, which would be very distressing for her to hear.—Brussels, 8th of July 1544. (fn. 16)
Indorsed: “Pour ajouter à la lettre de la Reine de Hongrie à Chapuys du 11 Juillet 1544.”
French. Original draft. pp.
10 July. 149. Eustace Chapuys to Prince Philip of Spain.
S. Estado, L. 806, f.87. B. M. Add. 28,593, f.326. “Days ago I received Your Highness' letter of the 4th of February, that was brought to me by Juan Çapata de Cadenas. (fn. 17) I kiss Your Highness' hands and feet one hundred thousand times for the singular and abundant favours contained in it. Since then, there has been no opportunity of a faithful messenger leaving, and indeed no event has occurred worth writing upon, save, perhaps, that mentioned in my letter to the High Commander of Leon (Cobos) I may, perhaps, be excused for having delayed an answer to it, and beg Your Highness to pardon me for the delay.
Their Most Serene Majesties of the King and Queen, as well as the Princess, have been glad to hear of the affection and love Your Highness professes for them, and have ordered me most urgently to return their commendations and compliments. Each of them individually has questioned me respecting Your Highness' marriage, and how it went off. I gave them such information as I possessed from private letters, and all seemed pleased at it.
Your Highness must already have heard of the prosperous and signal victory which the Emperor's arms have lately gained in Lombardy, which victory has excited and set up (excalientado) the English to such a degree that they have not ceased from that day to send troops across the Channel; so much so, that at this present moment there are on the other side no less than 40,000 men, and the King is more confirmed than ever in his resolution of crossing over in person. Indeed I am told that he is only waiting for the news that all things required for the encampment of his army are ready, to cross the sea and land at Calais. His intention is first to lay siege to Montreuil, a most important place, which, if taken, will facilitate the passage of provisions for his army, and become also the point of departure for Teruana, Andresy, Bolonia, (fn. 18) and the neighbouring districts. He is very sorry at the delay of that undertaking, especially since he has heard of the great success of the Imperial army, which, after gaining possession of a place called Commisy (Commersy), on the frontiers of Champagne, on the 29th ult., took Ligni and its territory further on within the said province, which surrendered at discretion to the Imperial General, though the Count and Lord of the place, as well as of Brienne, and Count de Ross and his brother, with about 1,000 French infantry and 500 Italians and some cavalry were inside. This has been a most important capture, and there is every reason to believe that since then the bulk of the Imperial army has prosecuted its triumphant march into the enemy's territory. As far as I can gather from letters received here, king Francis is amusing himself (holgando) near Paris, to the little satisfaction and content of the inhabitants (fn. 19) of those places already subdued in that province, and still less of those threatened with the same or worse treatment, for he is thinking of ordering all the villages of Champagne to be set on fire and destroyed. All his hopes are centred in 12,000 Swiss that he is trying to recruit in the Cantons, though on the 15th ult. his ambassador in Switzerland, for the purpose, had not yet been able to answer whether he had succeeded or not in his commission.
Your Highness must also have heard that the army of this most Serene Majesty has come back from Scotland, after wasting and destroying a good portion of that kingdom, and that after its return, the counts (earls) of Linus (fn. 20) and Glancarna (fn. 21) took up arms and fought against the Governor, and slew a great number of his men. Meanwhile, the English on the borders are making raids into Scotland and wasting the land. Count Linus, the nearest kinsman of the late king, and a nephew of Mr. Daulbigni, and his successor in France (to the post of captain of 100 men-at-arms), having left the service of France, has arrived here [in London], and married this King's niece, daughter of the late queen of Scotland and of count Douglas; he [the earl of Linus] has made over to this King his rights to the crown of Scotland.
No other news for the present; should there be any worth reporting I shall not fail to advise.—London, 10 July 1544.
Signed: “Eustace Chapuys.”
Addressed: To the Prince [of Spain].
French. Original, partly ciphered. 3 pp.
10 July. 150. The Same to the High Commander Of Leon.
S. E. L. 806, L. 88, f. 328. “Most illustrious Sir,”—By the nephew of the “factor” of Portugal, I wrote to Your Lordship some days ago, advising the news of this country. As since then I have written to His Highness the Prince and entered into more details, I will not make this letter of mine longer.—London, 10 July 1544.
Signed: “Eustacio Chapuys.”
French. Original. 1 p.


  • 1. “De manera que à lo que se cree puede juzgar [so] segun los principios se llevan, y de la manera que se entiende que esta lo de Francis, donde no se halla hasta agora resistencia, ni se sabe que tenga[n] junto exercito, ni lo podra[n] hacer tan presto, esperamos, &c.”
  • 2. “Ya podreis very considerar en la confusion en que nos veriamos, porque no solamente se aventuraria lo mucho que está gastado y consumido hasta agora, pero [sufriria] la reputacion, que seria lo que mas sentiriamos, y aun nueatros señorios y estados no sabemos la seguridad que tendrian si este exercito se deshiziesse en tal coyuntura haviendole hecho para remedio de ellos ó para reducir y atraer al rey de Francia á alguna buena y firme paz.”
  • 3. Secretary of the Council. See Vol. VI., Part II., p. 153.
  • 4. “Quant au departement de son armee, non point selon la teneur du dit escript, mais conforme en ce qu'on (il) fust dit au secretaire Paget.”
  • 5. See No. 143, p. 230.
  • 6. Here written Landemberg.
  • 7. “Et quant à ce quil a pleu à v[ost]re. mate m'escripre celle eust bien chastie le dit Landemberg en cas quil ne se fust porte dheument au service du dit sr roy, il m'a respondu quil neust este besoing que v[ost]re. mate eust prinse ceste peyne, car se trouvant une foir au camp le dit Landemberg (sic) il l'eust bien chastie s'il avoit voulu faire de la beste; que tout aultres propos que ceulx quil disoit nagueres, à sçavoir que Dieu luy avoit fait grande grace de cognoistre de bonne heure la maulvaise volonte du dit Landemberg (sic) avant que vinse au camp, car il eust peu faire des folies irreparables.”
  • 8. “Et quil sembloit que l'on avoit grant ennuye quil tira avant ains seullement quil gardast les frontieres des pays bas.”
  • 9. Father Daniel (Histoire de France, Vol. v., p. 406), calls him Roussy; he was the brother of the count de Brienne, lord of the place, who had with him the viscount of Estange, with the sieurs of Eschenais and Gonsoles.
  • 10. The dean of York, who, as stated, died at Brussels about the end of May; see p. 191.
  • 11. “Sur quoy le dit ambassadeur avoit requis que [l'on] voulsist fournir de ce costé IIm Vc chevaulx limonyers et IIm IIc chariotz à IIII chevaulx.” Such is the reading of the passage, but instead of IIm it is evident that XIm or XIIm must be meant.
  • 12. “Qu'il avoit charge de faire lever XIc (sic) chevaulx limoniers et Vc chariotz, les quelz il vouloit avoir à Calais en dedens (sic) six jours et sur ce que de la part de la royne luy fust remonstré qu'il n'estoit faisable qung seul peult (sic) lever IIImc chevaulx (sic) et conduire mille ou XIIc chartons et mesmes en grande diligence. Et luy demandant sil avoit aulcuns assistans, ou desiroit estre assisté de gens de par decha le dit commissaire respondit, etc.”
  • 13. A blank in the original: “Deppuis à la sollicitation de Franchois van Halle homme d'armes du roy, elle a encores fait fournir IIIe chariotz et une autre partie et XIIIc LX chevaulx lymoners, dont une partie est encore en chemin.”
  • 14. “Et si pour lever cent ou IIc;. pictons ou pionniers il est besoign d'avoir ung commissaire, ou aultre qui en ayt la charge, et que chacune enseigne de IIIc; ou IIIIc; testes ayt son capitaine et plusieurs officiers soubz luy, on peult considerer si pour lever et conduire Vc. ou M chariotz que du moins doibvent avoir VIIc; ou XIIIIc; chartons se peulvent lever et conduire par ung homme seul.”
  • 15. “Et combien que on ayt mandé que le roy l'envoyast au temps, si n'est il encoires venu, et neanmoins la royne pour faire son debvoir a fait publier ses placarts donnant francisse (sic) à tous vivandiers qui vouldront mener vivres aux camps du dit sr roy, ne plus ne moins qu'elle a fait pour l'empereur, le quel pour pourvoyr son camp de vivres a commissaire qui achepte toutes necessaires de vivres pour pourvoir son camp quant les marchandiers n'en aureient assex.”
  • 16. “Et si l'avant garde et l'arriere garde ont seiournée, n'a esté la faulte de la royne ou de ses ministres, mais à l'occasion avant dite; et seroit bien maryé [marrie] que on voulsist jecter la culpe d'aultruy sur elle ou ses ministres. Et veult bien advertir que s'ilz ne mettent meilleure provisions de leur coste, fait (est) à craindre qu'ilz en pourront avoir plus grande faulte [ce], que seroit au regret de la dite royne.—Fait à Bruxelles le VIII jour de Juillet XVC XLIIII.”
  • 17. Juan Zapata de Cardenas, son of Pedro Zapata de Mirabel. See Lopez de Haro, Nobiliario Genealoggico, Part II. lib. ix., p. 233.
  • 18. That is, Therouane, Landresis, and Boulogne sur Mer.
  • 19. Con poco (sic) alegria y consolacion de los dichos lugares.
  • 20. Lennox.
  • 21. Glencairn.