Preface

PREFACE.

The State Papers calendared in the present volume carry on the history of the reign of Charles I. from the Parliament's victory at Naseby in June 1645 to the final collapse of the Royalist cause and the imprisonment of the King in Carisbrooke Castle, towards the close of the year 1647. They are less complete than those contained in the two preceding volumes, not owing to the diminished interest of the events, but chiefly to the disappearance of the Entry Books containing the correspondence of the Committee of both kingdoms during this period. Those containing letters received by the Committee are wholly wanting, and those of letters sent extend only till March 1647. The Day Books containing the proceedings of this Committee, which represented the Executive Govornment in all that concerned the carrying on of the war, are only preserved in the Fair Entry Books up to 5th July 1645, but their place is fortunately supplied by two draft Day Books, bringing down the orders and proceedings to 11th December 1645, after which date brief entries of the proceedings are supplied from an analytical index to one of the missing Day Books till 4th March 1646. A few orders of reference by the Parliament to this Committee are supplied from a Parliamentary Order Book, extending from August 1645 to December 1647, which have not been entered on the Journals of either House; but as the great majority of these orders are printed in the Journals of Lords and Commons, it has not been deemed requisite to notice them at all. Of the regular series of State Papers there are only five volumes for this whole period of two years and a half, but they comprise many valuable and interesting documents, including letters of the King and Queen, and intercepted Royalist correspondence, frequently in cipher.

The King's letters are for the most part addressed to the Parliament at Westminster, written with the object of arranging "a treaty for a well grounded peace," of which on several occasions there appeared to be reasonable prospect; he even offered to come and reside near London, if guarantees were given for the security of his Court and person. Insuperable difficulties, however, presented themselves to all these plans, an agreement as to the basis on which these were to proceed being wanting. This would appear to have been clearly comprehended by the King, who in writing to the Queen, (fn. 1) endeavours to explain to her how "that a flower of the Crown once given away by Act of Parliament is not reduceable, and if the supremacy in church affairs be not one, I know not what is."

The political side of the great Civil War will always remain the most important and interesting part of that phase in our history, "The times of Charles I. forming," as D'Israeli says, (fn. 2) "the primitive state of modern political revolutions."

Vane, in the "The People's Case stated," defines the political question thus:—"The power which is directive and states and ascertains the morality of the rule for obedience is in the law of God; but the original source whence all just power arises, which is magistratical and coercive, is from the will or free gift of the people, who may either keep the power in themselves or give up their subjection and will into the hands of another." These definitions afforded no basis for a compromise, the one being held to be inconsistent with the other; so each attempt at peace, as it failed, rendered the prospect less and less hopeful. Milton, who was by no means an incorrigible Independent, would not hear of the combination of national sovereignty with divine right, which formed the basis of the Scottish system, (fn. 3) and which was more or less consonant with the feelings of the moderate Presbyterians in England. If the Crown, it was argued, were of divine right, no treaty with it could be binding, for in that case the entire power of the State would belong to the King. The Independents went a step further in this line of argument than Milton or the Presbyterians, logically holding that the objections against kingly power were in a minor degree applicable to the influence exercised by the aristocracy of birth and wealth. They made no secret of the fact that their view pointed to complete equality in both Church and State. In the memorable interview between the Earl of Manchester and Cromwell, as reported by Monsieur Sabran, Cromwell is accused of having said that "he hoped to see the day when there should not be a King nor a Peer in England." "It was their purpose," says Ranke, "to destroy the very name of King of England; while it was the wish of the Scots, and of the better part of the English, to save the royal authority, only under limitations which were certainly hard, but were based on the old laws." (fn. 4) Hence France and the other continental Governments were horrified at the idea of the Independents gaining the upper hand and changing England into a republic, which would act as an incentive to other countries to follow in the same track.

As the first open breach between the King and the English Houses of Parliament had been occasioned by their refusal to sustain him in his attempt to impose the Episcopal form of Church Government on the reluctant Scots, so the last chance of a peaceful solution of the questions in dispute by a mutual compromise was dissipated by the absolute refusal of Charles to give up the cause of the Bishops in England. His reason for so persistently adhering to the Episcopal form of church government is clearly stated in one of his letters to the Queen, (fn. 5) "Wherefore I assure thee, that the absolute establishing of Presbyterian government would make me but a titular King, and this is confessed by both the Wills" [Davenant and Murray]. At the beginning of the year 1645, the latter half of which is comprised in the present volume, an application was privately made to the King by an influential Member of Parliament to renew the negotiations for a treaty, (fn. 6) which had been summarily broken off at Uxbridge, in the Queen's name. To this application Charles replied that she was certainly the fittest person "to be the means of so happy and glorious a work as the peace of this kingdom, but that her name was by no means to be profaned, and therefore their agent must be well persuaded of the rebels' willingness to yield to reason," before he could allow the Queen to be made a party to any negotiation. He was," says Mrs. Green, (fn. 7) "probably not thus well persuaded, as the transaction went no further." Even after the crushing defeat at Naseby Field and the over throw of his armies in the West, he still adhered to his determination not to give way to the Parliament on what he considered he was in duty and honour bound to defend. In a letter dated 17th October 1646 at Newcastle to the Queen, (fn. 8) he wrote, "Nor can I doubt but thou wilt, when thou considerest that if I should forsake my conscience, I cannot be true to or worthy of thee; nor should I forgive myself, if by misinformed or strait-laced conscience I should prejudice thy just ends." To the solicitations of his Secretary, Nicholas, he replied, (fn. 9) "Let my condition be never so low, I am resolved by the grace of God never to yield up this Church to the government of Papists, Presbyterians, or Independents; nor to injure my successors by lessening the Crown of that ecclesiastical and military power which my predecessors left me; nor to forsake my friends." To the suggestion of his nephew, Prince Rupert, whom none could accuse of want of determination and military courage, that it was now time to make peace with the Parliament on such terms as could be obtained, (fn. 10) Charles replied direct (3rd August) (fn. 11) in a letter of great force, "If I had any other quarrel but the defence of my religion, crown, and friends, you had full reason for your advice, for I confess, that speaking as a mere soldier or statesman, I must say there is no probability but of my ruin; yet as a Christian, I must tell you, that God will not suffer rebels and traitors to prosper nor this cause to be overthrown; and whatever personal punishment it shall please Him to inflict upon me, must not make me repine, much less give over this quarrel." In this conviction of what was befitting him as a King and a Christian, Charles was fully sustained by his Queen, who, writing from Paris on the 10th of February 1645, (fn. 12) exhorts him to "take care to preserve the Bishops, and the sword that God hath placed in your hands, that is, not to quit it till you are a King." Since this letter was written circumstances had considerably altered within the short space of six months, but the determination of both King and Queen remained unshaken. On the 13th July, Sir Dudley Wyatt writes (fn. 13) from St. Germain to Secretary Digby,—"I arrived here in Paris yesterday, and had presently audience of Her Majesty, to whom I delivered all the letters committed to me, and the messages from the King and yourself. In all which I find she received much satisfaction except in one particular, which was concerning His Majesty's hazarding his own sacred person, which for no reason of gallantry or necessity Her Majesty would grant to be well done, and this I desire you to let the King know. All other businesses have other faces here than what is supposed at the Court with you, of which I cannot discourse particularly, nor as it is fit till I have a cipher."

This expression of Wyatt shows what reliance was then placed in the power of a cipher as a mode of concealing thoughts, and its extensive employment is proved by the frequent occurrence of ciphered letters amongst these Papers. The form then in general use was the numerical cipher employed by the two Royalist Secretaries, Digby and Nicholas, who seem to have preferred it to the more ancient symbol system on account of its power of being indefinitely changed by the mere alteration of the designation of the numerals and the insertion of nullities. It was not, however, the sole system then employed. Occasionally secret intelligence was conveyed under the guise of merchants' correspondence, but whether this were effected by simply substituting commercial words and phrases for political in accordance with a previously arranged vocabulary, or was a rude form of the so-called grill system, is uncertain. The grill system, which is one of the most difficult to resolve, consists of the employment of two sheets of paper, in one of which irregular horizontal apertures being made by cutting out small pieces of the paper, this is placed over the other, and in these spaces the words of the secret message are written. Then the writer removes the top paper or grill, and fills in between the words of the message, with such words or phrases as may best hide the true meaning. The grill being first sent to the person for whom the message is intended, needs only to be placed over the communication when received, and the secret message is read with ease. This, though considered one of the most successful ciphers, has been found capable of solution without the grill by experts, but it both takes time and considerable application. A somewhat similar form of word cipher will be found in the previous volume of this Calendar under date 20th January 1644–45. (fn. 14) Of this the following passage furnishes an example, the names within brackets being the decipherment:—"Also he desires me to nominate two or three out of whom an apposite overseer [Ambassador] may be chosen in this point to the blade [King of Portugal] from Barber [King Charles]; he conceives much will depend upon a moderate man for that occasion, one disinterested and not passionate to goldfinch [King of Spain]." In this cipher numerals are also occasionally employed, as 60 for [King], 10 fees for [1,000,000l.].

Another very ingenious form of cipher occurs in the MS. Collection of Ciphers for the reign of Charles I. in this Office, (fn. 15) and appears to have been used for correspondence with Flanders and France, but no examples of it are met with amongst the Domestic Series. It consists of a square, in which are arranged a double alphabet in this form:—

The explanation of this cipher is given in the original MS. This cipher is made double, going twice over the alphabet, only for variety to make it harder to be deciphered. When you wish to write anything in this cipher, you are not to use the letter intended itself, but in place thereof set down two letters, one such letter of the word "optimus" as is set directly over the letter you mean, and the other such letter of the word "Dominus" as is directly opposite to it; e.g., in writing the word "and," instead of writing "a" you must set down "o," which is directly over it in optimus, and "d," which is opposite to it in Dominus; or "i," which is over "a" in the second alphabet, and "i," which is also opposite to it in that alphabet; or else "s" and "s," which stand in like relation in the last square. It follows that the word "and" will be written thus in cipher, "od uo id", or else thus, "ii pu si", and so all other words. For convenience you may express proper names in figures.

The whole of the deciphered letters which are given in full in the Supplement to this Preface are written in the numerical cipher, and, as only brief notices of them could be given in the body of the work, they are here printed in their entirety; the keys having been supplied through the kindness of Colonel J. S. Rothwell, R.A. to whose skill in this matter the historical student will for ever be indebted. As the curious reader may like to see how one of these ciphered letters looked in its original form, he will find, by turning to page xvi of this Preface, a fac-simile of the letter written by Prince Maurice. These ciphered notes, being often concealed in the dress or hat of the bearer, were frequently written on very small pieces of paper, and sometimes in lemon juice, as the King's letter to Rupert of 15th October 1645, which is described as written in the invisible ink of the period, now preserved amongst the MSS. in the British Museum. (fn. 16) In Carte's Collection of Letters (fn. 17) we have an instance in which these secret despatches between Ragland and Denbigh Castles were carried by a woman quilted up in a truss of linen and tied next to her body; and another woman, "Scotch Nan," travelled with letters hidden in her dress between the King and the Marquis of Montrose. How faithfully these were carried is shown by their being in some instances bedabbled with blood. (fn. 18) Disguises of course were many. Sir S. Luke arrested, in June 1644, a spy "coming from his Majesty's army into ours" disguised as a fiddler, at Newport Pagnell, (fn. 19) and another carrying letters was detected at Cardiff, in November 1645, with despatches hidden in his wooden leg. (fn. 20) The letters and note books of Prince Rupert, Sir S. Luke, and Sir William Brereton supply numerous other instances of the employment of spies, and their punishment on either side when detected was death by hanging.

As the campaign of 1645 progressed, the conclusion became obvious to all men that any further attempts to wrest back, by force of arms, from the Parliament the power which it had already acquired was no longer possible. Even Digby, who always looked on the bright side of things, and in every change of fortune persuaded himself that there was a new prospect of triumph for the Royalist cause, at length became despondent, and on the 27th of August wrote to Lord Jermyn, (fn. 21) who was with the Queen in Paris, "I protest to God I do not know four persons living besides myself and you who have not already given clear demonstrations that they will purchase their own, and, as they flatter themselves, the kingdom's quiet, at any price to the King, to the Church, and to the faithfulest of his party. But to deal freely with you, I do not think it will be in the King's power to hinder himself from being forced to accept such conditions as the rebels will give him, and that the next news you will have, after we have been one month at Oxford, will be, that I and those few others, who may be thought by our counsels to fortify the King in firmness to his principles, shall be forced or torn from him; and you will find Prince Rupert, Byron, Gerard, Wm. Legge, and Ormond are the prime instruments to impose the necessity upon the King of submitting to what they, and most of the King's party at Oxford, shall think fit."

As to the names given in the above quotation there will probably be considerable diversity of opinion, for they have been carefully obliterated in the draft preserved amongst the State Papers, which is that which was kept by Lord Digby for reference, and was subsequently captured amongst his papers at Sherburn. In the copy printed in Rushworth they are omitted altogether, and Mr. Gardiner (fn. 22) reads only three, viz. "Rupert, Legge, and perhaps Culpepper." Who these persons were whom Digby suspected of being "the peace at any price party" in the Court, it is probably not of much moment to determine, as all parties at that time were more or less of the same opinion. The peace party, alike in the Court and in the Parliament, were a great obstacle in the way of bringing the war to a conclusion. In the former they kept alive the hope of ultimate victory, if not in battle then by negotiation; and in the latter their action interfered with the energetic prosecution of the war, by inducing the Houses to make fresh overtures for peace as successive occasions offered. The King, for his part, was always ready to entertain any new project, but without any serious intention of coming to terms except on his own conditions. To the Royalists the gaining of time alone was an object, as they were continually in expectation of foreign intervention. Lord Jermyn, who was with the Queen in Paris, writes, (fn. 23) —"If the treaty [with the Roman Catholics in Ireland] be not yet concluded, it is not likely that ever it will be, by those who manage it now; therefore it seems to me, for satisfaction of those that so much press it, of the Irish, and of those of this State [France], who are much of that opinion, and to secure our hopes at Rome, and lastly to put the business into a possibility of being concluded, it were not unfit that the proposition long since made to the King, of having the [Irish] treaty made here by the Queen and the Queen Regent [of France] were resumed."

But perhaps the most marked sign of the collapse of the Royalist cause in the autumn of 1645 was the conviction of the King himself that the struggle was now approaching a termination. "It is very fit," he writes (fn. 24) on the 5th of August to his eldest son, Prince Charles, who, it may be noted, was declared though never created Prince of Wales, "for me now to prepare for the worst, in order to which I spoke with Culpepper this morning concerning you, judging it fit to give it you under my hand, that you may give the readier obedience to it. Wherefore know that my pleasure is, whensoever you find yourself in apparent danger of falling into the rebels' hands, that you convey yourself into France, and there to be under your mother's care, who is to have the absolute power of your education in all things, except religion, and in that not to meddle at all, but leave it entirely to the care of your tutor, the Bishop of Salisbury, or to whom he shall appoint to supply his place in time of his necessitated absence."

The military jealousies which were ruining the King's affairs in the western counties were likewise rampant in the chief stronghold of the Royalists. Edward Walsingham, who was employed to transmit intelligence to Digby, writes, (fn. 25) —"Our condition here [m Oxford] is like summer ale, the faction grows every day more insolent and high, and the Governor [Col. Wm. Legge] since the favour he did Mr. Felton, is pleased daily to show his teeth plainer to your [Lordship] and yours." "Prince Rupert salutes him almost daily from Bristol with epistles beginning Brother Governor, &c., which are communicated daily to the Junto you know of [the King's Council at Oxford], and thence the ill humours are dispersed abroad. Their dexterity has so possessed us here with deep suspicions of Lord Goring that, until Col. Nevill came to town, the best affected were in a labyrinth what to think, but his arrival has done [Goring] so much right as it is no small addition to the disesteem of those that fomented it." Whilst the King's best Generals were thus at daggers drawing, it is no wonder that his affairs hastened to ruin. The Royalist armies were now in like condition to what the Parliament's were in before the formation of the New Model. The King himself was often in danger of surprise. "On Thursday last" Sir Samuel Luke notes, (fn. 26) "the King dined upon Broadway hills, where a cloth was laid upon a furze bush, but was forced to leave his dinner and post away to Worcester upon notice of his Excellency's approach.'

Finding it impossible to direct the course of events, Charles busied himself with preparations for a journey northward in order to join the victorious army of Montrose. In this design he was energetically supported by Lord Digby, though it did not meet with the approval of Rupert or of most of his military advisers, who rightly regarded it as impracticable. Preferring the judgment of his civil advisers to that of military experts, whom he saw unable to manage their own commands, and learning from Montrose that cavalry was all he required to secure his conquests in the Lowlands, Charles hesitated no longer as to the course he meant to pursue. So, collecting together the largest body of horse he could muster, he started on his northern enterprise, taking with him his favourite Secretary, Lord Digby, as his sole Councillor, the rest being left in Oxford. That others besides military experts were aware of the visionary nature of the undertaking is proved by Walsingham's letter (fn. 27) to Digby. He writes:—"I beseech God to "prosper the present design of his Majesty in going north, for every one here professes to impute the success of it to you. The grandees [Privy Councillors at Oxford] profess they are all amazed at it, and some of them told me both the honour and the obloquy of the consequence will be wholly yours." The Earl of Leven, who was occupied with the Scottish army, besieging Hereford, readily perceived the object of this expedition, and not knowing what mischief might follow to his native land from even a temporary junction of the English Cavaliers with the followers of Montrose, he at once despatched 4,000 horse, which constituted the bulk of his cavalry, under the command of his Lieutenant-General, David Leslie, to bar the progress of the King northward. By so doing Leven successfully accomplished his object, compelling the King's return southward, but at the same time he deprived himself of the means of carrying on the siege. Without horse to collect provisions from the surrounding country the army could not be kept together, especially as the Parliament were much behind with their promised pay, all the money that could be got in being required for Fairfax's army in the West. When David Leslie started with the Scottish horse, it was arranged that, having accomplished this service, he should send half of the cavalry back to the army before Hereford, and proceed to the Borders with the other half only, which they cal culated would be sufficient to reinforce the Covenanters' army under the Earl of Argyle. It was expected that by this means both objects might be accomplished. When, however, Montrose's great victory at Kilsyth became known, the whole of the Scottish horse under David Leslie insisted on proceeding to Scotland, protesting that they would not abandon their native land to pillage. In this they were backed by their officers, so that David Leslie was obliged to yield, and send word to his military superior that his orders could not be carried out. In this strait the Scots' General concluded that the wisest course would be to attempt the capture of Hereford by storm, when he would be in a better position to obtain supplies and to resist any attack of the Royalists in those parts. Before, however, the necessary preparations could be effected, the King with his large body of horse had returned to Huntingdon (August 24), and learning that the Scottish horse had not returned, he determined to make a dash at the Scottish army, and so take Leven by surprise while engaged in the siege works. To have risked a reverse under the present circumstances was by every means to be avoided, as the Scottish army might be required for the defence of their own country; besides, at that time it was a well acknowledged axiom of military science that, however brave, infantry by itself could not successfully encounter a large body of horse in the field. When intelligence of the King's movements was brought, there was consequently no alternative but to raise the siege and retreat at once. This the Scottish General did with all alacrity, and marched towards Gloucester. How the King gained intelligence that there was no chance of the return of the Scottish horse we do not know. It may have been from the following letter of Prince Maurice to Lord Digby of the 31st August, which is now for the first time deciphered.

"My Lord,—Yours of the 30th present came even now to my hands. We hear not a word of the return of the Scots' horse. The[re] being several places fordable between this and Bewdley I conceive it useless to have a guard there. The last intelligence from the leaguer before Hereford was that they resolved to assault the town yesterday; since then I have not heard anything, but they lie close together and have above 1,000 horse. My Lord Astley certified me the 23rd present that 7 counties are associated, and they are drawing [together] all the forces those counties can make for the relief of Hereford. And in order to that have appointed their general [rendezvous] on Thursday last at Usk, Abergavenny, and Crickhowell, from thence they are designed to move speedily and to rest on the confines of Herefordshire purposely to hinder the Scots from their foraging. I shall speedily acquaint my Lord Astley with his Majesty's design, having not time to mention other particulars. I rest your Lordship's very affectionate friend, Maurice. Worcester, 31 August, 11 o'clock."

This letter, which consists of 16 lines in cipher, is written on a strip of paper only three inches wide, and is numbered on the back 28, showing that it was probably amongst Digby's papers taken near Sherburn, in Yorkshire, and sent up to the Parliament. (fn. 28)

As the reader may like to see what these numerical ciphered letters look like, a fac-simile of the original is here subjoined. Others are wholly in cipher.

"My Lord,—Your Lpp. of the 30 present came eaven now to my hands, wee heare not a word of 70. 41. 98. 61. 34. 41. 63. 61. 59. 35. 73. 63. 55. 42. 98. 68. 53. 64. 41. 42. 68. 172. The beeing several places 74. 89. 49. 20. 34. 45. 34. betweene 70. 41. 99. 79. 70. 83. 20. 1. 50. 110. I conceive 8. 41. 15. 68. 34. 45. 34. 68. 69. 34. 125. 94. 20. 47. 16. 21. 61. 49. 73. 41. 96. 70. 76. The last Intelligence from the leagure before Hereford was that they resolved to assault the towne yesterday, since then, I have not heard anything 70. 41. 98. 25. 110. 53. 45. 63. 68. 34. 125. 47. 34. 20. 41. 98. 61. 79. 94. 20. 32. 64. 15. 34. (1000) 172. My Lord Ashly certifyed mee the 23 present that 7 countyes are associated, and 70. 41. 98. 25. 80. 71. 73. 49. 61. 21. 1. 103. 47. 77. 21. 45. 41. 98. 8. 61. 189. 68. those countyes 53. 21. 59. 51. 22. 57. 34. 89. 41. 98. 78. 62. 34. 45. 35. 9. 55. 35. 63. 55. 98. 61. 34. 89, 49. 70. And in order to that 94. 21. 43. 44. 63. 8. 59. 41. 34. 49. 41. 98. 8. 62. generall 73. 220. 64. 59. 41. 13. 8. 61. 68. 88. 45. 20. 68. 41. 81 Usk Abergaveny and Crickhowell, 90. 41. 98. 59. 54. 37. 42. 98. 28. 80. designe 70. 49. 125. 51. 63. 15. 35. speed 8. 110. 79. 125. 61. 35. 69. 41. 67. 60. 42. 98. 54. 64. 59. 55. 9. 60. 36. 68. 66. 56. 98. 60. 34. 89. 50. 68. 13. 10. 61. 34. purpose 110. 125. 14. 103. 50. 36. 62. 41. 98. 68. 54. 63. 41. 42. 69. 90. 41. 98. 11. 62. 89. 20. 47. 103. 48. I shall speedily acquaint my Lord Ashly with 70. 99. 51. 20. 9. 34. 69. 41. 25. 34. 69. 50. 36. 68. 12. 48. 59. 38. 70. 76. 77. having not tyme to mention other perticulers. I rest yor. Lpps. very affectionate ffriend, Maurice. Worcester, 31 Aug., 11 a Clock."

Although Leven was too quick for the King to effect his main object, the surprise of the Scots' army, the King was in good time for the relief of Hereford, which he entered in triumph on the 4th of September. Though not a born soldier, Charles possessed considerable military genius, and took an apparent pleasure in these feats of arms, now that all other excitements were denied him. How kindly he took to his new mode of life, notwithstanding its fatigues and privations, is shown by his occupying himself with the pleasures of the chase in the brief intervals between these military expeditions. The popular dissatisfaction with the supposed want of energy on the part of "our 'Brethren' from the north" met with open expression of want of confidence in them on this occasion. How the Scots could thus have abandoned the siege of Hereford at the bare approach of a body of horse without striking a blow was declared to be almost incomprehensible. Sir Henry Vane writes, (fn. 29) "The Lord Chancellor [of Scotland, Loudoun] is expected to-night; and from him [we anticipate] a clear and full inform ation of the affairs of Scotland, which to most men here as yet appear a mystery, as does the raising of the siege of Hereford in the manner it was done. Time and a clear representation of affairs will, I hope, bring matters to a good understanding between the two kingdoms; otherwise it is but too evident what will become of this cause." A younger scion of the Vane family, Captain Wm. Vane, actually perceived a new cause of congratulation in the defeat of their own party in Scotland. He writes, (fn. 30) on the 11th of September, "This [victory of Montrose] may not prove so disastrous for the affairs of England as is imagined, so that the King, as is believed [here at the Hague], continues his intended journey for Scotland. It may alter the scene of war and rid England of 'our brethren,' who otherwise might not so easily be got out of England. This news has brought a great joy in this Court [at the Hague], for it is believed it will wholly restore the King's affairs. God send you a peace."

The Parliament's dissatisfaction with "our brethren from the north" was somewhat unreasonable. For Leven, far removed from his base of operations and wanting regular pay as promised, was in no position to risk a reverse. He consequently was compelled by circumstances to husband his resources and keep his army in condition to march back into Scotland should the state of affairs there require his presence. It was very easy for Sir Henry Vane, the younger, writing from London, (fn. 31) to advise his father, the elder Vane, "It is very earnestly desired here that yourself and the rest of the Commissioners [to the Estates of Scotland] with you do, while you are in those parts, employ what influence you can upon them to quicken their action." This the elder Vane found was no easy task under the existing circumstances. The Scots' reply was ready, that the terms of their engagement were not duly kept by the Parliament as they had a right to expect The papers embodying these mutual recriminations will be found under their several dates, but most of them are already printed in full in Rushworth's Collections.

The King's timely relief of Hereford and the news of Montrose's crowning victory at Kilsyth so raised the hopes of Digby that he writes in no measured strains of the joyous prospect in the immediate future, apparently oblivious of the clouds looming in the West. (fn. 32) In a long and interesting despatch written to the Prince of Wales on the 7th September, he gives an account of the warm welcome given to the King in Herefordshire, and the joy that reigned in the Court at Montrose's victories over the Covenanters in Scotland. "These things, Sir, are things rather like dreams than truths, but all most certain. God is thus pleased to point out the way by which He will bring upon the rebellion of both kingdoms the judgments that are due upon it, having already brought so heavy a vengeance upon that which hath been the original of all our misery." (fn. 33) This letter to the Prince, and that to Lord Jermyn relating to the same events, (fn. 34) graphically depict the vicissitude of hope and fear that then distracted the Court.

No sooner had the King repossessed himself of Hereford than news arrived of the impossibility of Rupert's holding out in Bristol. Surprise was naturally expressed, as, on undertaking its defence, Rupert had promised to hold out for three months at least, and only a little more than two weeks had elapsed. Rupert's courage was well known, and it was anticipated that he would fight to the death rather than surrender so important a city. Uncomfortable reports, however, were in circulation, "That something extraordinary was in hand by reason of the daily letters which passed between [the Governors of] Oxford and Bristol continually, yet so as they are smothered as much as may be and disavowed." (fn. 35) In this state of affairs it would evidently have been unwise to trust too much to Rupert's pertinacity, so Charles was preparing for its relief with a body of horse, which he intended should be joined on the route by a portion of Goring's army. How he could have expected to have encountered successfully Fairfax's main body, well furnished with horse, with such inadequate forces can only be surmised. Sir Henry Vane, the younger, however, who was on the Parliament's side, entertained doubts of Fairfax being able to hold his own, especially in the late season of the year, when the rains had flooded the siege works. On the 9th of September he writes, (fn. 36) "The state of our forces before Bristol is indifferent well, considering the time of year and the wet and cold nights they meet with. They have not as yet any infection amongst them that they know of [though the plague is in Bristol]. They resolved to storm the town the latter end of last week, since which we have not heard from them. In case they did not succeed they intended to block it up and take the field against Goring, who, with all the forces he can get together, doth not make up above 8,000 horse and foot, and is on this side Exeter."

The next day after the writing of this letter the siege of Bristol was brought to a conclusion by Fairfax giving orders for the storming of the outer works, which extended in a circuit of near four miles. Although recently repaired, the forts were every way unsuited to maintain a lengthened siege against a well organized army with artillery, the city itself lying in a hollow. The first summons, or rather invitation, to Rupert to abandon a hopeless struggle was sent in by Fairfax on the 4th of September. In this he laid before him the grounds of the Parliament's quarrel with Charles, not as King but as the victim "of evil counsellors." "The Crown of England" he urged "is and will be where it ought to be. We fight to maintain it there. Our contention is that the King, in supreme acts, is not to be advised by men of whom the law takes no notice, but by his Parliament, the Great Council of the kingdom." Nor did he omit to urge the claims which the popular, or Protestant, party in England had upon the Palatine family, for whom they had expended both blood and treasure. The justness of these arguments Rupert did not contest, he only begged for time to communicate with the King, which was unavoidably refused. The siege was continued with the greater earnestness as so much depended upon its being ended before relief could arrive, with the result that Bristol capitulated on the 10th of September 1645. With his usual desire to avoid unnecessary effusion of blood, Fairfax, after the capture of the outer works, sent a second summons to Rupert to surrender the city, which opportunity was now readily embraced, and the conditions were speedily agreed on. Honourable terms were granted to the garrison, which evacuated the forts on the following day, Rupert retiring towards Oxford. These conditions, which are frequently referred to in this volume by those seeking to compound for their estates with the Commissioners sitting in Goldsmiths' Hall, will be found in Rushworth. (fn. 37)

It may be as well here to mention that the entries in this volume derived from the Composition Papers in this Office are confined to documents of general historical interest, like the terms of surrender of the royal garrisons. Many of the conditions granted to the more important towns and fortresses have already been printed by Rushworth, and throw much light upon the final pacification of the country, but in some instances these have only been preserved to our time in MS., and in such instances these terms will be found printed in the present volume, chiefly extracted out of the Series of State Papers known as the Composition Papers, which have been calendared by Mrs. Green as a separate series, with the object of keeping together the documents relating to each separate case submitted for composition; but as her entries are necessarily restricted, having reference only to the particular suit, the conditions of surrender under which they are treated are only briefly referred to. Mrs. Green has consequently favoured me with references to these and other documents, that they might be more fully calendared in the Domestic Series of State Papers as possessing a general historical interest. In those instances, when the conditions of surrender have been already printed, either no notice has been taken of them in this Calendar, or only a very brief entry given with the reference to where they are printed. The Composition Papers have likewise supplied a few petitions and other documents which appeared to require fuller notice, as giving information either with regard to the condition of the country, the altered value of property, or the fate which befell individuals of more than ordinary distinction. From these papers it will be seen that in most instances the royal garrisons were granted liberal terms, and were not required to take any humiliating oaths, being allowed to retire to their own homes on parôle not again to serve against the Parliament, to take service abroad, or to enroll themselves under the Parliament's officers for the reduction of the rebels in Ireland.

"If the most general reason for the King's disasters be sought," says Ranke, "it will be found in the rivalry between the holders of civil and military power." He himself could not master this, far less could the young Prince of Wales be expected to do so; whereas, on the side of the Parliament, since the passing of the Selfdenying Ordinance, the military tendencies were entirely supreme, "and carried away with them all energies of another kind; no other will could oppose them." This no doubt had its drawbacks as well as its advantages, as the subsequent history of the Commonwealth proved. At present, however, it was all powerful. Success in the field commanded the sinews of war, and the Exchequer in its turn maintained the army in efficiency, regular pay being, as Cromwell told the Parliament, the first element of discipline. On the King's side everything was wanting, no regular assessments could be levied, as in the City of London and the Eastern Association; and but for the resources supplied by the nobility and gentry, with the utmost self-devotion, the Royalist cause must have collapsed long previous to this date. On the 4th of September, the day on which Bristol was first summoned, Nicholas informed the King (fn. 38) that Lord Bernard Stuart, the brother of the Duke of Richmond, who for his gallant conduct in the wars had been promised the title of Earl of Lichfield, "was like to lose the honour of your Majesty's grant for want of money to pay the fees, his Lordship having at Naseby lost what he had prepared to have defrayed the charge, unless your Majesty be pleased to command that his patent pass without fees, as did those of the Earl of Brentford and Lord Astley upon less reason." Against this clause is written in the margin, in the King's own hand, "Barny done," implying that Lord Bernard Stuart's resources were now come to an end. It would appear that this necessary contribution to the King's Exchequer was unable to be dispensed with, as Bernard was never created, and died in the same year, his nephew Charles Stuart having the title conferred on him in place of his uncle. In the same letter Nicholas has to communicate another piece of ill news, which perhaps even more than the military disasters indicated the approaching end. The office of Chief Baron of the Exchequer having become vacant by Sir Richard Lane's elevation to be Lord Keeper, vice Lord Littleton, deceased, the King had assigned it to Sir Edward Herbert, then Attorney General, thinking no doubt that he would be pleased with the promotion. To Nicholas's amazement Sir Edward expressed himself "much afflicted at it," he "being by sentence of Parliament for obeying your Majesty's commands rendered incapable of any place other than that he hath. He saith, however, he shall obey your Majesty so far as to deliver up his place, if such be your unalterable pleasure; but he cannot see how he is possibly able as yet to take upon him that other place, and hopes your Majesty will not set so great a mark of your displeasure upon him; wherefore I crave your Majesty's directions," adds Nicholas, "which may be time enough if before the next term, because until the term no sergeant can be made, and he must be a sergeant before he can be a judge."

In the midst of these distractions Prince Rupert arrived at Oxford with other Royalist officers from Bristol, and signified his desire to repair to the Court in order, as it was supposed, to vindicate himself. The King declined to receive him personally, but ordered his appeal to be tried by a military council of officers, who acquitted him of any military dereliction of duty; but still he was refused admission to the Court, and was dismissed from all his high military posts. Having with his brother Prince Maurice cut his way through the country occupied by the enemy, he arrived at Belvoir just as the King, relinquishing his project of going northward, had returned from Welbeck to Newark. (fn. 39) Learning here that his old friend and military associate Sir Richard Willis had been displaced from the Governorship of Newark, as his other friend Colonel William Legge had been superseded in the Governorship of Oxford by Colonel Glemham, the Prince could endure this persecution, as he considered it, of his friends, because of their attachment to himself, no longer. He consequently resolved to visit his uncle at Newark, notwithstanding the King's letter of October 15, (fn. 40) warning him not to proceed further in the direction of the Court. In a letter to the Earl of Bath, Lord Privy Seal, of the 11th of October, we read, (fn. 41) "The late Governor of Oxford, William Legge, is close prisoner by the King's special command, and Prince Rupert's commission is taken from him." In the same packet of intercepted correspondence are further advertisements from Oxford. "Prince Rupert is at Banbury, from whence he goes this day to the King, who is yet at Newark. I believe the King stays there to treat with the Scots. My opinion is that the King will shortly be here at Oxford. The Duke of Richmond goes not from hence as yet for many considerations. Prince Rupert desired it much, they are very good friends and both much for peace, but not for par ticular ones as many here, who to that purpose it is said have sent to the Parliament to effect their own. I am almost distracted since my dear brother [Lord Bernard Stuart's] loss, therefore, Madam, pardon me for writing so imperfectly. Prince Maurice goes with Prince Rupert; General [Sir Chas.] Gerard has given assurance they shall have justice, then certainly Lord Digby will down, for 'tis now come to that. If the King get not first to Scotland to [join] Montrose, there is no doubt but Prince Rupert will have the better of it."

At first there was a general impression that Rupert had betrayed the trust committed to his charge, and had surrendered Bristol prematurely. Not only in Court circles but in the Parliament at Westminster it was suspected "that all was not honestly done that might have been." The King refused to hear any explanation, attributing the surrender solely to gross dereliction of duty. Writing to his Secretary, Nicholas, (fn. 42) at Oxford, he says, "Tell my son [the young Duke of York] that I shall less grieve to hear that he is knocked in the head than that he should do so mean an action as is the rendering up of Bristol castle and fort on the terms it was." The Queen, likewise, we are told, (fn. 43) "gave it out openly at Paris that Prince Rupert had sold Bristol for money." How baseless these insinuations were, the subsequent investigation of Rupert's conduct before a Council of War proved, in which his military honour was completely vindicated, and the King himself admitted as much, though he still held that he ought to have exacted better terms. When it is considered whom Rupert had to deal with, and that this was the second summons, the terms obtained were exceptionally good. Had Rupert held out longer he would have exposed both the soldiers and citizens to the fate which subsequently befell the garrison of Basing House. It was not only the surrender of Bristol which so exasperated Charles, but the belief that his nephew was in league with those who desired to make him accept a peace at any price. In a letter sent by the King through the Duke of Richmond, he writes this warning to Rupert, (fn. 44) " If you be not resolved to carry yourself according to my resolutions you are no fit company for me." Rupert's dismissal from all his high military employments was further embittered by the unnecessary insult, "that in future he might seek his livelihood on the Continent." It was, however, impossible for him to think of quitting England without taking a parting farewell of his uncle, and asking his permission to quit his service, for which he required a passport to pass through his guards.

On the 16th October, Rupert, who was staying at Belvoir Castle, hearing that his uncle was about quitting Newark for Oxford, decided that no time was to be lost, so he hurried to the Court, where his coming had been anxiously expected by the peace party. Having dismounted, he arranged with Sir Richard Willis and Sir Charles Gerard that they three should demand an audience of the King at once. The King, being informed of their having some important business to transact, rose from table as they entered, and retiring into a recess formed by the window, signalled to his nephew to approach that he might understand on what business they had come. According to the graphic narrative of this interview, preserved in Symonds' Diary, (fn. 45) Willis began the conversation by respectfully asking to be informed who his accusers were, and the cause why he should have been superseded in the Governorship of Newark. Here Rupert interrupted. "By God" he exclaimed, "this is done wholly out of malice to me, because Sir Richard has always been my faithful friend." The discussion upon this became more acrimonious than was fitting in the presence of the sovereign, Rupert directly accusing Digby of being the cause of all this distraction. Charles's temper could endure this no longer. He exclaimed indignantly, "They are all rogues and rascals that say so, and, in effect, traitors that seek to dishonour my best subjects." This was the outcome of the strife which had been for some time rankling in the minds of all military men against the aimless policy of the King's civilian advisers.

We learn from Evelyn (fn. 46) that the affair at Newark terminated by Prince Rupert "freely acknowledging his errors," and upon this understanding the family quarrel was subsequently composed, (fn. 47) but Willis was never suffered to come again into the King's presence, and Lord Gerard was the bearer of a challenge from the ex-Governor of Newark to Lord Bellasis, which the King forbade him to accept. It is unfortunate that we have no more trustworthy authority for what took place at this memorable interview, for Symonds himself was so convinced of the unreliable character of the narrative that he tore part of the pages out of his book, after a conversation with Sir Richard Willis on the subject, who assured him that on that occasion he, Sir Richard, uttered "not one word to the King all that while, that Lord Gerard said most, and that was concerning Lord Digby." It would appear that this narrative, which Symonds at first accepted as true, but afterwards designates as "a feigned formed lie of the pamphleteer," was printed in a tract (fn. 48) called "The Bloody Treaty," from which the mutilated pages of the Diary have been restored. Ranke, (fn. 49) however, accepts it as true in substance, and a footnote to the English edition of 1875 describes it as "the best passage in this little book, had it not been subsequently mutilated and never completed." The account given by Sir Edward Walker in his Historical Discourses may be considered trustworthy so far as it goes, and was corrected by the King himself, as appears by his own handwriting, in the manuscript. But, as Disraeli observes, (fn. 50) it betrays "a tale only half-told." Most of the printed accounts of the time are derived from exaggerated hearsay; while that extracted by D'Israeli from Lord Bellasis's Memoirs, (fn. 51) written by his Secretary Joshua Moore, refers only to what took place subsequently in the market-place at Newark. The editor of Evelyn, who refers to Sir Richard Bulstrode's Memoirs and to Clarendon, was sadly perplexed at the strange inconsistency in the accounts given of this affair by the various contemporary writers. It has since been shown that Clarendon's account is a mere transcript of Sir Edward Walker's narrative, and further, that Bulstrode's is a mere transcript of Clarendon's. Though these State Papers do not supply full particulars of this interview, there is a letter from Robert Hawley to Mrs. Boyle of the 2nd November, (fn. 52) which explains the leading circumstances and has apparently been overlooked, as also a confidential letter written shortly after in cipher by Prince Rupert to his trusty friend Col. Wm. Legge. (fn. 53)

After the interview, Rupert rode off from Newark back to Belvoir Castle, followed by about 200 officers and gentlemen, who now gave up the Royalist cause as hopeless, and determined to go beyond seas. As a last attempt at reconciliation, the two Princes, Rupert and Maurice, (fn. 54) with 20 officers of distinction, addressed a petition to the King, praying "that he would not deprive any officer of his commission without first suffering him to be heard in his own defence before a Council of War. If this could not be granted, then to have permission to leave Belvoir Castle and go abroad." The King replied that he would suffer no Council of War to sit in judgment on his actions. Prince Rupert then sent Colonel Osborne to the Parliament at Westminster, to solicit papers for himself and his friends to go abroad. The application was read in the Commons on October 31, and referred to the Committee of both kingdoms. It was granted on the following day. (fn. 55)

In a letter of November 4th, written by the Earl of Northumberland (fn. 56) to Sir Henry Vane the elder, we have some further interesting particulars. "The Princes Rupert and Maurice, with Lord Garrat [Gerard], Lord Hawley, Sir Richard Willys, and many other gentlemen of quality and officers, have laid down their commissions, and left the King in a discontent. Prince Rupert hath sent a gentleman with a letter to the Parliament desiring a pass for himself and the rest of his Company to go out of this kingdom, and that such of them as shall think fit to retire to their own dwellings may remain there with the like freedom which others do enjoy who live under the protection of the Parliament; the first of these desires I believe will be granted, but I do not perceive that we are fond of their company in our quarters."

In the same letter, Northumberland alludes to the prospect of a winter campaign, which was evidently a novelty to him:—He writes, "Our army in the west has taken up some quarters about Exeter, and so is passed further on towards Lord Goring; it will be hard for them to do any more great things this year, yet they say the army will be little idle this winter." It was in surveying the results of the battle of Naseby that Clarendon (fn. 57) first notices the superior discipline of the Parliament's army under Fairfax and Cromwell, as indicated by the readiness with which the soldiers rallied after being driven back on their reserves by the brilliant charge of Rupert's horse. This confidence in themselves and their officers became more and more conspicuous as the war progressed, and in the events immediately following on the fall of Bristol, we seem to be transported back to the time of the Plantagenet Kings, when the Edwards advanced from conquest to conquest as if they had nailed victory to their banners.

In another letter, addressed to Sir H. Vane the elder, we read: (fn. 58) —"Since the taking of Devizes, Berkeley Castle has surrendered to Col. Rainsborough upon composition. Sir Thos. Fairfax is marched westward against Goring with 5 regiments of foot and 6 of horse, besides Massie's forces and the Taunton brigade. The rest of Fairfax's forces, being 4 regiments of horse and 3 of foot, he has left for the present under the command of Cromwell, to take in Winchester and open the passages between London and the west." Early in October Winchester had fallen, and on the 14th Vane writes, (fn. 59) "Since that Cromwell went with his forces before Basing House and this morning took it by storm, as two messengers who came to the Commons House do report, but the particulars in writing are not yet come. The King continues still at Newark, and I fear if my groom be come away with the horse, will hinder his coming safe hither." On the 31st of October the King was still at Newark, "where he is watchfully blocked up, and the Committee of both kingdoms were endeavouring to draw together sufficient forces to prevent his escape."

In order to incite the Committees and Governors adjacent to Newark to increased speed with their preparations, the Committee wrote from Derby House (fn. 60) on the 31st October, "The public affairs are in a very hopeful posture for the Parliament, many garrisons of the enemy being reduced, and our quarters thereby very much enlarged. The forces of the enemy are beaten out of the field, except only those in Devon, who are attended by the whole army of Sir Thos. Fairfax. The King is still in Newark."

Rupert's unwelcome visit, which has been related above, appears to have so disconcerted the King's plans that he put off his departure from Newark for another week at least, as on the 4th November we read, (fn. 61) "The King for aught we know is still at Newark, but free to go away at his pleasure." The Earl of Northumberland adds, We have lost a fair opportunity there by our Brethren's not coming to our assistance." Before the Committee of both kingdoms could infuse energy into the dilatory local authorities, the King had effected his escape with a small body of horse from Newark.

The loss of the military experience of Prince Rupert was soon felt by the Royalists, who now had no general of the first rank to direct the campaign. The Prince had evacuated Bristol on the 11th September, and on the 26th the King's Secretary Digby wrote (fn. 62) to the Marquis of Ormond, "As for what concerns your Excellency's own person, his Majesty persists in his earnest desire to have you here, for in good faith, without flattery, we are likely to be in more want of such a general than of an army, and Prince Rupert's removal from all military power hath made way for your Excellency to be here in such a condition as may be for your honour, where you will be sure to have this comfort of high value in his Majesty's great affection to your person, and of entire readiness to serve you in all those who have the honour to be near him, and in no man more than your humble servant."

Probably no one knew better than the Marquis himself how difficult it would be to fill adequately the vacant post, especially as the King had no longer a veteran army that could be placed in the field against Fairfax's. The aid of Montrose, on which Digby dwells in this letter, was altogether illusory, for after his victory at Kilsyth his fortunes began to wane, and his defeat at Philiphaugh (September 13) completed his ruin. It was very true, as Digby informs Ormond, that immediate action was requisite, "since we must set up all rests to make a strong war upon the rebels this winter, in which their London forces will be hardly kept from their homes, but if we give them leisure till next spring they will swarm against us." It must be borne in mind that this was the first winter since the New Model had been in a condition to take the field, so that the mistake made by the Secretary as to the probable action of the London forces, was based on his remembrance of their actions under Sir William Waller. (fn. 63)

There was now in Fairfax's army no home-sickness to be reckoned with, the dearest wish of the reformed soldier was that the army might be maintained in its numerical strength, with no arrears of pay. These were the objects sought in the New Model, in which the great qualities of the British soldier pre-eminently shone out. These qualities, it has been observed by a master of history, (fn. 64) were not wholly absent from the strife even in its opening scenes. Rupert was a soldier of high merit; the Earl of Brentford and Forth had something like a general's eye; Hopton, Waller, and Fairfax were good commanders; and, as the contest progressed, Montrose displayed extraordinary powers as a partisan leader; but in Cromwell alone we see one of the few instances in which genius, supplying the want of training, brings a real master of war on the stage. It was to him that the soldiers of the New Model looked for guidance and sympathy, knowing that he had their best interests at heart, combined with the knowledge requisite to success. This volume is full of the evidences of his prowess, for what appeared to others impracticable was easy to him. The narrative of his autumn march through the miry roads of the west and south, relieved only by the storming or capture of every fortified town and stronghold he approached, reads almost like that of the Israelites under Joshua, with whom the Ironsides were wont to compare themselves.

It is no exaggeration to assert that until the recent introduction of railways no events had wrought so great a change in the fair face of rural England, since the wars of the Roses, as the wholesale dismantling of the feudal seats of the nobility and gentry during the Civil Wars. It was not only on account of their being centres of disaffection to the Parliament and incentives to rebellion that these strongholds were disliked by the Roundheads; they saw in them the raison d'étre of the sumptuous apparel and exclusive etiquette which distinguished the possessors of ancestral domains, and which was especially obnoxious to the lovers of social equality. Amongst the proudest of these fortified mansions was Basing House, the noble seat of the Marquis of Winchester, described as a "court worthy of an Emperor," and which with its outworks covered 14 acres. This mansion, after having held out for above two years, was stormed by Cromwell within three days after he came before it, (fn. 65) and having been plundered and burned was razed to the ground. A journal of this siege was printed at Oxford in 1645, and is one of the most soalstirring pieces of history during the Civil War.

In his dealing with the Club-men we had an example of Cromwell in his milder mood; towards the possessors of ancient castles and fortified mansions or moated manor houses we see him inexorable. Whenever these fell into his power he at once set about the work of demolition. Nor was he alone in his antipathy to them, all the local Committees regarding them as possible centres of hostility and inimical to the peace of the country. Even when they belonged, like Berkeley Castle, to the supporters of the Parliament, it was with difficulty that they could procure for them immunity, (fn. 66) and then not until they had been dismantled so as to render them "innocuous like other houses." The Cromwellians were not satisfied, like the poet, to wait until
"time
Had mouldered into beauty many a tow'r,
Which, when it frown'd with all its battlements,
Was only terrible,"
but endeavoured to hasten the processes of nature.

In the great majority of instances, however, these ancient seats were the property of Royalists, so that they would have had but a sorry chance of being spared but for the interposition of the Committee of both kingdoms. (fn. 67) This Committee, while endeavouring to preserve the finest of these fortified mansions from being wholly demolished, were equally particular as to the terms on which their submission should be accepted. Thus in the instance of Lathom House we find them writing to the Committee of Safety for Lancashire, (fn. 68) "that they conceive the propositions for surrendering Lathom [House] to be very unreasonable. [Especially] in these particulars, for Lady Derby's coming to Knowsley and enjoying her lands, paying the ordinary assessments; the Earl's not coming to London and submitting to the Parliament; and [Lathom] House to remain in the possession of the Earl's servants. But if such propositions be offered as are fitting but which require the authority of the House further than is granted to you, we will tender the same to the Houses for their approbation, if they please."

It will at once recur to the memory of the reader that this was the ancient seat of the Lathoms and Stanleys, celebrated in the ballad of Flodden Field,— (fn. 69)
"Farewell Lathom, that bright bower,
Nine towers thou bearest on high,
And other nine thou bearest in the utter walls,
Within thee may be lodged kinges three."
and still more famous in history for the successful defence made by Charlotte de la Tremouille, Countess of Derby, for three months against the Parliament's forces. (fn. 70) This siege is further remarkable, if the following anecdote from the Memoirs of Dr. John Barwick be reliable, as a very late instance of the employment of torture in England. During the siege of Lathom House communication was kept up by means of a woman, who for several months risked her life in carrying despatches during the frequent sorties by the besieged. She was at length taken and put to the torture, but she would reveal nothing, and suffered three fingers on both hands to be burnt off before her tormentors, tired out by her invincible fortitude, at length desisted. A dog was then trained to carry the despatches in his collar, and rendered eminent service for several months, till he was shot by a soldier, in mere wanton ill temper, just as he had swum across the moat. (fn. 71)

A fortnight before the surrender of Bristol, Sir Edward Nicholas (fn. 72) had written from Oxford to the King, informing him that there were "about 3,000 horse come out of the Associated counties to Brickhill [in Bucks.], upon the great complaint of the country against the disorders of your Majesty's soldiers; and it is said that they are to join with the united forces of Northants., Coventry, and Warwick to follow your Majesty. I beseech you be pleased to command that scouts and spies be diligently kept to observe and advertise you of their motions. I conceive your Majesty's condition to be at present so low as that it is requisite that you forbear no longer to let your best affected allies know it, and to crave their speedy assistance, which I conceive cannot be so sudden and effectual any way as by their declaration for your Majesty against the rebels, and an embargo to be made of all their (the rebels') shipping, which, if the French, Portugal, and Hollanders would do it would so awaken the rebels as to make them hearken to reason; whereas he bringing in of foreign forces would be hazardous, and so tedious as it would do your Majesty little good. God preserve your person, and prosper your enterprises." This letter, we learn from the endorsement, was one of those taken in the fight near Sherburn, in Yorkshire, where Lord Digby was defeated, and it was read in the House of Commons on the 3rd of November (1645), so that the Parliament was fully informed of the desperate state of the King's affairs. The knowledge that the Royalist armies in the West could no longer be relied on to face the better trained and organized army commanded by Fairfax and Cromwell, induced the young Prince of Wales, who now nominally commanded in the West, to remove to Exeter, where he took upon himself an active part in the political negotiations. Many of those who attended his Court had heard of the King's instructions for his departure to the Continent, which they considered unadvisable, as likely to endanger the monarchy. They therefore urged the Prince to take the responsibility of opening negotiations with the Parliament on his own account. This he declined to do without consulting his father, but, as an intermediate step, he addressed a letter (fn. 73) to Fairfax, who replied with courtesy that he would forward it to the Parliament. At Westminster, it would appear to have been considered superfluous, as no action was taken upon it. Principal Baillie writes, (fn. 74) —"The Prince's letter to the Parliament is not yet taken into consideration, yet we think that it and our earnest desire will bring on a treaty of peace." Its effect in the West, however, was eminently beneficial, and had Lord Goring seconded the action of the young Prince by military measures, the establishment of his Court at Exeter might have had the expected result of drawing around him the wisest of the nobility in those parts, and thus establishing a new Royalist centre in the West.

Ever since the capture of the King's cabinet at Naseby, it had been a favourite project with many to induce the people to demand Charles's deposition, and to proclaim the Prince of Wales, with the Earl of Northumberland as Protector of the Realm during his minority. (fn. 75)

It was remembered to the advantage of the young Prince that at the time of his birth, in May 1630, there appeared a star of such brightness at St. James's that it was visible to the naked eye even in the daytime. By the populace this star was supposed to be the re-appearance of the star of Bethlehem, and after the restoration it is alluded to by Dryden in his Ode on the Restoration as the promise of a brighter day dawning in the political horizon:—
"That star which at your birth shone out so bright,
It stained the duller sun's meridian light."

Whether this star were the planet Venus, which in certain positions of her orbit is occasionally visible to the naked eye in the daytime, only the astronomers can tell us.

The effect of the autumn elections to fill up the numerous vacancies in the House of Commons had now begun to tell on its composition, so that the Presbyterians no longer enjoyed the monopoly of opinion.

Sir Robert Heywood, in a letter of the 13th of October (fn. 76) to Sir H. Vane the elder, writes:—"The House fills daily with new members, most of the severer strain. Mr. Peters [the Chaplain to Cromwell's brigade], when he made relation of the taking of Winchester in the House, ended with a prayer that the spirit of the Pyms, Hampdens, and Strouds might be redoubled upon the new elected members." It was altogether contrary to the wishes of the majority of educated people in England that the ecclesiastical authority should pass into the hands of the sour fanatics represented by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster. (fn. 77) Besides, the popularity of the Scots was on the wane, so that the Commons had no wish to gratify the ambition of "our Brethren" by subjecting their consciences to their guidance. The question which first tested the strength of parties in the replenished House (fn. 78) was the power of the Presbyteries to determine the sins and moral offences for which excommunication ought to be enforced. This duty the two Houses insisted should be committed to the lay elders, (fn. 79) for whose election and government rules were prepared, assisted only in their decisions by the minister. This ordinance as might be expected did not give satisfaction to the zealous Presbyterians of the Assembly.

We know now that the only solution of the religious difficulty which disturbed the minds of men in the 16th and 17th centuries lay in the acknowledgment of the right of every individual to follow the dictates of his own conscience, and to exercise his private judgment in the choice of a religion. But in the reign of Charles I. such was not the prevailing opinion. The Church being held to be of divine institution both by the Anglicans and Presbyterians, no confounding of right with wrong could be suffered. Hence no compromise was possible. No severance of the civil from the ecclesiastical polity could be entertained. "For," as Charles wrote (fn. 80) to his wife, Henrietta Maria, thou must understand that, which I find absolutely mistaken by you all in France, the difference between the two [forms of] government, Episcopal and Presbyterian, is one of the least disputes now among us, even in point of religion; for, under the pretence of a thorough reformation, as they call it, they intend to take away all the ecclesiastical power of government from the Crown, and place it in the two Houses of Parliament, and of this there is no question. Moreover, they will introduce that doctrine which teaches rebellion to be lawful, and that the supreme power is in the people, to whom kings, as they say, ought to give account and be corrected when they do amiss." Charles having tried in vain to come to terms, first with the Scots and then with the English Presbyterians, at length, in the universal toleration claimed by the Independents, thought he saw a way to escape from this dilemma. He accordingly opened communication with their leaders, offering, it is said, an earldom to Cromwell. With this object in view, the King directed Sir William Vavasor to surrender himself a prisoner to the army in which the Independents predominated. They expressed a willingness to allow the King to regulate matters of religion in conjunction with his Parliament after his return to Westminster, nor did they object to the re-establishment of the Church of England, provided that complete toleration were secured to Presbyterians and Independents alike, and that when Ireland should have been subdued by the army, Independence should be there made the established form of Church government. In a letter sent to Sir Henry Vane (fn. 81) in March 1646, with the King's knowledge, it is sought to convince him that his party would gain nothing by the overthrow of monarchy, the sole result of which would be the ruin of the English greatness both at home and abroad. Besides, by accepting the liberal terms proposed by the Independents a bridle would be put upon the overbearing self-assertion of the Presbyterians. "If Presbytery shall be so strongly insisted upon as that there can be no peace without it," continues the writer, "you shall certainly have all the power my master can make to join with you in rooting out of this kingdom that tyrannical government, with this condition, that my master may not have his conscience disturbed, yours being free, when the work is finished." Dr. Lingard (fn. 82) affords us an ingenious conjecture on this extraordinary correspondence with this popular leader, "who had evidently listened to the King, and had indulged the intercourse with a view to keep 'the royal bird' in his nest till the 'great fowlers,' Vane's friends Fairfax and Cromwell, could get down to the toils," every day gained being of importance while they were bringing up their armies from Cornwall and Devonshire to Oxford. The French Agent, who received his inspiration from Cardinal Mazarin, earnestly exhorted the King against forming any political contract with the Independents, "the principles of these people being wholly averse from monarchy." The King's secret negotiations with the Roman Catholics of Ireland, (fn. 83) which were being simultaneously carried on, and his explanation given to the Queen—that his main object being to get back to Westminster, he hoped when this were accomplished to be able so to modify these promises that there would be little to dread from the Independents—so disgusted the leaders of that party that they henceforth ceased all correspondence with him. "I am endeavouring to get to London," he wrote (fn. 84) to his Secretary Digby on the 26th March 1646, "so that the conditions may be such as a gentleman may own, and that the rebels may acknowledge me King; being not without hope that I shall be able so to draw either the Presbyterians or Independents to side with me for extirpating one or the other that I shall be really King again." Charles's position was now a very precarious one, he had offended alike the peace party amongst the Royalists and the Independents, so that the Presbyterians alone remained as a possible support. To such an alliance M. Montreuil expressed his Government to be favourable, promising Charles that, should his affairs require such a step, he might implicitly trust himself in the Scots' army, where his person at least would be secure from violence, and France would use her influence with the Scottish nation in his behalf, the ancient friendship founded on treaties between these two countries being still warm. The strangest thing is that French statesmen should have so readily grasped the conclusion of the hopeless nature of the Royalist cause, when the experience of their own history pointed to the opposite conclusion. It was with comparatively little difficulty that their Henry IV., the father of the English Queen, had overthrown the Assembly of Estates in Paris, and seized on the government, establishing an autocratic authority, on which was based one of the proudest monarchies of Europe.

But to return to our history. "The fall of Bristol," Ranke (fn. 85) tells us, "was the moment at which the party of the statesmen, or rather civilian courtiers, about Charles I. obtained the upper hand of the military men." And this at once disconcerted all the plans of the Royalists. Slight as was the coherence of their armies before, the confusion which followed on the attempt to direct the movements of the Royalist forces by orders issued by the Privy Council was profound. Professional feeling was aroused, and all the more experienced soldiers made common cause with Prince Rupert and Lord Goring. In the long despatch written in cipher which will be found in the Supplement to this Preface, the several commanders in the south of England endeavour to explain to the King the serious nature of the crisis, and how difficult it is for them to act in concert, Lord Goring having positively declined to receive any instructions from the Prince's Privy Council. Disgusted at the ill success of the war, and chafing under the opposition he met with from the Prince's Privy Council, Goring incontinently retired into France, forsaking the cause for which he had vowed to shed his blood. Lord Hopton, who then succeeded to the chief command under the young Prince, would appear to have been very little more hopeful, taking as his motto "I will strive my king to serve." He showed many of the best qualities of a general, and declared his resolution to maintain the unequal struggle against Fairfax's veteran army, "even at the risk of my good name." While Fairfax was engaged in the siege of Exeter, the Prince of Wales, aided by Lord Hopton, was gathering the scattered Royalist forces in the neighbourhood of Tavistock. In the beginning of the year 1645–46, a battle took place on the well fortified pass near Torrington.

It proved only how hopeless was the attempt of the Royalist forces to resist the determined courage of the Parliament's infantry; so the Prince found it requisite to make his escape into Cornwall, where he stayed for some time at Pendennis, until Fairfax's advance into Cornwall rendered this retreat no longer safe. Prince Charles, then, in compliance with the King's instructions, determined that his stay in England was no longer advisable, so, embarking with some members of his Privy Council, he sailed for the Scilly Isles; and subsequently escaped to Jersey, and from thence to France. Here Evelyn, (fn. 86) on his return from the grand tour, visited him and the Queen at their Court at St. Germain on the 10th of September 1647. After the Prince's departure, a considerable squadron of horse kept together under the command of Lord Hopton, but courage had entirely forsaken the men. Their officers declared to the general that their men could no longer be brought to face the enemy, and consequently it would be necessary to commence negotiations. No formal proceedings, however, were required, for at the first encounter of the advanced guards in the vicinity of Probus, about four miles to the north-east of Truro, the Royalist foot raised the cry "Truce, truce!" so that, as Sprigge (fn. 87) says, "instead of asking they acted a cessation." Nor were the King's affairs in the Midland shires in much more hopeful condition. The superiority of the Parliament's army was everywhere asserted. The forts and castles went over one by one. And when, in April (1646), the city of Exeter had capitulated, Fairfax's army was ready to advance for the siege of Oxford. The war was now virtually ended, and the disheartened Royalists, in order to save having to lay down their arms at the command of the victorious enemy, began a kind of involuntary disbanding. In their resolution to accept the inevitable with as good grace as they were able, the Parliament readily aided them. Most of the troops which still maintained discipline volunteered for the war in Ireland, where the Parliament's action was more approved by Englishmen than the King's. They were promised the same pay and care as the Parliament's own forces, which induced officers as well as men to go gladly. So that the Parliament were enabled readily to carry out the reduction of the sister island, without overburdening the counties with new levies.

Exeter having capitulated upon terms which will be found in Rushworth, (fn. 88) Fairfax advanced against Barnstaple, which surrendered on 12th April upon Articles given at page 409, not having before been printed. The first clause of these Articles (fn. 89) is worth quoting here, as showing the liberal terms which were conceded by the Parliament's generals when protracted resistance was not offered. It is agreed,—"that all officers and soldiers and all other persons within the garrison and forts may have leave to march forth, both horse and foot, with their complete arms, colours flying, lighted matches, muskets loaded, and 12 shot apiece in their bandoleers, with the like proportion to the troopers for their carbines and pistols, to any garrison in England where his Majesty shall be in person. And that they shall have a safe-conduct to the same and free quarter on their march, and not forced to march above 10 miles a day."

Before proceeding on his march towards Oxford, Fairfax was engaged for a week in settling the future government of Exeter and Barnstaple. Over the former he appointed Colonel Hammond as Governor, and William Boreman Receiver of the Excise for Exeter and Devonshire. This tax it would appear had been appropriated for the maintenance of the infant Princess Henrietta, but owing to the stoppage of trade by reason of the siege, it had been insufficient, so that large arrears were owing to the officers and servants of her household. (fn. 90) Having completed his arrangements for the government of the western parts, Fairfax resumed his march eastward, (fn. 91) so that Oxford was no longer a safe residence for the Court. It consequently became requisite for the King to look to his personal safety. In a letter to M. Montreuil he writes, (fn. 92) "Exeter is to-morrow to be given up, so that I must expect to be blocked up here within very few days, which rather than be, I am resolved to run any hazard to come to you." There appeared to be only one chance of retrieving his lost cause, and that was the one formerly recommended by the Earl of Holland and Mons. Montreuil, to throw himself into the arms of the Scots. "This," Ranke (fn. 93) tells us, "was not Charles's own idea, but he accepted it, as seeming to offer him an endurable solution." And so it might, if he could only have made up his mind to accept without reserve the Presbyterian form of Church government, which the French Agent thought he might well have done, without risk to his kingly power. Charles's conscience, however, revolted against taking such a step without further consideration, and the Scots proving equally obstinate on this head, no positive agreement could be come to for Charles's reception in their camp before Newark. The utmost that could be obtained by Montreuil was a promise that his person should be held inviolate, and every mark of respect should be shown to him.

For these exertions of the French Agent in his behalf Charles expressed himself deeply grateful; and in a postscript to his letter (fn. 94) of the 13th April 1646 to the Queen, he vows that if God should enable him, "I will faithfully pay the great debt I owe to that Crown for the kindness it hath shown to thee and Prince Charles, to both whom, if I should miscarry or be taken prisoner by the rebels, in my attempts to join with the Scots, or otherwise, they will give full assistance to Prince Charles in all kinds, as they have promised, and I as little doubt of thy gratitude or his to them, when thou and he shall have power."

On this same day, which appears to have been that on which the King finally determined on his journey to the Scots' camp, he affixed his signature to a vow pledging himself to restore to the Church all impropriations and other property held by the Crown which of right ought to belong to it should he ever regain the royal power. On this vow and other documents recently acquired by the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's Cathedral, Dr. W. Sparrow Simpson read a paper before the Society of Antiquaries which will be printed in the Archæologia. (fn. 95)

The best account we have of what Charles expected to come of his visit to the Scots' camp is supplied by a letter of his (fn. 96) to the Marquis of Ormond, written (13th April) a fortnight before his flight from Oxford.

The King writes,—"We having lately received very good security that we, and all that do or shall adhere to us, shall be safe in our persons, honours, and consciences in the Scottish army; and that they will really and effectually join with us, and with such as will come in to us, and join with them for our preservation, and will employ their armies and forces to assist us to the procuring of a happy and wellgrounded peace, for the good of us and our kingdoms in the recovery of our just right; we have resolved to put ourselves to the hazard of passing into the Scots' army, now lying before Newark. And if it shall please God that we come safe thither, we are resolved to use our best endeavour, with their assistance and with the conjunction of the forces under the Marquis of Montrose and such of our well-affected subjects of England as shall rise for us, to procure, if it may be, an honourable and speedy peace with those who have hitherto refused to give ear to any means tending thereunto." This exposition of the King's intentions is sufficiently precise to dispose of the suggestion that when he left Oxford his destination was London. The reason of the Royal party taking a southerly direction to start with is sufficiently explained by the impossibility of their escaping capture if they had proceeded in a direct line towards Newark, nor is this contradicted by the expression in Dr. Hudson's examination, that when they came to Harrow-on-the-Hill, "His Majesty was almost persuaded to come to London." Charles might well have wished that such a step were feasible. But the state of public feeling which prevailed at that time in the City entirely forbade such an experiment. The contemporary narrative (fn. 97) referred to by Ranke, (fn. 98) in which it is stated that the King had a third alternative offered to him by the Lord Mayor of London, who had undertaken to preserve him safe if he should trust himself to the City, is evidently an exaggeration, though not wholly unfounded. For May, the Parliamentary historian, notes a great reaction in public opinion in the Capital about this time. "A great number of the citizens of London," he writes, (fn. 99) not of the meanest, had revolted from their former principles, insomuch that the inhabitants of the City, all the King's garrisons having been by Fairfax's bloodless victories emptied into it, came to be in such a condition of strength as that the Parliament without the army's help could not safely sit there." The narrative referred to by Ranke is in Italian, and dated from London, 17th June 1646. The writer would appear to have confused the report that became current on the King's escape from Oxford, that he intended suddenly to appear in the City, with a similar report that he was expected at the review of the City Militia, which was fixed for 5th May in Hyde Park. Military pronunciamentos have often taken well established governments by surprise, and it was altogether consonant with the known idea entertained by Charles (fn. 100) that by some such "generous confidence he might procure his protection from a grateful City." It may well be that the Parliament and City became alarmed at these reports, and in order to ward off any danger on the day before it was to have taken place suddenly postponed the review for a fortnight. This appears to be borne out by an entry in the Commons' Journals, (fn. 101) which states that "Colonel Mainwaring and others of the Militia of the City were called into the House, and Mr. Speaker acquainted them with the reasons that moved the House to desire that the general training be put off till to-morrow fortnight." At the same time the Militia officers were desired to put in force the powers that had been given to the Committee of the Militia "for searching after suspected persons, and for arms and ammunition, within 20 miles of London." On the same day that the review was put off an almost savage order was passed by both Houses:— (fn. 102) "That what person soever shall harbour and conceal, or know of the harbouring or concealing, of the King's person, and shall not reveal it immediately to the Speakers of both Houses, shall be proceeded against as a traitor to the Commonwealth, forfeit his whole estate, and die without mercy." To render this the more efficacious in preventing the King's coming to London it was further decreed, (fn. 103) "That the Committee of the Militia be desired to publish this order by beat of drum or sound of trumpet within the cities of London and Westminster and lines of communication." "The truth is," D'Israeli (fn. 104) correctly observes, "that even in this last reduced state of the King his enemies dreaded 'the Royal presence' more than they had done his armies." On the very morning while this strange ukase was being proclaimed in the City by beat of drum, the King had safely arrived after a long and dubious ride through the enemy's country at the Scottish camp before Newark.

Charles's coming to the Scots' camp was at once announced to the English Parliament by a letter from the English Committee in the army before Newark, addressed to the Speaker of the House of Peers pro tempore. (fn. 105) It states "that the King, with three others, came in great speed this morning, about 7 o'clock, to Southwell, and went to the house of Monsr. Montreuil, the French Agent, about 12 this day. Two of the Scottish Commissioners brought us a letter, a copy whereof is here enclosed. The two Commissioners presently returned, and in this surprise we could not for the present think further than to desire of them he might not remove, which they approved of, and that we might speedily meet the rest of them at Farnton [Farndon], which was consented unto, and we are now going thither accordingly." There are two copies printed in the Journals of the above-mentioned letter from the Scots' Commissioners as sent enclosed. A note in the Journals informs us that "a duplicate of this letter occurs also in the next page, but as there are some variations they are all inserted." Neither of these versions, it may be safely said, are exact, one being dated on the 4th May. The copy of this letter, preserved amongst the State Papers, and calendared at page 433, is neither addressed nor sealed, but is written in the same hand throughout, and signed Lothian, by command of the Commissioners of the Parliament of Scotland, like those in the Journals, but is more accurate than either of them. Notwithstanding therefore that a full abstract of it is given in the body of this work, it has been thought advisable to print a literatim version in the Supplement to this Preface, in order that it may be available for comparison with the versions printed in the Lords' Journals.

Immediately after the King's arrival was announced in the Scots' camp, the Earl of Lothian visited him at the lodgings of the French Agent, Montreuil, and presented for his confirmation a series of demands, including the immediate surrender of Newark into the hands of the English Commissioners, the signing of the Covenant, and declaration for the establishment of Presbyterianism, both in England and Ireland, as well as the surrender of Montrose in Scotland, whom he spoke of as James Graham, implying that the title of Marquis, which had been conferred on him by the King, was not to be acknowledged. This last demand Charles took for a personal insult, as denying to him the exercise of the Royal prerogative. He indignantly replied, "He who made you an Earl likewise created James Graham a Marquis." This rejection of the title of Marquis given to Montrose was no intentional slight improvised by Lothian to annoy Charles, as he apparently supposed. It was the custom of the Parliament's adherents to ignore all titles and honours bestowed on individuals subsequent to the King's quitting Westminster as being unconstitutional, not having been passed under the Great Seal. The King's reply settled matters; he was no longer regarded as a guest of M. Montreuil, but as their prisoner. Removed to the headquarters of David Leslie at Kelham, sentinels were placed before the doors and windows so as to preclude the possibility of any communication with those without, or the transmission of letters. As Newark would not be able to hold out much longer, Charles agreed to its immediate surrender, and the English Commissioners took possession of it. The Earl of Leven had already gone north to Newcastle, and on the 7th May, only two days after the King's arrival in their camp, the Scots' army, under Lieutenant-General David Leslie, followed. Charles was treated with every mark of consideration, but given to understand that he must consider himself a prisoner. Arrived at Newcastle by the 13th, the Scots demanded again that Charles should declare for Presbyterianism, as they averred he had promised. This he denied, but agreed to argue the questions involved with their favourite preacher, Alexander Henderson. That he really took an intelligent interest in this inquiry is proved by the lengthy Papers (fn. 106) which passed between them concerning "the change of Church government." His first paper is dated 29th May, and Henderson's reply 3rd June 1646.

The threatened breach with the Scots was for the present averted mainly through the wise moderation displayed by the Committee of both kingdoms. On the 29th of May they wrote (fn. 107) to the Committee at York:— "And for that a good understanding between the two nations is so necessary, we desire you to use all possible care to prevent all inconveniences and differences that may arise between the forces till the Houses shall take further order therein."

In prospect of the return of the army to Scotland, and the more readily to estimate the arrears of pay due, the Scots' General, in January 1646, ordered a muster roll of the whole of their forces in England to be made out, which is preserved in this Office. (fn. 108)

In his letters of the 18th of May (fn. 109) from Newcastle, both to the Parliament at Westminster and to the Estates of Scotland, Charles declared it to be his firm resolve, when restored to his kingly office, "to comply in everything which shall be for the happiness of my subjects and for the removing of all unhappy differences, which have produced so many sad effects." He likewise wrote a letter (fn. 110) addressed to the Lord Mayor and City of London, assuring them of his readiness to concur in all measures "for settling truth and peace." In order to further conciliate all parties he declared the war to be at an end, and wrote a note (fn. 111) to Sir Thomas Glemham, Governor of Oxford, directing him to surrender that Royalist stronghold on honourable terms; "which," he added in a similar note to the Parliament, "being granted to that town and the forces there, his Majesty will give the like order to the rest of his garrisons."

The Independents in the Commons' House objected to the King's note for the surrender of Oxford being forwarded to the Governor, Sir Thomas Glemham, so the siege was continued till the 15th June, when the Privy Council took upon themselves the responsibility of asking for terms of capitulation. The negotiations were protracted for five days, it being difficult to arrange about the terms to be granted to the many distinguished Royalists who were assembled in that city. On the 20th June the Articles of Capitulation were signed for the surrender of the garrisons of Oxford and Farringdon. These with a letter from the General were read in the Commons on the 23rd June, and being approved were ordered to be printed. A copy of these Articles (fn. 112) printed in pamphlet form is preserved amongst these Papers. On the title page is this announcement,—"In regard there are many short and imperfect copies abroad, this true copy is set forth to prevent abuses." By special permission, the two Princes Rupert and Maurice, who had returned to Charles's side during his declining fortunes, were permitted to depart on the 22nd June, and on the next day they were followed by many Lords and gentlemen.

Hume and subsequent historians, misguided by the earlier editions of Clarendon, make Ragland Castle to be the last of the Royalist garrisons that held out, viz. till August 1646. The last edition, which exhibits Clarendon's real text, gives this distinction to Pendennis Castle in Cornwall, where the Prince of Wales took refuge before his flight to the Scilly Isles. It is true, however, of neither of these. The castles of North Wales held out considerably longer. Holt Castle did not surrender till 13th January 1647, (fn. 113) and that of Harlech did not surrender till 13th March 1647, as shown by the Articles, which will be found at page 537, when the war concluded. (fn. 114) The terms granted were exceptionally favourable. By the eighth Article it was provided "that the town and corporation of Harlech shall enjoy all their former rights and privileges;" and by the ninth "that the Governor and others in Harlech Castle at its surrender shall have liberty to compound for their delinquency at such rate as if they had come in before 1 Dec. 1645, and this liberty shall extend to all but to such as be under the first and second exceptions, and are excepted from pardon, provided they compound within six months."

Holles in his Memoirs says the violent party were very desirous that the Scots should carry the King with them, and that nothing could have been more injurious to his interests. While we are told by Berkley, (fn. 115) who is much confirmed by Baillie, that the Presbyterians had secretly engaged to the Scots that the New Model army should be disbanded, and the King brought up to London with honour and safety. This was probably conditional on his declaring in favour of Presbyterianism. This understanding may be urged in justification of the Scots for delivering the King up to the English Commissioners. It is a popular error to suppose that the payment of the 400,000l. arrears to the Scots had anything to do with the negotiations for surrender of the King's person to the English Commissioners. The votes for the former were passed on August 21, 27, and September 1, "the acknowledged incentive being, to be rid of their brethren of Scotland," (fn. 116) while the negotiation for surrender of the King's person was not begun till about the 24th of December. The King would appear to have entertained no strong feelings on the question whether he should be transferred to the English Commissioners or should proceed with the army to Scotland. So prone was the hapless Monarch to exemplify his favourite motto, which he frequently wrote in his books Dum spiro spero, that in his letter to the Parliament (fn. 117) from Newcastle of the 20th December, he apparently ignores his position as a prisoner in the Scottish army, and expresses a wish to come to London, "where by his 'personal presence, he may not only raise a mutual confidence betwixt himself and his people, but also have those doubts cleared and those difficulties explained to him, without which he declares he cannot give a particular answer to the Propositions" submitted for his acceptance by the Parliament. Within three weeks after this letter was written it was resolved in the Commons' House, (fn. 118) "that a Committee be appointed by both Houses to go to Newcastle to receive the person of the King from the Scots' army."

The Supplement to this Preface consists of deciphered letters belonging to this and the preceding volumes; these are inserted here instead of being reserved for the Addenda, in order that they may come into the Index, which has been prepared, as in former instances, with much care by Mr. C. H. Woodruff, to whom the editor's grateful thanks are due.

Wm. Douglas Hamilton.

30th September 1891.

Letters deciphered by aid of keys supplied by Colonel J. S. Rothwell, R.A., Professor at the Staff College.

644. April 26. Court at Oxford.

The King to [George Lord] Goring. (fn. 119) The hazardous condition of the Marquis of Newcastle's army and consequently of all those northern parts if not timely succoured, having been represented unto us, hath made us, all considerations of the necessity of our other affairs laid aside, to send our dear nephew [79. Prince Rupert] with all the forces he can make to join with you for their relief with all possible expedition; whereupon in consideration of your being so much too weak, also, as we conceive, to fight with the Scots and the Fairfaxes now united; and since, in case of any attempt either on the Marquis of Newcastle's part or yours unsuccessfully [being made], he will lose the advantage even of our nephew's assistance, who cannot come with a sufficient strength to fight with the Scots and Fairfax alone, but must rely upon a conjunction with such forces as you, Lord Goring, shall have gathered together. Our will and pleasure is that till such time as our said nephew shall be advanced unto you that you do not in anywise attempt with your forces to fight with the Scots or to force your passage to the Marquis of Newcastle, or do anything that may hazard or hinder your joining with Rupert, but that you keep yourself at such a distance where you may avoid the hazard of being drawn to an engagement, and where you may strengthen yourself more and more against Rupert's coming. And to this purpose we have written to the said Marquis of Newcastle to stand upon a pure defensive, and that in nowise he command you to advance where you may run any hazard before Rupert's conjunction with you, which we make no doubt will be within this three weeks. And these precise orders of ours are not to be dispensed with, but in case of an apparent and certain ruin to the Marquis of Newcastle's army in [the event of] your obeying them, which we cannot judge of at this distance. So noways doubting but if the Marquis of Newcastle and you can but preserve yourselves till Rupert come we shall see our affairs there in a prosperous condition, we bid you heartily farewell. Given at our Court at Oxford, the 26th of April 1644. To our trusty and well-beloved [38. 79. 40. Rupert for?] Goring. [Certified as a true copy by Sir Edw. Nicholas, and endorsed, "From the King by Secretary Nicholas." Cipher. 2½ pp.]

Thomas Elyott to Prince Rupert, (fn. 120) Burford, 17th June 1644. It is fit I let you know how great a faction is made against you. Digby, Wilmot, and Percy are the men that endeavour your ruin; and Wilmot said at Council, the King at that time not being there, that he knew no reason why they should be beholding to a stranger when it is in their power to make an end by an accommodation, and so they should not owe their preservation to you. Sir, I believe it is not yet time for your Highness to take notice of the intentions of these men till it is in your power to ruin them, which you can find no surer way to than by making my Lord Newcastle yours, which I am certain he is very much inclined to. Pray, Sir, let me know whether you received my letter wherein my Lord Lindsey was concerned. Your Highness's most faithful humble servant. [In cipher. Seal with arms. 1 p. In Foreign Correspondence, France.]

6.5.K. The Earls of Brentford and Berkshire, (fn. 121) Lords Hopton, Capell, Culpeper, and Sir Edward Hyde to the King. Since the condition and state of your Majesty's affairs in these parts have made us change some former designs and resolutions, and to advise his Highness [the Prince of Wales] to undertake the charge and government of your army and to engage his own person in the head of it, we have thought it our duty to present to your Majesty a particular account of the motives and inducements of such designs and advice.

The rebels (more formidable by their success than their numbers), taking advantage of the ill government of your [Majesty's] forces, which in truth had equally distressed Exeter for many weeks on this side as the rebels themselves had on the other by keeping all manner of provisions from thence, whilst the foot being quartered in the town spent the stock and magazine of provisions there. Some weeks since [the rebels] drew a considerable part of their army, horse, foot, and cannon, into Kyrton [Crediton], and placed garrisons in two or three houses [Fulford and Canonteign] on this side Exeter and in the church of Powderham, by which means that fort cannot long be held, and seized a ship in the harbour [at Topsham]. By all which it easily appeared that if some speedy course were not taken to interrupt the [enemy's] progress Exeter will be speedily reduced to such extremities as it cannot long hold out, and your Majesty's horse likewise be driven into Cornwall, and so consequently in a short time be destroyed; and if Exeter should be lost, as visibly it may be (it having for the space of above two months not received so many provisions in a week as is spent there in a day, and the whole garrison being supported by the few persons of ability, strangers and citizens, who are yet left there), we need not inform your Majesty how soon Dartmouth (the works there being not defensible), and in truth almost every corner in obedience to your Majesty in the West will be lost, for the resistance and prevention whereof the Prince could think on no expedient but by drawing together the trained bands of Cornwall, which, joining with the other forces, might give some pause and interruption to the rebels, and thereupon he issued out warrants accordingly, himself staying at Truro and taking the orders of [the Earl of] Brentford, Lord Capell, Lord Hopton, and [285. Culpeper ?] to the army to confer with Lord Wentworth, with instructions to consider and direct what was fit to be attempted. Their Lordships went to the Lord Wentworth's own quarters at Ashburton (his Lordship, upon some advertisement of the enemy's motions, having failed to meet at Tavistock according to former appointment), where after conference on the state and condition of your Majesty's forces presented by them to his Highness, and upon due consideration of many circumstances in the temper and disposition of both Chiefs, and that, however the time was very pressing for action, there was not victual materiel or anything else in order to bring an army together and keep it when it was so, it was unanimously concluded as well by them as by us who attended the Prince both for the uniting and reconciling all differences in command and for the better bringing up the Cornish[men], that it were most convenient the Prince will in person bestow some time nearer the army, where upon debate and consideration of all particulars such resolutions might be taken as will appear best for your Majesty's service. Hereupon the Prince repaired to this place on Saturday, the 27th of the last month, where their Lordships met his [Highness], and upon a full consideration of the whole general state of your Majesty's affairs (as far as we had any notice or view of them), of the condition of these two Western chiefs, of the growing wants and inevitable danger of the loss of Exeter, and the consequence of that loss, of the necessity (increased by the disorders of your Majesty's forces in these parts), and of the strength and condition of the rebels (which we conceived many impaired by sickness and other accidents), we were unanimously of opinion that the only expedient will be to draw together and unite all forces of your Majesty's, of how different kinds soever and under what distinct commands (for we find too many independent commissions), and briskly to compel the rebels to a battle (not so hazardous to your Majesty as our present condition) or to quit their quarters, which will give breathing time (if bad success wanted) for other resolutions towards this union and incorporating of forces. We found it absolutely necessary to advise the Prince to declare that he will take charge of that whole army upon himself, according to the commission granted to him by your Majesty, and for the present to go to Totnes, which we conceived would be the fittest place for a general rendezvous, and where the magazines of provisions and materiel must be made, and where the Lord Wentworth might most conveniently attend him, and with whom we desired to keep all correspondence. The Prince resolving to make as little alterations in the command of the army, till this present attempt should be over, as would consist with the security of the service. Hereupon his Highness, on Tuesday the 30th of December, went to Totnes, and stayed there and at Dartmouth till Monday last, during which time he was several times attended by the Lord Wentworth, who declared that he had received a commission to be Lieutenant-General, with instructions which he was bound in point of honour, being told, to observe, and therefore he would receive no orders from any subject in [England ?], but only from the Prince. Whereas it is apparent (and in truth the necessity thereof was as great a motive as any to his Highness to undertake this present expedition) that of necessity the Prince may constitute a Lieutenant-General, from whom all persons in a day of battle may receive orders and directions, and it being as apparent that as the Lord Wentworth had declared that he will receive no orders but from the Prince, so [325. Grenvile ?] under whom all the Cornish[men] were to meet, and which, indeed, are upon the matter all the foot to be relied on (fn. 122) (for we are not sure to join with those of Exeter), will never receive orders from his Lordship. The Prince for many reasons thought then fit to make no other declaration than that he had himself taken upon him the charge of the army, and will expect to have all his orders obeyed, and is now at Tavistock with the Cornish trained bands, which by Monday next he hopes will be near two thousand foot, with whom and his regiments of guards, which will be nine hundred horse and four foot, he intends to go to Totnes (having given orders for the bringing great quantities of wheat out of Cornwall, and for which he hath paid 1,000l. ready money to Dartmouth for the relief of Exeter) about the beginning of the next week (if the rebels advance not before), when the three regiments of Fortescue, Carew, and [Lord] Seymour (consisting of above 1,000) are appointed to join with him, from Barnstaple he would receive (400), and of Grenvile's men (now at Okehampton) he would have above 600; Lord Wentworth reckons his force 2,500 horse, besides Grenvile's, Pollard's, and Berkeley's, which we suppose would amount to 500, and his Lordship hath with him 500 or 600 foot. If the Prince can join with those of Exeter he will receive a recruit of 1,000 foot under the command of Wagstaffe, which with the other 500 with the Lord Wentworth are all the foot belonging to Goring's army; to these joining at Exeter a long train of seven or eight pieces of cannon, besides three or four from Dartmouth and Barnstaple, would be added. And this is the force on your Majesty's behalf with which the Prince intends to encounter the rebels, who we suppose are not superior in numbers, and therefore we have great cause to hope for God's blessing in the attempt. If the rebels advance before we are ready, then the Lord Wentworth is to retire with the horse and those regiments of foot which are about Totnes to this place where the Prince intends to stay to fight with them, taking a body of horse to Exeter; that with the foot there they might infest them in the rear, and keep provisions from them. But having thus stated the whole business to your Majesty, we must inform your Majesty upon the main [point] that it being absolutely necessary (as we said before) that a Lieutenant-General be made to command all the forces, as well horse as foot, in the day of battle (since it cannot be thought to hazard his Highness's person in that part of the army from whence commands should naturally issue). The Prince hath declared that he intends to constitute [Lord] Hopton Lieutenant-General for that most important service, but hath only yet declared this his resolution in design; the Prince not intending for many reasons to publish it, though he hath drawn all his forces together, for we are not without a clear foresight of many possible inconveniences that must ensue by the laboured and formed faction we observe among many officers of the horse, yet the danger that threatens from hence is not so much (though not to be contemned) as that on the other hand, if no such officer should be appointed. All which we humbly represent to your Majesty that your Majesty might be informed of the motives and grounds of the Prince's proceedings, and might be pleased to dispense your commands in such manner as upon that representation might seem most convenient to your Majesty. To this we must add that Lord Goring gave the Prince notice at his going to Dartmouth that he intended to go for [France?] for two months, in which time he resolved to return, and had great hope of bringing a good supply of men and money from thence with him, upon which consideration, if it might have stood with your Majesty's affairs, the Prince will have made no alteration of command at all, and being compelled now to, he intends to declare that it is only temporary and for this expedition. All which we humbly represent and submit to your Majesty's grave consideration, and beseech your pardon for whatsoever (being intended well and upon these grounds) might succeed amiss, and pray for your Majesty's prosperity.

Tavistock, the 5th of January 1645–6. (Signed) Berkshire, Brainford, Ralph Hopton, Arthur Capell, John Culpeper, Edward Hyde. [Chiefly in cipher.]

Since the writing of this to your Majesty (which we hoped should have found a readier conveyance) the scene of your Majesty's affairs in these parts and our hopes are many [ways] altered. The enemy in great parties are advanced in several quarters, and have fallen upon the Lord Wentworth's horse and those under his command in several places, and have taken many and dispersed others, insomuch that whereas the Prince was in hope to have advanced to-morrow with a good body of foot which are here ready and cheerful, the horse are retired upon him in great disorder, and many harassed, weakened, and frightened, insomuch as there hath been a necessity to draw off the block before proceeding, which we hope would be securely done this night, which otherwise may speedily have been destroyed, and so by this advance of the enemy and sudden retreat of the Lord Wentworth the [hope of] joining with the foot of Exeter or those two regiments east of Dartmouth is taken away, and (which is the worst of all) the horse, neither officer nor soldier, declare the least inclination to fight, but are impatiently bent upon a retreat into Cornwall, which, how necessary soever it may fall out to be, cannot but produce great inconveniences. The Prince would find it fit to withdraw his own person to Liskeard, that so he may leave this place to the soldier, that so he might defer their coming into Cornwall as long as might be, and if he hath any breathing time by any pause of the rebels, whose strength or motion is not yet clearly known to him, we believe he will take such resolutions as may be most probably conducing to your Majesty's service, it still being in his purpose and hope to advance if possible; the officers of the horse pretend to have received some late encouragement from the Lord Goring out of [France ?] of a probability of present supplies from thence, and thereupon seem to ground their dislike of fighting.

Tavistock, 11th January 1645–6. (Signed) Brainford, Berkshire, Ralph Hopton, Arthur Capell, John Culpeper, and Edward Hyde.

(Addressed) For his Majesty. [In cipher as above.]

The Earl of Lothian to the English Commissioners with the Scots' Army. (fn. 123)

Right Honble.,

The dischargeing of ourselves of the duty we owe to the kingdome of England and unto you as Commissioners from the same moves us to acquaint you with the King's comeing into our Army this morning; which haveing overtaken us unexpectedly hath filled us with amazement and made us like men that dreame. We cannot thinke that he would have beene so unadvised in his resolutions [as] to have cast himselfe upon us without a reall intention to give full satisfaction to both kingdoms in all their just and reasonable demaunds in all those things which concerne religion and righteousnes. Whatsoever be his disposition, our resolution you may be assured is that we shall never entertaine any thought nor correspond with any purpose, nor countenance any endeavor that may in any circumstance incroach upon our League and Covenant or weaken the union and confidence betweene the kingdomes. That union betwixt our kingdomes was the matter of many prayers; and as nothing was more joyfull to us then to have it sett on foote, so hitherto have we nothinge too deare to mantayne it; and we trust to walke with such faithfulness and truth in this particular that as we have the testimony of a good conscience within ourselves so you and all the world shall see that we mind your interest with as much integrity and care as our owne, being confident you will entertaine no other thought of us. Signed by the warrant and at command of the Commissioners of the Parliament of Scotland. By your Lordships' humble servant Lothian. Southwell, 5th May 1646.